Cassius Dio's speeches and the collapse of the Roman Republic by Burden-Strevens, Christopher William
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Burden-Strevens, Christopher William (2015) Cassius Dio's speeches and 
the collapse of the Roman Republic. PhD thesis 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7325/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
© Christopher Burden-Strevens, 01/10/2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Cassius Dio’s Speeches and 
the Collapse of the Roman 
Republic 
Christopher Burden-Strevens 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
School of Humanities 
College of Arts 
University of Glasgow 
October 1st, 2015  
© Christopher Burden-Strevens, 01/10/2015 
Abstract: Dio’s Speeches & the Collapse of the Roman Republic 
This thesis argues that Cassius Dio used his speeches of his Late Republican and Augustan 
narratives as a means of historical explanation. I suggest that the interpretative framework 
which the historian applied to the causes and success of constitutional change can be most 
clearly identified in the speeches.  
The discussion is divided into eight chapters over two sections. Chapter 1 
(Introduction) sets out the historical, paideutic, and compositional issues which have 
traditionally served as a basis for rejecting the explanatory and interpretative value of the 
speeches in Dio’s work and for criticising his Roman History more generally. 
Section 1 consists of three methodological chapters which respond to these issues. 
In Chapter 2 (Speeches and Sources) I argue that Dio’s prosopopoeiai approximate more 
closely with the political oratory of that period than has traditionally been recognised. 
Chapter 3 (Dio and the Sophistic) argues that Cassius Dio viewed the artifice of rhetoric as 
a particular danger in his own time. I demonstrate that this preoccupation informed, 
credibly, his presentation of political oratory in the Late Republic and of its destructive 
consequences. Chapter 4 (Dio and the Progymnasmata) argues that although the texts of 
the progymnasmata in which Dio will have been educated clearly encouraged invention 
with a strongly moralising focus, it is precisely his reliance on these aspects of rhetorical 
education which would have rendered his interpretations persuasive to a contemporary 
audience.  
Section 2 is formed of three case-studies. In Chapter 5 (The Defence of the 
Republic) I explore how Dio placed speeches-in-character at three Republican 
constitutional crises to set out an imagined case for the preservation of that system. This 
case, I argue, is deliberately unconvincing: the historian uses these to elaborate the 
problems of the distribution of power and the noxious influence of φθόνος and φιλοτιμία. 
Chapter 6 (The Enemies of the Republic) examines the explanatory role of Dio’s speeches 
from the opposite perspective. It investigates Dio’s placement of dishonest speech into the 
mouths of military figures to make his own distinctive argument about the role of 
imperialism in the fragmentation of the res publica. Chapter 7 (Speech after the 
Settlement) argues that Cassius Dio used his three speeches of the Augustan age to 
demonstrate how a distinctive combination of Augustan virtues directly counteracted the 
negative aspects of Republican political and rhetorical culture which the previous two 
case-studies had explored. Indeed, in Dio’s account of Augustus the failures of the res 
publica are reinvented as positive forces which work in concert with Augustan ἀρετή to 
secure beneficial constitutional change. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Cassius Dio and his Speeches 
Scholarly interest in the eighty-book Roman History of Lucius Cassius Dio, researched and 
written in Greek over a period of twenty-two years around the turn of the third century CE, 
has traditionally been confined to two debates.
1
 The first of these, conventional source-
criticism, represents the vast majority of scholarship prior to Millar’s Study of Cassius Dio. 
In particular, the literature from this period aimed to quantify or criticise the historian’s 
intellectual debt to his predecessors and to identify the material in his work which could be 
usefully employed to reconstruct the lost sections of others.
2
 The second debate, that of the 
composition and role of the speeches in his work, has equally provoked frequent 
discussion. Like the study of his narrative, the study of Dio’s speeches was at one time 
confined to source-criticism and determining from which texts the historian drew.
3
 But in 
recent decades – and again especially after Millar’s Study – these compositions have 
enjoyed renewed interest as compositions in their own right.  
  
These discussions have unearthed important aspects of the historian’s use of speeches 
within his work. Several have investigated the way in which Cassius Dio deployed these 
compositions, and especially the speech of Maecenas in Book 52, to articulate his own 
views on the ideal constitution and the relationships between emperor and senate.
4
 Others 
have explored how Dio used his speeches to advocate a philosophy of ideal kingship and to 
set out his own paradigm of the ideal ruler as a corrective to Commodus, Caracalla, and 
Elagabalus.
5
 A number of studies have identified how Cassius Dio capitalised on the 
opportunity offered by speeches to assert his παιδεία and enhance his self-presentation as a 
πεπαιδευμένος: an educated member of the Greek elite versed in Classical literature and 
                                                          
1
 For Dio’s cognomen cf. Roxan (1985) no. 133, 1.18; Gowing (1990) 49-54; Rich (1990) 1 n.1; and Rees (2011) 
1. On the beginning and end date of the twenty-two-year composition of the history, anywhere between the 
190s and 220s, cf. Schwartz (1899) 1686; Gabba (1955) 289-301; Millar (1964) 28-32; Letta (1979): 117-
189; Barnes (1984) 240-255; Rich (1989) 89-92, (1990) 3-4; Swan (2004): 28-34; Kemezis (2014) 282-293. 
2
 For summaries of the older source-criticism, cf. Haupt (1882); Boissevain (1898) Vol. 1, ci-ciii; Schwartz 
(1899) 1685. 
3
 Cf. for example Fischer (1870); Straumer (1872); Meyer (1891); Litsch (1893); Kyhnitszch (1894); Vlachos 
(1905). Further in Chapter 2.  
4
 E.g. Hammond (1932) 88-102; Beicken (1962) 444-467; Millar (1964) 102-118; Usher (1969) 252; Dalheim 
(1984) 216; Dorandi (1985) 56-60; Fechner (1986) 71-86; Reinhold (1988) 179; Rich (1989) 99; and 
Kuhlmann (2010). Adler (2012) 477-520 has recently applied operational code analysis to both the speeches 
of Agrippa and Maecenas to determine their concordance with Dio’s views on government throughout the 
history, and argues that Agrippa’s ‘democracy’ speech is by no means the weaker party, as suggested by 
Gabba (1955) 316, (1984) 72; Strasburger (1977) 48; McKechnie (1981) 151-153; and Fechner (1986) 71-86. 
For a balanced view, cf. Kemezis (2014) 130-131.  
5
 E.g. Millar (1964) 79-82; Giua (1983) 324-325; Gowing (1997); Swan (2004) 147-149 Gowing (1997); 
Davenport & Mallan (2014); Madsen (forthcoming, 2016). Further in Chapter 7. 
12 
 
 
rhetoric, equipped with a liberal education in the arts and sciences.
6
 More canonically, Dio 
used his orations to set forth the words that a reader could reasonably expect from the 
speaker and the situation, in accordance with Quintilian’s tenet of speeches in 
historiography: that everything said be cum rebus tum personis accommodata.
7
 As Millar 
has argued, the historian appears to have used his speeches ‘not to focus a particular 
political situation or a particular character, but to set forth the moral sentiments appropriate 
to the situation’.8 This view has been influential.9 
  
These are important aspects of the orations that Cassius Dio composed for his work, and 
represent the overwhelming majority of the scholarship in this area in recent decades. But 
these are details: they are individual aspects of the character of the historian’s speeches. 
They do not give a broader picture of how Dio conceived of the role of speech in narrating 
and explaining history for his readers. In other words, there has been no research into how 
the historian used his speeches to elucidate the causes of historical events, to explain the 
problems inherent in the military, political, and constitutional organisation of the Late 
Republican state,
10
 and to set out his own overarching interpretation of the failure of that 
state and the causes of constitutional change. The explanatory and interpretative role of the 
speeches within Cassius Dio’s narrative of the late Roman res publica is crucial to our 
understanding both of the historian and of speeches in historiography as a whole, yet 
remains, to my knowledge, completely uncharted. 
  
Cassius Dio’s importance as a source for our understanding of the Late Republic has never 
been matched by scholars’ enthusiasm for him. Set alongside our other most complete 
narrative of the first century BCE, Appian’s Greek Bellum Civile, Dio’s history has 
traditionally failed to inspire confidence, even where our contemporary Latin sources –
Cremutius Cordus, Livy, Asinius Pollio, Sallust’s Histories, Aelius Tubero – have failed to 
survive.  In particular his skill as an historical interpreter, able to form a credible analysis 
of the nexus of events which led to the downfall of the Republic and emergence of the 
                                                          
6
 Cf. Fomin (forthcoming, 2016); Jones (forthcoming, 2016). Further in Chapter 3. Rees (2011) 5 n.18 has 
already remarked that the historian espouses the value of παιδεία on numerous occasions (Cass. Dio. F. 40.3; 
54.3; 57.23; 57.51; 38.18.1; 38.23.2; 46.35.1). This tendency naturally manifests itself in the speeches, for 
critiques of which cf. Millar (1964) 177; Reardon (1971) 209; Aalders (1986) 282-304; and Gowing (1992) 
290.  
7
 Quint. Inst. Or. 10.1.101. 
8
 Millar (1964) 79. Also Millar (1961) 14-15. 
9
 Stekelenburg (1971) 50; Gowing (1992) 244; Saylor Rodgers (2008) 297. 
10
 One exception is the recent article of Coudry (forthcoming, 2016), which argues that Dio deployed the lengthy 
speech of Q. Lutatius Catulus on the lex Gabinia in Book 36 to explore the constitutional ramifications of 
this law. I will turn to this in more detail in Chapter 5.  
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Principate, has met scant recognition. Millar, whose 1964 monograph remains the 
definitive study of the historian, wrote that 
 
the long years of working through the whole of Roman history brought Dio to 
formulate no general historical views whatsoever. The sheer effort of note-
taking and composition absorbed his energies and left no time for analysis or 
interpretation, and what he produced was a history whose justification lay 
simply in being itself, a continuous literary record which began at the beginning 
and went on as far as its author could take it. The opinions he expresses are 
therefore incidental, and largely called into existence by the demands of literary 
form.
11
 
 
In other words, to Millar the immensity of Cassius Dio’s project caused him to apply no 
overarching theoretical or conceptual framework to his narrative of constitutional changes. 
Millar expresses this view more candidly elsewhere: the historian conceived of ‘no explicit 
framework in terms of which he interprets the events he narrates, and there is nothing to 
show that he had any specific aim in view save that of composing the work itself’.12 It is 
testament to the permanence of this view that Kemezis, whose magisterial 2014 study 
examines Cassius Dio’s narrative of the Late Republic with great sympathy, vindicates the 
work with a caveat: 
 
Dio seldom if ever applies to any one incident the analytical acumen of a 
Polybius or a Thucydides, and he does not show the talent those historians do 
for condensing complex stretches of history into a compelling framework of 
causal explanation. At the detail level, Dio can indeed be conventional and 
sometimes downright banal, though he is not always so, and modern scholars 
have often unfairly censured him for failing in tasks he never attempted or 
contemplated.
13
 
 
To some extent, then, the Roman History continues to be evaluated in the terms that Millar 
determined for it. If Cassius Dio did develop a causal framework for the decline of the Late 
Republic and inception of the Principate as this thesis will discuss, or for the course of 
Roman history more broadly, it is opaque. However, the fact that Dio does not appear to 
have explicitly delineated such an interpretative skeleton does not mean that it did not 
exist.  
  
                                                          
11
 Millar (1964) 115. 
12
 Millar (1964) 73. 
13
 Kemezis (2014) 93. 
14 
 
 
To determine how Dio conceived of the downfall of the Roman res publica and where this 
process belonged within the broad sweep of his history, from the foundation of Lavinium 
to his own second consulship with Severus Alexander in 229 CE,
14
 it would be attractive to 
look to the historian’s preface. In both the Greek and Latin historiographical traditions, the 
preface served as the programmatic locus par excellence: here the historian set out his view 
of history and the magnitude of his subject, inveighed against the inaccuracies of his 
predecessors, and asserted the distinctiveness of his own contribution to the reader’s 
understanding. The importance of the preface cannot be exaggerated. The study of 
Thucydides, for example, would be far less advanced had his preface not survived. The 
proper interpretation of Thucydides’ programmatic statement on speeches at 1.22, in which 
he promises to ‘make each speaker say what I thought the circumstances required of them, 
adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what truly was said’,15 has been a 
subject of fierce debate precisely because this section of the preface determines our 
interpretation of the speeches in general.
16
 Thucydides’ assertion that the reader will find 
little pleasant to hear in the absence of mythical or fabulous content, but should instead 
draw lessons from his sound investigation of the truth, has framed the positivist reception 
of the work as a whole.
17
 Moreover, the Archaeology within the preface locates the 
Athenian and Spartan πολιτείαι within the history of Greece and delineates how they 
arrived at their fifth-century condition. In the preface, Thucydides establishes a clear place 
for his subject within the course of Greek history and establishes principles by which his 
work should be read.   The same is the case for Appian, Dionysius, Polybius, Sallust, and 
Tacitus.
18
  
  
Cassius Dio’s preface, on the other hand, is lost. All that remains of this important section 
of the work is four discrete fragments of the first book. Like Thucydides, whose language 
and thought Dio visibly imitated even in the preface,
19
 the historian appears to have 
embedded programmatic statements on his methodology within the Archaeology. But the 
                                                          
14
 For Dio’s life and career, cf. Millar (1964) 5-27: Dio’s father was governor of Dalmatia (Cass. Dio. 69.1.3) as 
well as legatus of Cilicia (69.1.3, 73[72].7.2); he may also have obtained the consulship (IGRR 3.654). 
Cassius Dio himself was probably praetor in 194 CE (74[73].12.2) and held his second consulship in 229 CE 
(80[79].5.1). For a prosopography of both, cf. PIR
2
 C 413 and PIR 
2 C 492. The dates of Dio’s first 
consulship and other provincial commands are unclear: for this debate cf. Schwartz (1899) 1684-1686; Vrind 
(1923) 163-8; Gabba (1955) 289-301; Eisman (1977) 657-673; Reinhold (1988) 1-4; Swan (2004) 1-3. 
15
 Thuc. 1.22.1. 
16
 Bicknell (1990); Swain (1993); Garrity (1998); Wiater (2014).  
17
 Thuc. 1.22.4. My own translation here is close to Crawley’s 2004 version, which I have selected simply for the 
sake of clarity. 
18
 App. Praef.; D.H. AR 1.1-8; Polyb. 1.1-15, 3.1-32; Sall. Cat. 1-4; Tac. Ann. 1.1-4. 
19
 Historically, this aspect of the historian’s writing has been treated with marked criticism: cf.  Melber (1891) 
290-7; Litsch (1893); Kyhnitzsch (1894); Schwartz (1899) 1690-1; Millar (1964) 42; Manuwald (1979) 280-
284; Aalders (1986) 294; Lintott (1997) 2499-2500; Parker (2008) 77. 
15 
 
 
factors which in Dio’s view governed Roman history are noticeably absent. 20  In the 
fragmentary preface, then, we have little to go by. If Cassius Dio did outline a conceptual 
framework which governed the development of the work as a whole, delineated key 
philosophical, moral, economic, and political factors of history, or explained his views on 
the role of speeches, it does not survive.  It is reasonable to assume that like Tacitus and 
Appian, Dio’s preface will have contained a periodisation of Roman history into four 
major eras of βασιλεία, δημοκρατία, δυναστεία, and μοναρχία.21 Dio explicitly sets out this 
periodisation at major points of political change. But more than this cannot be said. The 
loss of the preface means that we are absolutely without an overarching interpretation of 
the character of the longest and most detailed of these periods – the Late Republic – and an 
explicit introduction to the causal factors which in Dio’s view led to its collapse.22  
  
In this thesis I propose that the interpretative skeleton which Cassius Dio applied to the 
decline of the Roman Republic and its transition to the Augustan Principate can be found 
in the speeches, and that this was a deliberate choice on Dio’s part. I argue that Dio did 
develop a causation of this change, partly from the works of his predecessors and partly 
from his own interpretation; but scholars are not at all on firm ground in searching for this 
causal framework in the narrative alone.  I suggest that Dio most clearly articulates what he 
saw as the major political and constitutional problems of the Roman Republic within the 
speeches, not in the narrative. Dio’s speeches have been too often discussed as standalone 
set-pieces, and misunderstood as a result. A discussion of speeches in historiography must 
consider not only their immediate narrative context, but their relationship with narrative 
material or other speeches located long after or beforehand.  
  
The question of how Cassius Dio used his speeches to emphasise and elaborate the 
ramifications of the major political, constitutional, military, and ethical factors of his 
historical causation has received far less scholarly attention than its importance demands. 
The only major study to develop an extended analysis of the relationship between the 
speeches in the Roman History and Dio’s own historical views is that of Fechner. 
Fechner’s 1986 thesis is that Cassius Dio embedded within his speeches his own 
conception of the fundamental characteristics of the Republican constitution. Fechner 
analyses the content of the speeches in concert with the diegetic material and 
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programmatic statements which surround them; and concludes that the orations served to 
set out Dio’s own view of the res publica.23 Fechner’s analysis is the first extended attempt 
to unearth the theoretical framework contained within Dio’s speeches by considering them 
in relation to the narrative that surrounds them. However, while Fechner examined these 
compositions innovatively to find that framework, he did not set out how Dio used his 
speeches to demonstrate that framework exerting a causal effect upon historical events. 
That is the gap this thesis proposes to fill.  
  
This analysis of the place of the speeches within the causal skeleton that Cassius Dio 
applied to the end of the Roman Republic and of their role as a means of historical 
explanation contributes to our knowledge in three ways. Firstly, it will give a clear 
indication of precisely what that framework was. I will use the speeches to determine what 
historical factors Dio saw as innate to the Late Republic in particular and how these 
precipitated the failure of that constitution. Secondly, by setting out this framework we will 
be able to analyse what is distinctive in Dio’s interpretation. By understanding what is 
original in the Roman History in comparison to other sources, we will be able to determine 
what Dio brings that other historians do not, and what his work contributes to our 
knowledge of the Late Republic and the Augustan era. Thirdly, this discussion can further 
our understanding of the role of speeches in historiography. The formal orations of Greek 
and Latin history-writing are very rarely read in the light that I propose.
24
   
Dio’s Causation of Constitutional Change 
My intention, then, is to demonstrate what Cassius Dio contributes to our historical 
knowledge of the Late Republic; the role of speeches in convincingly setting out that 
contribution for the contemporary reader; and the way in which we today can use speeches 
to identify an ancient historian’s causal framework, even in ‘sophistic’ historiography.25 In 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 I will deal with the methodological problems which seem to me to 
have prevented the historical-explanatory reading of Dio’s speeches I propose to make. 
However, before moving on to discuss these it will be beneficial to give a brief conspectus 
of what the historian’s causal framework was and where this belongs within the tradition of 
writing the Late Republic. This preliminary summary of Dio’s will make his causal 
framework easier to recognise when we come to read the speeches in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
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Dio is not usually credited with forming an original and distinctive interpretation of the 
factors which led to the failure of the Republic and the comparatively peaceful ratification 
of the Augustan Principate. There may have been little room to manoeuvre in this regard: 
all accounts of the decline of the res publica were remarkably conventional, and do not 
appear to have attempted a radical reinterpretation.
26
 Rees, whose thorough discussion of 
Dio’s use of classical ideas of φύσις treats the historian with great sympathy, suggests that 
the historian differs from his predecessors, ‘if he differs at all, only in the intensity of his 
account; as a comparatively late writer, he might have struggled to make his mark on a 
well-worn period’.27 Although his tone is more forgiving, Rees here echoes a thought 
expressed in Millar’s Study:  
 
To write a connected narrative of late Republican political history is a task that 
might daunt anyone. For Dio, who came to it only as part of the whole sweep of 
Roman history, the chances of dealing with it in a way that was profound or 
original were small indeed.
28
 
 
The originality of Cassius Dio’s interpretation, then, is not fully recognised even today; 
least of all in the Late Republican narrative. Kemezis has recently investigated the 
distinctiveness of Dio’s account of this period in terms of its role as a commentary on the 
Severan age. In his view, the historian mapped his own lived experience onto the first 
century BCE and in so doing delivered a critique of his contemporary situation quite 
distinct from the most recent major Greek history of Appian. However, despite 
recognising the significant formal originality of his undertaking,
29
 Kemezis’ valuable 
study does not investigate those individual aspects of Dio’s historical interpretation which 
relate specifically to the Late Republic, rather than to the contemporary situation. 
‘Readers’, Kemezis writes, ‘would naturally have asked what was new or original, what 
Dio was adding to the existing record. Dio might have given many answers, but the most 
interesting from our point of view relates to the Severan context.’30  
  
The case-studies of this thesis will explore those many other untouched answers. I suggest 
that the skeleton of historical causation which Dio applied to the collapse of the Republic 
and the success of the Augustan Principate can be divided into six historical factors. 
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These factors relate principally to their period, divorced from the Severan context. I argue 
that taken together, these represent Cassius Dio’s contribution to our knowledge of the 
process of constitutional change. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this study will demonstrate that 
the historian used his speeches and their interaction with the surrounding material to 
elaborate these six factors, which I outline below. In what follows I state Dio’s argument, 
the theoretical framework in which it functions, and an example from a speech. 
1) The supreme executive power of the res publica, the dictatorship, grew to be an 
unviable and unattractive exercise of powers. In consequence, in Dio’s view this 
generated the imperative for a new position of absolute authority in the form of 
monarchy as such.  
As a fervent advocate of autocracy, Cassius Dio recognised the imperative for sole rule.
31
 
He writes on the appointment of the first dictator that the Romans ‘desired the benefit of 
monarchy, which seemed to them to exert a powerful influence in times of war and 
revolution’.32 Similarly, on the assassination of Caesar the historian opines that ‘the name 
of monarchy is not pretty to hear, but it is the most practical government to live under; for 
it is easier to find one excellent man than many of them’.33 However, in Cassius Dio’s 
interpretation, during the Late Republic the dictatura came under strain on both 
constitutional and reputational grounds and in consequence could no longer respond to 
foreign and domestic crisis. New extraordinary powers were required.  
  
Constitutionally, the historian brings the problem of the dictatorship to its fullest 
expression in the speech of Q. Lutatius Catulus, in his narrative of the lex Gabinia in 
Book 36. At 36.34, Dio’s Catulus argues that, rather than entrusting unprecedented 
powers to Cn. Pompeius Magnus to combat Mediterranean piracy,
34
 the Quirites should 
instead follow established precedent and nominate a dictator: ‘on the condition that he 
hold office no longer than the established time and remain in Italy…for no example can 
be found of a dictator sent abroad, except one who was sent to Sicily and who 
accomplished nothing to boot’.35 This argument is deliberately illogical: it was clear to the 
historian that the dictatorship was unable to respond to the piracy crisis of 67 BCE and that 
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the lex Gabinia would naturally be ratified in this context. In this way, Dio uses this 
speech to demonstrate the unsuitability of the dictatorship for the new challenges of a 
Republican empire.   
  
On reputational grounds, Dio argues through M. Tullius Cicero’s amnesty-speech in Book 
44 that the dictatorship had grown unattractive as well as unviable. In this oration, the 
historian suggests that within the mind-set of the Late Republican political class, the 
dictatura had grown synonymous with tyranny and the violent usurpation of power. This 
is achieved through the interaction between content and context. Set in the immediate 
aftermath of the assassination of the last dictator, Dio’s speech of Cicero performs a long 
excursus on the Athenian Amnesty of 403 BCE in order to advocate an amnesty for 
Caesar’s assassins. Within this excursus, reference is frequently made to tyranny: the 
Athenians were ‘subject to a tyranny of the more powerful citizens’ and only recovered 
from ‘being tyrannised and factious’ through reconciliation.36 In the context of the recent 
assassination of a dictator, the comments of Dio’s Cicero on tyranny are significant: they 
point to what the historian interpreted as a conflation in Republican thinking between 
dictatorship and tyranny, again precipitating the abolition of that office and its 
replacement by monarchy in truth.  
2) The continued prorogation of military power abroad and away from senatorial 
oversight led to autocratic ambitions among all major military actors of the 
political class. Dio argues that a series of dynasts of the late res publica became 
habituated to control through the experience of ruling almost absolutely in the 
provinces. They were thus reluctant to set aside their addiction to power.  
Dio states this argument explicitly at three points. First, in his account of the battle of the 
Colline Gate, in which he puts L. Cornelius Sulla’s transformation into a tyrant down to 
his experience of absolute conquest.
37
 Second, in his interpretation of Caesar’s decision to 
limit the terms of provincial governors: ‘because he himself had ruled the Gauls for many 
years in succession and as a result had been led to desire absolute power’.38 And third, in 
his explanation of the abolition of the dictatorship, stating that men’s misdeeds emerge 
from their protracted possession of military forces.
39
 As Eckstein has shown, Dio was 
doing nothing new in holding that the root of Caesar’s megalomania was an addiction to 
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power caused by long periods of military authority.
40
 Suetonius wrote that Caesar had 
been ‘seized by an habituation to his own authority’ (captum imperii consuetudine) and in 
consequence inevitably desired monarchy.
41
 This argument is now obvious to modern 
historians. Dio, however, broadens the application of this factor, and makes imperii 
consuetudo a central issue in all major generals, from C. Marius to Q. Metellus Creticus 
and Pompeius.      
  
Although stated briefly in the narrative, the historical problem of imperii consuetudo 
meets its most extended elaboration in the speeches. For one of many examples we may 
consider the Agrippa-Maecenas debate, which discusses the ills of imperii consuetudo in a 
call-and-response. Setting up the problem, Dio’s Agrippa dissuades Octavian from 
assuming autocratic power on the grounds that a monarch could never allow naturally 
proud men to assume control of military forces; such men are dangerous to monarchies. 
But an empire would need commanders, all the same: ‘and so, if you entrust armies and 
offices to such men as these, both you and your government will be in danger of 
overthrow’.42 Within the context of the Late Republican narrative this admonishment is as 
much a comment on the organisation of power under the res publica as under a monarchy. 
In this context, the recommendations of Maecenas on how to combat the problem of 
imperii consuetudo are equally significant. Crucially, Maecenas responds by insisting on a 
long hiatus between a magistrate’s tenure in the city and his position of command abroad: 
‘for after being private citizens for a time, they will be milder; and they will not rebel, 
since they have not been placed in command of legions alongside the prestige of their 
titles.’43 I will discuss the many other examples of Dio’s use of speeches to elaborate the 
problem of Republican imperii consuetudo in Chapter 5.  
3) Envy and ambition entered a destructive cycle. Dio presents φιλοτιμία as the 
natural motivation of most major political figures in the Late Republic; but in his 
view this inevitably caused mutual φθόνος, leading to an absence of harmony, 
aristocratic fragmentation, and political violence.  
Φθόνος is of fundamental importance to Cassius Dio’s presentation of Late Republican 
moral decline and of the far-reaching political ramifications which it triggered. As Kaster 
demonstrates, the word φθόνος carries connotations of the spiteful resentment of the 
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successes of another,
 44
 and thus approximates with the Latin invidia and with odium.
45
 In 
Dio’s account, it is particularly acutely felt among former equals, who regard another’s 
advancement with hostility if that advancement leads them out of their former state of 
equality.
46
 The historian underlines this principle even in the preface.
47
 It is therefore not 
at all surprising that these emotive conditions should prevail under a competitive 
Republican oligarchy in which even a prominent nobilis could expect to spend only a few 
years in power througout his career.
48
 Fechner has shown from his analysis of Dio’s 
Republican speeches that the historian conceived of equality of opportunity (ἰσομοιρία) as 
a fundamental ideal of the Republican πολιτεία.49 When that principle is transgressed 
because of the φιλοτιμία of another, this generates φθόνος. Cassius Dio was of course not 
the first historian to present φθόνος as a motivating factor in the hostile actions of 
individuals.
50
 But he is exceptional among our sources for the Late Republic in the 
intensity of this emotive aspect that he applies, and in his presentation of envy as political 
as well as moral problem which underlay several major political crises.
51
 
  
Accordingly it is a recurring focus in many of the Late Republican speeches, especially 
those in a deliberative context. In the orations of Pompeius and Catulus on the lex 
Gabinia, both object to the extraordinary honour of the command on the basis that the law 
would bring only φθόνος to its beneficiary. Here Dio foreshadows his own historical 
interpretation of the consequences of the lex. Later, Pompeius’ inability to have his 
eastern geopolitical settlements and land for his veterans ratified by the Senate was 
caused, in Dio’s view, by Metellus’ envy of his success; ‘and he then realised that he had 
no real power, but only the name and the φθόνος resulting from the positions he had once 
held’.52 As this interpretation forms the backdrop for Pompeius’ entry into the so-called 
first triumvirate, the political ramifications of φθόνος could be far-reaching indeed. 
4) Arguments for the preservation of the Republican system became empty and 
unconvincing as moral and constitutional decline grew so far advanced that the 
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ideal and the reality of δημοκρατία no longer corresponded. In tandem, self-
interested and dishonest public oratory proliferated. As rhetoric became a failed 
means of defending the traditional status quo, it inversely became a successful 
means of furthering vested interests. Therefore, all public oratory was either corrupt 
or ineffective.   
The conceptual basis for Dio’s presentation of public oratory in the Late Republic appears 
to overlap with a statement of Demosthenes.
53
 Charging Aeschines with wilfully deceiving 
the Athenian assembly on Philip II of Maecedon’s instructions, the orator states that ‘there 
is no greater wrong a man can do you than to lie; for as our political system is based upon 
speeches, how can it be safely administered if the speeches are false?’54 It is speculation to 
suggest that the historian read this passage or deliberately modelled his presentation of 
Late Republican oratory on it; but that is not the point. Dio’s argument and Demosthenes’ 
are the same. As Kemezis has pointed out from his brief synopsis of the fragments of Dio’s 
earlier speeches, the historian presented the period from the expulsion of the Tarquins to 
the razing of Carthage as a golden age of genuine deliberative oratory. Speeches appear to 
have been more numerous and arranged in complex clusters of call-and-reply, with the 
good of the state as the primary focus.
55
 In the Late Republican narrative, however, Dio’s 
representation of political rhetoric is markedly different. All public political oratory in this 
account can be divided into either the genuinely patriotic, which always fails to persuade 
the depicted audience, or the self-serving, which always prevails over them.  
 
To Dio, this failure of genuine deliberative oratory had profound political consequences in 
each case. One may consider the speeches of Catulus, Cicero on the Amnesty, or Agrippa, 
which Dio situates within the narrative at points of major political crisis to construct an 
imagined case for the preservation of the res publica. Although Dio’s own comments 
direct the reader to trust the moral probity of their words, these idealised ‘defences’ of 
δημοκρατία grow in each instance less and less representative of the reality of the Republic 
presented in the narrative. Their failure to persuade leads to political upheaval in the 
immediate term on each occasion. Conversely, the success of the self-interested speeches 
which are paired with these – those of Pompeius, A. Gabinius, and M. Antonius – lead to 
equal political upheaval; but in a manner presented as absolutely to the benefit of those 
orators. 
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5) The corruption inherent in human nature had been given a space to flourish in 
the newly-enlarged empire, and especially in Gaul and Asia Minor. In Dio’s 
interpretation, this corruption led to a degeneration of political rhetoric at home as 
Roman generals’ self-interested behaviour abroad needed to be obfuscated within 
discussions on foreign policy. In consequence, the fora of Republican decision-
making on imperial policy could no longer function effectively.  
By writing the state of the empire abroad into his history of the decline of the Republic, 
Dio places himself in a Latin tradition which goes back to Sallust. In the lengthy preface to 
his Bellum Catilinae, Sallust makes the fall of Carthage and the disappearance of the metus 
hostilis a turning-point in Roman history.
56
 Moral decline in the city began with expansion 
abroad. Tacitus’ idea is similar: the desire for power which was innate to men increased 
and then erupted cum imperii magnitudine.
57
 As Fechner has shown, Dio too accepted this 
commonplace of Latin historiography – which we find also in Livy and Velleius Paterculus 
– and embedded it into his own presentation of expansion abroad and the consequent moral 
decline at home.
58
 
 
The strength of this tradition may have left Dio little room to be distinctive in his 
interpretation of the relationship between imperialism and constitutional collapse. 
However, I suggest that the historian brings a new element to our understanding of the end 
of the Republic in his view of the effect of inherent moral corruption, exercised within the 
empire abroad, upon political rhetoric at home. Rees has recently argued that although 
Cassius Dio, like Thucydides, believed in negative aspects of human φύσις which were 
constant and inherent, these aspects could be triggered or could increase or decrease in 
intensity in consequence of circumstances – rapid imperial augmentation being the most 
obvious.
59
 Sion-Jenkins and Kuhn-Chen divide Dio’s conception of φύσις into seven 
negative aspects, three of which I argue pertain to his illustration of Late Republican 
imperialism: ἐπιθυμία, πλεονεξία, and φιλοτιμία.60  
 
Cassius Dio’s presentation of Late Republican imperialism is of course conventional in 
that within the narrative he presents these vices as rife in the newly-enlarged empire: 
individual dynasts use  their commands to satisfy their greed and ambition. But where Dio 
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differs from his predecessors lies in his interpretation of the effect of this imperial 
corruption on political rhetoric. I argue that those speeches which discuss foreign policy – 
especially those of major dynasts such as Pompeius, Caesar, and Antonius – present a false 
idealisation of the imperialism pursued by these generals which absolutely contrasts with 
the immoral reality depicted in the narrative. In each instance, this deceitful rhetoric 
successfully persuades the audience and ensures the desired policy-outcome of the 
speaking dynast.  Dio thereby illustrates through these speeches that the corruption of Late 
Republican imperialism, precipitated by the baseness of φύσις and triggered by the 
opportunity for vice that came with an enlarged empire, caused a degeneration of rhetoric 
on foreign policy in the urbs. Genuinely deliberative decision-making on imperial matters 
was made impossible, as individual dynasts shut down proper debate by obfuscating the 
true nature of an imperialism which served only them. This had far-reaching consequences, 
such as Pompeius’ acquisition of further power through ‘rejecting’ the lex Gabinia and 
Caesar’s ability to use a corrupted rhetoric of imperial glory to incite his soldiers to acts of 
civil war in his exhortation at Placentia.  
 
For an example one may consider the speech of Caesar to his mutinying troops at 
Vesontio, encouraging them to attack the Germanic king of the Suebi, Ariovistus. Here the 
orator begins, I think significantly, with a fallacious exhortation to sound debate on foreign 
policy, insisting that one’s personal interests and those of the state be kept separate in such 
matters.
61
 In the previous narrative Dio has already indicated that this is a posture: Caesar 
unfairly provoked Ariovistus, who he himself had made an ally of Rome, into war to 
secure his own personal power.
62
 What follows is a lengthy advocacy of the importance of 
defensive imperialism as Dio’s Caesar falsely presents his attack on Ariovistus as a 
crusade to ‘correctly manage the affairs of our subjects, keep safe the possessions of our 
allies, and ward off any who try to do them wrong’.63 To underline this intention, the orator 
cites as exempla the major defensive wars of the Mid-Republic, including Philip V of 
Macedon, Antiochus III of Syracuse, and the Punic Wars. Here, as so often in Dio’s Late 
Republican speeches, the ability of a commander to use rhetoric to misrepresent the 
immorality of their foreign policy leads directly to the further entrenchment of their own 
δυναστεία. 
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6) The Augustan Principate replaced the res publica successfully because it 
combatted both the moral and administrative defects of the Late Republic. In moral 
terms, a distinctive combination of Augustan virtues acted as a corrective to φθόνος 
and φιλοτιμία and thus prevented further fragmentation. In institutional terms, 
Augustus’ reforms to the distribution of governing power neutralised imperii 
consuetudo as a real risk within the provinces. Augustus’ engineering of his own 
δημοτικός persona additionally prevented the backlash experienced by Caesar. 
Dio presents Augustus’ reign as a moral revolution. The laudatio funebris of Tiberius 
following the princeps’ death praises his μεγαλοψυχία (magnanimity), φιλανθρωπία 
(liberality), ἐπιείκεια (clemency), and παρρησία (free speech), and the narrative of his 
reign is consistent with this throughout. In assessing the Augustan Principate in moral 
terms, the historian was not striking out on a new path. As Wallace-Hadrill has shown, 
there had been previous explorations of Augustan ἀρετή. 64  But Dio’s distinctive 
contribution lies in his interpretation of the corrective relationship between his own 
specific combination of Augustan virtues and Late Republican moral decline. Within this 
epoch in his history (Books 52-56), political events which would have triggered φθόνος in 
Dio’s res publica not only do not incur envy, but even secure honour for those involved 
because of the culture of μεγαλοψυχία and  φιλανθρωπία which Augustus’ rule 
encouraged. Moreover, free speech (παρρησία), which Dio considered a defining feature of 
the Late Republic as Nawijn and Mallan argue and which in Greek thought was considered 
characteristic of δημοκρατία,65 is paradoxically re-enabled with the advent of μοναρχία. 
‘Genuine’ free speech (ἀκριβής παρρησία), which Dio states disappeared forever at 
Philippi,
66
 does not re-emerge, but is reinvented. Negative examples of the excessive 
Republican παρρησία such as the ‘Philippic’ and ‘anti-Philippic’ invectives of Cicero and 
Q. Fufius Calenus (Books 45-46), disappear. It is replaced instead by the παρρησία of 
honest advisors, such as Livia, Agrippa, and Maecenas, who successfully advocate 
ἐπιείκεια, μεγαλοψυχία, and φιλανθρωπία in their speeches and thus enable these to exist 
in political life.   
 
Dio furthermore builds upon his theoretical framework of imperii consuetudo (Factor 2) to 
explain, through the speeches, how the Augustan regime overcame this Republican 
institutional problem. To Dio, a key element in Augustus’ neutralisation of imperii 
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consuetudo lay in his reforms to the imperial administration. In his analysis of these 
reforms, Dio writes that wishing to appear ‘Republican’ (δημοτικός),67  the new princeps 
divided the provinces between himself and the Senate, assigning the more heavily-manned, 
frontier provinces to his own charge. Moreover, governors of the imperial provinces were 
to be hand-picked by Augustus himself, but those of the weaker, senatorial provinces to be 
chosen at random and by lot – thereby imposing imperial control and removing senatorial 
competition at a stroke.
68
 Dio’s analysis here is incisive: Augustus’ stated motive was to 
free the Senate from the trouble of administering the frontier, but this was a mere πρόφασις 
to ensure that he could secure his power with greater might vis-à-vis the Senate.
69
  
 
This interpretation, in fact, is merely the later realisation of Dio’s earlier prediction of how 
Augustus would counter imperii consuetudo, articulated for the first time in the speeches of 
Agrippa and Maecenas. Setting up the problem, Agrippa dissuades Octavian from 
μοναρχία on the grounds that the ruler of a great empire must have commanders overseas: 
‘and so, if you entrust armies and offices to such men as these, both you and your 
government will be in danger of overthrow’.70  This of course has everything to do with 
Dio’s account of the Late Republic. It is a weak argument in favour of the res publica, and 
deliberately so: Dio uses his Agrippa to argue that imperii consuetudo would always be a 
problem, regardless of the constitution. In the response of Maecenas, however, Dio 
outlines his solutions: the princeps should ensure loyalty within the provinces by hand-
picking governors himself and so prevent ‘the same things happening all over again’ (ἵνα 
μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ αὖθις γένηται); and, crucially, pro-magistrates should not go out immediately 
after their urban office, but should wait: “for after being private citizens for a time, they 
will be milder, and, not having been placed in command of legions…they will not rebel”.71 
Several books later, Dio’s Augustus implements precisely these recommendations in the 
narrative. In this way, both speech and narrative interact to enable Dio to set out a 
distinctive argument about the proliferation of imperii consuetudo under the Late Republic, 
and his interpretation of its resolution under the Augustan Principate and thus the success 
of that regime.  
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These six factors, which I will treat in more detail in the case-studies in Chapters 5-7, 
constitute Dio’s interpretation of the failure of the late res publica and the success of the 
new regime.  
 
It is clear from this glance at these factors that Dio’s contribution to our knowledge lies not 
in his ability to concoct an entirely new causation of Roman constitutional change, but to 
reinterpret previous ideas, and thus create a narrative distinctive to him. For example, his 
predecessors Dionysius and Appian had already formed the connection between tyranny 
and the dictatorship which I outlined in 1).
72
 But Cassius Dio, Chapter 5 will show, forms a 
far more sophisticated analysis of the problem with his speeches: the office was not only 
infamous, and for different reasons at different periods. It was additionally powerless in the 
face of exigencies abroad. By connecting the reputational problem of the dictatorship with 
the needs of the enlarged empire – especially in the speech of Catulus – Dio re-
problematises the dictatorship and underpins his argument for the necessity of monarchy in 
a way which is entirely new. Similarly, his argument about imperii consuetudo which I 
detailed in 2) had already been long made by Suetonius with reference to Caesar.
73
 There 
are obvious source-questions to be dealt with here. But there are other, I think more 
interesting questions about how Dio reworked this analysis. Cassius Dio not only deployed 
his speeches of this period to broaden the scope of imperii consuetudo and to make the new 
argument that it was a general problem shared by all the major dynasts. He goes further, 
using Agrippa and Maecenas to set out how the Augustan Principate could – and in his 
interpretation, did – overcome it. Moreover, the historian’s analysis of the pervasion of 
φθόνος within political life clearly builds on an established tradition of Late Republican 
moral decline emerging from Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. However, Dio elaborates the 
problem of envy more fully than any other writer, Greek or Latin. Φθόνος is not only 
embedded within almost all of the Late Republican orations, indicating its importance 
within the causal framework. It is additionally reinvented under the Augustan regime as a 
positive force, as elites envy not the power or possessions of another, but their ἀρετή. In 
fact, in the Augustan narrative φθόνος occurs only in connection with ἀρετή, as I will show 
in Chapter 7. Surely generated by the historian’s view of the Augustan Principate as a 
moral revolution, this novel reinvention of  φθόνος is just about peculiar enough to be 
entirely Dio’s. Yet it again demonstrates his propensity to take established interpretations 
of the failure of the Republic and then reinvent them to deliver an entirely new narrative.  
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I suggest that all of this can be found within the speeches. Cassius Dio made a conscious 
and deliberate choice to give his audience, through oratory, an insight into the 
constitutional and moral problems of the Roman Republic as he believed contemporary 
Romans themselves would have perceived and discussed them. If this can be reasonably 
proven, then there can be no doubt that the speeches were designed to serve an historically 
explanatory purpose for the ancient reader. Furthermore, for the modern reader of ancient 
historiography this will confirm the importance of taking speeches into account when 
evaluating the causal or theoretical framework an historian applied to his subject.  
Methodology of the Speech in ‘Sophistic’ Historiography 
Finally, there are three key methodological problems which must be addressed before my 
explanatory reading of Dio’s speeches can be credible. These have prevented the reception 
of his orations which I propose, and indeed any such reception of speeches in ‘sophistic’ 
historiography. First, the belief that Dio composed without making ample use of 
contemporary rhetorical material, and therefore that his speeches do not approximate with 
the historical oratory of the Late Republic. Second, that Dio was a devotee of the epideictic 
rhetorical culture of his time who put παιδεία above all, and therefore that his speeches 
ought not to be taken seriously. And third, that the historian’s advanced rhetorical training 
inculcated an unimaginative, even banal, approach to rhetoric which rarely ventured 
beyond tried-and-tested commonplaces to use the speech as a means of serious historical 
explanation. Although I deal with these problems in much greater detail in Chapters 2-4, a 
brief overview here will be helpful.  
 
To turn to the first of these methodological problems. In Chapter 2, I will challenge the 
view that Dio’s presentation of Late Republican oratory is ahistorical and unreliable, in the 
sense that it did not make ample use of contemporary source-material to deliver a credible 
representation of public speech in the late res publica and to explore the role of oratory in 
its decline.   
 
In modern scholarship, only three of Dio’s orations of this period have been examined 
from the viewpoint of contemporary source-criticism: Catulus’ dissuasio of the Gabinian 
law in Book 36 and the two invectives of Cicero in the aftermath of Caesar’s assassination 
in Book 45. There are understandable reasons for this: both are Dionean depictions of an 
historical occasion of speech for which we have a surviving contemporary record for 
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comparison – in these cases the De Imperio Gnaei Pompei and Philippicae of Cicero. 
Given the richness of the surviving source-material, I will return to these in Chapter 2 for 
my own analysis. The historian modelled his own versions on rhetorical and argumentative 
strategies found in the original texts, and I think deliberately. If credible, this suggests that 
Cassius Dio made ample use of contemporary source-material for his illustration of public 
speech in the Late Republic; and therefore that the historian did attempt to make his 
orations represent the nature of the rhetoric of this period, rendering them a credible 
medium for historical explanation.  
 
It strikes me as unsatisfactory that modern examinations of Dio’s use of synchronous 
material for his Late Republican orations have arrived at precisely the opposite conclusion. 
Millar concedes in his discussion of the Cicero-Catulus polemics that ‘the use of 
contemporary material does bring these speeches perceptibly closer to their [historical] 
context than is the case with the majority’.74 Nevertheless, he concludes that the historian’s 
handling of Cicero in these orations is ‘a failure, perhaps the most complete failure in his 
History’.75 Haupt and Zielinski’s earlier studies of the ‘anti-Philippic’ of Calenus in Book 
46 omit the possibility of contemporary Latin source-material at all,
76
 arguing instead that 
Dio drew from the invectives of an Imperial Greek rhetorician.
77
 This theory, I will show 
in Chapter 2, bears a considerable burden of proof, and the debate over whether Dio could 
read Latin, or only Greek, is implicit in this.
78
 But even in view of the fact that, in his own 
analysis, the Cicero-Catulus invectives do clearly bear a close relation to contemporary 
Latin material, Millar’s closing summary on the speeches shelves their historical-
explanatory and –interpretative use: they ‘carry further the tendency towards generality 
and lack of apposite detail which characterises the History as a whole….their interest must 
lie not in what they can contribute to historical knowledge, but in the insight they can give 
into the mind of a senator writing under the Severi’.79  
 
Even recent analyses of Dio’s use of bona fide Latin oratory from the first century BCE 
sidestep the question of what this adherence to the contemporary material tells us about the 
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historical character of the speeches. Building upon a brief list of concordances tabulated by 
Van Ooteghem,
80
 Saylor Rodgers has recently touched upon Dio’s use of Cicero’s De 
Imperio as a source for his speech of Catulus. She recognises the historical arguments 
made in opposition to Pompeius’ power in 67-66 BCE which Dio found in the De Imperio 
and then placed within the mouth of his orator.
81
 And yet, from a discrepancy over whether 
Catulus actually spoke in the year Dio depicted, as all surviving ancient historians attest, or 
the year later,
82
 Saylor Rodgers concludes that ‘Dio’s choices of speakers and occasions 
often serve his philosophical or moralising agenda better than they serve history’.83 She 
argues that there is no justification for attributing Catulus’ arguments to anything but Dio’s 
imagination,
84
 and uses it as a further example of what she describes as ‘a consensus that 
Dio wrote up his orations himself without translating or accurately representing even 
famous speeches that were and are extant’.85  
 
Chapter 2 will challenge this consensus. It will make a first step in our scholarship by 
considering the implications of the historian’s use of contemporary Latin rhetorical 
material, in a re-evaluation of Dio’s speeches which recognises their explanatory purpose 
for the ancient reader and their use for us today in understanding the historian’s framework 
of causation. I do not of course suggest that we should look for historicity in the speeches. 
There were obvious questions of intellectual ownership which fed into the historian’s own 
self-presentation as a πεπαιδευμένος. We must take the speeches as Dio’s own creative 
output and his own assertion of his skill. We should not, however, sidestep the implications 
of a deliberate choice on the historian’s part to replicate the arguments of a geniune 
historical moment in the Late Republic in his own representation – however jarringly this 
may resonate with the modern consensus on speeches in historiography.   
 
A second methodological problem to consider for the way in which we read Dio’s 
speeches is the intellectual and literary climate in which the historian wrote. This will be 
my focus in Chapter 3. Cassius Dio’s relationship with the renaissance of Greek παιδεία 
and epideictic rhetoric known to us from Philostratus as the ‘Second Sophistic’ necessarily 
has an effect upon the way rhetoric in his work is received.
86
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As a Greek historian writing around the turn of the third century CE, Dio made 
transparently belletristic choices about the style and content of his work which were 
common also to the sophists and other extravagantly intellectual authors of his time. Dio 
wrote in the defunct prestige dialect of Attic, which he confesses he deliberately 
cultivated.
87
 He frequently recycled phrases from Classical authors, especially 
Demosthenes and Thucydides, as well as liberally quoting the Greek poets either in the 
narrative or in the mouths of his Roman characters. Furthermore, he wrote excursus – and  
occasionally quite elaborate ones – on abstruse topics to demonstrate his ἐγκύκλιος 
παιδεία. These facets of the Roman History certainly locate Dio within an intellectualised 
culture; whether we need to think this necessarily ‘sophistic’ is a point I will return to in 
Chapter 3. However, this apparent identification with the values of the Second Sophistic 
seems to me to have created a general distrust of the rhetoric within his work. Our 
awareness of the sophists’ fixation with epideictic or display rhetoric above all, and their 
frequently-attested proclivity for intellectual posturing and self-aggrandisement through 
the medium of rhetoric and the settings in which it was staged, may make us suspect that 
Dio, too, had similar objectives in mind when he wrote his speeches.  
 
This, certainly, is the impression to be gained from the scholarship. Reardon described 
Cassius Dio’s as ‘the sophistic way of writing: everywhere there is drama, commonplace, 
antitheses, and of course rhetorical displays: the battle of Pharsalus, a earthquake at 
Antioch, the Sullan proscriptions’.88 Anderson, whose 1993 monograph imposes sensible 
limitations on the snowball of ‘sophistic historiography’,89 exhibits a similar tendency. He 
suggests that, where the sophistic does appear to seep into Dio’s speeches, this can appear 
unattractive: 
 
There is a sense in which at least some of the fault can be traced back to 
mannerisms of Thucydides, of which Dio was undeniably an imitator; and at 
least some of the fault lies with rhetoric as such rather than with its more 
flagrant overindulgence. Hence for example the telescoping of Ciceronian 
speeches from different occasions and circumstances into a different discussion 
with an unknown Philiscus, intended to encapsulate an ethos rather than act as a 
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historical chronicle; or the use of the infamous speech of Maecenas to embody 
Dio’s reflections on the problems of the empire.90 
 
Although Anderson’s is a sceptical and measured treatment of the problem of ‘sophistic 
historiography’, the language of fault and infamy in his analysis of Dio’s speeches is 
indicative of an attitude (which I do not criticise). Elsewhere he writes of ‘the worst 
excesses of sophistic taste’ with regard to Dexippus, and of Lucian’s de Conscribenda 
Historia that ‘we can most clearly see…the potential abuse that threatens to emerge from 
epideictic tastes’.91 The sophistic, in short, is not an attractive quality for historiography, 
and we may feel justified in questioning the explanatory purpose, or interpretative or 
historical value, of a speech which betrays some of its more overindulgent characteristics. 
This tendency toward the sophistic is often identified in Dio.
92
 Most recently, Brandon 
Jones has taken this further, and suggests that Dio ought to be considered a sophist as 
such.
93
  
 
In Chapter 3 I will address some of these problems and re-evaluate the historian’s 
relationship with the Second Sophistic. Thus far modern scholars seems to have identified 
a fundamentally epideictic, Classicising, and paideutic bent in Dio’s rhetoric which has 
prevented the kind of reading of the speeches which we find in occasional modern studies 
of other historians, as for example Polybius.
94
 Therefore, in Chapter 3 I will unpick 
Cassius Dio from the display-oriented proclivities of the Second Sophistic. I will 
demonstrate that he in fact regarded sophists and sophistry with some hostility. In 
consequence, we should not be too eager to overstate the sophistic function of Dio’s 
speeches – to advertise his own παιδεία, provide ‘a great deal of declamation…the most 
fertile soil for a crop of Thucydidean imitations’,95 and to show off his knowledge of 
Classical literature and the topoi of years of rhetorical training. This was surely one aspect; 
but it was not the only aspect, and it (along with Quellenforschung) has crowded out the 
kind of examination of Dio’s speeches that I propose to make.  
 
I will furthermore suggest that the historian’s hostility to sophistry and the sophists in his 
own time exerts an effect not only upon the way we read the speeches today, but on the 
way the historian conceived of and presented public oratory in the Late Republic. Cassius 
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Dio appears to have accepted traditional Classical ideas about the moral probity of rhetoric 
and its incompatibility with sophistry – a concern amply represented in the dialogues of 
Plato. In what I will suggest are his critiques of the sophists of his own time, two recurring 
criticisms are falsehood and the ability to mislead others with a persuasive tongue; to make 
the morally weaker case appear the stronger. This, I argue, informed his representation of 
the use and abuse of public speech in the res publica, which as I have detailed in Factor 4 
above Dio believed to be a significant historical problem and a cause of the collapse of the 
Republic. 
 
A third and final methodological problem to consider is the historian’s rhetorical 
education. In Chaper 4, I explore Cassius Dio’s relationship with the progymnasmata, the 
loose curriculum of rhetorical exercises preliminary to the advanced arts of declamation 
and the writing of persuasive speech. The historian’s advanced instruction in rhetoric has 
long been recognised,
96
 and this is unsurprising for the son of a Roman consul in this 
period. In the context of the mid-second century CE, during which time Dio himself will 
have been schooled, the majority of this education from possibly the ages of around seven 
to fifteen will have been rooted in the progymnasmata.
97
 Yet in spite of the obvious 
influence of the schools upon Dio’s writing and the important role of these exercises in this 
regard, there has been to my knowledge no investigation whatsoever of the way in which 
the historian’s training informed his speeches or his work as a whole. In fact, although a 
number of studies have explored the influence of rhetorical education on ancient 
historians,
98
 such studies have generally ignored the progymnasmata.
99
 
 
This is especially important for understanding Cassius Dio’s speeches. Certain of their 
characteristics, which scholars have identified (and criticised) as typical of the rhetoric in 
the Roman History, are traceable back to the progymnasmata. One aspect, which I will 
discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, is Dio’s reliance on the τόπος or locus communis. 
Several scholars have listed the historian’s commonplaces unenthusiastically:100 a speech 
of Fabius Rullus can be ‘no more than a series of generalities about human nature’, or an 
exhortation of Caesar ‘an extrapolation in commonplace philosophical terms…of a speech 
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which in general urged his soldiers to fight’. One view suggests that Dio’s speeches 
suffered from a ‘poverty of invention’ in this respect. 101  One may also consider his 
frequent recourse to the moralising γνώμη or sententia, which has also provoked 
criticism.
102
 I suggest that this critical focus on the commonplace and moralising content of 
Dio’s orations has contributed, alongside the other factors I have delineated in this section, 
to preventing the explanatory and interpretative reading of the speeches which I propose to 
undertake.  
 
However, Chapter 4 will demonstrate that these aspects of the historian’s logography, and 
their argumentative function within the speeches, can be more fruitfully understood when 
we accept that they were deliberately inculcated by the progymnasmata. Just as ancient 
rhetorical handbooks use the language of ‘moulding’ or ‘imprinting’ the student in praise 
of these exercises, so too do modern scholars talk about how they trained ‘reflexes’.103 The 
progymnasmata, as a system of preliminary exercises, were designed to inculcate in the 
ancient student an instant recall of rhetorical forms and constructions and indoctrinate him 
into a set of received elite moral values. This, as Craig Gibson has recently written, had a 
tremendous tactical value. The commonplace and the moralising, far from making one’s 
rhetoric unsatisfying, could render it all the more persuasive:  
 
The moral focus of compositional instruction made students more successful as 
adult speakers when they addressed audiences which shared those values: ‘the 
tendency to deal with general considerations of the possible, the true, the just, 
the fitting, or the expedient had its value. The exercises equipped the boys with 
a ready command of the arguments and other amplifying material that could be 
adduced in support of the commoner major premises, and might easily persuade 
audiences of their truth’.104 
 
In view of this, the more interesting question seems to me not what the modern scholar 
thinks of the quality of Dio’s τόποι and γνώμαι, but what the ancient reader would have 
thought of them. I will argue that the received ideas and sentiments which the historian 
frequently embedded within his speeches – and, in parallel, within his narrative – rendered 
his causation of the collapse of the Roman Republic more persuasive and convincing. 
Rather than finding Dio’s reasoning banal and unoriginal, I suggest that the elite reader of 
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the late second or third century CE, who like the historian had been educated in the 
progymnasmata, would not only have found Dio’s speeches rhetorically attractive. They 
would furthermore be inclined, by virtue of undertaking the same curriculum as the 
historian, to identify with the moral reasoning that he applied to the fall of the Republic 
and the success of the new regime in his speeches. Somewhat perversely, then, it is 
precisely those moralising and commonplace criteria, so weak from the modern 
perspective, which would have been strong to the ancient one.  
 
My discussion of these methodological issues in the three chapters of Section One to 
follow will not attempt to be conclusive. The kind of traditional source-criticism I aim to 
undertake in Chapter 2 cannot hope to be less speculative than much of that which has 
come  before. Moreover, my conclusions in that chapter on Dio’s use of contemporary 
Latin sources for his speeches may not give an insight into where else the same principle 
can be applied in Imperial Greek historiography. Dio’s re-elaboration of his sources into 
his speeches may be idiosyncratic. But the source-question is nevertheless an issue which 
must be dealt with. I do, however, set out in Chapters 3 and 4 some approaches which may 
be usefully reapplied to speeches in other historians, writing in Greek during the Second 
Sophistic and versed in the progymnasmata, in order to confirm that the historiographical 
speeches written under those conditions need not solely enhance the historian’s 
characterisation either of his historical actors or of himself as a πεπαιδευμένος. Rather, in 
Cassius Dio’s speeches of the Late Republic and Augustan era the historian sets out a 
persuasive causal framework of constitutional change, which is effective not in spite of his 
methodology, but because of it.   
36 
 
 
Section One: Methodological Problems 
Chapter 2: Speeches and Sources 
Introduction 
Quellenforschung constitutes the vast majority of scholarship on Cassius Dio’s history 
prior to Millar’s 1964 monograph. Much of this, he conceded, ‘normally ends in mere 
speculation’, and in his view the search for a ‘proto-Dio’ is a hopeless one.1 It is not 
difficult to understand Millar’s scepticism. The theory put forward by Schwartz in the 
nineteenth century, that the historian relied substantially on Livy’s now-lost Late 
Republican and Augustan narratives,
2
 at one time commanded a broad consensus.
3
 But 
Manuwald’s discussion of Dio’s sources for his account of Augustus has imposed 
convincing limitations on that consensus, and in one view has exposed it as a ‘flimsy 
prejudice’. 4  It is testament to the complexity of Dio’s relationship with his narrative 
sources for the first centuries BCE and CE that the Livian consensus can be exploded.  
 
Scholars are on even more uncertain ground with Sallust, Cremutius Cordus, Asinius 
Pollio, and Aufidius Bassus as possible sources for the Late Republican and Augustan 
narratives. As with Livy, Dio mentions all except Bassus by name at one point in his 
history,
5  
and we can suspect that all wrote contemporary histories of the latter half of the 
first century BCE and in cases further beyond. Considerable scholarly attention has been 
devoted to Dio’s source-relationship with these historians.6 These, however, do not even 
survive in epitomated form. Given the absence of any comparative material they furnish 
for the kind of analysis necessary for productive source-criticism, this chapter will not 
address these historians. I share Millar’s scepticism: the evidence offered by scholars so far 
justifies only the cautious but not particularly satisfying conclusion that Cassius Dio may 
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have read all of them. Certainly he read widely. There is no reason to suspect his claim in 
the preface to have read πάντα ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ περὶ [τῶν Ῥωμαίων] τισι γεγραμμένα,7 and 
over a period of ten years of note-taking.
8
 This invites inclusivity. It is safe to assume that, 
if Dio knew of an historian’s work and mentions him – as in the case of Sallust, Pollio, 
Livy, and Cordus – he probably read it if it was available. More than this cannot be safely 
said.    
 
In comparison, far less research has been undertaken to determine the extent to which Dio 
used either rhetorical material as such, or the rhetorical flourishes in the works of previous 
historians, to inform the content of his own speeches and his presentation of Late 
Republican oratory more generally. This stems from a long-held consensus that Cassius 
Dio almost universally composed his speeches without the use of a previous model, and 
especially without drawing from contemporary oratorical texts.
9
 As Millar has already 
stated, more often than not the historian only inserted a speech where it was justified by his 
sources: that is, where he read that there had actually been an historical occasion of oratory 
to represent.
10
 Yet even in view of this assertion, the hypothesis that Dio ‘wrote up his 
orations himself without translating or accurately representing even famous speeches that 
were and are extant’ is held confidently:11 They are ‘freehand compositions’. No analysis 
has yet been done to follow up the lone statement of Berrigan that there may be more 
historical truth in Dio’s representation of Late Republican oratory than we have previously 
thought.
12
 
 
In this chapter, I argue that many of the arguments and rhetorical strategies in Dio’s 
speeches of the first century BCE can be traced directly back to Late Republican oratory. I 
am aware that this appears a bold claim. There were issues of intellectual ownership and 
self-presentation to consider, and simply providing a Greek précis of a Latin speech from 
the Late Republic in the relevant context would add little to the historian’s intellectual 
authority. Moreover, many of the texts required for a cross-comparison between Dio’s 
rhetoric and that of the first century BCE are now lost.
13
 This risks speculation, which I 
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 Cass. Dio. F 1.1.2. 
8
 Cass. Dio. 73[72].23.5. 
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 For a few examples, cf. Heimbach (1878) 29; Millar (1961) 15; Millar (1964) 81; Gowing (1992) 227-228, 
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have argued in the case of other historians has not produced secure results. I therefore 
propose to consider Dio’s speeches in relation only to texts which still survive: specifically 
the De Imperio Gnaei Pompei and Philippicae of Cicero. In my conclusions, there will also 
be a need to consider the implications of that analysis in how we conceive of Dio’s 
relationship with the Res Gestae of Augustus and Caesar’s De Bello Gallico, which may 
themselves have provided material and inspiration for other of Dio’s speeches.  
 
My suggestion is not that Dio’s presentation of Late Republican speech is ‘historical’ in 
the sense that we can use him to recover lost Latin oratory, or that the historian deliberately 
sought to deliver the ipsissima verba of public speech in this period. It may be possible to 
attempt this argument for a contemporary historian writing as an eyewitness shortly after 
the time;
14
 but Dio came centuries after the events he described. Rather, my point is that 
Cassius Dio was clearly well-versed, from his reading of contemporary material, in certain 
arguments that were current in political oratory in the Late Republic and in aspects of the 
self-presentation pursued by the orators of this period. These emerge in his speeches. In 
consequence, we need to reconsider the extent to which Dio’s representation of public 
oratory in the Late Republic was a product of pure invention.  
 
If that point can be reasonably demonstrated, then this will understandably exert an effect 
upon our reading of the speeches. It will show that, rather than belonging to a paideutic 
thought-world divorced from the depicted Late Republican context, Dio’s speeches of this 
period were an attractive and viable means of historical explanation because of their 
relationship with depictions of Late Republican oratory made by contemporaries 
themselves. 
 
To arrive at this point, however, we need first to briefly consider whether Dio would have 
been able to read the Latin rhetorical material which I suggest, and second, the possible 
implications of his method of data collection upon the re-elaboration of this material into 
his own speeches.  
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 Hammond (1999) makes the case that the speeches in Arrian’s Indica and Anabasis are ‘historical’ in this 
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Dio and Latin 
There is no scholarly consensus on the question of whether or not Dio was able to read 
Latin. This is crucial. The historian scatters dozens of quotations from the Greek poets, and 
especially Homer and the classical tragedians, throughout his history. But he only once 
directly quotes a work originally written in Latin – the Aeneid – in his entire text, and this 
in a rather prosaic Greek translation.
15
 This says little about Dio’s linguistic skills in any 
case. We know of a Greek translation by a Polybius of the Aeneid already available in the 
first century CE, and so too of Greek renderings of Sallust by Zenobius in the following 
century.
16
  Had he wished to quote Virgil or Sallust more extensively, he could have done 
so without using Latin. 
 
The question of Cassius Dio’s knowledge of Latin has generated little dedicated study 
owing to several other limitations. Firstly, we cannot be sure whether Dio was educated 
entirely in Greek in his πατρίς of Bithynia, or in Latin with his senator father in Rome, or 
in a combination of both. That the historian refers to Nicaea as his πατρίς and speaks of 
returning ‘home’ (οἴκαδε) to it may justify speculation on the former..17  But this option 
does not presuppose early instruction in Latin. There is remarkably little evidence of the 
instruction of Latin in Greek education in the earlier centuries of the Graecia capta, as 
evidenced by Rochette’s only brief comments on this and the relative paucity of scholarly 
work on the subject. Our evidence of Latin within Greek education, such as the bilingual 
glossaries of the Hermeneumata, papyri, and literary evidence of professors of Latin, 
emerge only from the third century CE, and more abundantly in the fourth and fifth. Too 
late for Dio.
18
 Within Dio’s history – our only source of biographical information aside 
from a military diploma and an inscription – there is nothing to indicate that the historian 
did not, just as Dionysius and Plutarch, have to acquire his Latin later in life, or indeed that 
he had any at all. As Rochette has concluded, the acquisition of Latin was not normally 
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 Cass. Dio. 76[75].10.2 with Virg. Aen. 11.371-373. 
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 Cf. Reichmann (1943) and Fisher (1982) 176 n.12 respectively of Virgil and Sallust. The Rylands Papyri (P. 
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included within the education of the Greek young; this was usually reserved for later life, 
where trade or administration demanded the skill.
19
  
 
Secondly, the fact alone that both the historian and his father held provincial commands 
within the Roman empire does not by the fact itself indicate knowledge of Latin. Both 
were posted to hellenophone provinces within the eastern half of the empire.
20
 Rome 
shows a marked preference within this period for assigning Greek-speaking governors to 
Greek-speaking provinces, and to have such territories publicly administered in their own 
language in cases where knowledge of Latin was not widespread.
21
  
 
Finally, while there is no shortage of examples for elite Romans who spoke Greek from the 
Late Republic onward,
22
 there is a long-held scholarly tradition that Hellenes scorned their 
conquerers and their language.
23
 Although Sherwin-White has challenged this view,
24
 its 
afterlife persists into modern scholarship. In his survey of Imperial literature, Bruno 
Rochette concludes that the Greeks 
 
were not remotely interested in purely Latin culture and literature. Even those 
Greek authors most favourable to Rome deliberately ignored Latin language 
and literature…Dionysius of Halicarnassus, despite his fierce defence of 
ancient Roman values dear to Augustus and familiarity with the reality of 
Rome, treats Latin as a mixed language...only Plutarch, whose remarks on 
languages are many, seems to hold back from qualifying Latin as a barbarian 
language. Later, Aelius Aristides in his To Rome seems to ignore the existence 
of a Roman history and a Latin language…he very probably considered it a 
barbarian tongue.
25
 
 
I am not sure what to make of this. Both Dionysius and Plutarch made the effort to learn 
Latin. The former calls those who treat the Romans as barbarians ‘malicious’ 
(κακοηθέστεροι) and, indeed, turns the accusation of barbarism on hellenophone kings and 
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their propagandist historians who hated Rome.
26
 He additionally prides himself upon his 
twenty-two years at Rome and his thorough knowledge of Latin and its ‘commended’ 
authors (ἐπαινούμενοι).27 Plutarch also did not merely ‘hold back’ (se retient) from treating 
Latin as a barbarian tongue. Praising the ‘beauty and quickness of the Roman style, the 
figures of speech, the rhythm, and the other embellishments of the language, which I think 
graceful’, Plutarch’s only apology is for knowing too little of the language.28   
 
These limitations make it still possible, and justified, for experts to ask whether Cassius 
Dio was able to read Latin.
29
 In response to this we need to consider four points. Firstly 
(and most speculatively), it strikes me as highly unlikely that, if the ἰδιώτης Dionysius and 
the archon of Chaeronea Plutarch learned Latin for their historical research, then the son of 
a Roman senator and consul, drawn from a family who may have had the citizenship since 
Nero’s time,30 who was himself twice a consul and spent forty years as a member of the 
Senate, would not also have done the same or already had Latin beforehand. However, 
aside from these details about the historian’s family and career there is no evidence to 
support this suggestion except common sense.  
 
Next, and as Millar has already written,
31
 Dio prosecuted the short-lived usurper of 193 CE 
Didius Julianus, ‘and as an advocate proved him guilty of numerous offences many 
times’.32 This suggests several appearances in a Roman court. Although Dio reveals few 
clues regarding the date, he treats his prosecution in connection with the reign of Pertinax 
and being offered the praetorship by him. This suggests around 193 CE, during which time 
the historian was in Rome. In other sources we only hear of Didius Julianus being 
prosecuted in court once: in the early 180s CE he returned to Italy after numerous 
provincial commands, was made praefectus alimentorum there, and was then implicated in 
an assassination plot against Commodus. He was prosecuted and acquitted.
33
 It is unclear 
whether Dio implies that he was involved in the prosecution of this trial and successfully 
demonstrated Julianus’ guilt in offences other than that of conspiracy, or whether he means 
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a later trial around the reign of Pertinax. In both cases, however, it is likely that they were 
held at Rome and this presupposes the use of Latin. Although we know from two 
contemporary inscriptions that Greek could be used in cases held in the east, with the 
official formalities in Latin and then evidence and proceedings in Greek,
34
 prosecuting in a 
court in Rome or indeed the western provinces will have demanded knowledge of Latin.
35
  
 
Thirdly there is the issue of the historian’s Roman institutional lexicon and endorsement of 
Latin geopolitical vocabulary. As an Atticist, Dio uses Classical Greek synonyms for 
Roman magistracies wherever possible. As such, he will regularly translate consul as 
ὑπατεύων, praetor as στρατηγός, aedilis as ἀγορανόμος and tribunus plebis as δήμαρχος.36  
However, at other points the historian will freely transliterate Latin vocabulary, such as 
auctoritas, into Greek (αὐκτώριτας). Vrind has already shown that these Latinisms are 
easily-identifiable aspects of his style,
37
 and I will not repeat their evidence here; Dio was 
not alone among Imperial Greek historians in transliterating Latin institutional terms. 
Instead, I turn to the less-studied point of the historian’s use of Roman geopolitical 
vocabulary.  
 
Dio’s use of this vocabulary may have been influenced by his own experience as a Roman 
provincial governor within the empire. I have argued elsewhere that his transliteration of 
Latin place-names for imperial territories exemplifies the role that imperium and governing 
abroad played in integrating Greek elites and making them sound ‘Roman’.38 But the point 
I make here concerns not his identity, but his bilingualism. The historian’s preference for 
Latin terminology is most pronounced in his etymology of Pannonia, in which he was 
legatus in 226-228 CE:  
 
After my promagistracies in Africa and in Dalmatia (ἐν τῇ Ἀφρικῇ ἡγεμονίαν 
τῇ τε Δελματίᾳ), which latter my father also governed for a while, I was drafted 
in for what is called Upper Pannonia (τῇ Παννονίᾳ τῇ ἄνω καλουμένῃ), for 
which reason I write with complete knowledge of their affairs (ὅθεν ἀκριβῶς 
πάντα τὰ κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς εἰδὼς γράφω). They are called ‘Pannonians’ because they 
sew together their sleeved tunics from those which they have ripped apart into 
strips in a way particular to them, known as panni (πάννους). And so these are 
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named Pannonians, whether for this reason or for some other; but some of the 
Greeks, being unaware of the truth of it, call them Paeones.
39
 
 
Dio not only prefers the Roman etymology for the province to which he was dispatched as 
legatus, and sees the logic in its derivation from the Latin pannus. He additionally refers 
here to Africa, which he governed as proconsul in 223 CE, with the transliterated Ἀφρικῆ. 
This is peculiar for a Greek history. Dio’s contemporary Herodian and the later Eunapius 
write of ‘Λιβύη, which the Romans in their native tongue call Ἀφρικῆ’ and of ‘Scipio 
Ἀφρικανὸς…derived from what the Λίβυες are called in the Roman language’.40 In this 
way Dio again endorses a Latin, not Greek, geopolitics. He similarly sidesteps the Greek 
etymology for the coastal town of Dyrrachium and provides instead the Latin 
nomenclature, citing the connection between ‘loss’ (damnum) and the rocky shoreline.41 
He furthermore refers to Cisalpine and Narbonensian Gaul as Galatia togata (Γαλατία 
τογᾶτα) and Galatia comata (Γαλατία κομᾶτα), and in both instances explains the 
significance of their names.
42
 
 
This does not strike me as a writer ignorant of Latin. There seems a burden of proof for 
evidence to the contrary, but scholarship still has yet to see this satisfied. Even discounting 
his two consulships and forty years in the Senate, Dio was a nobilis from a senatorial 
family who, while still attached to his πατρίς of Bithynia, clearly seems to have been able 
to speak Latin in a court at Rome as well as to read, and prefer, Latin geographical 
etymologies. If Dio acquired these etymologies from earlier Greek writers, we find no 
trace of them. In fact, by insisting on his knowledge and personal experience of Pannonia 
from his term as governor there,
43
 Dio claims the pannus etymology in particular as his 
own new factoid to impart. There were also odder things than a Greek historian of Rome 
using Latin for his research. In addition to Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Plutarch, 
Diodorus of Sicily too did so and like them says so in the preface to his work.
44
 As Dio’s 
preface is lost, we do not know if he advertised his learning of Latin and its texts in the 
same fashion. But by the third century CE there was probably no need, for a Greek consul 
of Rome.  
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A fourth and final point is the striking similarity of several of Dio’s Late Republican 
speeches to the surviving contemporary Latin rhetorical material, both in their 
argumentation and in the order in which that argumentation develops. There are 
furthermore translated overlaps in the language and expression. This in itself suggests a 
Latin original model. However, that will only become clear through a comparative analysis 
of Dio’s history with the original rhetorical material, which I will begin on the next page 
along. Before doing so, it is important to give a brief comment on how and where Dio may 
have collected this Latin material, and how this method may have facilitated the later re-
elaboration of that material into Dio’s speeches which I propose.  
Dio’s Method of Work 
We have little testimony from the historians themselves about how they worked. Pelling 
posits that Cassius Dio, like Plutarch before him, performed all his preliminary reading in a 
single and lengthy period before turning to the task of writing-up; and that he read a variety 
of different sources in the research-stage for compilation into notes, before then having a 
single main source before him, alongside his notes, during the composition-stage.
45
 We 
should thus imagine a programme of broad reading, in which the historian may have 
initially drawn details from several different sources even on the same historical event,
46 
 
and then the ‘following’ of a single source as a guide in the writing-up, kept open 
alongside the historian’s diverse notes.  
 
The sheer difficulty of handling rolls of papyrus may have necessitated this practice. They 
were, of course, large; and little evidence exists of contemporary methods to negotiate the 
geography of the physical text, such as headings and numberings.
47
 Moreover, owing to 
their size it would be difficult to compare versions during the composition even if a slave 
were to hold another.
48
 But historians needed to compare versions all the same, and decide 
upon the more plausible of two accounts. This decision over what to include and what not 
to include may well have happened in the compilation of the historian’s aide-memoire, or 
ὑπόμνημα, which we find first mentioned in Lucian: 
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The material ought not to be gathered slap-dash, but through laborious, careful, 
and frequent discrimination…and keeping to those who narrate in the least 
partisan fashion, you should choose authors who seem least disposed toward 
ingratiation or dislike of their predecessors. Let the process of deduction and of 
piecing together ‘which of the two’ is more reliable happen here. And when 
everything has been put properly together, or mostly, then you should compile a 
sort of aide-memoire (ὑπόμνημα) of that material; the body of it should still be 
free from ornamentation.
49
 
 
In what little is written on the topic scholars all agree that Cassius Dio will have had such a 
ὑπόμνημα.50 Although these ὑπομνήματα could vary in their level of polish – some appear 
to have been bare collections of topic-headings and notes, while others could be whole 
stretches of unadorned narrative – it is unlikely that these would have contained drafted 
speeches.
51
 This, certainly, is what Lucian seems to me to suggest (σῶμα ποιείτω ἀκαλλὲς 
ἔτι καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον). We need to imagine that Dio composed his speeches later, during the 
‘neater’ composition stage.  
 
This does not mean, however, that during the reading and note-taking process the historian 
will not have read speeches that he knew about and taken notes of what he saw had been 
said. Take the events of 43 BCE (Book 45) as an example. According to the consensus, in 
the composition of his ‘neat’ Book 45 the historian will have had a single historical 
narrative source before him as a guide, alongside his digest or comparison of several 
sources in the ὑπόμνημα. After writing-up the diegetic material, Dio came to consider 
Cicero’s political invectives against M. Antonius in that year. Given the ergonomic 
difficulty of scrolls, it may not have been attractive to then pause, open and search the 
scroll of the Philippicae for useful material, and then incorporate these straight into a new 
speech; especially in view of the fact that Dio seems to have drawn not only from one of 
the Philippicae, but several of them, as I discuss in the next section. This method, then, 
could involve three or more scrolls (ὑπόμνημα, Cicero or a Greek translation or précis 
thereof, Dio’s new draft itself) being open at the same time, let alone trawling through 
several Philippicae rather than only one. This is obviously impractical.  
 
I think we can envisage another possibility. Dio’s Late Republic centres around the 
δυναστεία and φιλοτιμία of individual actors – especially Pompeius, Caesar, Cicero, and 
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Octavian. It is telling that Dio wrote three speeches each for these latter three, more than 
for any other characters in his work. I suggest that in the course of his reading and research 
for the ὑπόμνημα, Dio turned to original material that was known to him already through 
his advanced rhetorical training or which especially exemplified the historical issue which 
he wished to elucidate through a speech. For the δυναστεία of Pompeius in Dio’s narrative 
of the general’s extraordinary commands, there was Cicero’s De Imperio Gnaei Pompei. 
Similarly, for the polemical debates between M. Tullius Cicero and M. Antonius – which 
exemplify Late Republican political oratory at its most fractious and hostile – there were 
the Philippicae. It seems reasonable to expect that, in the course of his reading and 
research, Dio may have appreciated quotations, ideas, or arguments in these works and 
noted them down in his ὑπόμνημα for later re-elaboration into a parallel speech of his own 
in the writing-up stage. In this way the ὑπόμνημα served as a repository not only of details 
and comparisons of the historian’s narrative sources, but of ideas from speeches he had 
read – ideas which originated in Late Republican oratory. 
 
I am aware that this is hypothetical. But Dio, as I discuss further in Chapter 4, was trained 
through a rhetorical curriculum which by his time universally advocated the chreia: the 
exercise in re-elaborating the words and sayings of great men into different contexts. There 
can also be little doubt that he would have had access to such contemporary Latin material 
as had survived, which I have argued he was perfectly able to read. In addition to residing 
in Rome in his capacity as a senator, the historian served as curator of the major 
intellectual centres of Pergamum and Smyrna in Asia Minor, accompanied Caracalla to the 
eastern metropolis of Nicomedia, and was connected to the ‘circle’ of Septimius Severus’ 
erudite wife, Julia Domna.
52
 If the historian needed these texts, he could get them.  
 
But to this point I have been begging the question. I have argued that Cassius Dio recorded 
arguments, quotes, and rhetorical strategies from the Latin literature of the Late Republic, 
which he had read, into his ὑπόμνημα for later re-elaboration. But I have not yet 
demonstrated that he read this material in the first place. The comparative analysis will 
reveal that this was probable. I turn now to discuss the example most rich in obvious clues: 
Dio’s relationship with Cicero. 
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The Ciceronian Material: The De Imperio Gnaei Pompei 
Four orations within the Roman History reproduce the argumentation which Cicero 
suggests in his own speeches was ‘historically’ employed, at Rome, in parallel contexts to 
those depicted by Dio. First, the speech of A. Gabinius in favour of his lex Gabinia (36.27-
28). Second, the lengthy dissuasio of that law by Q. Lutatius Catulus, set during a contio 
(36.31-36). Third, the ‘Philippic’ of Cicero against M. Antonius in the opening days of 43 
BCE (45.18-47). And fourth, Q. Fufius Calenus’ response in defence of Antonius at the 
opening of the next Book (46.1-28). All four speeches represent occasions of political 
oratory we know to have actually existed: in Gabinius and Catulus’ case, the debates 
surrounding Pompeius’ two extraordinary commands in 67 and 66 BCE, known 
respectively as the lex Gabinia and lex Manilia, attested in the De Imperio Gnaei Pompei; 
in Cicero and Calenus’ case, the exchanges of invective between Cicero and Antonius 
which occurred in the Senate after Caesar’s assassination, famously attested in the 
Philippicae. Accordingly I organise this analysis into two sections, turning first to the 
Gabinius-Catulus debate before the Cicero-Calenus polemics in the second.  
 
I do not wish to talk in particular depth at this point about the historical context of either or 
the historical details. I elaborate this more fully in Chapters 5 and 6, where it will be 
relevant. My intention here is to demonstrate that Dio in these speeches reproduced the 
contemporary Latin oratory of the late res publica; and thus that they were an ideal 
medium for discussing the problems that beset it, especially for an educated audience who 
may have known their Cicero.  
 
Nevertheless – and to turn to the first pair of speeches – there are important chronological 
issues with Catulus’ dissuasio. As rogator of the law,  which proposed extraordinary 
powers for Pompeius over virtually the entire Mediterranean,
53
 Gabinius will clearly have 
spoken in the contio in support of his legislation in 67 BCE. However, Catulus’ role during 
the lex Gabinia debate is far less clear. All our historians, including Dio, record that he 
spoke against Gabinius’ law in 67 BCE alongside Q. Hortensius Hortalus.54  However, 
Saylor Rodgers argues that Catulus’ role here is a fiction. Although Cicero in the De 
Imperio mentions Hortensius’ activity in the debates of that year, he makes no reference to 
Catulus in that context, apparently citing only his objections to the lex Manilia of the 
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 Ferrary (2007) gives an overview of the terms of the law and our sources. For the nature of Pompeius’ 
imperium in 67 BCE, which I do not touch upon in this thesis, cf. Jameson (1970). 
54
 Dio. Cass. 36.36; Plu. Pomp. 25.5-6; Val. Max. 8.15.9 ; Vell. Pat. 2.32.1-3. 
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following year, 66 BCE. Apparently, we should therefore assume that he did not speak.
55 
This has been specifically challenged by Coudry, and I think rightly.
56
 Saylor Rodgers’ 
thesis is based upon the suggestion that Cicero would have cited Catulus had he been a 
member of the opposition to the Gabinian law too. But Cicero’s explanation of Hortensius’ 
role in 67 BCE extends to no more than two fairly brief comments:
57
 it is clear that he did 
not intend to give a full overview of the debates of 67 BCE. Saylor Rodgers’ second 
supporting detail, that when Cicero finally quotes Catulus’ objections to Pompeius’ power 
he is ‘clearly describing a very recent event’ (i.e. 66 BCE on the lex Manilia), is also a moot 
point. There seems to me nothing in the quotation to suggest that it has just occurred, and if 
there is, Saylor Rodgers does not specify what. The opposition of Catulus quoted by Cicero 
could just as easily have occurred in the previous year as all our historians attest.
58 
 
 
To provide some positive evidence, we should also consider that Cicero leaves Catulus’ 
dissuasio out of his speech altogether until the end. He devotes an independent, final 
section of his argumentation to deal specifically with Catulus’ objections to Pompeius’ 
power (reliquum est ut de Q. Catuli auctoritate et sententia dicendum esse videatur).
59
 
This being the case, it is not surprising that he did not mention Catulus’ role when 
discussing that of Hortensius in 67 BCE earlier. This additionally has the effect of making 
the opposition appear weaker than it actually was. It does Cicero’s argumentative purpose 
no favours to marshal the arguments of all the distinguished Roman statesmen that spoke 
against Pompeius’ power, especially over two consecutive years. Cicero was being vague, 
and I think deliberately, to deliver a political objective. The chronological issue may 
appear esoteric, but it is important for how Dio’s speeches surrounding the lex Gabinia are 
read. It is specifically Cassius Dio’s apparent displacement of Q. Lutatius Catulus’ 
dissuasio from 66 BCE to the context of the previous year which has justified the claim that 
‘Dio’s choices of speakers and occasions often serve his philosophical or moralizing 
agenda better than they serve history’.60 But the evidence that Catulus did not speak in 67 
BCE is limited and unconvincing.  
 
A second but less complicated chronological issue is the text and subject matter of the 
source-material itself. It will already have become clear that Cicero delivered the De 
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 Saylor Rodgers (2008) 289-300. Conversely, there is no doubt that Hortensius spoke in both years; cf. 
Morstein-Marx (2004) 181-182. 
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 Cf. Coudry (forthcoming, 2016). 
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Imperio not in 67 BCE on the lex Gabinia, but a year later in support of the lex Manilia. 
Therefore, Dio displaces the content of Cicero’s oration to a different historical context. 
This can be explained simply by the similarity of those contexts and the scope of the 
historian’s work. To Dio, both Cicero and Gabinius played parallel roles as advocates of 
Pompeius’ extraordinary commands in the same 67-66 BCE period. Rather than dealing 
with both laws separately at length, he compressed these two examples of the same 
historical problem of Pompeius’ δυναστεία into a single rhetorical moment when the issue 
first arose. This is confirmed by the very cursory treatment Dio affords the lex Manilia: he 
states merely that the tribune C. Manilius proposed the law and that Cicero urged the 
populus to ratify it.
61
 The brevity of this note in comparison to the lengthy episode Dio 
constructs around the lex Gabinia indicates that the historian viewed the two laws as part 
of the same problem. It made sense to explore that problem in detail once, at the first 
opportunity, rather than twice.  
 
The arguments of A. Gabinius in favour of Pompeius’ power in 67 BCE therefore represent 
those we know from the De Imperio to have been made by Cicero in favour of it a year 
later. This, it seems to me, is no coincidence, but was a deliberate choice on the historian’s 
part to align his own representation of the debate surrounding the lex Gabinia with the 
contemporary evidence. This will be borne out by my discussion of the concordances, 
some of which were collected by Van Ooteghem. Van Ooteghem’s tabulation, however, 
considers only Cic. Man. 27-28 and 61-62, and does not provide analysis.
62
  
 
To begin that analysis, then, with Gabinius. Dio visibly reproduces five arguments in 
support of Pompeius we know from the De Imperio to have been used for that purpose and 
in that period. These are: i) that the general is blessed with felicitas or τύχη; ii) that he 
alone is exceptional and distinctive; iii) that this exceptionality demands unanimous 
support; iv) that he has had a glorious career even from youth; and v) that he will be able to 
preserve and maintain Rome’s allies and revenues. Within these Dio furthermore imitates 
the rhetorical stragtegies of aporia, anaphora, polyptoton, and possibly polysyndeton at 
precisely the same argumentative points at which Cicero portrays himself having used 
them in 66 BCE. 
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 Cass. Dio. 36.42.4-43.5. This also suggests that Dio knew about Cicero’s De Imperio. 
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The first three of these arguments are compressed into a single passage. Consider the 
following comparison: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both advertisements of Pompeius’ virtues begin with aporia articulated with βουλοίμην ἂν 
and utinam. Both also wish that Rome have more able men; and both reach the same 
conclusion by encouraging unanimous approval by the end of the thought. It seems 
particularly striking that both argumentative chains begin with the same technique, before 
moving on to stress the exceptionality of this one man alone and then reaching the 
conclusion that none should hesitate to make use of him. The argument of Dio’s Gabinius 
that all of the virtues of the ideal leader are present in τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ is of course the main 
thrust of De Imperio 28-49 as a whole, a lengthy explanation of why Pompeius alone 
possesses all four qualities of the summus imperator;  but Cicero too later reduces this 
I would be glad if you had many good 
men, and would pray so too if I had to. But 
since this matter is one neither of prayer nor 
comes of its own accord, but requires that 
one be born with innate ability, learn what 
is serviceable, do what is required and 
above all enjoy good fortune – all of 
which I think very rarely come to the 
same one man – you must all 
unanimously support and make use of 
him when such a man is found. 
βουλοίμην μὲν γὰρ ἂν πολλοὺς ὑμῖν 
ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εἶναι, καὶ εἴγε καὶ 
εὔξασθαι δεῖ, εὐξαίμην ἄν: ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ 
εὐχῆς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦτό ἐστιν οὔτ᾽ 
αὐτόματόν τῳ παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ 
φῦναί τινα πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδείως, καὶ 
μαθεῖν τὰ πρόσφορα, καὶ ἀσκῆσαι τὰ 
προσήκοντα, καὶ παρὰ πάντα ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ 
χρῆσθαι, ἅπερ που σπανιώτατα ἂν τῷ 
αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ συμβαίη, χρὴ πάντας ὑμᾶς 
ὁμοθυμαδόν, ὅταν τις τοιοῦτος εὑρεθῇ, 
καὶ σπουδάζειν αὐτὸν καὶ καταχρῆσθαι 
αὐτῷ. 
Cass. Dio. 36.27.5-6. 
 
I wish, people of Rome, that you had 
such a great abundance of strong and 
honest men that to determine the man 
strong enough to be set at the head of such 
weighty matters and so great a war were a 
difficult decision! But now, truly, since 
there is this one Gnaeus Pompeius who 
has surpassed in valour not only the glory 
of men now alive, but even the recollection 
of our history, what matter is there that 
could make anyone doubtful in this case? 
utinam, Quirites, virorum fortium atque 
innocentium copiam tantam haberetis ut 
haec vobis deliberatio difficilis esset 
quemnam potissimum tantis rebus ac tanto 
bello praeficiendum putaretis! nunc vero 
cum sit unus Cn. Pompeius qui non modo 
eorum hominum qui nunc sunt gloriam sed 
etiam antiquitatis memoriam virtute 
superarit, quae res est quae cuiusquam 
animum in hac causa dubium facere 
possit? 
 
Cic. Man. 27 
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argument to the sort of digestible one-liner we find in Gabinius’ speech.63 All that is 
lacking in the excerpt of Cicero, in comparison to that of Dio’s Gabinius, is a word on 
felicitas or τύχη. But Pompeius’ felicitas is praised several times throughout the De 
Imperio, and elaborated in some detail.
64
 
 
The historian’s technique is similar later. Stressing Pompeius’ exceptionality even from his 
youth, both orations use anaphora and polyptoton to emphasise the point: 
   
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63
 Cic. Man. 51: et necessarium bellum esse et magnum et in uno Cn. Pompeio summa esse omnia; also 28: in 
summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere, scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, 
felicitatem. 
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He, whom you chose to command as a 
youth, you will reject now that he’s a 
grown man? He, to whom as an eques you 
entrusted those wars, you will not entrust 
this campaign now that he’s a senator? Of 
him who alone you had need for the 
emergencies back then before putting him 
properly to the test, will you not now 
entrust this, an emergency no smaller than 
those ones, now that you have more than 
sufficiently tested him? And he, whom you 
engaged against Sertorius when not yet 
able to hold a magistracy, you will not 
now send against the pirates now that he’s a 
consular?  
οὐκ ἂν ὑμῖν χρησιμώτατος γένοιτο; ἀλλ᾽ ὃν 
ἔφηβον ὄντα ἄρχειν εἵλεσθε, τοῦτον ἄνδρα 
γεγονότα ἀποδοκιμάσετε; καὶ ᾧ ἱππεῖ ἔτ᾽ 
ὄντι τοὺς πολέμους ἐκείνους ἐνεχειρίσατε, 
τούτῳ βουλῆς γεγονότι τὴν στρατείαν 
ταύτην οὐ πιστεύσετε; καὶ οὗ καὶ πρὶν 
ἀκριβῶς πειραθῆναι, μόνου πρὸς τὰ τότε 
κατεπείξαντα ὑμᾶς ἐδεήθητε, τούτῳ νῦν, 
ἱκανώτατα αὐτοῦ πεπειραμένοι, τὰ παρόντα 
οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκείνων ἀναγκαῖα ὄντα οὐκ 
ἐπιτρέψετε; καὶ ὃν οὐδὲ ἄρχειν ἔτι πω καὶ 
τότε δυνάμενον ἐπὶ τὸν Σερτώριον 
ἐχειροτονήσατε, τοῦτον ὑπατευκότα  ἤδη 
ἐπὶ τοὺς καταποντιστὰς οὐκ ἐκπέμψετε; 
Cass. Dio. 28.2-3. 
 
Who set out from school and juvenile  
education for his father’s army and the 
discipline of the camp in the midst of the 
greatest war and fiercest foes; who became 
the soldier of the greatest general when in 
the height of boyhood, then himself 
became the general of a great army upon 
attaining adolescence; who fought with the 
enemy more often than any other, waged 
more wars than others have even read 
about, subdued more provinces than others 
have dreamed of; whose  youth was trained 
to military matters not by another’s 
precepts, but by his own commands.   
qui e ludo atque e pueritiae disciplinis 
bello maximo atque acerrimis hostibus ad 
patris exercitum atque in militiae 
disciplinam profectus est, qui extrema 
pueritia miles in exercitu summi fuit 
imperatoris, ineunte adulescentia maximi 
ipse exercitus imperator, qui saepius cum 
hoste conflixit quam quisquam cum inimico 
concertavit, plura bella gessit quam ceteri 
legerunt, pluris provincias confecit quam 
alii concupiverunt, cuius adulescentia ad 
scientiam rei militaris non alienis 
praeceptis sed suis imperiis. 
 
 
Cic. Man. 28 
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Just as in the previous example Dio clearly compressed several Ciceronian arguments 
made in favour of Pompeius in 66 BCE and reproduced these with the same rhetorical 
strategy, so too do we find the same here. My inelegant translation of the Greek is intended 
to preserve the repetition and case-variation of the relative pronoun. It seems to me 
unusually coincidental that in both, the anaphora and polyptoton are generated in the 
relative pronouns ὃς and qui. It is also striking that this occurs in the same argumentative 
thought, in which both focus on Pompeius’ youth and the distinctiveness of his meteoric 
career.  
 
Third and finally, Cicero appears to have appealed to Roman imperialistic self-interest in 
his advocacy of the lex Manilia in 66 BCE; an argument which finds its way also into the 
exhortation of Dio’s Gabinius. In a summary of Pompeius’ martial prowess, both speeches 
argue that the general’s interventions have, and will again, preserve Rome’s revenues and 
protect its allies: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rhetorically, there may be less of interest in these passages from the viewpoint of source-
criticism. Both display a predilection for co-ordinating conjunctions (καὶ, τε, μὲν, δὲ: 9; et, 
atque, que, ac, aut: 7), and a case could be made here; but this is less striking than the 
Or do you think that this Pompeius, who in 
his boyhood was able to campaign and lead 
an army and increase your possessions 
and protect those of your allies and 
acquire those of your enemies, could not 
now, being in the prime of his life and of 
such an age as every man is at his best, and 
having gained such great experience from 
those wars, not now be most useful to you? 
οἴεσθε ὅτι Πομπήιος οὗτος ἐν μὲν μειρακίῳ 
καὶ στρατεύεσθαι καὶ στρατηγεῖν καὶ τὰ 
ὑμέτερα αὔξειν καὶ τὰ τῶν συμμάχων 
σώζειν τά τε τῶν ἀνθισταμένων 
προσκτᾶσθαι ἐδύνατο, νῦν δὲ ἀκμάζων καὶ 
ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὢν ἐν ᾗ πᾶς τις ἄριστος 
αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ γίγνεται, καὶ ἐμπειρίαν ἐκ τῶν 
πολέμων πλείστην ὅσην προσειληφώς, οὐκ 
ἂν ὑμῖν χρησιμώτατος γένοιτο; 
Cass. Dio. 36.28.1 
 
His arrival held in check even Mithridates, 
puffed-up with his unusual victory, and 
delayed Tigranes, threatening Asia with 
great forces. And who can doubt what he 
will do by his valour who has achieved so 
much by his authority? Or how easily with 
this command and his army he will 
preserve our allies and our revenues, who 
has defended them already merely by his 
name and the dread of it? 
huius adventus et Mithridatem insolita 
inflatum victoria continuit et Tigranen 
magnis copiis minitantem Asiae retardavit. 
et quisquam dubitabit quid virtute 
perfecturus sit qui tantum auctoritate 
perfecerit, aut quam facile imperio atque 
exercitu socios et vectigalia conservaturus 
sit qui ipso nomine ac rumore defenderit? 
Cic. Man. 45 
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identical rhetorical figures in the previous pairs. In the Greek the polysyndeton creates the 
rhetorical effect of a stressed enumeration of Pompeius’ many services, although this 
seems to me less pronounced in the Latin. But even without the shared polysyndeton it is 
striking that Dio’s Gabinius is again made to provide the same arguments in support of 
further extraordinary powers for Pompeius in the debate of 67 BCE as Cicero had 
historically offered around the same time, and with several clear overlaps in rhetorical 
strategy. It is even more striking that Dio covers all of this supporting Ciceronian material 
in such a short speech.  
 
For historical objections to the Gabinian law, however, the sources of evidence of 
historical oratory were less abundant. As I have already explained, Dio uses his Catulus as 
a catch-all opponent to Pompeius’ extraordinary commands, representing in him the 
opposing argument to these developments in Roman foreign-policy voiced by Q. 
Hortensius Hortalus in 66 BCE and probably by Q. Lutatius Catulus himself in 67 BCE. But 
no speech of either survives from the Late Republic. They may, or may not, have published 
their dissuasiones of the two laws; but Cicero mentions no such texts in the Brutus and 
didn’t consider Catulus in numero oratorum.65 
 
For the material, I suggest that Cassius Dio again looked within the De Imperio. Cicero 
preserves numerous fragments and testimonia of Catulus and Hortensius’ reasons for 
rejecting the Gabinian and Manilian laws. According to Cicero, they made five arguments: 
i) that great power ought not to be entrusted into the hands of one man alone; ii) that this 
ought to apply even if the recipient of those powers were the most worthy of all; iii) that 
such extraordinary commands would contravene the mores maiorum; iv) that over-reliance 
on Pompey had already led to a shortage of tried-and-tested commanders, and would 
continue to do so; and v) that it was inappropriate to bestow this honour upon a privatus 
rather than existing pro-magistrates. All five are reproduced in the historian’s speech of 
Catulus against the lex Gabinia. 
 
Cassius Dio inserts the first objection cited above into the mouth of his orator immediately 
after the proemium, and then the second some way further along the development of the 
argumentation. The similarities, again overleaf, seem to me striking: 
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We know from Cicero’s eyewitness testimony that Hortensius objected to Pompeius’ 
increasing military might in 66 BCE on the principle that it ought not to be placed into the 
charge of only one man (ad unum tamen omnia deferri non oportere). We can also be 
reasonably confident that he made the concession that if such a concentration of powers 
were appropriate, then Pompeius would be the most worthy of all to enjoy it (dignissimum 
esse Pompeium). Both the general principle and the concession cited in the contemporary 
Latin material find their way into the mouth of Dio’s Catulus: even if Pompeius were the 
finest of all (κἂν τὰ μάλιστα ἄριστός τις ᾖ), the command would be ill-advised. It is 
entirely possible that the historian drew inspiration here from Velleius Paterculus’ 
testimonium of Catulus. He also states the general principle contained in both Dio and 
Cicero. But only Cicero, among our ancient records of the debate, cites the concession as 
well as the general principle, which only Dio, too, reproduces in his oration of Catulus.  
 
There was then the third objection: the problem of ancestral custom. Cicero does not state 
explicitly that either of the two traditionalist statesmen involved in the debates of 67-66 
BCE objected on the grounds of the mores maiorum, and he does not quote. However, he 
And so first of all (and most importantly), I 
assert that we should never entrust so many 
commands to the charge of a single man, 
one after another. 
ἐγὼ τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστά φημι 
δεῖν μηδενὶ ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ τοσαύτας κατὰ τὸ 
ἑξῆς ἀρχὰς ἐπιτρέπειν. 
For who doesn’t know that it is neither 
fitting nor of advantage to confer all our 
affairs upon one person and to make one 
man master of our possessions, even if he is 
the finest of all?  
τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἄλλως καλῶς ἔχει 
οὔτε συμφέρει ἑνί τινι τὰ πράγματα 
προστάσσεσθαι καὶ ἕνα τινὰ πάντων τῶν 
ὑπαρχόντων ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν κύριον γίγνεσθαι, 
κἂν τὰ μάλιστα ἄριστός τις ᾖ; 
Cass. Dio. 36.31.3, 36.35.1 
 
What says Hortensius? That if all things 
should be entrusted to one man, Pompey 
would be the most worthy of all, but these 
should not be conferred upon a sole 
individual. 
quid ait Hortensius? si uni omnia tribuenda 
sint, dignissimum esse Pompeium, sed ad 
unum tamen omnia deferri non oportere. 
[Catulus said in the contio that Gnaeus 
Pompey was indeed a great man, but 
already too great for a free Republic, and 
that all  powers should not be placed in 
one man.] 
[in contione dixisset esse quidem 
praeclarum virum Cn. Pompeium, sed 
nimium iam liberae rei publicae, neque 
omnia in uno reponenda adiecissetque.] 
Cic. Man. 52; [Vell. Pat. 2.32.1] 
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goes quite transparently on the defensive on this question, and within a section of the 
speech (59-63) specifically devoted to Catulus’ objections to the lex Manilia: 
 
at enim ne quid novi fiat contra exempla atque instituta maiorum. non dicam 
hoc loco maiores nostros semper in pace consuetudini, in bello utilitati 
paruisse, semper ad novos casus temporum novorum consiliorum rationes 
accommodasse…in ipso Cn. Pompeio in quo novi constitui nihil volt Q. 
Catulus quam multa sint nova summa Q. Catuli voluntate constituta 
recordamini.  
 
Let there be no innovation contrary to the examples and principles of our 
ancestors. I will not say here that our ancestors always obeyed custom in times 
of peace and expediency in times of war, and always accommodated plans of 
action to the novel circumstances of new times…but in the case of this 
Gnaeus Pompeius, for whom Quintus Catulus objects to our introducing 
any innovation, remember how many new laws were constituted with the most 
willing consent of Quintus Catulus before!
66
   
 
It seems clear from Cicero, then, that Catulus rejected the possibility of further powers for 
Pompeius on the grounds that these would contravene established custom. The issue of the 
mores maiorum does not find its way into our other accounts of Valerius Maximus and 
Velleius Paterculus. Dio, on the other hand, reproduces it in his speech of Catulus. ‘How’, 
his orator asks, ‘will you not bring hatred upon yourselves from [the existing magistrates] 
and from all others selected to engage in public affairs, if you revoke our ancestral offices 
(ἂν τὰς μὲν πατρίους ἀρχὰς καταλύητε)?’67 This is an expansion of an earlier argument in 
Catulus’ oration, in which he states that ‘it is not in the nature of man, not only of the 
young but the old as well, to spend a long time in possession of power and still wish to 
abide by ancestral customs (τοῖς πατρίοις ἔθεσιν)’.68 Leach argues that these were ‘standard 
optimate arguments’: in view of the literary tradition of writing Catulus as the ideal staunch 
Republican, it would not be difficult to imagine and then reproduce such arguments without 
reference to a source.
69
 The number of parallels between Dio’s speeches of Gabinius and 
Catulus and the De Imperio, in addition to the overlaps in the rhetorical strategy, says 
otherwise. But if Cassius Dio did imagine and fabricate the objection to Pompeius’ 
δυναστεία in the early 60s BCE on the grounds of the mores maiorum, it merely 
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demonstrates how aware he was of genuine contemporary optimate arguments for the 
preservation of the Republic. 
 
A fourth argument in the historian’s dissuasio which comes directly from Late Republican 
oratory is the concern that selecting Pompeius for yet another command had led to a 
scarcity of competent generals and would continue to. Catulus, Cicero records, had flirted 
with the possibility of Pompeius’ death, and suggested that in such a case, Rome would 
have no other tried-and-tested commanders to turn to: 
 
reliquum est ut de Q. Catuli auctoritate et sententia dicendum esse videatur. qui 
cum ex vobis quaereret, si in uno Cn. Pompeio omnia poneretis, si quid eo 
factum esset, in quo spem essetis habituri, cepit magnum suae virtutis fructum 
ac dignitatis, cum omnes una prope voce in eo ipso vos spem habituros esse 
dixistis. 
 
It seems all that is left is for me to talk about the authority and opinion of 
Quintus Catulus. When he asked you in whom you would place your hopes, 
in the event that you entrusted everything to Gnaeus Pompeius and 
something then happened to him, he reaped the great crop of his virtue and 
dignity when you all with one voice said that you would place your faith in him 
instead.
70
 
 
It is unclear from Cicero’s paraphrase whether this objection was voiced in 67 or 66 BCE,71 
but it emerges in all our sources on the lex Gabinia, and possibly also in Sallust’s lost 
histories.
72
 This argument that over-reliance on a single commander would leave Rome 
with a dearth of other options, again, is re-elaborated also into Dio’s speech. His Catulus 
predicts that, should Pompeius be chosen again, ‘it is inevitable that there will be a 
profound lack of men to train for and be entrusted with the necessary matters; indeed, it’s 
for this reason most of all that you lacked a general for the war against Sertorius, since 
prior to that time you used to employ the same men for long periods’.73 As I will show in 
Chapter 5, in this thought Cassius Dio articulates very much his own historical analysis of 
Rome’s problematic inability to distribute power effectively within the Republican empire. 
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But he also re-elaborates another objection to Pompeius’ power in the early 60s BCE as we 
find it preserved in Cicero, and as such closely aligns his own speech of Catulus with the 
contemporary Latin evidence.  
 
Finally, from the evidence of the De Imperio Pompeius’ status as a privatus may also have 
been grounds for opposing the Gabinian and Manilian laws. Again, it is in the section of his 
oration specifically devoted to Catulus’ objections that Cicero labours this point. ‘What’, he 
asks, ‘can be more of an innovation than a teenage privatus raising an army in a time of 
emergency for the Republic? But Pompeius did so.’74 He continues: ‘what could be so 
unusual, as for a Roman eques [Pompeius] to be sent to a most important and formidable 
war? But he was sent. And indeed, when at that time someone in the Senate said that “we 
ought not to send a privatus with proconsular power”, it’s said that Lucius Philippus 
quipped “in my view, we’re not sending him with proconsular power, but actually in 
defence of the consuls”’.75 Cicero mentions Pompeius’ privatus status elsewhere:76  the 
point is laboured. It was an objection which had to be dealt with. Accordingly, Dio 
reproduces it in his oration of Catulus. Following on from his historically-accurate 
arguments about the preservation of the mores maiorum, Dio’s Catulus states that 
Gabinius’ lex would ‘overthrow the ancient offices, entrusting nothing to those elected by 
law, but instead assigning some strange and to this point unheard-of command to a private 
individual (ἰδιώτῃ)’.77  
 
I do not think we can agree that Dio’s Catulus ‘was talking as if he were in the Republic of 
Plato rather than the sink of Romulus’.78 As with Gabinius, all his main points replicate 
genuine arguments in the Latin political oratory of this context. I suggest that the historian 
found the material for both the opposing and supporting case on the lex Gabinia within the 
De Imperio, either stated explicitly (Gabinius qua Cicero) or reconstructed from Cicero’s 
quotations and testimonia. We do not know of Greek translations of Cicero’s speech. In any 
case, there are few grounds to suspect that the historian would have been unable to draw 
from the contemporary Latin version: I have set out the evidence which confirms that Dio 
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could read and speak Latin. It is most likely that in the course of his decade of reading and 
research, the historian will have consulted the De Imperio when the issue of Pompeius’ 
extraordinary commands arose. Given the ergonomical difficulty of ancient texts, he then 
excerpted quotations and arguments from this text into his ὑπομνήματα for later re-
elaboration into his own representation of the debates surrounding Pompeius’ power when 
the time came for writing-up. Fechner’s scepticism – that it is questionable whether or not 
Dio really did use the De Imperio – may be cautious, but is not necessary.79 
The Ciceronian Material: The Philippicae  
Cassius Dio’s use of the Philippicae to construct both the for- and against-case regarding 
M. Antonius in the Cicero-Calenus invectives is remarkably similar. As with my previous 
analysis, I leave aside a detailed discussion of the historical context of those speeches, 
which is not relevant here. However, the historian’s relationship with the Philippicae has 
been more thoroughly discussed than the relatively neglected De Imperio, and it is 
worthwhile to look cursorily at this first.  
 
Dio’s debt to the Philippicae in the composition of his Cicero-Calenus debate has long 
been acknowledged. Fischer’s detailed study concluded that Dio certainly used material 
from all fourteen Philippicae, but that he was so faithful to the original ‘that you would 
think you were reading an actual speech of Cicero translated into Greek’.80 This, I will 
show, is an exaggeration, but my conclusions will absolutely support Fischer’s thesis that 
there is no reason to suspect an intermediate source (and especially not a Greek one) 
between Cicero and Dio, which two later studies have insisted upon.
81
 It is testament to the 
detail of Fischer’s investigation that all modern discussions of the historian’s re-
elaboration of the Philippicae now merely mention the fact that it happened, either directly 
from the Latin original or through a later Greek compilation or translation.
82
  
 
Calenus’ riposte to Cicero’s treatment of Antonius in Book 46 is less studied. Although 
both Gabba and Millar recognise that Cicero in the Second Philippic gives fragments and 
testimonia of Antonius’ words which could have provided anti-Ciceronian material for 
Dio’s speech of Calenus, both set aside the possibility.83 Gabba concludes that the historian 
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drew instead from Asinius Pollio’s lost invectives.84 In fact, I will suggest here, there is no 
need to imagine any source for Dio’s Cicero-Calenus polemics other than Cicero himself, 
and in Latin. As in his Gabinius-Catulus debate, the historian appears to have taken a Latin 
text of Late Republican oratory and then used it, not only to build one side of the debate, 
but to reconstruct the other in addition. He furthermore again replicates aspects of the 
rhetorical as well as argumentative strategy of Cicero.  
 
Beginning, then, with the invective of Book 45, the speech strikes me as a fusion of three 
Philippicae: the Second, Fifth, and Eighth. Gabba argued that it corresponds predominantly 
to the Fifth Philippic.
85
 The main body of the parallels between Cicero and Dio, moreover, 
have been discovered in the Second and Third.
86
 Two aspects are missing in those 
analyses. Firstly, while the historian certainly does locate his speech in the context of the 
Fifth Philippic in the earliest days of January 43 BCE, it is addressed directly to Calenus 
(45.46.1: ὦ Καλῆνε), the addressee of the Eighth Philippic.  It therefore merges both the 
context of the Fifth and the setting of the Eighth. Moreover, Dio deliberately locates his 
speech of Cicero as second in the ‘series’. This is indicated from the beginning. His orator 
opens by reiterating the ‘recent’ (πρῴην) defence he has made in a previous speech both 
for his departure from Rome and for his long ἀποδημία following Caesar’s assassination.87 
This is a reference to the exculpatory content of sections 1-11 of the First Philippic. Dio 
therefore collapsed several Philippicae as has already been argued elsewhere, but did so 
not only in content, but in context, addressee, and sequence.  
 
The historian clearly took liberties with Cicero’s polemics against Antonius. It would 
hardly have been feasible to provide a version of all fourteen speeches; and his purpose 
was not to provide the reader with a précis in any case, but to demonstrate the way in 
which public speech and political life were corrupted by factional discord in the Late 
Republic. This purpose, I suggest, was made more attainable by Dio’s reproduction of the 
contemporary  Latin evidence of oratory.  
 
When we compare the argumentation of the historian’s Cicero with the historical Cicero, a 
striking pattern emerges which demonstrates how closely Dio followed the contemporary 
evidence in the course of his reading and note-taking. I suggest that the historian excerpted 
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details from the Second Philippic for long stretches (‘runs’), occasionally interrupting this 
where he felt the original Ciceronian material uneccessary to include (‘breaks’). Where 
these ‘runs’ occur, the order in which the argumentation develops is identical in both.  At a 
later point, Dio additionally ‘loops’ back to an earlier point in the Second Philippic before 
the argument resumes, again in parallel. 
 
RUN 1: Cicero declares that Antonius is an enemy of the state (45.20.4: πάλαι φημὶ 
πολέμιον αὐτὸν ἁπάντων ἡμῶν εἶναι = 2.2: esse hostem patriae); Antonius’ banditry 
substantiates that point (45.20.4: τὴν χώραν πορθῶν καὶ λυμαινόμενος = 2.5: beneficium 
latronum); Caesar’s documents are unfaithfully edited (45.23.6: τοῖς μὴ λαβοῦσι 
δέδωκε, παραποιησάμενος τὰ τοῦ Καίσαρος ὑπομνήματα = 2.8: habes scientiam 
quaestuosam); Antonius’ prostitution in his youth (45.26.2: τὴν ἀκμὴν τὴν ἐφ᾽ ἥβης 
ἀπεκήρυξε = 2.45: puer emptus libidinis); the paraliptical posture of sparing details of 
this for modesty (45.26.2: αἰδοῦμαι, νὴ τὸν Ἡρακλέα, ἀκριβῶς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον  = 2.47: sunt 
quaedam quae honeste non possum dicere);  
BREAK 1: Phil. 2.48-56: description of Antonius’ political career 
RUN 2: Antonius’ romp in Italy with pimps and prostitutes (45.28.2: πόρνους καὶ 
πόρνας = 2.58: sequebatur raeda cum lenonibus, comites nequissimi); his disgrace of the 
lictors, still crowned with laurel, by exposure to such company (45.28.2: μετὰ τῶν 
ῥαβδούχων δαφνηφορούντων = 2.58: lictores laureati antecedebant); vomiting in the 
tribunal while conducting public business in the assembly (45.28.2: ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τὴν 
κραιπάλην ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ βήματος μεταξὺ δημηγορῶν ἐξήμει = 2.63: in coetu vero populi 
Romani negotium publicum gerens…vomens frustis esculentis vinum redolentibus gremium 
suum et totum tribunal implevit); shock in both that Antonius’ ‘dared’ purchase 
Pompeius Magnus’ estate (45.28.3: τὴν τοῦ Πομπηίου οὐσίαν μόνος ἀνθρώπων ἀγοράσαι 
ἐτόλμησε, μήτε τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀξίωμα μήτε τὴν ἐκείνου μνήμην αἰδεσθείς = 2.64: qui ad illud 
scelus sectionis auderet accedere, inventus est nemo praeter Antonium); public grief at 
the auction (45.28.3: ἐφ᾽ οἷς πάντες ἔτι καὶ τότε ἐθρηνοῦμεν = 2.64: dolor…gemitus 
populi Romani); Antonius’ immediate squandering of Pompeius’ property (45.28.4: 
πάνθ᾽ ὅσαπερ ἐκτήσατο, παμπληθῆ τε γενόμενα καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου ἀργυρολογηθέντα, 
κατακεκύβευκε καὶ καταπεπόρνευκε καὶ καταβέβρωκε = 2.66: illa tam multa quam paucis 
non dico mensibus sed diebus effuderit); Antonius as Charybdis (45.28.4: καταπέπωκεν 
ὥσπερ ἡ Χάρυβδις = 2.66: quae Charybdis tam vorax?);  
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BREAK 2: Phil. 2.67-70: rhetorical questions on Antonius’ activities in Pompeius’s house 
[RUN 3?]: Paraliptical transitioning from the narrative of Antonius’ personal life to 
deal with the Civil War (45.29.1: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐάσω: τὰς δὲ δὴ ὕβρεις ἃς τὸ κοινὸν 
ὕβρισε, καὶ τὰς σφαγὰς ἃς κατὰ πᾶσαν ὁμοίως τὴν πόλιν εἰργάσατο, πῶς ἄν τις 
σιωπήσειεν; = 2.70: sed omitto ea peccata quae non sunt earum partium propria quibus tu 
rem publicam vexavisti; ad ipsas tuas partis redeo, id est ad civile bellum);  
BREAK 3: Phil. 2.70-84: Antonius’ Mediterranean peregrinations 
RUN 4: Antonius’ naked harangue of the people at the Lupercalia (45.30.1: γυμνὸς καὶ 
μεμυρισμένος ἔς τε τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐσῆλθε, πρόφασιν τὰ Λυκαῖα ποιησάμενος, κἀνταῦθα πρὸς 
τὸ βῆμα μετὰ τῶν ῥαβδούχων προσῆλθε, καὶ ἐκεῖ κάτωθεν ἐδημηγόρησεν = 2.85: O 
praeclaram illam eloquentiam tuam, cum es nudus contionatus!); the crowning of Caesar 
(45.31.3: καὶ τό τε διάδημα εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ ἐπιθεῖναι = 2.86: diadema 
ostendis); shock that Antonius should take it upon himself to establish a king without 
popular consent (45.32.1-2:  ἡμεῖς, ὦ Ἀντώνιε, ἡμεῖς σοι ταῦτ᾽ ἐνετειλάμεθα;… ἡμεῖς 
βασιλέα τινὰ ἀσπάσασθαί σε προσετάξαμεν;… ἡμεῖς τύραννόν τινα ἀποδεῖξαί σοι 
ἐκελεύσαμεν; = 2.86: a nobis, populoque Romano, mandatum id certe non habebas);  
LOOP 1: Concordances drop at Phil. 2.86 and return at 2.25-2.41, below:  
RUN 5: Refutation of the accusation that Cicero was responsible for Caesar’s death, 
with acknowledgement that this is praise, not defamation (45.41.1: εἶπέ ποτε ὅτι ἐγὼ 
τοὺς σφαγέας ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν παρεσκεύασα: οὕτω γὰρ ἀνόητός ἐστιν ὥστε μου καταψεύδεσθαι 
τολμᾶν τηλικούτους ἐπαίνους = 2.25: Caesarem meo consilio interfectum…me non solum 
meis laudibus ornaret sed etiam oneraret alienis); responsibility for Caesar’s death 
shared by Antonius as any other (45.41.1: τοῖς μέντοι πράγμασιν αὐτοῖς φημι ἐκεῖνον 
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀπολωλέναι = 2.34: vide, quaeso, Antoni, quid tibi futurum sit, quem et Narbone 
hoc consilium cum C. Trebonio cepisse notissimum est); yet he was too cowardly to be 
directly involved in the plot (45.41.1: οὐχ ὅτι οὐκ ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο κατέδεισε 
=  2.35: virum res illa quaerebat); Antonius did not receive the patrimony from his 
father (45.47.3: μήτε τὸν πατέρα τῆς οὐσίας κληρονομήσας = 2.42: cum ipse hereditatem 
patris non adisses); instead, he inherited from people he had never even met (45.47.5: 
τῶν μὲν ἐκείνου χρημάτων οὐκ ἐκληρονόμησεν, ἄλλων δὲ δὴ καὶ πάνυ πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν 
μήτ᾽ ἰδὼν μήτ᾽ ἀκούσας πώποτε = 2.41: te, quem numquam viderat aut certe numquam 
salutaverat, fecit heredem). 
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The architecture of both orations is fundamentally the same from beginning to end, and 
progresses consecutively. The breaks, at which the historian appears to have stopped 
following Cicero, can be explained by the structure of Dio’s text as a whole. There was no 
need to provide the summary of Antonius’ political career articulated in Phil. 2.48-56 
(Break 1), as the particulars had been outlined earlier in the narrative. Dio apparently did 
not feel the need to incorporate the lengthy selection of rhetorical questions at Phil. 2.67-
70 (Break 2) into his own version; but it appears to be arguments that the historian 
required, and not rhetorical questions, which were easy enough for Dio to devise of his 
own accord. The absence of an enumeration of Antonius’ travels abroad at Phil. 2.70-84 
(Break 3) is harder to explain: it is peculiar that the historian omitted this especially long 
and incriminating section of the argument, although this can perhaps be again justified by 
the record he provides of Antonius’ travels throughout his career earlier in the diegesis. 
The reasons for the ‘loop’, again, are unclear. It may be that after excerpting details from 
the Second Philippic in the course of his reading and research, Dio set the text aside, but 
returned to it later. All told, there are no fewer than twenty-one points at which the 
arguments of Dio’s Cicero and the historical Cicero run in tandem.  
 
The mirroring extends to the rhetorical as well as the argumentative strategy of the Second 
Philippic. Unlike Dio’s imitation of the De Imperio, there is less here from the viewpoint 
of rhetorical figures. It is possible that the abundance of detailed arguments left little room 
for recording also how those were expressed. However, just as in his speech of Gabinius 
the historian reproduced rhetorical figures in conjunction with the arguments they 
originally reinforced in the De Imperio, so too here did Cassius Dio retain the original 
wording of Cicero at the beginning of a transition from one argument to another. The 
comparison follows on the next page: 
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In his use both of the De Imperio and Second Philippic, Cassius Dio worked to bring his 
orations into line with the contemporary Latin material where composing a speech parallel 
to an historical occasion of oratory. That is, he seems not to have qualms about collapsing 
the content, context, and addressee of several Philippicae into one, if it was to demonstrate 
Late Republican oratory at its most aggressive; nor did he find displacing genuine 
δὴ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ βίον τάς τε ἰδίας 
ἀσελγείας καὶ πλεονεξίας ἑκὼν 
παραλείψω, ὅτι αἰδοῦμαι νὴ τὸν Ἡρακλέα 
ἀκριβῶς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον 
But I shall pass over his private life and 
his lusts and his greed, since (by God!) I 
am ashamed to detail them point-by-point. 
Cass. Dio. 45.26.2 
τὴν τοῦ Πομπηίου οὐσίαν μόνος ἀνθρώπων 
ἀγοράσαι ἐτόλμησε, μήτε τὸ ἑαυτοῦ 
ἀξίωμα μήτε τὴν ἐκείνου μνήμην 
αἰδεσθείς...ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ οἷς πάντες ἔτι καὶ τότε 
ἐθρηνοῦμεν, ταῦτα μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἁρπάσας. 
He alone among men dared to purchase the 
estate of Pompeius, having regard neither 
for his own dignity nor the memory of that 
great man…At the sight of him grasping at 
these things with pleasure, we all groaned, 
and still do now. 
Cass. Dio. 45.28.3 
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐάσω: τὰς δὲ δὴ ὕβρεις ἃς 
τὸ κοινὸν ὕβρισε, καὶ τὰς σφαγὰς ἃς κατὰ 
πᾶσαν ὁμοίως τὴν πόλιν εἰργάσατο, πῶς 
ἄν τις σιωπήσειεν; 
And so I shall leave that aside; for how 
could one remain silent about the outrages 
which you committed against the state, 
and the slaughter you inflicted upon all the 
city alike?  
Cass. Dio. 45.29.1 
sed iam stupra et flagitia omittamus: sunt 
quaedam quae honeste non possum dicere. 
tu autem eo liberior… 
But let us leave aside, now, your 
depravity; there are some things which 
cannot be with decency said. You’re all 
the freer for that… 
 Cic. Phil. 2.47 
qui ad illud scelus sectionis auderet 
accedere, inventus est nemo praeter 
Antonium, praesertim cum tot essent…qui 
alia omnia auderent...Dolor – bona, 
inquam, Cn. Pompei Magni!...gemitus 
tamen populi Romani liber fuit. 
No one was found who would dare to 
commit that criminal purchase, except 
Antonius, even when there were so many 
there who would commit any crime!...The 
grief – the goods, I say, of Pompeius 
Magnus!...But the Roman people groaned 
freely. 
Cic. Phil. 2.64 
sed omitto ea peccata quae non sunt earum 
partium propria quibus tu rem publicam 
vexavisti; ad ipsas tuas partis redeo, id est 
ad civile bellum 
But I pass over those offenses which have 
no connection with the part you took in 
harassing the republic; I return to that in 
which you bore so principal a share,—that 
is, the civil war. 
Cic. Phil. 2.70 
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arguments, on the constitutional problem of Pompeius’ extraordinary command of 66 BCE, 
to a debate on that topic a year earlier a source of disquiet. Probably he would not have 
understood why some modern scholars do.
88
 The important aspect appears to have been to 
preserve, where possible, those arguments which Dio knew to have been put forth in the 
Late Republic in a comparable historical situation.  Even the rhetoric is not entirely his – 
and this is no criticism. On a number of occasions, Dio imitated not only the historical 
argumentation but the rhetoric used to deliver it, grafting the expressions he found in the 
texts onto identical arguments in his own version. A mere list of concordances between 
Dio and Cicero will not suffice. Through a rhetorical analysis of the texts, it is clear that 
Dio found a compromise route between the time- or space-demands of writing his 
enormous history, and giving a credible representation of some Late Republican oratory 
that was still his own. 
 
I close this discussion of the Ciceronian material with the ‘anti-Philippic’ response of Q. 
Fufius Calenus. Gabba held the view that the speech was compiled from anti-Ciceronian 
literature as such, either the lost polemics of Asinius Pollio or the pseudo-Sallustian 
Invectiva in Ciceronem.
89
 But as Syme has shown, there is little evidence to suggest that 
the Invectiva date to the Late Republic at all;
90
 they may come from the Imperial period, 
and this is the literature from which Millar believes Dio drew the body of his ‘anti-
Philippic’ material.91 Gabba adduces ten concordances between the Invectiva and Dio’s 
oration of Calenus, and is surely correct that these admit of little doubt that the historian 
did draw from a source. But the case for Asinius Pollio’s polemics, being lost, is not 
strong; and although Gabba has outlined ten parallels between the pseudo-Sallustian 
Invectiva and Dio’s Calenus, these are lacking in detail, and ten are rather few for so 
famous an event. There is the possibility that M. Antonius’ own published responses to 
Cicero were still available in the historian’s time. Plutarch appears to have read them, and 
one of his recorded attacks on Cicero’s divorce and remarriage appears in Dio’s speech of 
Calenus.
92
 This, however, will not help, as Antonius’ ἀντιγραφαί are lost, and we last hear 
of them a century before Dio.  
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In fact, and as Frisch has already suggested,
93
 the richest source of evidence for Antonius’ 
arguments against Cicero which we know to have still been extant in Cassius Dio’s time 
were the Philippicae themselves. The historian’s motivation in placing these into the 
mouth of Calenus rather than that of Antonius himself is a different question, but at the 
time of the debate in the early days of January 43 BCE, Antonius is away in Gaul and 
cannot possibly defend himself.
94
 Knowing from the Eighth Philippic that Q. Fufius 
Calenus was a supporter of Antonius, Dio again appears to have chosen the most natural 
available character to present the opposite side of the debate, as with Q. Lutatius Catulus 
for the events of 67 BCE.  
 
The Second Philippic preserves fourteen of these accusations against Cicero. It seems to 
me that, just as Dio had the De Imperio to hand for the exhortation of Gabinius and then 
found in that text all the main arguments needed to reconstruct the opposing case of 
Catulus, so too could he draw both the ‘Philippic’ and the ‘anti-Philippic’ from this text. In 
a series of quotations and testimonia, Cicero repeats those contentions which Antonius had 
levied against him in reply to his First Philippic of September 44 BCE: i) that he had 
violated their friendship;
95
 ii) that he had been ungrateful for Antonius’ retiring from the 
augurship contest in his favour;
96
 iii) that he had taken advantage of Antonius’ beneficia;97 
iv) that he had sent him friendly letters and was now changing face;
98
 v) that he had 
demonstrated misconduct in his consulship;
99
 vi) that the Capitoline had been full of armed 
slaves on Cicero’s watch;100 vii) that he had mistreated Antonius’ uncle, Lentulus;101 viii) 
that Clodius was slain by his contrivance;
102
 ix) that he advised and rejoiced at the death of 
Milo;
103
 x) that the alienation of Pompeius and Caesar was Cicero’s fault, and by extension 
the Civil War too;
104
 xi) that he had spurred individuals on to Caesar’s assassination;105 xii) 
that he was an accomplice in the plot;
106
 xiii) that he was disliked and consequently 
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received few inheritances;
107
 xiv) and that Cicero returned from voluntary exile under 
cover of darkness and in un-Roman dress.
108
 
 
Strikingly, only two of these recriminations of Antonius preserved in Cicero’s text do not 
find their way into Dio’s ‘anti-Philippic’ of Calenus. The speech makes no mention of 
accusations i) and iv), that Cicero had violated his friendship with Antonius and was 
displaying hypocrisy in changing face after a cordial exchange of letters. This may owe 
something to the choice of speaker in Dio in comparison with the personal nature of the 
accusations: Calenus may not have seemed the best-placed to comment on the friendship 
formerly enjoyed by the pair, or to have read their correspondence in the context. Twelve 
others, however, are reincorporated from the Second Philippic into Calenus’ invective.  
 
The points at which the two texts most closely overlap in their argumentation appear to be 
arranged into three clusters of concordance. First, the short section from 46.2.2-46.4.2 
reproduces eight of these testimonia; second, the yetbriefer 46.20 preserves three; and 
third, a couple of sentences in 46.22.3-5 replicate four, in rapid sequence.  
 
To turn to the first of these clusters, it is clear that Dio on eight occasions reproduces the 
crimina which Antonius marshalled against Cicero at some point in September or October 
44 BCE; but he does so with no particular regard to the order in which the Second Philippic 
preserved them. Here the historian’s method is noticeably different from his invective of 
Cicero in Book 45, for which as I have shown he imitated the sequence of the original 
argumentation. As for the overlaps in the argumentation, there is, first, the accusation that 
Cicero was the cause of the emnity between Pompeius and Caesar and in consequence 
precipitated the civil war (46.2.2 = 2.23).
109
  This is followed by Cicero’s supposed 
responsibility for the death of P. Clodius Pulcher through T. Annius Milo (46.2.3 = 
2.21);
110
 and, similarly, the killing of Caesar through M. Junius Brutus, stated once 
explicitly and insinuated a second time (46.2.3 = 2.27; 46.3.3 = 2.27).
111
 Calenus then 
raises the controversial topic of Cicero’s consulship, with reference to Catiline (46.2.3 = 
2.11),
112
 before accusing him of cruelty toward Antonius’ uncle Lentulus during that time 
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(46.2.3 = 2.18).
113
 The final two points are a considerable jump forward in the material of 
the Second Philippic: Calenus implies that the orator’s voluntary exile in Athens shows 
how foreign (ἀλλότριον) he is to the Roman way of life (46.3.2 = 2.76),114 before raising 
Cicero’s lack of inheritances, here owing to his provincial background (46.4.2 = 2.40).115 
Surprisingly, then,  Dio compresses eight of M. Antonius’ actual accusations of 
September-October 44 BCE scattered across the Second Philippic into a very short section 
of his own speech of Calenus. 
 
In the second brief cluster, Dio’s Calenus returns to the year 63 BCE to attack Cicero on the 
basis of his consulatus. Here again the earler argument that the orator ought to be punished 
for his consulship is repeated (46.20.1 = 2.11);
116
 but Calenus provides further detail. Dio 
here introduces Antonius’ accusation that the Capitol was filled with armed slaves during 
Cicero’s term (46.20.1 = 2.16),117 and brings forth the unjust imprisonment and execution 
of Lentulus a second time, on this occasion in much greater detail (46.20.3-5 = 2.18).
118
 
 
The third cluster reconstructed from testimonia of Antonius’ criticisms of 44 BCE focusses 
again on the assassination of Caesar and introduces the relationship between Cicero and 
Antonius. Dio’s Calenus first repeats the orator’s apparent involvement in the murder plot, 
and his exhortations to others to do his dirty work for him by literally stabbing the dictator 
in the back (46.22.3 = 2.27).
119
 Here the historian returns to, but modifies, Antonius’ 
crimen that Brutus had held his dagger aloft to Cicero and called his name following the 
bloodshed in the Senate, thereby implicating him too.
120
 Dio’s version (46.22.4 = 2.28) is 
slightly corrrupted: Calenus is made to detail nameless tyrannicides running into the Forum 
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 Cic. Phil. 2.28: at quem ad modum me coarguerit homo acutus recordamini. 'Caesare interfecto' inquit 
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libertatem est gratulatus.' cur mihi potissimum? quia sciebam?  
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brandishing their swords and calling ‘ὦ Κικέρων᾿, without reference to Brutus in the 
Senate or recuperatam libertatem.
121
 The reasons for this corruption of the material escape 
me, particularly given the distinctiveness of the image. It may be that the historian did not 
record Brutus’ name into his ὑπόμνημα, and in a misinterpretation of the original Latin 
believed that the tyrannicide invocation of Cicero happened in the Forum rather than the 
senate-house. And to close, there are lastly the accusations of Cicero’s ingratitude toward 
Antonius’ beneficia (εὐεργέτην ὄντα ἐφόνευσε): both in the matter of the generously-ceded 
augurship (46.22.5 = 2.4),
122
 and with regard to Antonius’ refraining from killing Cicero at 
Brundisium (46.22.6 = 2.5).
123
  
 
Cassius Dio thus appears to have re-elaborated the actual argumentative strategy pursued 
by Antonius in September-October 44 BCE into his own ‘anti-Philippic’ of Calenus. The 
parallels between the historian’s method here and in his speech of Catulus on the Gabinian 
law seem to me evident. In two Latin speeches of Cicero, Dio found not only the case 
which was historically parallel to the one he was intending to make, but also the quoted or 
paraphrased objections of the other side, which he duly reconstructed.  In these debates on 
Pompeius’ power and the rectitude of Antonius, the historian built four speeches out of 
two. In all four cases, Cassius Dio presents the actual case that he found, among the 
contemporary Latin evidence of oratory, to have been historically made in a similar context 
to the one he depicts.  
 
There were of course gaps in the material. The historian’s intention was not to provide a 
précis or translation of any speech of Cicero, Catulus, Hortensius, or Antonius; whole 
sections of the ‘anti-Philippic’ of Dio’s Calenus cannot be traced back to the Second 
Philippic. The oration, which covers twenty-eight chapters (46.1-28) only corresponds 
strongly with the original text of Cicero in clusters with often lengthy gaps inbetween, 
especially from cluster one (46.2.2-46.4.2) to cluster two (46.20). The historian fills these 
‘breaks’ with material demonstrably not from the Second Philippic. For example, one may 
consider the vulgar and graphic excursus criticising Cicero’s unexalted background (46.4-
7). We should not be too quick to imagine that a novus homo would not have to face 
similar slanders in Late Republican oratory: some of Asinius Pollio’s comments on Cicero 
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were so vulgar that even he decided not to circulate them further.
124
 Therefore, , there is no 
need to posit that this aspect of Dio’s invective necessarily emerged from Imperial Greek 
literature or was alien to the world of Late Republican oratory.
125
 Dio could have as easily 
drawn this material from other contemporary Latin sources,
126
 or, as I will come to in 
Chapter 4, from the memory of his rhetorical education. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
something other than the Philippicae contributed to this section. Similarly, the stretch of 
the ‘break’ which follows this slander (46.7-10) sets out a number of general and 
unsubstantiated criticisms of the orator’s character – mediocrity, covetousness, hypocrisy, 
boastfulness – which need not have derived from a source at all.  
 
Even during these breaks, however, we find defensive responses of Dio’s Calenus to the 
historical arguments made by Cicero himself in the Second Philippic scattered about. The 
historian still found room in his speaker’s crude digression on Cicero’s provincial origins 
to register Calenus’ shock that ‘you dared, you wretch, to slander Antonius for his early 
manhood, he who enjoyed attendants and teachers which befit his pedigree’:127 a clear 
reference to Cicero’s attack on Antonius’ boyhood relationship with Curio.128 There are in 
addition in this break a rather weak defence of Antonius’ nudity at the Lupercalia,129 and of 
his gift of two thousand acres of Leontine land to the rhetor Sextus Clodius:
130
 both 
directly respond to accusations in the Second Philippic. Whether the historian devised 
these ripostes himself from excerpts and quotations of the original in his ὑπόμνημα, when 
the time came to writeup, or derived them from another source, is speculation. But they 
demonstrate further that in this less sophisticated section of the oration, comprised mainly 
of personal abuse rather than the genuine arguments of Antonius recorded in the Second 
Philippic, Dio incorporated the historical material even here.  
 
I am aware that to this point I have not investigated similarities in the rhetorical, and not 
only argumentative, strategy pursued by Dio’s Catulus and Calenus. Such an analysis, I 
have suggested in the case of Gabinius’ and Cicero’s orations, can be fruitful: in his speech 
of Gabinius in support of Pompeius, the historian’s use of anaphora, polyptoton, aporia, 
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and polysyndeton at precisely the same argumentative points as Cicero in the De Imperio 
cannot be a coincidence. Nor, indeed, the striking mirroring of the Ciceronian language in 
Dio’s ‘Philippic’. For want of Greek translations of either, the extant material suggests that 
this was the historian’s own intellectual endeavour and that he deliberately chose to 
reproduce the historical evidence of oratory into his own speeches. However, I have found 
nothing to indicate that Dio replicated the rhetorical strategy pursued by Q. Lutatius 
Catulus and Q. Hortensius Hortalus in 67-66 BCE in his own speech of Catulus on the 
Gabinian law, nor that of M. Antonius in 44 BCE in his invective of Calenus.  
 
I speculate that the reason for this is simple. Cassius Dio could not align his own ‘versions’ 
of these speeches with the rhetorical strategies of those orators because he did not have 
access to them. I have suggested that the historian reconstructed the ‘opposing’ cases put 
forward on the depicted occasion of speech by reading and noting down the testimonia and 
quotations of Catulus, Hortensius, and Antonius that he found in Cicero, for later re-
elaboration. These are universally brief, and give an indication only of what was 
supposedly argued, not how it was argued. These fragments of oratory were not presented 
in propria voce, but were quoted, and possibly misrepresented,
131
 by Cicero for his own 
argumentative purposes. The historian had, on the one hand, two ample and rhetorically-
finished orations of Cicero in support of the lex Manilia of 66 BCE and in castigation of 
Antonius in 44 BCE: these provided both the argumentative and rhetorical basis for his 
speeches of Gabinius and Cicero. But on the other hand, for his Catulus and Calenus he 
had only testimonies of the arguments put forward by ‘their’ side of the debate. These 
arguments he preserved in his notes and then reincorporated into his dissuasio of the 
Gabinian law and ‘anti-Philippic’, with a surprising degree of accuracy. The rhetoric, 
however, was down to Dio.  
Conclusion 
Cassius Dio’s speeches are no more an absolute fabrication and nonsensical distortion of 
the nature of Late Republican oratory than they are a verbatim transcript of it. Both of 
these are extremes, and no scholar would approve either. The consensus, however, seems 
to me to have shifted too far toward the former of this pair, and our general impression of 
the meaning and role of Dio’s orations of the Late Republic and Augustan era has been 
altered by this consensus. It is telling that there is far more bibliography on concordances 
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between the historian’s speeches and the writings of Thucydides or Demosthenes than 
there is on the relationship between these compositions and the evidence, especially 
synchronous evidence, of Late Republican oratory.  
 
By returning to a source-critique of Dio’s speeches – a subject which has generated only a 
few items of discussion in the past century – I have been ploughing traditionally well-
furrowed ground, at least in the case of the Philippicae. However, there is also room from 
the analysis of this chapter to posit three general principles with respect to these 
compositions which are, to my knowledge, new and hitherto unstudied.  
 
Firstly, it seems clear to me that Dio used contemporary Latin source-material in cases 
where the historical occasion could be expected to be recognisable to an educated 
audience. Where Cassius Dio had an occasion of oratory to represent which ran parallel to 
an actual historical occurrence, we can be confident that he had at least read, and had 
probably excerpted into his ὑπομνήματα, the historical particulars of the case, for re-
elaboration into a speech of his own later. In the next chapter I will come to the problem of 
the moral probity of rhetoric in Dio, and this discussion will touch upon the speech of 
Caesar at Vesontio in Book 38 and the false recusatio of Augustus in Book 53. Although 
the source-material is less rich than what I have discussed here, there is certainly a case to 
be made about the extent to which the historian modelled these orations on what he found 
in, for example, Caesar’s own speech to his troops at Vesontio in the De Bello Gallico, or 
aspects of Augustan self-presentation which the princeps brought to the fore in his Res 
Gestae. Having now established this principle, we can proceed into further notes about the 
composition of Dio’s speeches with greater confidence. 
 
Secondly, it is not an anachronistic value-judgement to suggest that the historian’s 
handling of the writing of speeches may be more sophisticated than has been traditionally 
thought. The mirroring of Ciceronian rhetorical strategies which Dio mapped onto the 
argumentative strategies they initially reinforced in the Latin texts required careful reading 
of the original rhetorical material; and it furthermore speaks to the historian’s level of 
rhetorical education and his literary art. Some scholars may believe that I have credited 
Cassius Dio with too much subtlety in suggesting that he reconstructed the arguments of 
his Catulus and Calenus from the opposing testimonia and quotations preserved in the De 
Imperio and Second Philippic. But the preserved objections of the ‘other side’ are not 
particularly hidden or obfuscated in the text: they are plain enough to see. If Cassius Dio 
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performed the task of reconstruction which I suggest, then he may have beaten Meyer’s 
19
th
-century Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta to the task by about sixteenhundred years.  
 
Third – and most importantly – the fact that the historian aligned his own representation of 
the debate on Pompeius’ δυναστεία in the early 60s BCE or the polemics of Cicero and 
Antonius with the contemporary record speaks to the relationship between speech and 
historical explanation in Dio’s work. In these contexts, the historian reproduces the actual 
for-and-against arguments, which (if we are to believe Morstein-Marx) we can reasonably 
trust that Cicero recorded in his published speeches with something approximate to 
accuracy.
132
 These compositions in the Roman History do not belong in a sophistic 
thought-world divorced from what we, and Dio himself, read in the contemporary Latin 
record of the Late Republic. Rather, by setting out the genuine historical arguments in 
favour of or opposition to Pompeius’ power, or for and against Antonius classification as a 
hostis, he locates the speeches implicitly in their proper historical context. There were, of 
course, opportunities to imitate Demosthenes and assert one’s παιδεία. But this was not the 
sole objective, or even a main one. In fact, Cassius Dio seems to have resented rather than 
participated in some of the shallower rhetorical foibles of his time. But that is for the next 
chapter.
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Chapter 3: Dio and the Second Sophistic 
Introduction 
The way we read a speech is necessarily influenced by the rhetorical culture in which it 
was composed. In the case of Cassius Dio, that culture has come to us from Philostratus 
under the name of the ‘Second’ Sophistic. 1  As numerous studies and the important 
testimony of Philostratus show,
2
 this was an intellectual movement underpinned by 
display-rhetoric first and foremost, even where its purview extended to the education of the 
young, political affairs, or the writing of history. In education, the exercises of the 
progymnasmata developed the skills of composition and delivery as routes to acquiring 
and then reproducing canonical literary knowledge. This curriculum was the sophistic 
education par excellence,
3
 and equipped students with the tools to advertise their παιδεία in 
their own writings.
4
 In political affairs, rhetoric became a means to secure representation. 
The poleis of the Greek east, which already began replacing genuine political rhetoric with 
declamation in the Hellenistic era,
5
 nevertheless required those declaimers for embassies, 
especially to the emperor.
6
 Such sophists often operated with sufficient distinction to 
become secretaries ab epistulis Graecis or consuls. And in history-writing, narratives even 
on military concerns could serve as a means of ‘sophistic’ self-presentation through the 
medium of rhetoric. The belletristic choice to use the defunct prestige-dialect of Attic took 
deliberate training and time,
7
 and the practice was sufficiently prevalent for the rhetorician 
Lucian to satirise it.
8
 History-writing additionally provided fertile ground for showy 
Homeric quotations and Platonic allusions.
9
 Scholars cite several exponents of ‘sophistic 
historiography’, such as Cassius Dio’s contemporary Antipater who like him wrote a 
monograph of Septimius Severus’ rise to power,10 or the also-contemporary Lucian and 
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Dexippus, as examples of the insinuation of ‘epideictic and sophistic tastes’ into the 
writing of history.
11
  
 
The sheer range of ‘sophistic’ activity above should give us pause. As Kemezis has 
recently written, the umbrella of ‘the sophistic’ has become so broad that it is at risk of 
becoming meaningless. The identifiers now called ‘sophistic’ by scholars can be detected 
‘in almost any author, monument, or cultural practice one cares to look at’.12 There can be 
no doubt that a flourishing of display-oratory did occur in the first centuries CE and that 
this oratory did assert Hellenic identity by memorialising a glorious Greek past. It is also 
paradoxical, but probably true, that the removal of Greek geo-political power by the 
Roman state provided both the catalyst for such nostalgic memorialisation, and the 
conditions of security under which it could flourish.
13
 However, we should not be too 
quick to identify sophistic self-presentation in any Greek author from this period who 
asserts his own literary, intellectual, or political authority.  
 
Yet the view that Cassius Dio was a committed exponent and member of this Second 
Sophistic is widely held. This exerts a significant impact upon how we read his speeches. 
For Millar, the Second Sophistic ‘lay close behind Dio and his history’.14 Reardon writes 
of Cassius Dio’s as ‘the sophistic way of writing; everywhere there is drama, 
commonplace, descriptions (almost ecphrases), antitheses, and of course rhetorical 
displays.’15 In his comparison of Cassius Dio and Appian, Alain Gowing sees the former as 
the far more ‘sophistic’ of the pair.16 Most recently, Brandon Jones’ survey of this topic 
writes of Dio as ‘a literary and socio-political member of the Second Sophistic’, whose 
‘self-promotion’ is his ‘most obvious sophistic feature’. In him, ‘one can easily discover 
the elite eastern background, imperial ambassadorship and egocentrism that seem to 
characterise the socio-political sophist’.17 Taking this further, Ameling suggests that Dio 
was a sophist as such.
18
  
 
There are problems with some of these views. In this chapter, I reassess Cassius Dio’s 
relationship with the rhetorical culture of his time. In the first section, I suggest that Dio in 
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fact regarded the sophists of his own day with hostility: he criticised them for misleading 
others with a persuasive tongue, among other things. Here Dio endorses Classical concerns 
about the moral probity of rhetoric, amply represented in Plato. In the second longer part, I 
want to consider how Dio’s response to the sophistic influenced his depiction of rhetoric in 
the Late Republic. A considerable number of the historian’s orations of this period 
exemplify precisely the penchant for deception and self-presentation which Dio abhorred 
in the sophists. Being aware of the improbity of rhetoric in his own time, he appears to 
have selected the set-piece speech as the ideal medium to explore the problem of corrupted 
public debate in the late res publica.  
The Historian and the Sophists 
The basis upon which Cassius Dio founded his suspicion of the sophists of the second and 
third centuries CE can be divided into four aspects: i) the belief that sophistry was a sham 
form of imitation philosophy; ii) hatred of moral improbity, particularly in connection with 
magic and apostasy; iii) dislike of the artifice of sophistic self-presentation; and iv) anxiety 
about the sophistic tendency for pretence, lies, and deception. I suggest that Dio viewed 
these four negaive traits as hallmarks of the typical sophist of his day, often hearkening 
back to a Classical reception of the sophists. In view of this, we need to reconsider the 
unspoken consensus that educated Greek writers of this period willingly participated in the 
intellectual culture in which they lived. Moreover, in Dio’s case, we should question 
whether the historian would have found paideutic self-advertisement through sophistic 
display a necessarily attractive desire to fulfil through his speeches. It may be that παιδεία 
was not in fact the whole point, or even a particularly important one, given the lengths Dio 
saw others go to in their transparent attempts to assert it and his polemics against such 
people.   
 
To turn to the first of these bases, then, the historian was clearly influenced by the texts of 
Plato and consequently conceived of sophistry along noticeably Platonic lines. From 
Classical antiquity, the term ‘sophist’ had been synonymous with ‘false philosopher’,19 and 
Dio’s own comments suggest that he fully endorsed the criticism. I will come momentarily 
to the evidence from Dio’s text which confirms that view, but a word on his relationship 
with Plato is important first.  
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As Gowing has already demonstrated, the elaborate consolatio philosophiae of Dio’s 
Cicero and Philiscus in Book 38 betrays numerous overlaps with Platonic language and 
ideas, especially with those in the Alcibiades, the Republic, and the Phaedrus.
20
 To this list 
of possible sources of inspiration Jones has also recently added the Phaedo – a text whose 
contents the historian appears to have known in view of the fact that he calls it familiarly 
‘Plato’s book on the soul’ (τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος βιβλίον τὸ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς).21 The historian 
furthermore adds, in his brief account of the portents and signs which led Septimius 
Severus to seize power, a striking image of the future princeps laying his hands upon all 
the lands and seas, ‘as one might on an instrument capable of playing all modes’. The 
image is too distinctive not to owe something to the Respublica.
22
 Even without these 
allusions, it is hardly possible to imagine that the historian had not read Plato. Lucian, a 
few decades before Dio, satirised social climbers who ‘reach in longing for the wisdom of 
Homer or the vim of Demosthenes or the sublimity of Plato’ in an attempt to cultivate 
παιδεία.23 The philosopher furthermore appears regularly attested within a ‘canon’ of the 
most-read authors of the period.
24
 Plato of course polemicised against the sophists on the 
grounds of their pretensions to philosophy: consider the lengthy debate between Socrates 
and ‘Gorgias’ on whether the purpose of rhetoric is to speak useful and instructive truths or 
simply to persuade regardless of veracity;
25
 or the exchange between Socrates and 
Phaedrus, in which Socrates’ interlocutor argues, fruitlessly, that good speechwriting is all 
persuasion rather than knowledge.
26
 Plato’s attack on sophistry as a false form of artificial 
wisdom was a response to an uncomfortable synonymy. 
 
Dio accepted this view. His account of Marcus Aurelius’ education is a case in point. From 
his reading of this passage, Millar has suggested that the historian approved of sophists, 
but disliked philosophers.
27
 Aurelius had been trained in rhetoric under Herodes Atticus 
and M. Cornelius Fronto, and in philosophy under Apollonius of Nicomedia and Q. Junius 
Rusticus. Dio records that Aurelius took to the latter subject naturally, ‘and as a result of 
this (ἀφ᾽ οὗ δὴ), many people pretended to pursue philosophy (φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπλάττοντο), 
hoping to enriched by him’. 28 The historian’s criticism here does not seem to me at all of 
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philosophers. Indeed, he writes that Aurelius’ nature was virtuous ‘even before’ (καὶ γὰρ 
πρὶν) he associated with these teachers: the implication is that his innate virtue was only 
increased through these studies. Aurelius’ education in the wisdom of Zeno is moreover 
treated with favour. The disapproval expressed here is not toward philosophers, but only 
toward those who pretended to be.  
 
This is merely part of a broader concern in Dio’s contemporary history. Antiochus of 
Aegae is described by Philostratus as a sophist from a distinguished Cilician family:
29
 he 
was probably born in the mid second century and so was contemporary with Dio’s 
lifetime.
30
 In his narrative of Caracalla’s campaign against Parthia in the 216-217 CE 
period, Dio initially writes approvingly of Antiochus: though surely an old man by this 
time, he would roll about in the snow to lift the morale of Caracalla’s freezing troops. 
However, he faked it as a Cynic philosopher, too (φιλοσοφεῖν κυνηδὸν τὰ πρῶτα 
ἐπλάττετο), and grew rich from Septimius Severus and Caracalla’s beneficence: as a result 
he grew haughty and defected to Parthia.
31
 Dio’s concern, again, is not that ‘all 
philosophers were fraudulent’,32 but that there were sophists masquerading as philosophers 
who are reprehensible.  
 
The problem of false philosophy meets an even clearer expression in the ‘to monarchy’ 
speech of Maecenas. It has long been accepted that the historian here uses his speaker as a 
voice for his own views about third-century political life.
33
 This is surely right, but it was 
not the only consideration: Maecenas, I will show in Chapters 5 and 6, additionally serves 
an explanatory purpose as Dio’s comment on the problems of the Late Republic and the 
challenges to be faced by the Augustan Principate. His admonishment about the risk of 
false philosophers, however, relates very much to Dio’s time: 
 
For men like this, who speak the occasonal truth but really speak falsehoods for 
the greater part, often encourage many people to make trouble. And indeed, not 
a few of those who pretend to be philosophers do the very same thing (τὸ δ᾽ 
αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν φιλοσοφεῖν προσποιουμένων οὐκ ὀλίγοι δρῶσι). For this 
reason, then, I warn you be on your guard against these people. Do not believe, 
just because you have experienced Areius and Athenodorus and other good 
men, that all others who say they pursue philosophy (τοὺς φιλοσοφεῖν 
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λέγοντας) are like these; for some who use this profession as a screen (τοῦτο 
προβαλλόμενοι)  wreak many thousand ills upon communities and citizens 
alike.
34
 
 
Cassius Dio clearly disapproved of those who pretended to be philosophers. In the context 
of his time I am at a loss for whom such comments may be aimed at other than the 
sophists. Certainly the distinction between sophistry and philosophy remained blurred and 
controversial. A string of orators from Dio’s period attack the sophists in their work, 
professing instead to be philosophers or rhetors.
35
 Philostratus’ ambiguity in describing the 
difference between philosophy and sophistry only compounds the synonymy.
36
 Several of 
these writers, moreover, warned their audiences vehemently to be on their guard and not to 
fall prey to false philosophers.
37
 Such criticisms of sophists are somewhat ironic, 
particularly coming from a sophist such as Dio of Prusa.
38
 But they are indicative of a 
hostile attitude with a long pedigree, which went back to Plato and was still current in 
Cassius Dio’s time. This, then, is paradoxical. It is precisely the historian’s familiarity with 
the canonical texts of Plato which scholars have used as grounds to call him and other 
authors ‘sophistic’.39 In fact, by adopting a Platonic view of the sophists, Cassius Dio finds 
the grounds of false wisdom on which to criticise those of his own day.  
 
A further source of dislike from Dio’s perspective was the possible relationship of the 
sophists with magic and charlatanism. The charge seems absurd, but we hear of a number 
whose displays were so dazzling that their audiences accused them of witchcraft. 
Jacqueline de Romilly has already explored the equation between magic and brilliant 
rhetoric in the ancient world – an equation which first appears, I think significantly, in the 
time of Philostratus’ ‘first’ sophist, Gorgias. 40  The sophist Apuleius’ fascination with 
magic is transparent throughout his Asinius Aureus. Hadrian of Tyre’s oratory was brilliant 
enough to make him a suspected γόης.41 Further, Dionysius of Miletus’ skill at memoria 
was so exceptional that Philostratus had to insist that he did not use magic to teach it: ‘for 
what man who is recorded among the number of the wise would be so careless of his own 
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reputation as to practice magic (ὡς γοητεύων) with his pupils?’42 That Philostratus makes 
an excursus to develop the defence may indicate that others faced the same charge. 
Certainly the sophist Apollonius of Tyana did. In the additional biography that Philostratus 
devotes to Apollonius he is made to deliver a lengthy apologia against the charge of 
witchcraft.
43
 
 
One of Apollonius’ retrospective accusers, in fact, was Dio. Immediately before his 
critique of the sham-Cynic Antiochus of Aegae, he details Caracalla’s winter-quarters in 
Nicomedia. In his description of Caracalla’s many misdeeds, Dio singles out Apollonius as 
a γόης καὶ μάγος: ‘for the emperor so loved magicians and tricksters that he praised and 
honoured Apollonius of Cappadocia, who really had been both a magician and a trickster 
(καὶ γόης καὶ μάγος ἀκριβὴς ἐγένετο), and set up a shrine to him’. 44  Scholars have 
suggested that Cassius Dio probably read Philostratus’ work, as both were active at court 
in the same period.
45
 If so, then the formulation of the historian’s scorn here may have 
been a deliberate contradictory response to Philostratus’ defence of Apollonius ‘witchcraft’ 
in the VA: Dio asserts that the sophist ‘really had been’ what he was called by others 
(ἀκριβὴς ἐγένετο). Similarly, the historian attacks Caracalla’s companion Sempronius 
Rufus on the grounds that he too had been a γόης καὶ μάγος and was once banished from 
court by Septimius Severus.
46
 It strikes me as bizarrely coincidental that this occurs just 
before Dio’s attacks on the sophist Apollonius as a charlatan and then on Antiochus as a 
false philosopher. What we have here is a sustained attack, though exempla, on sophists as 
magician-tricksters and false philosophers over a short stretch of narrative (78[77].17-19). 
Although we hear nothing secure of Sempronius Rufus outside of the Roman History, the 
chronological and prosopographical clues and the Dionean appellation γόης καὶ μάγος 
indicate he may have been a sophist attested also in Philostratus’ VS.47  
 
In fact – and to return to the previous point – there appears to be an overlap in the 
historian’s thinking between γόης καὶ μάγος and ‘false philosopher’. This connects the idea 
of witchcraft and religious irregularity more securely to the sophists. I have already set out 
the evidence which indicates that Cassius Dio conceived of sham-philosophy and sophistry 
as comparable along Platonic lines. In view of that Platonic conception, and the reputation 
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of certain sophists for magic and trickery, I think that we can triangulate false philosophy, 
sophistry, and charlatanism and witchcraft. Such again is the effect of Dio’s Maecenas, 
who places all three into the same thought: 
 
Allow no one to reject the gods or to be a magician (ἀθέῳ τινὶ μήτε γόητι). 
Soothsaying is of course necessary, and you should always appoint some 
diviners and augurs that people who wish to consult with them can turn to. But 
there should be absolutely none who practice magic tricks (μαγευτὰς πάνυ οὐκ 
εἶναι προσήκει). For men like this, who speak the occasonal truth but really 
speak falsehoods for the greater part, often encourage many people to make 
trouble. And indeed, not a few of those who pretend to be philosophers do the 
very same thing…48 
 
Cassius Dio therefore seems to have endorsed particular hostile views about the sophists 
which, though by no means unique to him, are certainly inconsistent with a ‘sophistic’ 
writer. He additionally appears to have disliked aspects of artificial self-presentation and 
outward display which are so often identified in the sophists. Even Philostratus, the 
biographer of the sophistic, conceded that sophistry and especially public declamation 
were ‘prone to egocentrism and arrogance’.49 Pretensions of Spartan simplicity were a 
common extreme,
50
  of which there are several examples. The sophist Apuleius adopted 
the guide of poverty – modest garb, a wooden staff, few servants – in order to enhance his 
self-fashioning as a Platonist.
51
 Aristocles of Pergamum did the same.
52
 Maximus of Tyre’s 
quip that ‘a purse and staff do not constitute emulation of Diogenes’ explicitly condemned 
such sophistic masquerades of penury; the critique is indicative of a trend.
53
 And despite 
his own outward pretensions to philosophical poverty, even Apuleius was not above 
mocking such sophistic foibles when he saw them in others. The fact that the protagonist of 
his Asinius Aureus runs into an emaciated acquaintance sitting on the ground and dressed 
in the shreds of a cheap Greek pallium takes on a particular resonance when we bear in 
mind Apuleius’ deliberate choice of the acquaintance’s name: ‘Socrates’.54 
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Dio’s account, again, of Caracalla’s time at Nicomedia before his campaign on Parthia 
reflects some of these concerns. The historian contrasts Julia Domna’s genuine love of 
philosophy and overall excellence with the emperor’s vain pretensions of rustic simplicity: 
 
Surely I do not need to say, too, that Julia hosted public gatherings for all the 
men of the first rank, just as the emperor did? But while she preferred to engage 
in philosophy with these men all the more (ἡ μὲν καὶ μετὰ τούτων ἔτι μᾶλλον 
ἐφιλοσόφει), he kept on saying that he needed nothing more than the necessities 
of life, and he preened and plumed over his ability to live on the cheapest 
sustenance (ὁ δὲ ἔλεγε μὲν μηδενὸς ἔξω τῶν ἀναγκαίων προσδεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ 
τούτῳ καὶ ἐσεμνύνετο ὡς ὅτι εὐτελεστάτῃ τῇ διαίτῃ χρῆσθαι δυνάμενος). But 
really, there was nothing on earth, sea, or air that we did not have to keep 
giving him, both in gifts and state grants.
55
  
 
The distinction between Julia Domna’s genuine philosophical bent and the princeps’ 
veneer of affected poverty is deliberately constructed. The historian admits of no doubt that 
these pretensions were an artifice. Although the contrast between ‘genuine’ philosophy and 
the false trappings of poverty was a dichotomy between philosophers and sophists already 
recognised by Dio’s contemporaries, the location of this critique of the emperor’s 
behaviour seems to me the historian’s own attack on sophistic self-presentation, above all, 
when considered within the narrative context. It is significant that this critique occurs 
within the same stretch of narrative as Dio’s attacks on Antiochus, Apollonius, and Rufus 
(78[77].17-19). Immediately after this passage the historian goes on to attack one of the 
most celebrated sophists of the Imperial period, recently memorialised in Philostratus Vita 
Apollonii, as a γόης καὶ μάγος; he also lambasts Rufus on those same grounds and attacks 
the false philosophy of Antiochus. In that context, then, 78[77].17-19 is a critique of 
pseudo-intellectual life at Nicomedia in which three sophists and an emperor exemplify the 
affected self-presentation, religious aberration, and false veneer of wisdom that Dio 
detested in the sophists. Only the woman in the episode, Julia, is conspicuously excellent, 
and so illustrates the historian’s message by contrast.  
 
A related and final issue in the historian’s odium toward the sophists of his time is his 
anxiety about the moral probity of rhetoric, particularly in connection with pretending and 
deception. This will be borne out in the following section (‘A Sophistic Republic?’). Dio 
does not hold back in presenting the sophists as arch-falsifiers both of themselves and their 
words. In recapitulation we may consider the argument of Dio’s Maecenas that ‘those who 
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pretend to be philosophers’ (τῶν φιλοσοφεῖν προσποιουμένων) are comparable to sorcerers 
and mountebanks who use philosophy ‘as a screen’ (τοῦτο προβαλλόμενοι) to mislead 
whole populations in their displays.
56
 Many, again, pretended to pursue philosophy to 
attract Marcus Aurelius’ favour (φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπλάττοντο). 57  Caracalla’s affectations to 
Platonist poverty are comparable to the pretensions of Apuleius and other sophists which 
Maximus of Tyre attacked; and Antiochus pretended himself (φιλοσοφεῖν κυνηδὸν τὰ 
πρῶτα ἐπλάττετο) in order to secure favour with the emperor and the army.58 Maecenas 
furthermore castigates those who ‘put on an act of feminine behaviour’ (μαλακίαν 
προσποεῖσθαι).59 Accusations of affected effeminacy were frequently directed at sophists, 
such as Dio’s contemporary Philiscus of Thessaly, whose high-pitched voice and artificial 
dress and deportment caused outrage.
60
 As a ‘virtuoso rhetor with a big public 
reputation’,61 the first task of the sophist was to speak. The amount of criticism that the 
historian reserves for these orators, particularly with regard to pretence and deception, 
suggests that he saw in their oratorical careers an innate capacity for misleading others. 
This, certainly, is the argument of his Maecenas.
62
 
 
Dio valued philosophy and philosophers. But the sophists of his day were to him a menace. 
This does not mean that the historian was alien to the values of παιδεία or wished to be 
viewed as such. It was possible to hold those values without identifying with the sophists, 
and indeed as Dio shows, at the same time as disliking most. It may seem possible that the 
historian’s attacks upon the sophists for their affectations of poverty, religious and moral 
unorthodoxy, capacity for deceit, and pretensions to philosophy may seem an over-
vehement attempt at dissociation. He would not be the first sophist to reject the title and 
attack its holders: one thinks of Isocrates, Dio of Prusa, Aelius Aristides, Apuleius, 
Favorinus, and Maximus of Tyre.
63
 But those authors made those attempts at dissociation 
in a context of public speech in which the connotations of artifice and pretence (which 
were inherent in sophistry) would undermine their immediate political or philosophical 
objectives. In other words, these orators attacked the sophists in their political and 
philosophical speeches because they had to in order to be believed. We hear of none of this 
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in Dio’s case. We only know that the historian spoke once publicly, and that in a judicial 
capacity. Philostratus never mentions a forensic speech as a notable sophistic work;
64
 and 
he explicitly divides Antiphon’s speeches into ‘the forensic type’ and ‘the sophistic type’ 
(δικανικοὶ μὲν…σοφιστικοὶ δὲ).65  The idea that Dio may have declaimed some of his 
speeches such as the Agrippa-Maecenas debate is attractive, but unsupported by any 
evidence.
66
 Cassius Dio attacked the sophists simply because he disliked them and what 
they represented.  
A ‘Sophistic’ Republic? 
In this final section, then, I suggest that Cassius Dio projected his contemporary concerns 
about the rectitude of rhetoric onto his speeches of the late res publica. This does not 
undermine the explanatory purpose of these compositions or the degree to which they 
communicate Dio’s historical interpretations. From the experience of his own time, Dio 
had anxieties about the ambiguity of rhetoric and its capacity for misleading others; but 
this does not mean that the application of those anxieties to the Late Republic was 
anachronistic or fanciful. The problem of self-interested or unethical persuasion was 
perhaps applicable to any period; although it is easy to see why the first century BCE 
seemed a time in which that problem was historically important. There was, of course, the 
prestige of the Ciceronian material, as detailed in the previous chapter. Evidence of this 
oratory was forthcoming and provided inspiration. Moreover, like Polybius, Cassius Dio 
conceived of παρρησία as the hallmark of a δημοκρατία.67 It seems reasonable that he 
chose to explore public political oratory most fully in the final stages of its existence. In 
any case, and as Catherine Steel has argued, concerns about the probity of rhetoric were as 
alive and well in the Late Republic as in Dio’s time.68 In choosing to exemplify the moral 
ambiguity of public speech in his account of the Late Republic, Cassius Dio made a choice 
which was both appropriate to that historical context, and informed by his own third-
century opinion of the sophists.  
 
Of Dio’s sixteen speeches between the lex Gabinia and Augustan Settlement, just under a 
third (five) are deliberately constructed by the historian as examples of Republican oratory 
at its most deceitful. I return here to the orations of Pompeius (36.25-26) and Gabinius 
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(36.27-28), already seen in Chapter 2. I also discuss the two speeches of Caesar at 
Vesontio and in the Senate (38.35-46; 43.15-18) and the false recusatio imperii of 
Augustus (53.3-10). Cassius Dio, as I have outlined in the preceding sections, conceived of 
sophistic rhetoric as fundamentally dishonest. He frequently uses verbs of pretending in his 
veiled and overt criticisms of sophists. Those who pretended to pursue philosophy (τῶν 
φιλοσοφεῖν προσποιουμένων) used it as a ‘screen’ to obscure their immorality (τοῦτο 
προβαλλόμενοι). 69  Many, again, pretended to pursue philosophy to attract the young 
Marcus Aurelius  (φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπλάττοντο),70 and Caracalla preened over his Platonist 
guise of poverty (ἐσεμνύνετο), like Apuleius and the other sophists whom Maximus of 
Tyre attacked.
71
  Antiochus assumed similarly false trappings himself (φιλοσοφεῖν 
κυνηδὸν ἐπλάττετο);72 and at the other extreme, Dio’s Maecenas castigates those who 
‘affect feminine behaviour’ (μαλακίαν προσποεῖσθαι).73 Cassius Dio considered pretence 
and artifice a fundamental characteristic of sophistic speech – and so, too, of political 
oratory in the Late Republic.  
 
The historian consciously alerts the reader to the deception and artifice of his Late 
Republican speakers in two ways. Firstly, in four of the five orations Dio provides a 
narrative ‘preface’ immediately prior to the speech. These prefaces inform the audience of 
Dio’s interpretation of the orators’ true hidden motives, which are diametrically opposed to 
the content of the forthcoming speech itself. In this way the historian creates a simple but 
effective contrast between speech (‘deception’) and narrative (‘truth’) which serves his 
explanatory purpose: to demonstrate the corruption of public debate in the Late Republic. 
Secondly (and in this connection), Dio places sentiments and factoids within these five 
speeches which directly contradict the preceding historical diegetic material. He will, for 
example, undertake an ‘embedded focalisation’ of an event in the past,74 which sets out the 
selfish thinking which underpinned a dynast’s particular course of military or political 
action. But then later, when that dynast reflects upon that action in his speech, Dio will 
have his speaker deliberately misrepresent those activities and posit a patriotic motivation. 
That the embedded focalisation, within the ‘true’ narrative of the historian’s interpretation, 
comes before the ‘false’ speech is important. Dio’s intention is that the reader remember 
the narrative ‘truth’ as a lens for viewing the pretence of the later speech. Too often, 
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speeches in historiography are studied as standalone set-pieces, without consideration of 
the narrative material which precedes them or of the order in which consonant or 
contradictory elements are presented in both speeches and narrative. Both parts – speech 
and narrative – seem to me to interact and will be read in this light here.  
 
Beginning, then, with Pompeius and Gabinius on the lex Gabinia. A word on the context, 
which is relevant here to the historian’s presentation of their deceptive rhetoric. Dio writes 
that Mediterranean piracy had grown to egregious proportions as a result of the drawn-out 
Third Mithridatic War sapping Roman military capital. A year before Gabinius’ proposed 
law, raiders sacked Ostia.
75
 To restore security to the politically-charged issue of the 
interrupted annonae, Gabinius proposed a controversial innovation: to grant an 
extraordinary proconsular jurisdiction over every province within 50 miles of the littoral to 
Pompeius for three years, with a large (but unspecified) number of legions, ships, and 
legati.
76
 Although Dio does not give clues as to the nature of Pompeius’ imperium under 
these proposals – which may have been greater than or equal to that of other pro-
magistrates – he nevertheless stresses the controversy of the measure.77 According to Dio, 
Senate and people were diametrically opposed. There was violence on both sides as the 
populus attempted to storm and burn down the curia. A number of senators, including the 
consul Piso, also tried to assassinate Gabinius before attempting in vain to persuade the 
tribunes to veto.
78
 
 
It is in that context that the historian interprets Pompeius’ and Gabinius’ true motives, with 
which the tenor of their speeches is entirely inconsistent. The latter, he writes, proposed the 
law ‘either at Pompeius’ prompting (τοῦ Πομπηίου καθέντος αὐτόν) or because he wanted 
to ingratiate himself to him; but surely not because of his concern for the common good, as 
he was an awful man’ (κάκιστος ἀνὴρ).79 Having now explored the possibility of prior 
collusion between the pair – not inconceivable in this context, since contional speakers 
would often have time to prepare – Dio unveils Pompeius’ tactic: dissimulatio. 80 
Historically, the recusatio imperii or disingenuous refusal of honours in order to obtain 
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them all the more easily was a favoured Pompeian trick;
81
 especially in the contio, where 
he could compensate for his rather average oratory by making direct appeals to the people 
and advertising his military achievements.
82
 To Dio’s credit, all of these historical details – 
the dissimulatio, the popular appeal in the contio, the enumeration of military services – 
are present in his recusatio of Pompeius.
83
 In keeping, then, with this persona, Dio 
underlines Pompeius’ intentions in the same manner as of Gabinius:  
 
Pompeius was thoroughly eager for the command, and because of his own 
ambition (τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φιλοτιμίας) and the enthusiasm of the throng,  he already 
did not regard the position so much as an honour as the failure to win it a 
disgrace. Further, because he saw the opposition of the optimates (τὴν δὲ 
ἀντίταξιν τῶν δυνατῶν ὁρῶν) he wished to seem forced to accept it (δοκεῖν 
ἀναγκάζεσθαι). For he always affected (προσποιούμενος) not at all to desire 
what he really did desire; and he pretended (ἐπλάττετο) more than ever now, 
because of the envy that would follow if he willingly sought the command, and 
the glory if he should be deemed the most worthy even ‘against his will’.84 
 
In that context, then, Dio deliberately presents the mendacity of both speakers as a 
necessary but ignoble scheme concocted in order to attain their political purpose in the face 
of senatorial opposition, and makes this obvious. He provides a narrative preface through 
which to read both subsequent speeches. This, I will show throughout this section, is a 
common technique of Dio’s, especially with deceptive political oratory in the Late 
Republic.  
 
What follows is a string of statements which the reader knows from these prefatory 
remarks to be false. Pompeius, first, insists that it is inappropriate that one person be 
continually invested with power, and that the Quirites must confer offices upon others as 
well. He furthermore deflects accusations of cupido dominandi from himself by putting the 
responsibility for his growing political might down to the ‘insatiability’ of the people for 
his services (ἀπλήστως).85 These, obviously, are postures. Pompeius then briefly relays his 
military achievements (36.25.2-3) in Sicily and Africa against the forces of C. Marius. 
These are used by Dio’s Pompeius as disingenuous proof that he has ‘endured many 
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hardships’ (ἐταλαιπώρησα) , many dangers (ἐκινδύνευσα), and is in short worn out in both 
body and soul from a lifetime’s devoted service to the people (ὅτι πολλὰς μὲν φροντίδας 
πολλοὺς δὲ κινδύνους ὑπέμεινα, κατατέτριμμαι μὲν τὸ σῶμα, πεπόνημαι δὲ τὴν γνώμην).  
 
Frustratingly, Cassius Dio’s account of these campaigns is lost, aside from one fragment 
detailing Pompeius’ earliest ventures in Italy. This is the only narrative material we have to 
compare to this section of the recusatio on the speaker’s early military career. In the 
fragment, Dio records that although he had not yet attained manhood, Pompeius gathered a 
force of his own at Picenum and ‘set up his own personal power there’ (δυναστείαν ἰδίαν 
συνίστη) before joining Sulla, for whom he would then go on to fight in Sicily and 
Africa.
86
 The choice of the term δυναστεία in Pompeius’ first appearance in the Roman 
History is significant. In the Late Republican context it universally denotes extra-legal and 
coercive personal power, usually acquired through military or factional means.
87
 It will 
characterise Pompeius’ career throughout the text, not just here at his first appearance. It is 
no great stretch of the imagination to posit that Dio presented the early campaigns of his 
Pompeius in Sicily and Africa in the same fashion as they began and as the rest of his 
career is presented: as a quest for δυναστεία. Having read this account, then, Dio’s reader 
would probably be struck by the polarity between Pompeius’ own patriotic spin on his 
earliest campaigns and the unflattering narrative truth of it a few books before.  
 
Pompeius then asserts in his list of his military achievements that ‘I alone was deemed 
worthy to undertake the campaign against Sertorius, when no one else was willing or able 
to undertake it’ (μηδενὸς ἄλλου μήτ᾽ ἐθελήσαντος μήτε δυνηθέντος αὐτὴν ὑποστῆναι).88 
This is cited as further ‘proof’ of his exhaustion from a lifetime’s devoted service to Rome. 
Again, this is a  posture. As with Sicily and Africa, Dio’s record of the Sertorian War in 
Hispania is lost, and so comparison between speech and narrative is impossible. We know 
from Plutarch, however, that  others certainly were willing and able to undertake the 
Sertorian War, and that Pompeius was hardly elected to the honour unwillingly as he is 
made to falsify in Dio. Plutarch records that Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius was already 
engaged against Sertorius in 76 BCE. But Pompeius, desiring a proconsulship of his own in 
Hispania, remained hard by Rome with an army and refused to disband it even when 
ordered to, offering προφάσεις not to relinquish it and remaining by the city under arms. In 
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the wake of Sulla’s comparatively recent march on Rome, the Senate read the threat and 
finally gave him the command he desired.
89
 The point, of course, is whether Dio provided 
this information to his readers, which the tenor of the recusatio contradicts. I see little 
reason to doubt that Cassius Dio had Plutarch’s biography of the general: in addition to 
quoting his life of Pompeius,
90
 both Dio and Plutarch are our only texts to attribute a 
particular quotation of Sophocles to him at the moment of his death in Alexandria.
91
 I am 
aware that this reconstruction is speculative. But if Dio did present Pompeius’ manoeuvres 
of 76 BCE to obtain his desired command in the Sertorian War as they are detailed in 
Plutarch, this would merely be consistent with his characterisation of Pompeius throughout 
the Roman History. It seems likely to me that the patriotic spin of Dio’s speaker on the 
circumstances that led him to enter into the Sertorian War was deliberately constructed by 
the historian as a transparent falsehood.  
 
A more obvious indicator of Pompeius’ deceit lies in the irony which the historian applies 
to his statements. In the closing section of his recusatio, Dio’s speaker accuses the Quirites 
of ‘pretending’ to show concern for his safety: ‘for if any of you persist in this demand, 
remember that all positions of power cause envy and hatred; and although you do not care 
about this fact – and it is shameful that you pretend to (προσποιεῖσθαί) – nevertheless, it 
would be most grievous to me’.92  The accusation of pretence from one who ‘always 
affected (προσποιούμενος) not at all to desire what he really did desire’ is absurd, and I 
think deliberately here. Dio has his Pompeius ironically project the moral failings of his 
own rhetorical style onto his audience in order to render more clear his explanation of the 
moral ambiguity of Late Republican political oratory.  
 
Gabinius’ exhortation which follows on from the recusatio sustains the farce. I have 
already outlined the historian’s narrative preface which stressed the turpitude of the 
tribune’s character and his prior collusion with Pompeius. Building upon that foundation, 
the speech continues Dio’s demonstration of the especially deceptive character of rhetoric 
in the late res publica. It opens with another ironic twist: Gabinius observes that 
‘Pompeius’ behaviour in this matter is worthy of his character (ἄξιον τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἠθῶν), in 
that he neither seeks the command (μήτε ἐφιέμενος τῆς ἀρχῆς)  nor accepts it when it is 
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given to him’.93 Pompeius’ actions, Dio has already informed the reader in the narrative 
preface, certainly were worthy of his character: he was an habitual liar. From that preface 
we additionally know the tribune’s claim, that the general was not seeking the command 
(μήτε ἐφιέμενος τῆς ἀρχῆς), to be a simple falsehood. 
 
As in the recusatio, so here does Gabinius’ exhortation spell out a number of patriotic 
falsehoods. A good man like Pompeius, for example, does not desire offices (οὔτε γὰρ 
ἄλλως ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἄρχειν ἐπιθυμεῖν), and the people ought to choose ‘not what is 
gratifying to him, but what is of benefit to the state’.94 We are already aware from Dio’s 
introductory remarks that Gabinius, the κάκιστος ἀνὴρ, is in no position to lecture on the 
duties of the ἀγαθός ἀνὴρ. Dio has also spelled out that the tribune, who now instructs the 
people not to attempt to gratify Pompeius (κεχαρισμένον), may himself have proposed the 
law precisely in order to gratify him (χαρίσασθαί οἱ ἐθελήσας).95 These verbal contrasts 
between speech and narrative are sophisticated, and seem to me to have been intentionally 
inserted to draw the scale of Gabinius’ deceptive rhetoric into the reader’s focus. 
 
Dio’s speaker closes by repeating Pompeius’ lie about the lack of volunteers for command 
in the Sertorian War. As I argued earlier, it seems likely that although the historian’s 
account of Pompeius’ promotion to the Hispania campaign is lost, it will have elaborated 
the young general’s lust for δυναστεία in as unflattering a fashion as in Plutarch. Certainly 
the rest of Dio’s narrative of Pompeius’ career does. ‘Remember’, his Gabinius states, ‘the 
number and nature of the things we suffered in the Sertorian war because we lacked a 
general (στρατηγοῦ δεόμενοι), and that we found no other man (οὐδένα ἕτερον), either 
among the young or old, but this one!’ 96  The overlap between the tribune’s 
misrepresentation of the circumstances that led Pompeius to enter into the Sertorian War 
and that of the general himself in his recusatio (μηδενὸς ἄλλου μήτ᾽ ἐθελήσαντος μήτε 
δυνηθέντος) is clear. Furthermore, like his earlier counterpart, Dio’s Gabinius dresses his 
words in a falsely patriotic and selfless language. This again is a deliberate play with 
verbal contrasts between speech and narrative on the historian’s part. The speaker exhorts 
Pompeius to assume the pirate command and thus save the state and its citizens, ‘on whose 
account the noble and patriotic man (χρηστὸς καὶ φιλόπολις) would most readily give up 
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his body and soul’.97 Within the narrative preface prior to his oration the historian has 
already interpreted Gabinius’ character and motivations for the reader, and these were the 
opposite of φιλόπολις; the tribune did not care about the common good and had only 
selfish interests at heart (οὐ γάρ που καὶ ὑπ᾽ εὐνοίας αὐτὸ τῆς τοῦ κοινοῦ ἐποίησε). Not 
φιλόπολις, but κάκιστος. 
 
Despite the intervention of Q. Lutatius Catulus, which I discussed from a source-standpoint 
in the previous chapter, the lex Gabinia was ratified. As I will show in Chapter 5, the cadre 
of genuinely patriotic deliberative oratory, epitomised in Catulus’ intervention, fails to 
persuade in Dio’s account of the late res publica, leaving the way open for dynasts such as 
Pompeius and Gabinius to mislead the people through corrupt rhetoric and seize further 
power.  
 
Strikingly, Cassius Dio is the only historian who formed that interpretation in this case. His 
is the only one of our several accounts of the lex Gabinia to present the moral corruption of 
Pompeius’ and Gabinius’ oratory as the cause of their successful grasp at control over the 
state. Plutarch makes no mention of Pompeius’ dissimulatio and says nothing of his 
collusion with the tribune; neither, furthermore, is given a speech.
98
 Appian’s account is 
similarly brief, preserving only the details of the law and obliterating Gabinius’ role 
altogether.
99
 Velleius Paterculus records only the circumstances of the case and Catulus’ 
objections, but says nothing of Pompeius’ and Gabinius’ deception; so too Valerius 
Maximus.
100
 Only Cassius Dio chose to explore the problem of the moral probity of 
rhetoric in the late Republic in the events of 67 BCE. This, I argue, emerged as a result of 
his own third-century concerns about the ambiguous capacity of rhetoric for demagoguery 
and deception, which he most commonly expresses, in the context of his own time, in 
connection with the sophists. In this way, then, Dio’s relationship with the sophistic 
rhetoric of his day did not bring his two lex Gabinia speeches into a classicising thought-
world of flashy display rhetoric where παιδεία was prized above all. In fact, Cassius Dio’s 
belief in the traditional Platonist equation between sophistry and deception and pretension 
enhanced, rather than detracted from, his ability to form his own historical interpretation of 
the political consequences of rhetorical artifice in the Late Republic. As Vervaet has 
                                                          
97
 Cass. Dio. 36.27.6. 
98
 Plu. Pomp. 25.  
99
 App. Mith. 94. 
100
 Vell. Pat. 2.31-32; Val. Max. 8.15.9.  
91 
 
 
already shown, Pompeius was an arch-dissembler.
101
 We should not be too surprised if Dio 
was right about the extent to which dissimulatio was used before the people in the events 
of 67 BCE. 
 
Two of the Caesarian speeches in the Roman History serve as further examples of this 
argument of Dio’s on the historical ramifications of the ambiguity of speech. These are the 
battle exhortation of Caesar to his mutinying troops at Vesontio and, later, a reassuring 
speech to the patres in the Senate shortly after Pharsalus. As with the orations of Pompeius 
and Gabinius, the historian alerts his reader to the deceptive character of these speeches in 
two ways. Firstly, he again embeds a focalisation into the narrative immediately prior to 
the Vesontio exhortation, interpreting in the authorial voice Caesar’s true character and his 
motives in speaking (the ‘narrative preface’). The tenor of the speech will, however, 
entirely contradict this interpretation of that truth. Secondly, in both orations Dio has his 
speaker make statements which the reader knows from the preceding narrative to be 
entirely false.     
 
Before analysing the first of these it will again be worthwhile to give a brief word on the 
context and the source-material. We of course have an earlier version of the speech on the 
mutiny at Vesontio in the form of Caesar’s own much shorter version at BG 1.40. It has 
long been recognised that Dio probably used the De Bello Gallico for his narrative of 
Caesar’s campaign in Gaul.102 There is good reason to believe that the historian was not 
solely reliant on the BG: probably he blended a number of different factoids from different 
texts, not relying upon any as a sole source.
103
 Dio’s method of work may have facilitated 
precisely this practice: I have already shown how he mined Cicero for details to record and 
then re-elaborate into his own speeches later. It would therefore not be peculiar for the 
historian, in his decade of reading, to consult more than one source of information for 
Caesar’s campaigns in the 50s BCE and then excerpt details into his notes for later re-use. 
Despite the probability of numerous sources, however, it is hardly possible to escape the 
idea that the speech of Caesar in the BG provided inspiration for Dio’s own version.104 
Given his practice with the De Imperio and Philippicae, he may again here have recorded 
genuine arguments he found attested in the contemporary Latin rhetorical material. 
Granted, Dio’s exhortation of Caesar at Vesontio is vastly longer than its Latin model; and 
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as I will show in Chapter 7 the historian designed it primarily to show his interpretation of 
the problems of Late Republican imperialism and their historical consequences. But 
several of the supporting arguments made by Caesar in the BG do reappear in Cassius 
Dio’s speech. 105  Given the historian’s method of re-elaboration with the Ciceronian 
contemporary material, the possibility of the same here renders Dio’s version again no 
more a nonsense than it is a verbatim transcript.
106
  
 
As for the context, Dio deliberately establishes it in such a way as to exaggerate Caesar’s 
duplicity.
107
 According to the historian, in 58 BCE the two Gallic tribes of the Sequani and 
Aedui approached Caesar as friends and allies of Rome. They did so to invite him to attack 
the Germanic king Ariovistus, upon whom they wished to exact revenge over a dispute 
(τιμωρήσασθαι). More importantly, they did this as a ‘favour’ to Caesar (εὐεργεσίαν), 
because they saw that he had his own designs on Ariovistus (τήν τε ἐπιθυμίαν αὐτοῦ 
ἰδόντες). Indeed, by requesting Caesar’s intervention, they happened to be asking for 
precisely what he himself wanted (ἐτύγχανον γὰρ δεόμενοι ὧν ὠρέγετο).108 As with the 
speeches of Pompeius and Gabinius, then, Dio lays the ground by bringing forth the 
possibility of prior collusion between the two parties just before the deceptive speech. 
 
In the remaining small stretch of narrative before the oration the historian elaborates 
Caesar’s motives and actions in a similar manner to Pompeius and Gabinius. Cassius Dio 
is unequivocal. Just as Caesar deliberately provoked the Herminians into war to cement his 
own political power during his praetorship in Lusitania in Dio’s interpretation,109 so too 
with Ariovistus did he desire a false πρόφασις for war in order to satisfy his own 
φιλοτιμία: 
 
For Ariovistus was the king of those Germans…and Caesar himself as consul 
had enrolled him among the friends and allies of Rome. But when compared 
with the glory to be gained from war with him and the power it would bring 
(τὴν ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἰσχὺν), Caesar cared not at all for 
these facts, except in so far as he wanted to get a pretext (πρόφασιν)…and 
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because of this, he sent for him, pretending to want to speak about something 
(ὡς καὶ διαλεχθῆναί τι αὐτῷ δεόμενος). But when Ariovistus did not obey, and 
replied ‘if Caesar wants to speak to me, let him come to me himself!’…Caesar 
became angry on the ground that he had insulted all the Romans, and 
immediately demanded all the allied hostages from him…but he did this not in 
order to scare Ariovistus, but to enrage him, and thereby to gain a good and 
credible pretext for war (κἀκ τούτου πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου καὶ μεγάλην καὶ 
εὐπρεπῆ λήψεσθαι ἤλπισεν).…meanwhile, the soldiers heard that Ariovistus 
was preparing vigorously for war…and they were terribly afraid…indeed, the 
talk on everyone’s lips was that they were undertaking a war which was neither 
their business nor had been decreed by the Senate, but was merely on account 
of Caesar’s private ambition (ἐθρύλουν ὅτι πόλεμον οὔτε προσήκοντα οὔτε 
ἐψηφισμένον διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν τοῦ Καίσαρος φιλοτιμίαν ἀναιροῖντο)…So, when 
Caesar learned this, he did not address the mass of the soldiers at large…but 
instead gathered together his captains, and said in their company words similar 
to these which follow here (τοιάδε ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔλεξεν).110 
 
This, then, is the focalisation that Dio provides his readers in another narrative ‘preface’, in 
order to ensure that they perceive the mendacious tenor of the speech to follow. To Dio the 
aggressive campaign against Ariovistus was simply an unjustified project orchestrated by 
the general to suit his private ambitions. Being aware of this fact, the legions mutinied. As 
with the lex Gabinia episode, Cassius Dio is our only source to bring the deceit and 
pretence of the dynast to the reader’s attention. Plutarch states that Caesar warred against 
Ariovistus ‘absolutely in defence of the Gauls’ and that these Germans were an intolerable 
threat. He nowhere mentions Caesar’s duplicity and presents him as the righteous party.111 
A fragment of our other source, Appian, actually states that Ariovistus was the aggressor, 
attacking Caesar’s emissaries without provocation.112 Only Dio, again, uses the historical 
moment to explore the problem of a corrupted rhetoric in the Late Republic. 
  
As with his Pompeius and Gabinius, Dio consciously weaves irony into the speech in order 
to exaggerate the speaker’s hypocrisy and thereby demonstrate deceitful rhetoric at its most 
successful under the Late Republic. Encouraging his subordinates to restore discipline and 
push forward with the march, Caesar instructs his subordinates to ‘look not in this instance 
to what is agreeable and safe to you personally (τὸ ἴδιον ἡδὺ καὶ ἀσφαλὲς), but to what is 
good and advantageous to all the Romans’.113 ‘τὸ ἴδιον’ is a transparent verbal clue: we 
know from the previous narrative that since Caesar was motivated by his own private 
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ambition (διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν τοῦ Καίσαρος φιλοτιμίαν), he is the last person to lecture against 
others pursuing their own private interest (τὸ ἴδιον ἡδὺ καὶ ἀσφαλὲς). There is, then, the 
outright lie that the Ariovistus campaign was a defensive engagement occasioned by the 
need to defend Rome’s allies, the Sequani and Aedui, from a German attack: ‘we have 
come here not to laze about or to be carefree, but in order to manage properly the affairs of 
our subjects, keep secure the property of our allies (τὰ τῶν ἐνσπόνδων ἀσφαλῶς 
διασώσωμεν), and ward off those who try to wrong them (τούς τε ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντάς 
σφας ἀμυνώμεθα)’.114 The reader already knows that this is nonsense: the Sequani and 
Aedui invited Caesar to attack Ariovistus not in their defence but because they wanted 
revenge.
115
 Ariovistus was, furthermore, a friend and ally of the Roman people and had 
been made such by Caesar himself, as Dio states in his prefatory remarks to the speech: the 
campaign can hardly be a quest to preserve Rome’s allies (τὰ τῶν ἐνσπόνδων ἀσφαλῶς 
διασώσωμεν). 
 
Like Pompeius, Dio’s Caesar additionally deflects the taint of pretence by ironically 
accusing others of the same. Just as the habitual pretender Pompeius (προσποιούμενος) 
accused the Quirites of ‘pretending’ (προσποιεῖσθαί) to be concerned for his well-being, so 
too does Caesar accuse Ariovistus of double-dealing and disloyalty: 
 
When he once wished to benefit us and chose to be well-treated by us in return, 
he rightly obtained his wish; just so too now, then, should he most rightly be 
considered an enemy when he pursues the opposite course (ἐπειδὴ τἀναντία 
αὐτῶν πάντα ποιεῖ). Do not be surprised that I am saying these things now, 
even though it was I who used to defend his interests in the Senate and 
assemblies. For I hold the same view now as I did back then; I’m not changing 
front! (οὐ μεταβάλλομαι). And what view is that? To honour and reward good 
and trustworthy men, but to dishonour and punish evil and untrustworthy men. 
He is the one who is changing front (ἐκεῖνος δέ ἐστιν ὁ μεταβαλλόμενος).116  
 
From Dio’s own interpretation of the circumstances which led to the mutiny at Vesontio the 
reader can easily recognise this as absurd. According to the historian Caesar had made 
Ariovistus a friend and ally of Rome himself during his consulship, but chose to disregard 
these facts given the opportunity to acquire power and glory by stabbing him in the back.
117
 
The historian has consciously and deliberately chosen to represent Caesar as the hypocrite 
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in the narrative, but then have his speaker project that fault onto another in the speech to 
follow. The speech underlines that deceit. In this way, Dio again uses verbal clues, such as 
the play on τὴν ἰδίαν τοῦ Καίσαρος φιλοτιμίαν and τὸ ἴδιον ἡδὺ καὶ ἀσφαλὲς, or οὐ 
μεταβάλλομαι and ἐκεῖνος δέ ἐστιν ὁ μεταβαλλόμενος, to alert the reader to the scale of the 
Late Republican dynast’s deception.  
 
The fourth of Dio’s five deceptive speeches of the Late Republic is the short oration of 
Caesar before the Senate in 46 BCE in the wake of Pharsalus (43.15-18), reassuring the 
senators that he will not become a tyrant. Firstly, the issue of the sources can be set aside. 
No surviving text other than the Roman History has Caesar reassure the Senate of his 
benevolence or reject accusations of adfectatio regni. It may be that the historian indeed 
invented both the content and occasion.
118
 This conclusion certainly seems preferable to 
using the speech as evidence for the dictator actually speaking in this context or even for 
what was actually said.
119
 But the fact that the historian invented the occasion for his own 
purposes does not mean that we necessarily need to regard it as ‘a fiction, a propaganda 
speech…packed with imperial slogans’, 120 or to think that the speech relates simply to 
Dio’s own time and has little to do with Caesar.121 It seems to me a further exploration of 
the historical problem of the moral ambiguity of public oratory in the Late Republic; and 
of how Caesar, like his predecessors Pompeius and Gabinius, capitalised on that ambiguity 
for his own political ends.  
 
Unlike the previous three speeches or the recusatio of Augustus which will close this 
discussion, Dio does not provide a narrative ‘preface’ to the speech of Caesar in the 
Senate. That is, he sets up no explicit interpretation of the speaker’s true motives to be used 
as a lens for reading the speech to follow, which will obfuscate those motives. He does, 
however, outline the circumstances which lead his Caesar to speak in 46 BCE. According to 
Dio, he perceived that the Senate had grown afraid of his great power and suspicious of his 
haughtiness, and that they feared to suffer as before under the tyranny of Sulla.
122
 
Immediately prior to this introduction, the historian additionally numbers the extraordinary 
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and monarchical honours which had been voted to Caesar.
123
 In the narrative immediately 
before the speech, then, the historian focuses on the speaker’s absolute power.  
 
The proemium of the speech underlines that intention. ‘None of you should believe’, Dio’s 
Caesar begins, ‘that I shall bring forward anything harsh in either word or deed, just 
because I have conquered and am able to say whatever I wish with impunity and do 
unopposed whatever I choose’. 124  This opening – surely Dio’s own analysis of the 
historical situation – is intended to be reassuring rather than intimidating. Dio’s speaker 
goes on to mollify the Senate by stating that, although Marius and Sulla initially secured 
the support of others by making benevolent proclamations only to later become tyrants, he 
will not do the same  (καὶ ἐμέ τις ὑπολάβῃ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιήσειν).125 Nor, indeed, should 
the senators believe that he had been operating under a disguise the whole time 
(προσποιητῶς) only to reveal his true nature now, in the fullness of his power. Caesar 
additionally reassures the patres that he is by no means so aggrandised by his success that 
he would wish to wield kingly power (οὔτ᾽ αὖ ὑπὸ τῆς πολλῆς εὐπραγίας ἐξῆγμαι καὶ 
τετύφωμαι ὥστε καὶ τυραννῆσαι ὑμῶν ἐπιθυμῆσαι).126 
 
But Dio’s narrative of the dictator’s career gives the lie to these statements. He is 
consistent both in stating that Caesar had always aimed at sole power and in presenting 
him as a deceitful pretender adept at precisely the disguises he rejects (προσποιητῶς). Dio 
records in the previous book, for example, that upon seeing the severed head of Pompeius, 
Caesar had wept and lamented; but people mocked him later for this transparent disguise of 
grief (ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ τῇ προσποιήσει γέλωτα ὠφλίσκανε). Dio writes here that he had always 
aimed at δυναστεία from the very beginning, and hated Pompeius bitterly as his 
competitor: his mourning was simply a sham, a προσποίησις.127 Indeed, Caesar came to 
Egypt for the sole purpose of destroying Pompeius; finding the job done, he ‘faked and 
made a show of vexation at his murder’ (ἐπλάττετο καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῷ ὀλέθρῳ αὐτοῦ 
ἐσκήπτετο). 128  Prior to this, in Book 41, the historian records that both Caesar and 
Pompeius stated publicly that they alone were fighting for Rome’s interests: but in fact, all 
either desired was the advancement of his own.
129
 This selfish duplicity is equally 
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perceptible to the reader in the narrative of Caesar’s consulship. The historian writes that 
from the very start, he arranged most of the business of state independently and 
imperiously, as if he were already a monarch (ὡς καὶ μόνος αὐτῆς ἄρχων). But as for 
proposals which were to his own benefit, ‘he arranged them through others, because he 
was extremely careful not to offer anything to himself; and through this tactic he all the 
more easily accomplished everything that he desired’.130   
 
Hiding his longing for absolute power behind a screen of pretence and obfuscation is, 
therefore, a defining characteristic of Caesar’s career in Dio’s narrative. By having his 
Caesar assert that he had neither assumed disguises nor sought autocratic power, Cassius 
Dio brings to the fore precisely those aspects of the speaker’s duplicitous character which 
the speech is staged to reject. In this way the ‘lie’ of the speech and the ‘truth’ of the 
preceding narrative again move in opposing directions to demonstrate the corruption of 
public speech in the Late Republic. Presumably the historian did not expect the reader of 
his oration of Caesar in Book 43 to remember all of the prior narrative details. But it hardly 
seems possible to imagine that he expected them to forget his presentation of Caesar’s 
career and character, either – and especially not the Ariovistus episode, which Dio 
elaborated to critique Caesar’s hypocrisy.   
 
The historian also coded a quite explicit criticism of the sophists into his speech of Caesar. 
To this point I have been reading these speeches of Dio as an implicit attack upon the 
sophists. I have argued that from his own experience of the sophists and from his readings 
in classical literature, Dio became intently concerned about the power of rhetoric. By 
retrojecting this concern onto the Late Republic, the historian found a way of exploring 
that problem which was also appropriate to the historical context. The ‘deceptive’ speeches 
of this period are therefore an implicit criticism both of persuasive but improper rhetorical 
art as such, and of the Late Republican dynasts who resorted to its abuse. At one point, 
however, Dio seems to me much more explicit on this point. Following a long sequence of 
philosophical ruminations on the ethics of power (the fortunate should be moderate, the 
strong should uphold the weak, rulers must protect the ruled, etc.)
131
 Dio’s Caesar defends 
these moralistic digressions: 
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I have not said these things as mere sophistries (ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἄλλως 
ἐφιλοσόφησα), but in order for you to know that these things I think and say 
are not just for effect (οὐκ ἐς ἐπίδειξιν) nor just happened to come to me on 
the spur of the moment. Rather, they have been convictions of mine from the 
very beginning on what is appropriate and advantageous. And for this reason, 
you should be not only confident for the present but hopeful for the future, too, 
when you consider that, if I really have shown any pretence (εἴπερ τι αὐτῶν 
ἐπλαττόμην), I would not now be deferring my plans, but would have made 
them known here today. 
132
 
 
Cary’s translation of φιλοσοφεῖν as ‘to say sophistries’ is particularly appropriate in this 
context. The sense of contrivance or insincerity carried in ἐφιλοσόφησα is not purely 
Dio’s invention: both Lysias and Isocrates use it in this manner.133 In this passage, the 
historian underlines a clear distinction between genuine philosophy and philosophy which 
is ‘just for effect’ (ἐς ἐπίδειξιν). His Caesar contrasts his long-held ethical convictions 
with rhetorical display, which has merely the appearance of philosophy. In view of Dio’s 
acceptance of the Platonic tenet that sophistry is a form of sham-philosophy, this seems to 
me significant. He found room, even in his speech of Caesar, to assert that the sophists 
were merely false philosophers; but in a way that additionally reflects upon the mendacity 
of his Caesar. The pious sentiments of the speaker here are quite inconsistent with his 
actual characterisation in the narrative (and in the speech on Ariovistus) as a deceitful 
megalomaniac. The reader knows, furthermore, that Caesar’s rejection in the above 
passage of the possibility of ever showing pretence (εἴπερ τι αὐτῶν ἐπλαττόμην) is simply 
untrue, from the earlier evidence of his behaviour in his consulship, toward Ariovistus, 
and at Pompeius’ death.  
 
Even Caesar’s advertisement in the speech of his clementia toward his enemies,134 which 
follows immediately on from the above excerpt, is contradicted by Dio’s narrative. 
Shortly prior to his oration, the historian writes that Caesar executed L. Afranius and C. 
Memmius Faustus sine iudicio, and had his cousin Lucius killed in secret after a show-
trial (κρύφα ἀπέκτεινε), even though the man had surrendered himself as a voluntary 
suppliant (ἐθελούσιον ἱκετεύσαντα). 135  In Dio’s account such back-handed 
bloodthirstiness is not uncommon: he writes that Caesar’s tactic in general was not to 
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attack adversaries openly but to have them disposed of in secret.
136
 Dio lays out all these 
incriminating details just shortly before Caesar’s speech in the Senate; he expects the 
reader to remember when they come to the oration. The antithesis of speech and narrative 
is thus deliberately constructed to emphasise the dictator’s mendacity.  
 
Fifth and finally, there is the recusatio imperii of Octavian before the Senate in the 
account of 27 BCE, promising (falsely) to restore the libera res publica. It is Dio’s last 
deceptive speech: none of the compositions in his twenty-seven remaining books will 
characterise the speaker as being wilfully hypocritical. This aspect, tellingly, is particular 
to the Late Republican orations alone.
137
 Significantly, the recusatio of Octavian is not 
only the historian’s last deceptive speech, but his last speech of the Republic. In this way, 
the years 67-27 BCE in Dio – from the narrative of the δυναστεία of Pompeius and Caesar 
to its replacement with the μοναρχία of Augustus – are framed by two major 
constitutional innovations, the lex Gabinia and the Augustan Settlement, each of which in 
the historian’s interpretation were successful because of rhetorical dissimulatio. 
 
Again, like all of his other four mendacious speeches (except that of Caesar in the 
Senate), the historian focalises the orator’s true aims in a short interpretative preface 
deliberately just before the proemium. These prefatory remarks in Octavian’s case are 
noticeably less negative than the previous examples, in keeping with Dio’s positive 
attitude toward the first princeps generally.
138
 But the similarities between Octavian’s 
intentions and those of Pompeius four decades earlier in the historian’s interpretation are 
striking. Both concealed their true motives; both wished to be honoured all the more for 
seeming to reject power but being ‘forced’ to accept it; and both colluded with their 
supporters in advance: 
 
And when he received approval and praise for these actions, he wished to show 
his magnanimity a second time, in order that he would be honoured even more 
by such a deed (ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου μᾶλλον τιμηθείη) and have his monarchy 
confirmed willingly by the people, rather than appear to have forced them to 
ratify it unwillingly (ὴν μοναρχίαν βεβαιώσασθαι τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν ἄκοντας 
αὐτοὺς βεβιάσθαι). And so, after priming his closest associates in the senate 
(τοὺς μάλιστα ἐπιτηδείους οἱ τῶν βουλευτῶν παρασκευάσας), he entered the 
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curia in his seventh consulship, and read out words similar to these which 
follow:
139
  
 
Dio’s decision to emphasise Octavian’s duplicity is not fanciful: John Rich has recently 
shown that the career of Octavian-Augustus was a history of deceptions to secure 
control.
140
 In this respect, that either Pompeius or Augustus used dissimulatio to obtain 
their objectives in the course of their careers, as we see emphasised in Dio above all, is 
not historically inadmissable. Still, as with Caesar’s speech in the Senate we hear nothing 
of a recusatio imperii outside of the Roman History, and it has been long assumed that the 
historian fabricated both the occasion and the content of Octavian’s refusal.141 This may 
be so, but it is worth noting that the first princeps in his Res Gestae is eager to list what he 
declined, and especially executive powers: the dictatorship, consulship in perpetuity, and 
right to act sine collega.
142
 It is hardly possible that the offering of such powers will not 
have involved some manner of public proclamation and, presumably, public recusatio. 
Thus, in having his Octavian publicly reject power Dio was not doing anything especially 
peculiar. The only contentious point is whether we accept his interpretation that the 
princeps did so disingenuously, pretending not to desire what he truly did. That is 
unanswerable – we cannot read Augustus’ mind – but it is clear that Dio believed so, and 
that this in his view was one reason for the successful ratification of his sole rule in the 
wake of Actium.  That is the interpretation that the false recusatio of Book 53 was written 
to demonstrate. 
 
Reading the oration in this vein, then, the historian again establishes the same sort of 
contradistinctions between speech and narrative he constructed in the four earlier 
speeches. Like Caesar in the Senate, Dio’s Octavian begins by summarising his might: 
should he wish, he can rule alone forever (πάρεστί μοι διὰ παντὸς ὑμῶν ἄρχειν), since he 
is at his most popular with the people, his most powerful with his army, and least 
threatened from factious elements.
143
 He goes on to state that he will relinquish these 
powers, however, and restore the Republic, ‘so that you may know this: that from the 
beginning I never desired any power (οὐδ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς δυναστείας τινὸς ἐπεθύμησα)…for I 
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wish that I hadn’t had to take such a hand in affairs as I did, and that the state had not 
required me to do this’.144  
 
This, obviously, is a lie and Dio presents it as such. The narrative preface has already 
served as the historian’s anteoccupatio, disproving these postures in advance by 
underlining Octavian’s desire for monarchy. The earlier diegetic material creates precisely 
the same contrasts. In his prelude to the Battle of Actium, the historian states quite 
explicitly that Octavian, like his rival Antonius, was trying to secure supreme power for 
himself: ‘both were trying to appropriate everything for themselves in so far as either of 
them could seize the advantage over the other (ὥς που πλεονεκτῆσαί τι ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν 
ἐδύνατο, ἰδιούμενοι)’:145 this included a race from both parties to control as much land as 
possible to cement their own power.
146
 Again, the narrative is quite clear that Octavian’s 
purpose in speaking was to have his absolute power confirmed, not to lay it aside. 
 
The historian furthermore gives the lie to his Octavian’s claim that he has accepted no 
extraordinary privileges. The patres should not be surprised, the orator argues, that he 
would relinquish such great authority, ‘when you can see my love of a life free from 
politics (ἀπραγμοσύνην), and when you also reflect that I have never accepted any 
extraordinary privilege nor anything beyond what many others have (οὐδὲν πώποτε οὔθ᾽ 
ὑπέρογκον οὔθ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοὺς πολλούς), even when you have often voted such things to 
me’.147 Obviously the speaker can hardly lay claim to ἀπραγμοσύνη after the preceding 
six books of competition between himself and Antonius. Nor can he reasonably affect to 
have never accepted excessive honours beyond those conferred upon others. Dio details 
an ample list of extraordinary privileges at the opening of Book 53 – again, just before the 
recusatio – including Octavian selecting and inaugurating a praetor urbanus of his own 
choice in addition to new magistrates, abolishing and creating new laws suo iure, and 
forbidding senators to travel outside of Italy without his personal permission.
148
 The claim 
is clearly absurd, and is designed to be read as such. 
 
Finally, Dio extends this absurdity to much greater proportions with the use of irony, an 
element which, as I have set out here, he liberally employed in several of these speeches. 
For such irony to work there must of course be an understanding between narrator and 
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reader of the void which separates appearance (the speech) from reality (the narrative). 
The total of such ironic statements in Dio’s false recuatio of Octavian would be difficult 
to enumerate, and I do not provide an exhaustive overview here. One may consider, for 
example, the speaker’s transparently untrue assertion that he wishes the Senators to 
manage their own affairs without his oversight;
149
 or that by praising his patriotic act of 
returning power to the patres he is ‘certainly not boasting, for indeed, I would not have 
said these things in the first place, if I thought I would gain any personal advantage from 
them!’;150 or the rhetorical question, in view of his act of ‘laying aside’ power, of ‘who 
could be found more magnanimous than I…who more nearly divine?’;151 or, lastly, the 
string of Republican sentiments scattered throughout a speech whose purpose is presented 
as monarchical.
152
  
 
Like all of Cassius Dio’s other four ‘mendacity-speeches’, the false recusatio imperii of 
27 BCE succeeds, in the historian’s narrative, in its aims. Augustus’ monarchy – like the 
lex Gabinia or Caesar’s desired campaign against Ariovistus – became an historical fact, 
but only after the act of deceptive speech which the historian presents as instrumental in 
its ratification. To be a successful orator in Dio’s late res publica had nothing to do with 
knowing one’s subject or having the morally stronger case – the tenet of good rhetoric we 
find in the Gorgias, Phaedrus, and Protagoras of Plato. In fact, and as I discuss in 
Chapter 5, that party of the debate, represented in Dio by Catulus’ dissuasio of the 
Gabinian law or Cicero’s speech on the tyrannicide Amnesty, universally fails to 
persuade. In this context it seems to me peculiar to read the ‘Heuchelrede’ of Octavian as 
the historian’s ‘final comprehensive opportunity to display the advantages of the 
Republic’.153 Rather, here and indeed only in his account of the first century BCE as a 
whole, the historian elected to demonstrate the problem of the moral ambiguity of rhetoric 
in a significant proportion of his speeches – a third of them. After 27 BCE, the problem 
disappears from Dio’s radar. Octavian’s ‘Heuchelrede’ was certainly a final opportunity 
to reflect upon the Republic – but in a way that only showed its flaws.  
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Conclusion 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. The first is purely methodological: I set 
out the implications of approaching Dio’s speeches from the viewpoint of the time in 
which they were composed. The second relates more broadly to the thesis as a whole, tying 
my discussion of the historian’s ‘mendacity-speeches’ into the main argument of this 
research.  
 
First, then, it seems clear to me that the way Cassius Dio wrote his speeches was indeed 
influenced by the rhetorical culture of the Second Sophistic; but not at all in the manner 
that scholarship has traditionally held. It has become quite natural to read a rhetorical 
flourish in ‘sophistic historiography’ as a rhetorical flourish tout court: as an assertion of 
the author’s παιδεία intended to impress upon the audience the abundance of the author’s 
compositional art. Such flourishes, moreover, are viewed as display-rhetoric and for 
display above all, notwithstanding the time-honoured tradition of using speech as a mode 
of characterisation. I have already reviewed the modern literature which asserts this view, 
often justifiably. Given the epideictic culture of his time, in which rhetoric was 
overwhelmingly for display, we may understandably interpret Cassius Dio’s motives in 
writing his own speeches in a similar light. Certainly the historian has been treated as an 
exponent and member of the Second Sophistic or even as a ‘sophist’ so-called.  
 
This view does not strike me as particularly tenable. Dio’s contemporary history 
demonstrates the permanence of certain Platonist anxieties about aspects of sophistic 
artificiality and self-presentation; and the degree to which even highly intellectual authors 
such as Dio shared those anxieties. He criticises the sophists frequently and by way of 
several points of reference. Some were classical in origin, such as the views of sophistry as 
false philosophy or of the relationship between dazzling oratory and magical power. 
Others, such as the outward show of artfully-constructed penury to assert philosophical 
probity, had become sufficiently widespread in recent times to be satirised.  
 
The case is not, I think, that he protests too much. Unlike the sophists so-called of his time, 
who vehemently rejected the title and attacked the sophists explicitly, Dio’s attacks are 
rather oblique. They are for an intellectual reader who has read their Plato and would 
perceive the points of reference and the implied message. Dio had sufficient experience of 
the sophists to dislike them even at the same time as being a court intellectual himself. One 
did not simply become a sophist, nor even particularly approve of sophists and forget one’s 
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education in the anti-sophistic tradition of classical philosophy, because one was 
intellectual. Certainly Dio wrote in archaic language, quoted other authors, imitated 
Thucydides, and placed poignant antitheses in his narrative or moralising maxims in his 
speeches. But so did Sallust. Cassius Dio asserts that his work is sophisticated work, but 
not necessarily sophistic. Indeed, the speech of Maecenas demonstrates the extent of Dio’s 
concern about the capacity of sophistic rhetoric to deceive and mislead individuals and 
entire communities, and the ambiguous relationship of the sophists with falsehood, 
pretence, and artifice. Dio seems to have rejected, rather than embraced, the propensity for 
outward display of the sophists of his time. 
 
This then raises the question of whether speech still served other purposes in his view, and 
brings me to my second conclusion. I have argued that the historian retrojected his own 
third-century concerns about sophistic deception onto the Late Republic. Dio consciously 
and deliberately made a third of his speeches of the first century BCE into negative 
examples of the power of mendacious oratory to persuade. By writing prefatory 
interpretative remarks to each of these, constructing obvious contrasts between factoids in 
the speeches and the preceding narrative, and by inserting verbal clues and word-plays, the 
historian ensured that his reader was aware of the deception. Cassius Dio elaborated the 
problem of the moral ambiguity of rhetoric in the late res publica more fully than any other 
surviving account.  
 
This latter point is in one respect an argument from silence. For this era we depend on only 
a few sources: Sallust, Caesar, Velleius Paterculus, and Appian for historical narrative; and 
Suetonius and Plutarch for biography. We do not know, then, whether Dio’s presentation 
of Late Republican political oratory was distinctive to him or whether this was inspired by 
an earlier historian. It is striking, however, that Dio brings the problem of rhetoric to the 
fore where others do not. Only Dio among our four sources for the lex Gabinia mentions 
Pompeius’ dissimulatio, and indeed only he explores it at length. The same is the case for 
Gabinius’ role, which most sources virtually obliterate. Further, for the Ariovistus 
campaign Plutarch and probably Appian followed the positive version doctored by Caesar 
himself in his De Bello Gallico, but only Dio inserted the element of Caesarian hypocrisy 
and duplicity. It is furthermore striking that the historian explored the problem of rhetorical 
artifice not only in a third of his Late Republican speeches, but only in his Late Republican 
speeches. He conceived of the issue as especially important in that context.  
 
105 
 
 
It is here that these orations are crucial for understanding the theoretical framework which 
the historian applied to his subject. Dio clearly sensed that the ethical ambiguity of rhetoric 
was relevant in his own time; but it had more dramatic and far-reaching consequences in 
the context of the first century BCE. As Dio recognised, within the political system of 
δημοκρατία the decision-making process was based upon debate. The corruption of that 
debate would lead, inevitably, to the corruption of the organism of state. This idea had a 
long pedigree, beginning with Demosthenes,
154
 whom Dio held in great regard.
155
 By 
presenting persuasive but fundamentally self-interested and deceitful oratory as 
consistently successful at times of important deliberation, Dio makes an historical 
argument through his speeches. He argues that the fora of decision-making became a 
means of dynastic self-advancement in the Late Republic, rather than instruments of the 
public or national good. The ability of individual dynasts to manipulate the platforms of 
public deliberation with selfish but suasive rhetorical artifice was a cause of the downfall 
of the res publica. It secured further δυναστεία for Pompeius in 67 BCE; it procured further 
δόξα καὶ ἰσχὺς for Caesar with Ariovistus in 58 BCE and a compliant Senate a decade later; 
and it enabled Octavian to dispose of the Republic altogether in 27 BCE.  
 
Dio does not state this argument explicitly. Only by reading the speeches can this causal 
interpretation of constitutional change be perceived. Paradoxically, then, the historian’s 
relationship with the epideictic rhetorical culture of the Second Sophistic enhances, rather 
than obstructs, the explanatory and interpretative value of these compositions. By 
moulding his political oratory of the Late Republic after the model of the rhetorical vices 
he loathed in his own time, Cassius Dio produced a persuasive representation of the 
problematic scale of deceptive rhetoric in the late res publica which was very much his 
own. 
 
 
                                                          
154
 Dem. FL 184. 
155
 cf. Vlachos (1905); Saylor Rogers (2008). 
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Chapter 4: Moralising and the Progymnasmata 
Introduction 
The explanatory value of the speeches, both as Dio’s means of communicating his causal 
framework of constitutional change to his reader and as a means for the modern scholar to 
identify that framework, can only be realised by addressing a third and final 
methodological problem. This is the abundance of explicitly moralising content, and 
especially generalising and universal moral maxims (sententiae or γνῶμαι), in Dio’s 
speeches and narrative.  
  
The preponderance of such content in the Roman History has often led scholars to 
disregard Cassius Dio’s importance as a source for the Late Republic and the interpretative 
quality of his work. These reservations are understandable. If an ancient historian 
expressed himself overwhelmingly in universal moral statements which could apply to any 
age or situation, then it is not unreasonable at first glance to assume that the author was 
more concerned with pursuing a didactic agenda – edifying and instructing his audience – 
than with analysing historical facts or causes. More unfavourably, one can be misled by 
such content to assume that the historian was uninventive, lazy, or lacking in analytical 
skill. Certainly earlier authors than Dio have been criticised on account of their sententious 
tropes;
1
 and Dio has been similarly received.  
 
This applies, more than anywhere else, to his speeches. Millar draws an explicit 
contradistinction between moral content and historical explanation, writing that where Dio 
included an oration he did so ‘not to illuminate the historical situation, but to write a 
rhetorical elaboration, often in the form of a debate, of the moral issues involved in it’.2  
He later argues that these compositions ‘carry further the tendency towards generality and 
lack of apposite detail which characterises the history…their interest must lie not what in 
they can contribute to historical knowledge’: they are a collection of ‘commonplace moral 
attitudes to the issues at stake’, and ‘disappointing’, ‘banal’, and ‘unoriginal’.3 This view 
remains prevalent. Stekelenburg in his discussion of the Cicero-Philiscus consolatio 
concludes that the episode was constructed from generalising moral and philosophical 
                                                          
1
 Cf. comments in Gomme (1945-1981); Walbank (1957-1979); Grayson (1975); Meister (1990); Grant (1995). 
Our understanding of the purpose of moralising in historiography consists of brief and pejorative comments 
rather than studies of its meaning. However, cf. the forthcoming book of Dr Lisa Hau (Glasgow) for a re-
evaluation.  
2
 Millar (1961) 14-15. 
3
 Millar (1964) 82-83. 
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views relevant to any similar occasion.
4
 Gowing fully endorses Millar’s view that ‘when 
Dio does include a speech, it is a long and involved creation, usually with scant relevance 
to the specific situation’.5 Lintott writes that ‘there can be no doubt that the striving for 
effect in certain historical set-pieces led [Dio] to obscure the facts’, and that Dio’s 
exhortations before Actium present not an historical interpretation, but rather  ‘a great deal 
of declamation about the iniquities of civil war and the bitterness of the actual fighting’.6 
Most recently, Rodgers writes that Dio’s speeches ‘often serve his philosophical or 
moralising agenda better than they serve history’.7 The ethical dimension, in short, has not 
led to favourable receptions of the role of the speeches within the historical account.  
 
In this chapter I argue that the moralising content both of Dio’s speeches and narrative was 
a means of persuasion which actually contributed to, rather than detracted from, the 
explanatory value of the speeches for the ancient reader. I suggest that the historian placed 
sententiae into his history to present individual moral failures as the cause of even major 
political and military events in the Late Republic, and especially those which precipitated 
the downfall of that constitution. The causes of major historical movements are described 
within a moral or philosophical framework shared by and common to both the narrator and 
his reader. Interestingly, then, it is precisely those universalising ethics which are 
uninventive and irrelevant to the modern perspective which would have been strong and 
persuasive to the ancient one.  
 
I am aware that this point may seem deliberately antithetical or rather perverse. But the 
systems of rhetorical and compositional education practiced in Cassius Dio’s time and 
indeed probably for some centuries before aimed in precisely that direction. The 
progymnasmata – the curriculum of preliminary rhetorical exercises widespread at the 
latest by the first century CE – taught the young elite to think morally through learning to 
write; or, perhaps, to learn to write through thinking morally. Both were concurrent and 
inseparable aspects of the structure and aims of the progmymnasmata. In consequence, I 
suggest that the universalising and gnomic ethics of Dio’s Roman History were generated 
directly by the historian’s childhood instruction in these drills. By articulating his 
interpretation of the downfall of the Roman Republic in an ethical language which both he 
                                                          
4
 Stekelenburg (1971) 50; also Millar (1964) 51: ‘the dialogue has no function within the History’.  
5
 Gowing (1992) 244. 
6
 Lintott (1997) 2501-2502 with Millar (1964) 42-43. 
7
 Saylor Rodgers (2008) 297. 
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and his similarly-educated elite reader will have shared, Dio’s causation of the collapse of 
the res publica will have been more convincing, not less, to the contemporary perspective.
8
 
 
In considering Dio’s relationship with these progymnasmata I am approaching a rather 
unbeaten track. Although several modern studies have investigated the influence of 
rhetorical education on ancient historians,
9
 these discussions have generally ignored the 
progymnasmata.
10
 Yet this is where the process of writing began for our Imperial authors. 
In spite of very recent work on this syllabus,
11
 there has been to my knowledge no research 
on the way in which the processes of compositional education shaped how historians 
approached the task of causal interpretation. As Gibson concludes, we need rhetorical 
analyses of post-Classical historians which investigate how these authors used the 
building-blocks of the progymnasmata to construct their histories, and how Imperial 
historiography tout court emerged from rhetorical education.
12
 By this I do not mean that 
we need to identify where authors ‘cut and pasted’ the exercises of their childhood into 
their adult writings.
13
 Rather, I suggest that the process of an education in the 
progymnasmata  taught Cassius Dio to conceive of historical narrative as the 
exemplification and valorisation of moral truths; and to repeat those truths (in the form of 
γνῶμαι) as historical causes, in order to render his interpretation of the decline of the 
Republic more authoritative and convincing.  
 
To arrive at these conclusions, in the first section I give a survey of the development, 
components, and objectives of the progymnasmata, which united compositional practice, 
moral instruction, and historical knowledge in a single curriculum. They were thus 
especially suited to the writing of Dio’s history. I focus especially on the exercises in 
maxim (sententia or γνώμη) and fable (fabula or μύθος), which occupied the ancient 
student in the earlier stages of his schooling. In the second and third sections I present two 
short case-studies which demonstrate that the historian conceived of historical causes in a 
fundamentally moralising fashion. I investigate Dio’s use of the sententia and fabula-
structure in two stretches of narrrative: first, the Mithridatic War and Pompeius’ 
engagement against the pirates; and second, the exile of Cicero under the lex Clodia. I 
                                                          
8
 I give an overview of the scholarship surrounding this point in the next section. 
9
 Cf. for example Wiseman (1979); Woodman (1988); Nicolai (1992); Moles (1993). 
10
 As Gibson (2004) 105 observes. Although Nicolai (1992) and Gibson (2004) do discuss the progymnasmata, 
they investigate the use of historiographical texts in the rhetorical classroom, not the influence of the 
classroom upon historiographical texts. 
11
 Cf. Webb (2001); Heath (2003); Gibson (2004), (2009), (2014); Bloomer (2011); Penella (2011). 
12
 Gibson (2004) 124. 
13
 For which cf. Barwick (1928) and Hock (1997).  
109 
 
 
demonstrate in these studies that the historian often posited the moral thought contained 
within a sententia as the cause of a political or military event in the Late Republic, either in 
his own authorial voice of in that of one of his speakers. These moral thoughts often have 
significant consequences, which are postponed in the narrative and can only be perceived 
in the longer term. I additionally explore the way in which Dio structured individual 
narrative episodes in a manner remarkably similar to the Aesopic and schoolroom fabula. 
These episodes, I show, valorise a moral maxim which is postponed to the end of the 
diegesis and is often introduced with οὕτω or οὕτως (thus, in this way) after the manner of 
an epimythium (ἐπιμύθιον): a concluding moral exemplified in the preceding tale. In such 
instances, the historian appears not only to be following, perhaps unconsciously, the 
compositional techniques we see regularly attested in the rhetorical schools of this period. 
He additionally uses these ‘fable-structures’ to emphasise an important moral point which, 
having been ‘proven’ by way of example in the fable-structure, he then goes on to display 
as an underlying cause in a later historical development. From this analysis, we will be 
better able to perceive how the moral aspect, far from undermining Cassius Dio’s historical 
explanation, served rather to reinforce it.       
Moral, Compositional, and Historical Education 
The system of education called by its pedagogues progymnasmata (or gymnasmata) was a 
set of exercises practiced in the rhetorical schools of the Imperial period as a training 
preliminary to advanced composition and declamation.
14
 This cannot be described as a 
fixed syllabus. The individual authors of our extant handbooks exhibit differences in the 
order and application of the exercises; and the level and quality of training available will 
additionally have depended on geography and class.
15
 But despite differences in practice, 
the surviving handbooks suggest a remarkably static curriculum, whose exercises and 
objectives became established in the first two centuries CE and changed little five centuries 
later. The progymnasmata taught boys, aged perhaps roughly seven to fifteen,
16
 to be able 
to speak and write on any number of subjects: the probability of a myth, the advantages or 
drawbacks of an imagined law, a critique of Homer, or to deliver invective and panegyric.  
 
Possibly none of the surviving compendia of these drills date from the historian’s time. 
The third-century Pseudo-Hermogenes arrives around a century after Cassius Dio will have 
                                                          
14
 All translations of Aelius Theon, ps.-Hermogenes, Aphthonius, and Nicolaus within this chapter are those of 
Kennedy’s 2003 edition. 
15
 For which cf. Dionisotti (1982) 121; Webb (2001) 297.  
16
 Fisher (1987) 45-51. This is, of course, a rough estimate. 
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been educated. Aphthonius’ and Nicolaus’ treatises likely follow in the fourth and fifth 
centuries, respectively.
17
 Last, the progymnasmata of Theon were at one point believed to 
date from the first century CE. But Heath has recently adduced evidence indicating that he 
may date to the fourth century.
18
 This does not mean, however, that these drills were not 
being regularly practiced in the third century CE; and the publication of such treatises 
possibly within the historian’s lifetime, such as those of ps.-Hermogenes, helps in this 
regard. We know as early as Cicero and the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium that the 
exercises in narratio or διήγημα, locus communis or τόπος, and sententia or γνώμη were 
being practiced as early as the first century BCE, and these consistently find their way into 
the later collections of progymnasmata.
19
 A century before Dio, Quintilian recommends a 
broad range of the exercises found in the manuals, including maxim, fable, chreia, 
narrative, confirmation, and refutation.
20
 Indeed, this tradition probably goes back much 
further. The term progymnasmata first appears in the 4
th
-century BCE Rhetorica ad 
Alexandrum, where the author recommends preliminary exercises as a means to understand 
the formal elements of composition.
21
 Aristotle, too, recommends half of the fourteen 
exercises which later find their way into the collections.
22
 We are therefore to imagine a 
programme possibly only categorised in the manual format in Dio’s day, but already in use 
among Greeks in the Hellenistic period and quite commonly indeed from the first or 
second centuries BCE.
23
  
 
All but one of our surviving collections divide the progymnasmata into fourteen parts.24  
Following the order in which they appear in Theon (the only treatise to have survived 
which may have been available in Dio’s time),25  these are: moral maxim and quoted 
anecdote; fable; narration; confirmation and refutation; vivid description; speech-in-
character; encomium and invective; comparison; proposition; and law. In Theon, some of 
these (such as encomium and invective) are paired as a single exercise; and different 
manuals occasionally variate the order of the drills slightly.
26
 But all of the treatises place 
the focus of this chapter, the sententia and fabula, at the earliest stage of the student’s 
                                                          
17
 Kennedy (2003) i-x. 
18
 Heath (2003) 141-142. 
19
 Cic. Inv. 1.27, 2.77; Rhet. Her. 1.12, 2.9, 4.56-57.  
20
 Quint. Inst. Or. 1.9, 2.4, 10.5. 
21
 [Arist] Rh. Al. 1436a 23-27.  
22
 Arist. Rhet. 2.20. These are fable, maxim, narrative, encomium, vivid description, and thesis.  
23
 Hock and O’Neill (1986) 10; Kennedy (2003) xi; also Clarke (1951) 165 for the second-century date. 
24
 The edition of ps.-Hermogenes has thirteen, omitting invective.  
25
 Although Kennedy (2003) also points out that we know of the manuals of Harpocration, Minucianus, and Paul 
of Tyre, all probably from the second century CE. 
26
 Penella (2011) 82-83 gives an overview of these variations; these are also tabulated in Kennedy (2003) xiii. 
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education. Quintilian furthermore subordinates maxim and fable to the grammaticus, the 
elementary teacher of grammar and literature – again in the earlier stage of schooling.27 
Turning, then, to these two exercises themselves, a survey of these reveals what occupied 
the student in his most formative years after the basics of the alphabet, handwriting, and 
some grammar had been acquired.
28
  
 
The sententia, first, is a short moral statement or aphorism with a universal application, 
usually derived from the corpus of Classical literature. These need little detailed 
explanation; recommended by Quintilian to be of strictly moral value,
29
 collections of 
moral maxims first appear in the Hellenistic period and emerged out of a literary tradition 
of universally moral writing which began as early as Homer.
30
 Short and memorable, the 
sententia could be redeployed in any number of compositions in which its ethical force was 
appropriate and relevant: poetry, historiography, and in various branches of speechwriting. 
They had not only the moral valour required to situate the words of the speaker or writer 
within the accepted moral code of the elite (and thus to lend credibility to the composition). 
In their derivation from the Classical canon – Menander was a common source of 
sententiae – they also possessed the cachet of antiquity. 31  In addition to its edifying 
purpose, the maxim also appears to have been used in the earliest stage as an exercise in 
handwriting.
32
 As a grammatically-complete expression in direct speech, the maxim could 
then be incorporated into more complex exercises later, after it had been copied and 
memorised. 
 
One of these, and next in Theon’s programme, was the fabula.33 The structure and purpose 
of this drill require a little further unpacking than the sententia, which is more obviously 
recognised in modern scholarship on historiography. Theon describes the fable as ‘a 
fictitious story giving an image of truth’:34 a short narrative recounting events that the 
reader or listener knows to be false and improbable, but which demonstrates and proves the 
truth of a moral idea.
35
 As a complete diegetic unit, the fable has a clear beginning and end, 
                                                          
27
 Quint. Inst. Or. 1.9. 
28
 For which cf. Cribiore (1996) 139-144.  
29
 Quint. Inst. Or. 1.1.35. 
30
 Cf. Morgan (1998) 120-151 and Bloomer (2011) 139-169.    
31
 Bloomer (2011) 142 on Menander.  
32
 Cribiore (1996) 44-46. 
33
 In the (probably) later pedagogical manuals, the fabula appears first, with sententia and chreia second.  
34
 Theon. Prog. 72. 
35
 For a history of the fabula, which it is not my intention to give here, cf. Fisher (1987); Adrados (1999-2003); 
Holzberg (2001). Gangloff (2002) for the distinction between fable and myth and their differing use in the 
handbooks and technical treatises.  
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containing at least two main characters, usually animal or non-human, who must negotiate 
an alteraction or other moral situation. As a short story, the fabula furthermore provided 
context, actions, and often direct or indirect speech. Erroneous schoolchildren’s copies on 
papyri suggest that it was an exercise in listening and copying at the earliest stage,
36
 but 
pupils were later called upon to compose their own fables.
37
 Its suitability for young 
children was inherent in the form: the moral of the story was always unequivocal, and its 
focus on animals and the impossible lent it a particular ψυχαγωγία, a ‘persuasive charm’.38  
 
As with the sententia, the moral dimension is again key here. Although both μῦθος and 
λόγος were in currency among Hellenic prose writers as terms for fable, the manuals also 
suggest that the ancient term for them, αἶνος, emerged from παραίνεσις (‘advice’) or vice 
versa.
39
 The etymology is probably spurious, but that is not the point: it is indicative of a 
clear association in the Imperial Greek mind between fable and didacticism. Most 
commonly by Dio’s period, this didacticism had come to take the form of a concluding 
moral, an epimythium, which served not only as the conclusion of the narrative but 
additionally as its point of departure. Crucially, in the treatises we hear of rhetoricians 
assigning their students the concluding moral first, and then requiring them to invent a tale 
which exemplified its truth.
40
 This seems to me an important point. The purpose of 
narration, even of preposterous events, began with valorising the moral of a story. The 
student’s first attempt at a proper composition – and a grammatically-advanced one, which 
strove for syntactic compression through ablative or genitive absolutes and participles – 
began, and ended, with proving a moral idea.
41
  
 
To linger on these epimythia a moment longer, it is clear that they were common in the 
collections long before Cassius Dio’s time and had their own recognisable style. Generally 
epimythia were brief and memorable, but more sermonising examples can be found.42 
Although the later collections of progymnasmata state, furthermore, that this concluding 
moral could be placed at the beginning of the tale, Nicolaus in particular stated that the 
maxim was most effective at the end; and Theon does not mention promythia.
43
 Certainly 
they are more commonly attested at the conclusion in the compendia. By the time of our 
                                                          
36
 As Adrados (1999-2003)
1
 115-117 has argued. 
37
 Theon. Prog. 75-76. 
38
 Nicol. Prog. 9. 
39
 Theon. Prog. 73-74; Nicol. Prog. 6. 
40
 Theon Prog. 75-76. 
41
 On the grammatical requirements cf. Bloomer (2011) 136. 
42
 Phaed. Fab. 3.10, 4.11, 4.20, 5.4. 
43
 Nicol. Prog. 10-11. 
113 
 
 
earliest surviving collection of fabulae, that of Phaedrus in the first century CE,
44
 the 
closing maxim is regularly found as a standard part of the architecture of the fable.
45
 In the 
biography of him by Philostratus, Apollonius of Tyana is furthermore made to treat the 
epimythium as commonplace in the fabulist’s toolkit: ‘for the poet, after he has told his tale 
(εἰπὼν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον), leaves the sane reader torturing himself to work out whether it 
really happened; but one like Aesop, who tells a story which we know to be false and adds 
the moral (ἐπαγαγὼν δὲ νουθεσίαν),46 shows that he has used falsehood for the benefit of 
his audience’.47  
 
These epimythia furthermore had their own associated language. By the time of Phaedrus, 
the closing maxim had commonly come to be introduced with οὕτω or οὕτως: in a single 
compendium from this period, 82 out of 230 fables have epimythia beginning with this 
adverb.
48
  Strictly speaking this appears to have been an evolution from the earlier 
Classical practice: the reciter of a fable, particularly in persuasive speech, would often 
conclude prosphonetically, underlining the applicability of the story to their specific 
moment by stating ‘thus you too take care that…’ or similar (οὕτω δὲ καὶ σύ).49 The 
conventional epimythium by the Imperial period, then, will be usually short, have a 
universal moral application, conclude a unit of narrative, and often begin with οὕτω or 
οὕτως. These parameters will be important in the analysis to follow in sections two and 
three.  
 
Finally, in addition to the moral purpose there was a clear persuasive function to the fable, 
and this had a long pedigree. Within classical rhetoric, the fabula served above all as a 
form of illustration by example: it demonstrated the veracity of a universal truth by 
narrating fictitious events which valorised the argued point by analogy. Both Aristotle and 
Cicero recommend the fable as a form of proof by example within persuasive speech.
50
 
Nicolaus, praising the striking effect of the postponed epimythium in his treatise, 
furthermore states that the primary purpose of the fable was to persuade: pupils would be 
left more convinced of the veracity of the explicitly-stated maxim by first seeing the events 
                                                          
44
 The earliest known collection by Demetrius of Phalerum, mentioned in Diog. Laert. 5.580, does not survive. 
45
 Perry (1940). 
46
 The aorist here strikes me as important: the fabulist has finished the job of telling the false story and then adds 
the moral, indicating an epimythium, not a promythium. 
47
 Philost. VA 5.14; cf. Luc. Bacch. 8, who also treats concluding morals as commonplace.  
48
 Perry (1940) 397. 
49
 Examples at Hdt. 1.141; Soph. Aj. 1146; Plat. Phaed. 60C; Xen. Mem. 2.7.13-14; Arist. Rhet. 2.20. For the 
‘prosphonetic’ epimythium see Nicol. Prog.10. 
50
 Arist. Rhet. 2.20; Cic. Part. Or. 30; although Cicero does not use them in any of his extant orations. 
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which confirm its truth unfold.51  This exemplifying quality is the central and fundamental 
characteristic of the fable. As the child’s first exercise in independent composition, the 
fable demonstrated that the truth of a moral precept he had memorised since first beginning 
to write could and should be valorised in narrative. The student’s first experience of 
piecing together the components of narrative began with a maxim whose veracity it was his 
primary objective to prove. It was thus a moral idea made truth, and could be redeployed in 
persuasive speech as a form of analogy.
52
  
 
Even setting aside the traditional use of the fabula as a convincing form of illustration by 
example within speech, the moral dimension inherent within the fable, sententia, and 
indeed all the exercises of the progymnasmata was persuasive in and of itself. Nicolaus 
posits a direct relationship between moral probity and rhetorical credibility and authority:
53
 
a theme in which I have argued in the previous chapter Cassius Dio was especially 
interested. This curriculum furthermore equipped its students to a society in which the vir 
bonus and dicendi peritus were still related notions.
54
 As Bloomer has writen, the process 
of memorising the sententia and then re-elaborating it into the fabula, before going on to 
reproduce both of these drills in the later, more advanced exercises of speechwriting, 
involved a process of internalisation: the student would instinctively reapply his arsenal of 
memorised moral thoughts throughout his historiographical, political, and even private 
discourses.
55
 If the writer or speaker was an elite individual trained in the progymnasmata, 
writing or speaking for elites raised within the same system, this had an obvious tactical 
value. As Clark has written, 
 
the moral focus of compositional instruction made students more successful as 
adult speakers when they addressed audiences which shared those values: ‘the 
tendency to deal with general considerations of the possible, the true, the just, 
the fitting, or the expedient had its value. The exercises equipped the boys with 
a ready command of the arguments and other amplifying material that could be 
adduced in support of the commoner major premises, and might easily persuade 
audiences of their truth’.56 
 
Moralising, then, was not merely a mode of sermonising – or, more charitably, of 
philosophical reflection – but rather served to lend authority and vim. When the student of 
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the Imperial period came later to the more advanced compositional exercises essential to 
historiography and oratory, he would be well-equipped from his training in the 
progymnasmata to meet these challenges with an instant recall of the socially-acceptable 
mores of the Greek and Roman elite, and argue upon that basis from truths that all present 
could be presumed to accept.  
 
There is a third, and I think particularly important, aspect of the progymnasmata with 
which I close this cursory survey. I have detailed the didactic and persuasive dimension: 
the moralising focus which was prevalent even from the elementary level with the 
sententia and remained throughout the curriculum. This, necessarily, served a bipartite 
purpose, both to edify and indoctrinate the student within elite values while at the same 
time imparting a knowledge of the major moral premises which could sway a reader or 
audience. There was then the compositional aspect. This is confirmed simply by the 
graduated sequence of the exercises; from memorisation of the sententia and its re-
elaboration into the more syntactically-complex fabula, to the writing of narrative and then 
all the branches of logography. But a third, and telling, application of the progymnasmata 
was their use in the teaching of history.  
 
There is no evidence to suggest that ‘history’ existed at all as a subject in schools; ancient 
pupils did not study history as such or as a course in its own right. Rather, the acquisition 
of historical knowledge was a corollary of practicing rhetorical and compositional drills set 
in contexts of past time, and imitating model historical texts. Craig Gibson has recently 
shown the way in which each of the preliminary exercises (aside from maxim, 
commonplace, and law) recommended that pupils mine details from the works of previous 
biographers and historians in order to fulfil the requirements of the corresponding exercise. 
In Theon, for example, fabula brought the student to imitate fabulous passages of 
Herodotus, Philistus, Theopompus, and Xenophon and the historical contexts in which they 
were embedded.
57
 For confirmation and refutation Theon mentions only historical texts as 
exemplars, supporting or rejecting factual narratives and myths in Herodotus, Ephorus, 
Thucydides, and Theopompus.
58
 Later drills such as encomium furthermore required 
students to mine these sources, with the addition of Xenophon and Plutarch, for the 
biographical details of the character set.
59
 The progymnasmata were thus as much an 
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instruction in history as they were in composition or moral rectitude. As Gibson concludes, 
‘one could simply not learn to argue without learning how to argue about history’.60  
 
The progymnasmata, then, drew together compositional technique, moral didacticism, and 
historical knowledge in a single formative unity. This intention was certainly underlined by 
Theon in the preface to his manual: he wrote that he had  
 
laid out these precepts not because I believe that all are suitable for every 
beginner, but in order that we may see that the practice of exercises is very 
necessary – not only for those who intend to become orators, but also if 
someone wishes to practice the art of poetry or history or any other genre’.61 
 
The progymnasmata according to Theon were therefore, firstly, a means for the beginner 
to acquire the technical facility to practice any genre of composition; a series of praecepta, 
of received modes of conduct; and appropriate to the historian’s task as much as any 
other’s. The technical rudiments of narrative were taught through materials drawn 
overwhelmingly from the historical past and historical texts. The fable inculcated in the 
student an inherently moralising conception of the purpose of narrative: pupils were first 
set an ethical maxim and then composed a narrative to valorise its truth, often postponing 
that maxim to the conclusion as an epimythium. And those moralising sententiae, which 
had been coded into the student from childhood, provided him an arsenal of thoughts 
which could be redeployed in historical narrative or speech-in-character as a convincing 
assertion of the author’s moral probity, rhetorical art, and intellectual authority.  
 
 Whether this moralising curriculum, and especially the drills in sententia and 
fabula, had a profound effect upon the way in which Cassius Dio interpreted the collapse 
of the Roman Republic remains to be seen in the next two sections. At first sight it would 
be reasonable to assume that these did not. They came at the earlier stage of the student’s 
education, under the age of ten; and we can hardly expect an historian to continue to have 
been influenced by these drills many decades later. In response to this I suggest two points. 
Firstly, the sententia and fabula were not, as I have detailed above, intended merely for the 
student’s earliest years: they will have been re-elaborated throughout his compositions in 
school until the age of perhaps fifteen or sixteen. In consequence, the student came 
repeatedly into contact with these exercises throughout his most formative, retentive, and 
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absorptive years, at which his memory was at its best. This at least is as Quintilian 
described the primum tempus, quod initia litterarum sola memoria constant, quae non 
modo iam est in parvis sed tum etiam tenacissima est.
62
 Secondly (and in this connection), 
it is precisely because these exercises were elementary that they reveal ‘the lowest 
common denominator of training and reveal the basic conceptions of language, categories 
of composition, and modes of thought which informed both the production and the 
reception of rhetorical and other texts’.63  Just as ancient rhetorical handbooks use the 
language of ‘moulding’ or ‘imprinting’ the student in praise of the progymnasmata, so too 
do modern scholars talk about how they trained ‘reflexes’.64 Returning to where it all 
began for Imperial historians – in the schoolroom with the progymnasmata – indicates that 
even this earliest experience of composition could continue to inform historical narrative 
decades later.  
The Mithridatic Narrative 
This second section discusses Dio’s narrative of the Third Mithridatic War, the Gabinian 
and Manilian laws, and Pompeius’ return from the east in Books 36-37 (69-60 BCE). 
Unlike the earlier books of the Late Republic (25-35), this survives quite complete. My 
treatment of the moral dimension of the historian’s explanation of the cause of events in 
this section will not be exhaustive. My intention is not to give a comprehensive overview 
of every moral maxim or concluding γνώμη in Books 36-37. Rather, I demonstrate how 
Dio presented (very) important military and political events, such as the cause of Rome’s 
repeated failures against Mithridates and Tigranes or the motivations which led to the 
formation of the First Triumvirate, as precipitated by a vice or virtue.   
 
With that in mind, we must also distinguish between three different types of moral 
argument in Dio. Understandably, the person or situation to which an ethical form of 
argument in speech or narrative applies will not always be the same. Firstly, a Late 
Republican speaker such as Dio’s Catulus may well argue, for example, that ‘it is neither 
appropriate nor of advantage to entrust affairs to any one man’.65 But that of course is not a 
lesson for the monarchist-historian’s contemporary audience, who had been living under a 
monarchy for two centuries. It is a presentation of an argument which would have been 
persuasive to the depicted audience, in the Late Republic, not to Dio’s own contemporary 
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reader under the monarcy. I will refer to this as Type 1 moralising: an explicit moral 
thought in a speech whose referent is the depicted Late Republican audience, not Dio’s 
third-century reader.  Secondly, certain moral premises in Dio’s speeches of this period 
relate both to the depicted first-century BCE audience and to the reader of the historian’s 
own day. An example might include a statement of Dio’s Cicero in Book 38: ‘it is easier to 
counsel others than to be strong oneself under suffering’.66 Its force is universal, applying 
both to the historian’s contemporary reader (didactically), and within the historical context 
described; indeed, as I will show in the next section, this thought is especially relevant to 
the rise and fall of Dio’s Cicero. This is Type 2 moralising: a maxim in a speech applicable 
to both audiences. Third and finally, there are the ethical premises within the historical 
diegesis in the voice of the didactic narrator. These generally occur at the end of a narrative 
episode as a concluding moral before the transition to a different subject: an example may 
read ‘for when men become reconciled after great enmity, they are suspicious of many 
insignificant acts done and of many coincidences; in short, they view everything through 
the lens of their former enmity as if it were done on purpose and with evil intent’.67 The 
maxim is didactic: its purpose is to edify and instuct Dio’s reader. But it additionally 
explains the underlying cause of an historical event, in this case the cause of hostilities 
between Octavian and M. Antonius. This is Type 3 moralising: a moral thought in the 
narrative intended to be didactic as such (to instruct the contemporary reader), but which 
explains an event long in the past. This has persuasive value. The educated reader of the 
third century, having also been trained in the progymnasmata, can be expected to accept 
already the veracity of that maxim: and by making that maxim his explanation of an 
historical event, Dio convinces the reader of his narrative interpretation. I will refer to 
these three Types in the analysis to follow. 
 
Beginning that analysis. Some historical context is important. By 69 BCE, the Third 
Mithridatic War between Rome and Mithridates VI of Pontus with Tigranes II of Armenia 
had already been in train for four years. It was a drawn-out affair. The repeated escapes of 
Mithridates and Tigranes were a source of continuing frustration and embarrassment at 
Rome. The protracted and unsuccessful nature of the war would lead, ultimately, to the lex 
Manilia of 66 BCE, transferring supreme command to Pompeius in place of L. Licinius 
Lucullus. Dio treats this lex Manilia as a further example of discord between Senate and 
people: the urban plebs, seeing the Senate’s rejection of further powers for their favourite 
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Pompeius, were furious (τὸ πλῆθος δεινῶς ἠγανάκτει); and the Senate for their part 
persisted in their opposition (ἀγανάκτησις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀντιλογία καὶ τότε παρὰ τῶν 
δυνατῶν). In the end the measure was passed, but only – as Dio interprets – after Caesar 
and Cicero both used the occasion to court the favour of the plebs. Cicero, the historian 
writes, wanted to use this opportunity in order to get control over the state (τήν τε 
πολιτείαν ἄγειν ἠξίου). More significantly, Caesar supported Pompeius because he wanted 
to make him envied for his success and thus destroy him more quickly (τὸν Πομπήιον καὶ 
ἐπιφθονώτερον καὶ ἐπαχθέστερον ἐκ τῶν διδομένων οἱ ποιῆσαι).68 The lex Manilia was 
thus, in the historian’s view, an expression of fragmentation between Senate and people 
and of ambition and hostility on the part of Cicero and Caesar.  
 
But this time of moral turpitude began three years earlier in Dio’s interpretation, with the 
moral failings of the general Lucullus. The historian writes that the general’s failure to 
keep Mithridates and Tigranes in check in one key episode owed little to strategic error, 
but was rather precipitated by his moral failings. He first narrates the military details: 
Lucullus arrived at Talaura to beseige the Pontic king, but he remained behind his walls; 
and news arrived that Tigranes was approaching with his army. Lucullus’ army mutinied. 
The army followed Lucullus away from Talaura to a crossroads and then, contrary to his 
order, marched away to Cappadocia.
69
 After recounting these historical details, Dio pauses 
the diegesis to interpret the cause of the disaster in his own authorial voice. It is structured 
in a manner remarkably like fable:  
 
No one should be surprised that Lucullus, who had been the most skilled 
Roman general, first of the Romans to cross the river Taurus with an army as to 
war, who had previously vanquished two powerful kings and would have 
captured them if he had actually wished to end the war quickly, was not now 
able to control his men, and that they were constantly mutinying and finally 
deserted him. For he asked a lot of them, was unapproachable, strict in his 
demands of work, and unmerciful in his punishments (πολλά τε γάρ σφισι 
προσέταττε, καὶ δυσπρόσοδος ἀκριβής τε ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἔργων ἀπαιτήσεσι καὶ 
ἀπαραίτητος ἐν ταῖς τιμωρίαις). He did not understand how to win someone 
over with persuasion or to attach him with mildness or to gratify him with gifts 
of money. All of these are necessary in a crowd, but especially in an army. It’s 
for this reason (καὶ διὰ τοῦθ᾽) that the soldiers obeyed him as long as they were 
doing well and obtained prizes commensurate with their risks; but the moment 
they encountered trouble and felt fear instead of hope, they obeyed him no 
longer. This is proven (τεκμήριον δὲ ὅτι) by the fact that when Pompeius 
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assumed command of this same legion – for he re-formed the Valerians - he 
kept hold of it without a whisper of revolt. So much does one man differ from 
another (τοσοῦτον ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὸς διαφέρει).70  
 
Dio establishes a causal framework for the mutiny after Talaura which is inherently moral: 
it was simply the failings in Lucullus’ character which precipitated the revolt. In Dio’s 
interpretation this revolt had farther-reaching historical consequences than merely the 
delay of the general’s progress. Immediately after this excursus on the character of 
Lucullus, the historian states that directly because of the mutiny,  Mithridates won back 
most of the territories he had lost, setting back Roman progress in the war (ὡς δ᾽ οὖν τοῦθ᾽ 
οἱ στρατιῶται ἔπραξαν, πᾶσάν τε ὀλίγου τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Μιθριδάτης ἀνεκτήσατο καὶ τὴν 
Καππαδοκίαν ἰσχυρῶς ἐλυμήνατο). Q. Marcius Rex furthermore refused to provide 
Lucullus assistance, on the grounds that Lucullus was unable to control his men (οὐκ 
ἐπεκούρησε, πρόσχημα τοὺς στρατιώτας ὡς οὐκ ἐθελήσαντάς οἱ ἀκολουθῆσαι 
ποιησάμενος).71 The events within the didactic pause in the narrative, then, are presented 
as having significant historical consequences in the immediate term. 
 
And it is certainly a didactic narrative pause. To make this excursus on a moral theme, Dio 
interrupts the historical diegesis to start this new story about Lucullus’ character and the 
mutiny. The diegesis then resumes immediately after that story.  The moral that the reader 
is intended to refer from this stand-alone tale is postponed until the end, and has a 
universal application indicated by the present tense and the absence of definite articles: 
τοσοῦτον ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὸς διαφέρει.  This closing moral message – that a man’s character is 
everything – has of course been fully exemplified in the story which precedes it on 
Lucullus’ vices and the revolt of the army. In this way it seems to me that Dio has, 
probably unconsciously, replicated the structure of the fabula for didactic purposes, to 
instruct the reader. But it additionally serves historical-explanatory purposes. By proving 
the veracity of his concluding maxim τοσοῦτον ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὸς διαφέρει in the story of 
Lucullus, Dio illustrates by example the fact that a man’s character is of fundamental 
importance in military and political matters. This then renders his interpretation of the 
causes of the revolt and the consequent fallout – Mithridates’ successful recapture of his 
land and Rex’s refusal to send help – more valid and persuasive. This form of moralising 
(Type 3) replicates the structure of the fabula not only to demonstrate by example the truth 
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of a moral statement in the narrative which Dio’s reader will already have accepted; but, 
having proven it, then makes that accepted moral thought a causal factor of history.  
 
Lucullus’ poverty of good ἔθος, articulated in the fabula-structure with its concluding 
valorised moral, thus had immediate historical consequences. But it exerted further 
ramifications in the medium-term: the prolonging of the Mithridatic War and Rome’s 
response to this problem in the form of the Gabinian and Manilian laws (more 
personalpower for Pompeius). On the one hand, Dio suggests that Lucullus prolonged the 
war deliberately in any case, in order to secure further authority and prestige for himself. 
While in 69 BCE Mithridates was negotiating an alliance with Parthia, Dio intimates 
Lucullus’ deliberate inactivity: ‘he did not follow him up, but allowed him to reach safety 
at his leisure; and because of this he was accused of refusing to end the war, in order to 
hold command longer’ (ὅπως ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἄρχῃ).72 Lucullus was not the first general to use 
war to cling to power in Dio’s view: in 67 BCE, Q. Caecilius Metellus attacked the Cretans 
in spite of their recent treaty with Rome, ‘because of his eagerness for power’ (δυναστείας 
τε ἐρῶν). 73  On the other hand, there can be no doubt that Lucullus’ moral failings 
inadvertently protracted the war in the historian’s interpretation, too. The ethical thought of 
the epimythium,  τοσοῦτον ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὸς διαφέρει, explains why the general could not stop 
Mithridates from undoing Roman advances in Asia and could not draw upon Rex for 
assistance, thus setting back progress in that theatre: his troops were simply bound to 
desert him.   
 
This inability to bring the Third Mithridatic War to a swift conclusion had political 
consequences at Rome in Dio’s interpretation, too, in the form of the lex Gabinia. In his 
assessment of the causes of the controversial law, Dio states that because the Romans had 
been kept busy by Mithridates and Tigranes, piracy in the Mediterranean had been allowed 
to flourish unhindered (τῶν γὰρ Ῥωμαίων πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιπολέμους ἀσχολίαν ἀγόντων ἐπὶ 
πολὺ ἤκμασαν, πολλαχόσε τε περιπλέοντες καὶ πάντας τοὺς ὁμοίους σφίσι 
προστιθέμενοι). 74  It is hardly possible not to infer that in Dio’s view the costly and 
distracting Roman preoccupation with Mithridates, caused on the one hand by Lucullus’ 
deliberate prevarication for the sake of δυναστεία and on the other inadvertently because of 
his poor ἔθος, generated the desperate pirate situation of 67 BCE and Gabinius’ response to 
it.   
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In the speeches of Pompeius and Catulus which follow this interpretation of Dio’s, the 
historian uses several sententiae and later another fabula-structure to explain the moral 
causation of major political and miliary crises. I have already illustrated the historian’s 
explanation of Pompeius’ motivations in speaking in Chapter 3: he pretended not to desire 
the command, because he knew that appearing forced to accept it would bring him glory 
(δόξα), and that jealousy (τὸ ἐπίφθονον) would surely follow if he seemed to have been 
eager.
75
 Pompeius’ goal, in the historian’s presentation, was therefore to secure power 
without incurring φθόνος; this is important.  
 
In his speech, Dio’s Pompeius employs only one sententia. It is of what I have called Type 
2 moralising: a moral thought within a speech which has a universal force in that it applies 
both to the historian’s third-century reader  (as instructive didacticism) and to the depicted 
Late Republican audience (here the people in a contio). Superficially read, the sententia of 
Dio’s Pompeius is a mere generalisation on the ethics of power. However, it in fact serves 
as the historian’s own interpretation of one of the reasons for the speaker’s success in the 
contio that year, and as his prediction, or foreshadowing, of what the historical 
consequences of the lex Gabinia will turn out to be. His Pompeius states: 
 
And so if any of you carries on demanding this of me, consider this: all 
positions of power are causes both of envy and hatred (καὶ ἐπίφθονα καὶ 
μισητὰ πάντα). And although you do not care about this fact – it is shameful 
that you pretend to  – nevertheless, it would be most grievous to me. And I 
confess that I am not as vexed or grieved by any one of the dangers of these 
wars as I am by such an attitude as that. For what man in his right mind could 
live happily along men who envy him (ἡδέως παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποις φθονοῦσιν αὐτῷ 
ζῴη)? And what man would willingly carry out public business, if destined only 
to stand trial if he fails or be envied if he succeeds (ἂν δὲ κατορθώσῃ, 
ζηλοτυπηθήσεσθαι)?76 
 
The trope was of course easy enough to recycle: those invested with great power ought to 
expect to be envied for it. In Chapter 5 I will demonstrate how Cassius Dio embedded the 
problem of mutual φθόνος in a startling proportion of his Late Republican speeches only 
for the problem to disappear after Augustus’ succession, indicating its place within his 
interpretative framework for this period; but this is not my aim here.  Rather, I am 
concerned with the role of the moral thought within Dio’s historical explanation. When 
considered in conjunction with the preceding authorial statement that Pompeius had to 
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employ recusatio imperii to acquire his desired command without attracting φθόνος, the 
speaker’s gnomic statement – ‘all positions of power are causes of envy and hatred’ 
acquires an important explanatory dimension. The sententia is both the motivating factor 
of Pompeius’ dissimulatio and the means whereby it attains its objective. The moral 
thought contained within the maxim that all positions of power cause envy and hatred is so 
integral to Dio’s interpretation of the historical situation that the speech would not be fit 
for purpose without it. In both his own authorial voice and in the corresponding sententia 
of Pompeius itself, Dio sets out his consistent argument: φθόνος was a real risk within the 
Republican framework of power-sharing in 67 BCE, and that it is precisely by manipulating 
those concerns – disingenuously, as I showed in the previous chapter – that Pompeius 
succeeded.  In this way, Dio deploys the seemingly uninventive repetition of a moralising 
compositional unit drilled in the progymnasmata, both to set out the rationale behind 
Pompeius’ actions and the cause of his success.  
 
The response of Dio’s Catulus picks up this refrain. In a fragment of what must be the end 
of his oration, which is lacunose,  he is made to predict that ‘his position as monarch over 
all your possessions will not be free from envy’ (οὔτε ἀνεπίφθονον ἔσται αὐτῷ πάντων τῶν 
ὑμετέρων μοναρχῆσαι).77 This thought, which of course responds to Pompeius’ earlier 
universal sententia on the relationship between power and jealousy, in fact seems to me to 
function as the historian’s own prediction, through his speaker, of the historical 
consequences of the extraordinary honour of the lex. In his account of 63 BCE Dio records 
Pompeius’ triumphant return to Italy after four years’ campaigning against pirates in the 
Mediterranean and against Mithridates and Tigranes in Asia. Arriving at Brundisium 
twenty years after Sulla had, he symbolically disbanded his forces: ‘for, because he 
understood that the deeds of Marius and Sulla were hateful to men, he did not wish to 
cause them fear, even for a few days, that they would suffer any repetition of those 
circumstances’.78  
 
According to Dio, he came to regret that decision three years later, and specifically because 
of φθόνος. In 60 BCE, Pompeius successfully had L. Afranius and Q. Metellus Celer 
appointed consuls, hoping to accomplish political matters through their influence (ἐλπίσας 
δι᾽ αὐτῶν μάτην πάνθ᾽ ὅσα ἐβούλετο καταπράξειν), and wishing especially to have his 
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territorial arrangements in the East and land for his veterans ratified.
79
 Afranius and 
Metellus had been his legati under the terms of the lex Gabinia. In that respect, another 
prediction of Dio’s Catulus, that the command would grant Pompeius political leverage 
through the appointment of legati, is very astute: the prediction is Dio’s hindsight 
presented as Catulus’ foresight.80 However, Pompeius’ plan backfired: according to Dio, 
his former legate Metellus, now consul, opposed every one of his acts. Metellus, Dio 
records, was so vehement in his opposition that Pompeius had him put in prison. The 
consul’s response was simply to convene the Senate there.81 In this context, Dio then 
interprets that the φθόνος, which his Pompeius cited in his sententia as a false rejection of 
the lex Gabinia and which in response his Catulus presaged would come to claim 
Pompeius, was a prediction come true: 
 
And so, since he could accomplish nothing because of Metellus and the others, 
Pompeius declared that they were jealous of him (φθονεῖσθαί ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν) 
and that he would communicate this to the people. However, as he feared that 
he might fail to win them over too and incur even greater shame, he abandoned 
his demands. Thus he realised that did not have any real power, but only the 
name and the envy for the positions he had once held (τὸ μὲν ὄνομα καὶ τὸν 
φθόνον ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἠδυνήθη ποτὲ εἶχεν). In fact, he received no benefit from them, 
and regretted disbanding his legions and leaving himself at the mercy of 
his opponents (μετεμέλετο ὅτι τά τε στρατόπεδα προαφῆκε καὶ ἑαυτὸν τοῖς 
ἐχθροῖς ἐξέδωκε).82 
 
I have digressed far from the original universalising sententia of Dio’s Pompeius that ‘all 
positions of power are causes of envy and hatred’. But this has been necessary to 
demonstrate the sophistication with which Dio weaved that moral thought into his 
explanation of the rise and fall of Pompeius’ power in the 60s. By having his Pompeius 
bring to the fore concerns about the relationship between power and envy in a 
universalising moral language in his recusatio, Dio did not merely insert a moralising 
commonplace. Rather, he emphasised his evaluation of the real historical problems that 
Pompeius had to face in the lex Gabinia, and the motivations which precipitated the choice 
of recusatio imperii as a tactic. Then, by having his Catulus respond to that sententia with 
a prediction about the φθόνος great powers would bring, the historian articulates his own 
interpretation of the risks of great authority under the Late Republic – risks which, in his 
take on the events of 60 BCE, turn out to be a significant causal factor in the course of 
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events. Significant indeed: in Dio’s view Pompeius entered the First Triumvirate with 
Caesar and Crassus in the very year of his embarrassment at the hands of Metellus’ φθόνος 
precisely because he was ‘not as strong as he hoped to be’ (οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς ὅσον ἤλπισεν 
ἰσχύων).83 In this way, the moral language of Pompeius’ sententia is used to set in motion 
a chain of historical events which one must look beyond the speech itself to understand. 
This strikes me as the subtle and sophisticated development of a causal interpretation 
which begins with a moral thought and ends with the consequences of that thought: 
Pompeius’ impotence at the hands of his rivals’ envy, and the formation of the First 
Triumvirate. Cassius Dio shows considerable planning of and command over his material.  
 
Another two sententiae in Catulus’ oration against the Gabinian law demonstrate further 
Dio’s tendency to embed an explicit moral dimension within his framework of historical 
causation. Both of these are of what I have called Type 1: explicit ethical statements within 
a speech which relate not to the third century, but exclusively to the depicted historical 
context and audience. Indeed, as I have discussed in Chapter 2, the historian seems to me 
to have clearly based both of these following sententiae on the objections of Q. Lutatius 
Catulus and Q. Hortensius Hortalus which he found preserved in Cicero’s De Imperio. By 
virtue of that relationship with the contemporary Latin material, these sententiae are 
particularly suitable as a means of historical explanation. His Catulus’ statement, which 
both begins and ends with gnomic maxims, is worth quoting in full: 
 
For my part, I say that one should never entrust such great positions of 
power, one after another, into the hands of one man (φημι δεῖν μηδενὶ ἑνὶ 
ἀνδρὶ τοσαύτας κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀρχὰς ἐπιτρέπειν). For this is not only forbidden 
by law, but has proven to be most perilous by our experience (πείρᾳ 
σφαλερώτατον ὂν πεφώραται). What made Marius what he became, so to 
speak, was nothing else than being entrusted with so many wars in a very short 
space of time and being made consul six times in the briefest period. In the 
same way, Sulla became what he was precisely because he commanded our 
armies for so many years in succession, and was later appointed dictator, then 
consul. For it does not lie in human nature for a person – I speak not only 
of the young, but of the mature as well – to be willing to abide by ancestral 
customs after holding positions of authority for a long time (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν 
τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ψυχήν, μὴ ὅτι νέαν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρεσβυτέραν, ἐν 
ἐξουσίαις ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐνδιατρίψασαν τοῖς πατρίοις ἔθεσιν ἐθέλειν 
ἐμμένειν).84 
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Clearly the historian’s agenda in inserting these two general statements on the ethics of 
power at the beginning and end of this excerpt is not didactic. The universality is 
confirmed by the language of human nature and the present tenses; but these are a 
representation of such ethical concerns as an optimate politician of the Late Republic 
would raise with his audience (and, as I have argued in Chapter 2, probably did raise). 
Cassius Dio, as a monarchist, did not hold these views, and probably did not expect his 
reader to accept them either: monarchy was a reality, and that was that.
85
 
 
Instead, these sententiae facilitate the historian’s own evaluation of the incompatibility of 
the Republican system of annual magistracies with the desire of elites to wield power; and 
they furthermore articulate his own view of the historical cause of Marius’ and Sulla’s 
degeneration into tyranny.
86
 By making explicit reference to both of these figures, and 
inbetween the two sententiae on the relationship between power and moral corruption, 
Dio’s Catulus does not deliver simply a moralising discourse.  Rather, he voices the 
historian’s interpretation: Marius and Sulla had set a precedent for ambitious generals in a 
competitive Senate – a precedent being repeated by Pompeius in 67 BCE. Dio deliberately 
draws parallels between Pompeius’ unconstitutional might and that of his predecessors in 
order to demonstrate that he belonged in a chain of Late Republican generals who vied for 
δυναστεία. These sententiae therefore seem to me, on the one hand, to look back in history, 
stating the cause of Marius’ and Sulla’s earlier corruption. But they additionally look 
forward, prognosticating that Pompeius, like his ancestors, will vie for control over the 
πολιτεία just as they did.  
 
Finally, this prognostication later comes true in the Roman History. In a similar fashion to 
the foreshadowing of Dio’s Catulus that the lex Gabinia would bring φθόνος to its 
beneficiary (which it later did), so here again does the historian use his speaker as a 
medium of historical explanation through moral sentiment. In his third and final sententia, 
Dio’s orator states that great honours and powers magnify and then corrupt their holders. 
This sententia, again, is based upon the genuine historical arguments of the optimates 
against Pompeius’ power in the early 60s which Dio found in Cicero, as I have suggested 
in Chapter 2. Catulus argues: 
 
For who does not know that it is neither fitting nor of advantage to entrust all 
our affairs to one man, and to make one man master of all our existing 
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possessions, even if he is the finest of all? For great honours and excessive 
powers magnify and then destroy even these men (αἵ τε γὰρ μεγάλαι τιμαὶ 
καὶ αἱ ὑπέρογκοι ἐξουσίαι καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους ἐπαίρουσι καὶ διαφθείρουσιν).87 
 
This prognostication of Pompeius’ magnification, corruption, and ultimate destruction 
meets its confirmation in Dio’s narrative of the Battle of Pharsalus long after the lex 
Gabinia, in 48 BCE. The historian first recounts the details of the battle itself: the 
exhortations delivered on both sides, the sound of the trumpets and the beginning of the 
engagement, and the rout of Pompeius’ soldiers following their defeat.88 He will shortly go 
on to detail Pompeius’ flight to Alexandria and his assassination there.89 But between these 
two narratives Dio inserts a pause to reflect on the causes of the general’s defeat. In this 
pause, the historian stresses Pompeius’ complacency and his over-confidence. He had 
usually always been evenly-matched with his enemy and as a result did not usually ‘take 
his victory for granted’ (προελάμβανε τῇ γνώμῃ τὴν νίκην); but this time, ‘as he assumed 
that he would prove greatly superior to Caesar, he took no precautions’ (τότε δὲ πολλῷ τοῦ 
Καίσαρος περισχήσειν ἐλπίσας οὐδὲν προείδετο). Dio goes on to detail how: he had 
neither placed his camp in a sensible position nor planned a refuge in case of defeat; and 
rather than waiting for the upper hand, he had charged in headlong, either at the prompting 
of others ‘or because he expected to win anyway’ (ὅμως, εἴτε ἐθελοντὴς ὡς καὶ πάντως 
νικήσων). 90  Dio concludes his pause on Pompeius’ complacency with a long and 
sententious closing moral: 
 
Because of this, the moment he was defeated he was greatly terrified, and had 
no opportune plan nor secure hope for facing danger again. For whenever an 
event falls upon one unexpectedly and contrary to expectation, it humbles his 
spirit and shocks his reason, so that he becomes the worst and weakest judge of 
what should be done; for reason cannot dwell with panic, but if it occupies the 
ground first, it thrusts the other out boldly; but if it is last on the field, it gets the 
worst of the encounter. 
 
καὶ διὰ ταῦτ᾽, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα ἐνικήθη, δεινῶς ἐξεπλάγη καὶ οὔτε τι  βούλευμα 
καίριον οὔτ᾽ ἐλπίδα βεβαίαν ἐς τὸ ἀνακινδυνεῦσαι ἔσχεν. ὅταν γάρ τι 
ἀπροσδοκήτως τέ τινι καὶ μετὰ πλείστου παραλόγου προσπέσῃ, τό τε φρόνημα 
αὐτοῦ ταπεινοῖ καὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον ἐκπλήσσει, ὥστ᾽ αὐτὸν κάκιστόν τε καὶ 
ἀσθενέστατον τῶν πρακτέων κριτὴν γενέσθαι: οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσιν οἱ λογισμοὶ 
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τοῖς φόβοις συνεῖναι, ἀλλὰ ἂν μὲν προκατάσχωσί τινα, καὶ μάλα γενναίως 
αὐτοὺς ἀπωθοῦνται, ἂν δ᾽ ὑστερήσωσιν, ἡττῶνται.91 
 
This rather lengthy gnomic moral statement closes the pause in the narrative before its 
resumption with Pompeius’ misguided flight to Alexandria, where he would subsequently 
die. I am again struck by the historian’s choice to interrupt his historical diegesis to provide 
an excusus on a specific ethical theme – here the story of Pompeius’ complacency – before 
concluding with a universal moral statement at the point of transition from the pause to a 
new historical diegesis. Just as with Lucullus’ failings of ἔθος, the historian postpones the 
concluding moral, which is surely believed by the reader, to the end of the narrative 
reflection which exemplified it – fulfiling the function of an epimythium. This, again, 
enables didacticism, a process of instruction for the contemporary reader in values they 
could already be expected to share (Type 3).  
 
But it also seems to me a clear explanatory statement, too.  Dio’s historical argument, 
developed from the third and final sententia of Catulus to the fabula-structure of the 
general’s complacent over-confidence, is this: the extraordinary powers of the lex Gabinia 
– a confirmation and further expression of Pompeius’ δυναστεία over the πολιτεία like 
Marius’ and Sulla’s – would and did magnify and then destroy him. This prediction of 
Dio’s Catulus meets its final valorisation in the historian’s interpretation of the events 
following Pharsalus: the general was simply too sure of his own brilliance to form a 
coherent plan or take precautions. The shock, moreover, at that unexpected defeat denuded 
Pompeius of all his φρόνημα; and as a result, he lost hope, fled to Egypt, and died. Great 
honours and excessive powers, as Dio’s speaker presaged in his sententia, magnify and 
then destroy even great men.  
 
We do not necessarily have to accept that this fundamentally moralising conception of 
historical causes goes back to the unity of composition, moralising, and historical 
knowledge that I have identified in the progymnasmata. We also do not have to accept 
that, in the diegetic pauses for the story of Lucullus’ ἔθος and Pompeius’ arrogance, with 
their concluding maxims illustrated by example therein, this technique necessarily goes 
back to the schoolroom fabula. I do suggest that Dio’s rhetorical and compositional 
education was the origin of this approach to explaining the causes of past events and 
structuring those explanations. But it is not essential to credit this link between Dio’s moral 
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thoughts and the progymnasmata in order to see the explanatory purpose of the moral 
dimension in his account of the Late Republic. It may simply be that the historian was 
lacking in the interpretations of previous authors with respect to, for example, the cause of 
the revolt of Lucullus’ soldiers; the protraction of the Mithridatic War; Pompeius’ inability 
to have his Eastern settlements ratified; the formation of the First Triumvirate; or the cause 
of Pompeius’ defeat at Pharsalus.  
 
The causes of these events, in Dio’s evaluation, were fundamentally generated by a moral 
problem. It is indeed possible that the historian invented those ethical causes; but these 
would not have been unpersuasive to the contemporary perspective. What third-century 
reader educated in the didactic progymnasmata would not believe that a man’s character is 
crucially important, or that absolute power corrupts, or that great honour brings with it also 
the risk of great envy? If, then, Cassius Dio lacked inspiration from his sources on the 
precipitation of the major events detailed above, I do not think that he compromised for 
this paucity in a way that was unpersuasive or even incredible. By establishing a skeleton 
of causation in which it is the moral and emotive aspect of human behaviour which drives 
forward historical action, Cassius Dio was not doing anything particularly peculiar. He 
formed an interpretation of the ethical failings of individual actors in the late res publica, 
and his own distinctive assessment of the historical consequences of those failings. He then 
communicated that assessment in a language that his reader would be predisposed, after a 
childhood and adolescence indoctrinated in sententious literature, to credit. Moral 
argument, therefore, could serve as a form of historical evidence or proof, when presented 
to an audience which shared the same moral values. There were worse things an historian 
could do. 
The Exile of Cicero 
Having established this principle, I aim to close with some briefer words on the lengthy 
consolatio de exsilio between Cicero and an unknown philosopher, Philiscus, in Book 38.
92
 
The exchange has long baffled enquiry. It has produced, to my knowledge, almost no 
conclusions on the role the dialogue has to play within Dio’s reconstruction of the collapse 
of the Roman Republic. All scholars assume it to be fiction in both content and context 
with no parallel historical occasion or source.
93
 I do not challenge this. I do, however, 
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again intend to examine the moral sentiments expressed within it in order to better 
understand Dio’s explanatory purposes in writing such a piece.  
 
Where rarely the Cicero-Philiscus consolatio has been studied it has been read as a mere 
jeu d’esprit, possibly written as a philosophical piece for declamation and as a further 
example of the historian’s ‘sophistic’ tendencies.94 Millar writes that it has no function 
within the text whatsoever, except perhaps to emphasise Dio’s hostility toward Cicero.95 
Fechner, on the other hand, suggests that it in fact treats Cicero favourably as an exponent 
of the ‘Republican’ virtues of freedom, free speech, and concordia.96 Although this is a 
welcome development which attempts to situate the exchange in relation to Dio’s broader 
thematic ideas, Kemezis is right to state that this brings us no closer to understanding the 
function of the speech within the narrative context.
97
 Kemezis himself has recently read the 
speech as the historian’s own consolatio ad Dionem, a philosophical treatise on coping 
with exile to help Dio himself to come to terms with his own exile from Rome. This is very 
convincing: the number of clues within the Cicero-Philiscus exchange which relate clearly 
to the historian’s own career in public and military life point in that direction.98 I fully 
accept Kemezis’ persuasive analysis. However, this is not the only aspect. In addition to 
serving as a reflection on exile to comfort the historian himself, it seems to me that the 
moral thoughts contained within this exchange again function as Dio’s own evaluation of 
the historical circumstances and causes which led to Cicero’s exile in 58 BCE.  
 
Significantly, the themes that run throughout several sententiae in this dialogue are 
advocacy, favour, and public speech. The applicability of these themes to the historical 
character of Cicero is obvious. But they serve an important purpose in the reconstruction. 
To understand this purpose, a short word on the narrative context is again needed, as Dio 
seems to me to have deliberately paired up the content of these sententiae with that 
context.  
 
In his record of the years 59-58 BCE Dio heavily emphasises Cicero’s excessive frankness 
of belligerent speech. He writes, for example, that the orator defended M. Antonius over-
vehemently when the latter was implicated in the conspiracy of Catiline: perceiving Julius 
Caesar to be responsible for the accusations against Antonius, he made an ample attack 
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against him (πλείστην…καταδρομὴν ἐποιήσατο) and, according to Dio, resorted to 
personal insults (προσελοιδόρησεν).99 Caesar, however, did not take the bait. Rather than 
return the salvo, he watched for his opportunity (τοῦ δὲ δὴ καιροῦ διεσκόπει), preferring 
instead to exact retribution secretly and where it would be least expected (ἐν οἷς ἥκιστα ἄν 
τις προσεδόκησε).100  
 
In Dio’s assessment this opportunity for revenge came in the person of the tribune P. 
Clodius Pulcher. He writes that Caesar, seeing that Clodius owed him a favour for refusing 
to prosecute him for incestum a year earlier, ‘set Clodius secretly against Cicero’ 
(παρεσκεύασε κρύφα κατὰ τοῦ Κικέρωνος). After being transferred to the plebeian class 
and appointed tribune by Caesar’s influence, Clodius courted the favour of the people and 
Senate in order to be able to crush Cicero all the more quickly (ταχὺ κατεργάσεσθαι); and 
he then brought forward his lex Clodia, proposing retribution for any magistrate who put a 
Roman citizen to death without a trial. Dio writes that, although Cicero was not mentioned 
nominatim, it was clear that Clodius’ law had been conceived with the orator as its 
principal target.
101
 
 
In the sententiae which follow both in his interpretation of the development of these events 
and in the Cicero-Philiscus exchange, Dio again uses a universal moral language to 
articulate the historical cause of the orator’s downfall. The historian is not ignorant of the 
political details: he sketchesout the significance of Clodius’ incestum and the Bona Dea 
débacle, Caesar and Clodius’ alleged compact and the former’s support for his bid for the 
tribunate, and the political implications of the new tribune’s programme of reforms and his 
currying of favour with both the urban plebs and the aristocracy. But it is again the moral 
dimension which Cassius Dio especially chooses to elaborate at great length in his own 
voice: 
 
Clodius hoped that, if he could win over the wealthy to his side, then he would 
easily destroy Cicero, whose strength lay in others’ fear of him rather than their 
good opinion (διὰ φόβον μᾶλλον ἢ δι᾽ εὔνοιαν ἰσχύοντα). For he annoyed a 
great number of people with his speeches, and those who had been helped by 
him were nowhere near as grateful to him as those who had been harmed by 
him were alienated. For people are more ready to be annoyed at what 
irritates them than to be grateful to anyone, and they think that they have 
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repaid their advocates properly with their fee even when their desire is to 
ward off their opponents in some way or another (πρὸς γάρ τοι τῷ τοὺς 
πλείους τῶν ἀνθρώπων προχειρότερον ἐπὶ τοῖς δυσχερεστέροις ἀγανακτεῖν ἢ 
τῶν ἀμεινόνων χάριν τισὶν ἔχειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν συναγορεύσασί σφισιν 
ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸν μισθὸν νομίζειν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀντιδικήσαντας ἀμύνεσθαι τρόπον 
τινὰ προαιρεῖσθαι). Furthermore, Cicero had made himself the most bitter 
enemies by always trying to get one-up in some way on even the most powerful 
men, and by always using unbridled and excessive frankness of speech to all 
alike (παρρησίᾳ πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως ἀκράτῳ καὶ κατακορεῖ χρώμενος). He 
hunted eagerly after a reputation for being a powerful speaker and sage like no 
other, even in place of being thought a good person (καὶ πρὸ τοῦ χρηστὸς εἶναι 
δοκεῖν). As a result of this fact, and because he was the greatest boaster of all 
men and thought no one equal to himself, but instead in his words and his life 
looked down upon everyone and did not think fit to live in the same manner as 
others,  he was boorish and hateful (φορτικός τε καὶ ἐπαχθὴς ἦν), and as such 
was envied and despised (ἐφθονεῖτο καὶ ἐμισεῖτο) even by those he had once 
pleased.
102
  
 
The thrust of the sententia in bold certainly has an universal application: it is a didactic 
lesson within the narrative to the contemporary reader (Type 3). But it again expresses 
Dio’s own interpretation of the historical situation, and in a language of conventional 
morality that all audiences educated in the moralising progymnasmata could be assumed to 
accept. In his view, Cicero’s excessive παρρησία and personal insults not only attracted the 
resentment of Caesar in Antonius’ trial in 59 BCE; they additionally generated the 
circumstances in which Caesar was able to satisfy that resentment a year later through 
Clodius. The orator’s failures of character – his love of being a good speaker rather than a 
good citizen (καὶ πρὸ τοῦ χρηστὸς εἶναι δοκεῖν), as well as his haughtiness and unbridled 
attacks upon others – left him bereft of defenders against Caesar’s retribution in 58 BCE. 
There is no reason to believe that the historian himself did not believe in the message of his 
sententia or did not expect his reader to: it would not be difficult to accept the view that 
people more readily resent offence than appreciate kindness, and no longer feel obliged to 
do their benefactors a favour after paying them for services rendered. 
 
It is only after the ratification of the lex Clodia and Cicero’s exile, however, that Dio 
explicitly posits the moral thought of this sententia as the principal cause of the orator’s 
banishment. For this we need to look to the dialogue of Cicero and Philiscus. According to 
Dio, this latter approached the orator while he was staying in Macedonia, wishing to lift his 
spirits with some improving sentiments.
 
I think it significant that Philiscus focusses on 
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Cicero’s oratory in the courts from the beginning, and that the two responding sententiae 
of Cicero also underline that intention. Dio’s Philiscus first accuses his interlocutor of 
weeping and wailing in shameful fashion, and asks how ‘one who has acted as an advocate 
to many could be so feeble’ (ὡς ἔγωγε οὔποτ᾽ ἄν σε προσεδόκησα οὕτω 
μαλακισθήσεσθαι… πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ συνηγορηκότα).103 Cicero’s response continues this 
reflection on his career as a public speaker, with accompanying maxims: 
 
But it is not the same thing, Philiscus, to speak for others as it is to advise 
oneself (ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέν τοι ὅμοιόν ἐστιν, ὦ Φιλίσκε, ὑπὲρ ἄλλων τέ τινα λέγειν καὶ 
ἑαυτῷ συμβουλεύειν). For the things said on behalf of others are most useful, 
when they come from a solid and unshaken mind. But whenever some suffering 
overtakes one’s spirit, the spirit becomes turbid and opaque and cannot come to 
reason usefully. It is for this reason, I suppose, that it has been rightly said 
indeed that it is easier to counsel others than to be strong oneself when 
suffering (ὅθεν που πάνυ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ῥᾷον παραινέσαι ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἢ 
αὐτὸν παθόντα καρτερῆσαι).104 
 
From the opening of the episode, then, the historian shifts the reader’s focus onto Cicero’s 
oratorical career, and especially his performances in the courts – precisely what in Dio’s 
interpretation had caused Caesar to set Clodius against him in the first place and had left 
him devoid of allies. When situated in the context of the preceding narrative, these 
sententiae of Dio’s speaker on the theme of speaking on the part of others are particularly 
relevant to the historical situation of 58 BCE. 
 
This focus on Cicero’s advocacy and oratory continues throughout. As a philosophical 
dialogue that focus is of course couched in the language of loci communes, especially of 
the type amply represented in Plato. Philiscus compares Cicero’s case to that of 
Hippocrates: if he were to fall ill, he would not be averse to accepting the treatment of 
another. Why, then, should this orator not listen too when he is in need of help? In the 
same way, a wordsmith such as he should be readily prepared to hear the words of another 
to cure his own malady of grief.
105
 Dio’s concentration on the here highly relevant theme 
of oratory – of words, counsel, and advocacy – is still evident here even in spite of the 
medical commonplace. Cicero’s enthusiastic acceptance of his counterpart’s medical 
metaphor then continues in this same vein, returning to the theme of words and speech and 
accepting Philiscus’ comparison between the two professions: ‘for words, like medicines, 
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are of many properties and potencies; and so it will not be surprising if you can steep even 
me (εἰ καὶ ἐμὲ) in a little philosophy, I, who have been brilliant in the Senate, assemblies, 
and law-courts!’ 106  The self-aggrandisement that the historian excoriated in Cicero’s 
character earlier is all there. But importantly, this allegorical focus on the orator’s legal 
career and the theme of words and public speech enables Dio to go on to set out explicitly, 
through Philiscus, the cause of his exile: 
 
Most of your benefits did not come to you by inheritance in a way that means 
you should take particular personal pains over them. No, they were acquired 
by your own tongue and by your own words – on account of which you also 
lost them (ἀλλὰ ὑπό τε τῆς γλώττης καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων σου πεπόρισται, δι᾽ οὓς 
καὶ ἀπόλωλεν). You should not therefore be troubled if your benefits have 
been lost in the same way they were won. Ship-masters, for example, do not 
take it so badly if they suffer great losses; for I imagine that they understand 
how to evaluate the problem sensibly, that the sea which gives wealth also 
takes it away again (οἶμαι, φρονίμως ἐπίστανται ὅτι ἡ θάλαττα ἡ διδοῦσά 
σφισιν αὐτὰ καὶ ἀφαιρεῖται).107 
 
From his reading of this passage Brandon Jones suggests that the Platonist ship-metaphor, 
and so too the medical allegory, demonstrate Cassius Dio’s self-advertisement as a 
sophistic intellectual, as indeed does the dialogue as a whole.
108
 The nautical sententia at 
the end of this excerpt certainly required little skill at invention or particularly profound 
philosophical outlook, and demonstrated a knowledge of classical loci.  
 
But there is much more to this occasion of speech than that. The historian in the first 
instance formed a negative opinion of Cicero’s unrestrained and offensive παρρησία at the 
incestum trial of M. Antonius, and then posited this directly as the reason for Caesar’s 
anger and consequent desire for revenge. In an excursus on Cicero’s career in public life a 
moment later, Dio then found a universalising sententia consonant with his view that the 
orator’s jarring παρρησία and his supercilious character were remembered with greater 
hatred than were his services to others (τοὺς πλείους τῶν ἀνθρώπων προχειρότερον ἐπὶ 
τοῖς δυσχερεστέροις ἀγανακτεῖν ἢ τῶν ἀμεινόνων χάριν τισὶν ἔχειν). In that context, he 
was generally despised and in Dio’s view was left without allies when the time came to 
defend himself.  
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 Cass. Dio. 38.19.1. 
107
 Cass. Dio. 38.20.3-4. 
108
 Jones (forthcoming, 2016). 
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Finally, in the consolatio de exsilio which follows, the historian brings this interpretation to 
its full explanatory denouement with the sententiae of Cicero and Philiscus. These, 
obviously and deliberately, centre around the theme of forensic oratory and speaking on 
the part of others. Dio’s Philiscus, who serves tout court as a medium for the author’s own 
historical interpretation, at last states explicitly that it was Cicero’s career in the courts 
which both furthered and then destroyed him. This was certainly Dio’s own view, as his 
narrative of Caesar’s resentment of Cicero at Antonius’ incestum trial confirms. This view, 
moreover, is valorised through a sententia on a nautical metaphor. These sententious 
maxims, indeed, are universalising and commonplace. But their universality ought not to 
blind the reader to their place within Dio’s interpretation of the historical situation in 59-58 
BCE, and the causal factors which precipitated Cicero’s exile. The moral is, in fact, an 
indispensible aspect of the historian’s evaluation of the relationship between character and 
cause in the Late Republic. 
Conclusion 
In view of Cassius Dio’s education in the progymnasmata I find it unsurprising that he 
approached the task of evaluating and writing the past through a transparently moral lens. 
From his earliest experience of writing to his last declamation with the schoolroom 
rhetorician, the ancient elite individual – and particularly one from a wealthy governing 
background with ample access to education and travel – did not cease to separate the moral 
from the literary. The belief that when ancient historians such as Dio wrote moral 
sentiments, they did so in the expectation that they would appear banal or unpersuasive to 
their audience, ought to be abandoned. Rather, from this analysis of only two historical 
episodes in the Roman History I conclude that Cassius Dio deployed sententiae in both his 
speeches and narrative to emphasise those moral failings, and especially failures of 
character, which the reader could be expected to recognise from their moralising education 
as a genuine problem. By locating these maxims within a value-system common to both 
himself and his audience, Cassius Dio filled his text with thoughts that were highly 
persuasive to the similarly-educated reader. If modern scholars dislike to read them, that is 
not the important issue.  
 
I am more surprised by the relationship between moral sentiment and historical 
explanation, however. For all its universality, Cassius Dio’s moralising is surprisingly 
astute, and – to engage in some healthy speculation – strikes me as not uncreditable. It is 
not difficult to imagine that Cicero, who boasted o fortunatam natam me consule 
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Romam,
109
 and more than once that he had saved the Republic,
110
 might be disliked in 
certain quarters: I have already mentioned in Chapter 2 that Asinius Pollio detested him 
and wrote amply to that effect. If Cassius Dio viewed the events of 59-58 BCE through the 
lens of the moral problem of Cicero’s unbridled παρρησία and self-promotion, he was 
perhaps not making a misstep. This ethical argument, moreover, strikes me as complex and 
sophisticated: the historian develops it across half of Book 38, and it is clear that the 
sententiae of the Cicero-Philiscus dialogue on advocacy and public speech are intended to 
demonstrate the ultimate historical ramifications of Dio’s earlier narrative sententia: that 
men are readier to remember insults and offences than they are benefactions rendered. 
Only by being prepared to accept the moral sentiments within the Cicero-Philiscus 
exchange from the perspective of the ancient reader – which involves also considering the 
didactic curriculum in which both the narrator and reader were trained – can its 
explanatory purpose within the narrative context be realised.  
 
What is happening here is not merely a reflection of the historian’s schooling. Rather, the 
process of learning to compose history – the genre taken so often as a model for imitation 
and a source of factual knowledge in school – inculcated in the writer a moralising 
conception of history itself. Through the fabula, the ancient pupil learned to approach 
narrative as the exemplification and validation of moral thoughts. My focus in this chapter 
has predominantly been on the historian’s sententiae. But the stand-alone excursus on 
Lucullus’ ἔθος and on Pompeius’ arrogance at Pharsalus, with their concluding morals 
exemplified and then postponed to the end, seem to me reflections of the impression that 
the schoolroom fabula continued to have upon the way in which narrative was approached 
and structured. In concentrating only on the Mithridatic narrative and the exile of Cicero I 
have had to leave aside Dio’s many other fabula-structures, with their digressive, stand-
alone explorations of a moral story and their concluding epimythia.  
 
I am aware that I will appear to have attempted to subvert a consensus, which still persists, 
that the moralising content within Dio’s speeches and indeed within his work more 
generally serves little purpose. The work of a number of scholars to that effect has been 
cited in the introduction to this chapter. However, this consensus seems to me untenable. 
By verbalising his evaluation of the ethical problems which underlay major military and 
political movements in a universal moral language – a mutinying army, the enfeeblement 
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 For a discussion of this line cf. Allen (1956). 
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 E.g. Cic. Rep. 1.7. 
137 
 
 
of Pompeius at the hands of his envious inferiors and his consequent entry into the 
Triumvirate, the exile of Cicero – the historian rendered his interpretation of these events 
more convincing to the reader, not less.  
 
Dio’s relationship (or lack thereof) with contemporary Latin sources, with his time, and 
with the moralising tropes of an Imperial rhetorical education need not deter modern 
scholars from recognising the important role the speeches played within his work. The 
circumstances and methods under which Dio’s work was composed have usually been 
received as grounds to discount the embeddedness of these orations within Dio’s 
interpretative framework. In my discussion of these three areas I have argued, in fact, that 
precisely the opposite inference ought to be drawn. For a more detailed survey of Cassius 
Dio’s six historical factors of constiutional change, however, we must move beyond the 
methodological considerations – which aided, rather than hindered, the use of the speeches 
as media of historical interpretation – and turn to the case-studies as such.  
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Section Two: Case-Studies 
Chapter 5: The Defence of the Republic 
Introduction 
In this first case-study I argue that Cassius Dio placed three orations at points of major 
political crisis over a forty-year period to elaborate three problems he perceived as 
germane to the Republic. First, the increasing unviability of the dictatorship as a mode of 
supreme executive power and the imperative for its replacement with monarchy as such. 
Second, the effect of the continued prorogation of military authority abroad upon 
individuals’ desire for absolute power (imperii consuetudo). And third, the inevitability of 
hostile emotion, and especially φθόνος, within the competitive senatorial aristocracy and 
the dire political consequences of such emotion. These correspond respectively to Factors 
1, 2, and 3 in my overview of Cassius Dio’s causation of the collapse of the Republic in the 
Introduction, and I organise this chapter accordingly.
1
  
 
Dio embedded his exploration of these causes of constitutional change within three ‘pro-
δημοκρατία’ orations: the dissuasio of Q. Lutatius Catulus on the Gabinian law, which I 
have already discussed in some detail (36.31-35); Cicero’s advocacy of a general amnesty 
for the Caesarian and tyrannicide factions (44.23-33); and M. Vipsanius Agrippa’s 
argument to Octavian for a res publica restituta in the wake of Actium (52.2-13). These 
will be the focus of this study.  
 
The historical significance of each of these occasions of speech, set in the contexts of 67, 
44, and 27 BCE respectively, will be immediately apparent. Each functions as a ‘defence’ 
of the Republic and the traditional order in response to a key moment of constitutional 
upheaval and innovation: the controversy surrounding Pompeius’ acquisition of further 
δυναστεία by manipulating tribunician legislation; the aftermath of Caesar’s assassination 
and the risk of renewed strife; and Octavian’s victory over M. Antonius and his position of 
absolute power. As I will show in the second case-study (Chapter 6: The Enemies of the 
Republic), these ‘to democracy’ orations present only one side of the debate. The historian 
pairs them with the opposing speeches of Pompeius and Gabinius on the lex Gabinia 
(36.25-26; 36.27-28), Antonius’ laudatio funebris of Caesar (44.36-49), and the 
                                                          
1
 For a briefer snapshot of this discussion cf. Burden-Strevens (forthcoming, 2016). 
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monarchist speech of C. Cilnius Maecenas (52.14-40). These, in each instance, attain their 
objective; and their δμοκρατικός counterparts, in each instance, fail to persuade. 
 
Although I will suggest here that all three of Dio’s ‘defences’ of δημοκρατία articulate the 
historian’s interpretation of the significance of the problems of the dictatorship, imperii 
consuetudo, and φθόνος – all of which recur in each oration – I do not propose that his 
presentation of these concerns was static. The historian’s conception of the Republican 
dictatorship noticeably develops between his narrative of the Gabinian law and the 
aftermath of Caesar’s dictatura in perpetuum. This is most clearly articulated in the 
speeches, in which Dio demonstrates the development of different (hostile) ideas about the 
dictatorship from the Republican perspective over time. In a similar fashion, Maecenas’ 
lengthy encomium of monarchy and programme of recommendations for its 
implementation also returns to the problems of the dictatorship, imperii consuetudo, and 
φθόνος encountered in the earlier three speeches; but here, too, the point is different. 
Significantly, Cassius Dio uses his speech of Maecenas to set out his own interpretation of 
how those problems were overcome by the Augustan Principate.  
 
I perform this analysis through three investigative sections – one for each of Dio’s Factors 
of constitutional change. In the first section I explore how Cassius Dio developed a 
conceptual framework of the Republican dictatorship. I suggest that he used the speeches 
of Catulus, Cicero, and Agrippa to argue that the dictatura had grown impractical and 
needed to be replaced by a new plenipotentary power: the monarchy. The historian 
embedded sentiments within these orations which, though not necessarily always his own, 
in each instance present the dictatura as unviable for two principal reasons: the increasing 
conflation in the Republican psychology between the dictatorship and monarchy in its 
degenerate form of tyranny; and the inability of that office to meet the demands of a 
recently-enlarged empire. In the second section (and in this connection), I argue that 
Cassius Dio conceived of the organisation of military power within the empire as a direct 
cause of the autocratic ambitions of Marius, Sulla, Pompeius, and Caesar. This, obviously, 
had significant historical ramifications for the res publica; but I additionally suggest that 
Dio used the speech of Maecenas to underline the solutions to that problem, which his 
Augustus would subsequently pursue. In the third section I argue that Cassius Dio viewed 
φθόνος as a distinctly Late Republican moral problem which motivated a striking 
proportion of political activities, and that he brought this concern to its fullest expression in 
the speeches – in fact, in most of them. It will be necessary here to refer briefly to 
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compositions other than the three δημοκρατία-orations. I will also perform a statistical 
analysis which demonstrates the clear preponderance of φθόνος within Dio’s account of 
the Late Republic and its complete, and I think significant, disappearance from the 
Augustan books (Books 53-56).  
 
For each section it will furthermore be beneficial to set out the theoretical framework of 
the historical Factor under discussion before beginning the analysis of its elaboration in the 
speeches. This will consider Dio’s own programmatic statements on these issues and their 
presentation in earlier sources. It is to that, then, that I turn first in my exploration of the 
problem of the dictatorship in Dio’s Late Republic.   
Factor 1: The Dictatura 
Cassius Dio’s historical view of the Republican dictatorship must be placed within his 
conception of the nature and role of monarchy. There can, first, be no doubt that the 
historian believed that μοναρχία was the best form of government under which to live. In a 
long programmatic statement after Caesar’s assassination, Dio compares δημοκρατία and 
μοναρχία. This passage expresses the historian’s view of all three Factors with which this 
chapter is concerned: the problems of sole rule in the form of dictatorship, of the 
distribution of power within the empire, and of the relationship between φιλοτιμία and 
φθόνος. It is worth quoting in full: 
 
Monarchy is not easy on the ear, but it is the best form of constitution (ἡ 
μοναρχία δυσχερὲς μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, χρησιμώτατον δὲ ἐμπολιτεύσασθαι ἐστί). For 
it is easier to find one good man than many of them; and even if that seems 
difficult to some to achieve, the other alternative [of democracy] is necessarily 
impossible, since not all can attain virtue anyway. And so, even if a horrid man 
should attain sole power, he is preferable to the masses of the people who 
are like him (ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε πλήθους τῶν ὁμοίων αἱρετώτερός ἐστιν)….Indeed, if 
there has ever been a strong democracy, it has only been at its best for a short 
time, so long as it had neither the kind of numbers nor strength for the 
envy that results from ambition or the aggrandisements that result from 
prosperity to spring up within it (μέχρις οὗ μήτε μέγεθος μήτ᾽ ἰσχὺν ἔσχον 
ὥστε ἢ ὕβρεις σφίσιν ἐξ εὐπραγίας ἢ φθόνους ἐκ φιλοτιμίας ἐγγενέσθαι). But it 
was impossible for Rome, being so large and ruling over the finest and 
greatest part of the world (πόλιν δὲ αὐτήν τε τηλικαύτην οὖσαν καὶ τοῦ τε 
καλλίστου τοῦ τε πλείστου τῆς ἐμφανοῦς οἰκουμένης ἄρχουσαν), and having 
come to rule many and diverse races of men, and having great wealth, and 
enjoying great fortune in every fashion both individually and collectively, to 
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ever remain moderate under a democracy (ἀδύνατον μὲν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ 
σωφρονῆσαι).2  
 
This passage is revealing and is of fundamental importance to my reading of how three 
problems are elaborated for the reader in Dio’s ‘defences’ of δημοκρατία. The historian 
asserts, first, that the rule of one man alone will always be preferable to the rule of the 
mob; second, that δημοκρατίαι inevitably generate φιλοτιμία and that φθόνος emerges 
from this; and third, that Rome could not possibly continue under such a system in view of 
the size of its empire. Dio viewed these problems as fundamentally Republican in 
character, and these receive their fullest treatment in the speeches under discussion here. 
Sole rule, simply, was the best form of government to the historian. 
 
Significantly, this is the interpretation that Dio applies to the appointment of the first 
dictator, T. Lartius (or Largius), in 501 BCE after the expulsion of the Tarquins. He writes: 
‘the man thought worthy of this position was called dictator (δικτάτωρ), and had power 
equal to that of kings (ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς βασιλεῦσι); for the Romans hated kingship on account 
of the Tarquins, but as they desired the benefit of sole rule (τὴν δ’ ἐκ τῆς μοναρχίας 
ὠφέλειαν) because it was strong in the face of war and revolution, they chose it under 
another name (ἐν ἄλλῳ ταύτην ὀνοματι ἕιλοντο)’.3 Dio, then, treats the dictatorship as a 
form of kingship under another name.  
 
He may not necessarily have been wrong, as it is surely significant that the appointment of 
the first dictator came within a decade of the expulsion of the kings.
4
 Indeed, we see 
similar in Latin sources from the first century BCE which Dio used. Cicero, in a rare 
moment of praise for M. Antonius, applauds his earlier law abolishing the dictatorship, 
‘which by this time had come to posssess regia potestas, ripped out of the state by its 
roots’.5 With regard to Sulla he furthermore reflected on ‘universal destruction or the 
dominion of the victorious and kingly power’ (dominatus ac regnum), and that after his 
conquest of Marius, Sulla virtually became a king (regnaverit) who ‘without a doubt had 
regalis potestas.
6
 Livy, who does not explicitly equate the Republican dictatura with 
monarchy, nevertheless treats the inauguration of T. Lartius as an occasion for great fear 
                                                          
2
 Cass. Dio. 44.2.1-4. My translation. 
3
 Zon. 7.13. As Aalders (1983) 203 n.12 rightly notes, ‘Zonaras' epitome as a rule follows Dio so closely that he 
may be used as evidence for Dio's ideas and attitude’. 
4
 But cf. Ridley (1979) 30, who dowmplays the internal political aspect: he argues that the dictatorship was 
merely a response to the Sabine crisis in that the discordia ordinum endangered the war and needed to be 
addressed for military success.  
5
 Cic. Phil. 1.2. 
6
 Cic. Har. Resp. 54. Detailed discussion in Hurlet (1993). 
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on the part of the plebs, who saw their right of provocatio under threat from a single 
unaccountable autocrat.
7
 The equation of the Republican dictatorship with monarchy began 
long before Dio.  
 
My point here, however, is that Cassius Dio used his three ‘to-democracy’ orations to 
argue that within the Late Republican psychology, the dictatura had become synonymous 
not with monarchy as such, but with monarchy in its degenerate form: tyranny.
8
 For this 
reason, in the historian’s interpretation by 27 BCE such offices had to be abandoned 
altogether and replaced with Augustus’ enlightened despotism. In his speech of Agrippa, 
Dio has his orator assert that ‘tyrannies are the natural product of monarchies’ (τὰς 
τυραννίδας τὰς ἐκ τῆς μοναρχίας ἐκφυομένας).9 This of course is not the historian’s own 
view, given his strong approval of monarchy; rather, it is a representation of what Cassius 
Dio conceived of as the motivation in the Late Republic to abandon the supreme executive 
power of the res publica.  
 
The conflation between dictatorship and tyranny had, in fact, a long tradition, beginning 
first in our sources with Cicero and then continuing in Greek historians. Cicero writes in a 
letter to Cassius that with the recent assassination of the dictator Caesar, Rome had been 
liberated not only from a king (non regno sed rege liberati videmur) but from a tyrannus, 
whose injuries against the republic had been avenged with his death (ulta suas iniurias est 
per vos interitu tyranni).
10
 Indeed, he compares the dictator’s power to a τυραννίς even 
from the beginning of his de facto monarchy in 49 BCE.
11
 We should not put too much 
faith in the counter-argument to this, Cicero’s protestation in the Pro Deiotaro that Caesar 
is non modo non tyrannum, sed clementissimum.
12
 The speech was delivered before the 
dictator himself. More generally, tyranny pervades the orator’s other works, and especially 
in connection with crudelitas;
13
 this will be important to remember in my analysis of the 
speeches. 
                                                          
7
 Liv. 2.18.2. Following Humbert (1988) and Ducos (1984), Kalyvas (2007) 419-420 argues that while the ius 
provocationis was established to protect the plebeian class from the political leverage of the patricians, the 
dictatorship was deliberately designed as a counterweight to these increasing plebeian rights. Astutely, this is 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ interpretation at AR 5.70.3: that the office was instituted ἵνα δὲ μηθὲν 
ἐναντιωθεῖεν οἱ πένητες. For a discussion of the ius provocationis within the context of discordia ordinum cf. 
Lintott (1972a). 
8
 For this definition, cf. esp. Béranger (1935) 85-94. 
9
 Cass. Dio. 52.13.6. 
10
 Cic. Fam. 12.1.1-2. 
11
 Cic. Att. 7.11.1. 
12
 Cic. Deiot. 34:. 
13
 For example: Cat. 2.14; Dom. 75, 94; Fin. 4.31; Inv. 2, 49.144; Cael. 52, 89; Phil. 2.117, 13.18; Rep. 2.48; 
Verr. 1.82. 
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We are not beholden only to Cicero for Late Republican views of dictators as tyrants, 
either. Such a view is attested also in coinage. According to Dio, in 53 BCE electoral 
competition simmered into bribery and then boiled over into violence. Even in the seventh 
month the vacancies still had not been filled. Unfavourable omens furthermore prevented 
the interreges from addressing the crisis.
14
 Among the chaos, continually stressed in Dio’s 
account of this year,
15
 Pompeius was nominated in absentia as dictator. The historian 
records that the proposal was controversial – ‘since in rememberance of Sulla’s cruelty all 
hated that office’ – and that Pompeius accordingly declined.16 However, a silver denarius 
(overleaf, Fig. 1) minted by the son of one of the finally-appointed consuls of that year, M. 
Valerius Messalla Rufus, suggests that some contemporaries thought that Pompeius’ 
tyrannical ambitions had been thwarted. The obverse features a helmeted bust of Roma 
with a spear; the reverse displays the curule chair of the consul Messalla subordinating a 
royal sceptre and a diadem,
17
 with the inscription PATRE COS and S C (senatu consulto). 
One interpretation reads this denarius as a triumphant response to Pompeius’ failed 
manoeuvring for the dictatorship:
18
 the symbols of kingship are overcome by the 
successful resumption of Republican magistracies. If so, it would not be the first time 
Pompeius was compared to a tyrant. One aedile remarked upon seeing a white fillet 
attached to Pompeius’ leg that it made little difference where on his body the diadema 
sat.
19
 Cicero also remarks in a letter to Atticus that Gnaeus noster desired regnum just as 
much as the last dictator had done.
20
 
 
In the forthcoming analysis I will suggest, then, that Dio used his three ‘defences’ of 
δημοκρατία to communicate to the reader his view that the dictatorship and monarchy, but 
especially monarchy in its degenerate form of tyranny, had become conflated in the 
Republican mindset. From the contemporary evidence this suggestion was clearly not 
fanciful.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Cass. Dio. 40.45; cf. Cic. Att. 4.17. 
15
 Cass. Dio. 40.17.2, 40.32.5, 40.44.2, 40.45.1, 40.46.1, 40.48.1. 
16
 Cass. Dio. 40.45.5: πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ Σύλλου ὠμότητα ἐμίσουν πάντες τὸ πολίτευμἀ. 
17
 Rawson (1975) 150. On the diadem and royalty cf. RRC (1974)
1
 507/2; Carson (1957) 50-52; Phil. 2.85. 
18
 RRC (1974)
1
 435/1; also Rawson (1975) 150, 157. 
19
 Val. Max. 6.2.7. 
20
 Cic. Att. 9.7.3; also Att. 9.10.6. 
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Fig. 1: silver denarius, minted 53 BCE in: Crawford, M. RRC (1974)
1
 #435/1, p.457 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This was not Cassius Dio’s only basis for problematising the dictatura, however, and it is 
not even necessarily distinctive. Earlier Greek sources had already suggested that the 
Republican dictatorship resembled tyranny: Dionysius describes it as ‘a form of elective 
tyranny’ (ἔστι γὰρ αἱρετὴ τυραννὶς ἡ δικτατορία),21  and writes of it as a medium of 
aristocratic control over the masses through tyrannical power.
22
 Appian, too, writes that 
Sulla ‘became in truth a king, or rather a tyrant’ through force (ὁ δὲ ἔργῳ βασιλεὺς ὢν ἢ 
τύραννος, οὐχ αἱρετός, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει καὶ βίᾳ); 23  and he twice later describes his 
dictatorship as a τυραννίς.24 As Andreas Kalyvas has argued, Dionysius’ and Appian’s 
illustration of the dictatorship as a form of tyranny directly implicated this office in the 
collapse of the Republic itself.
25
 
 
In arguing, therefore, that the dictatura as a result of its relationship with tyranny was a 
key factor in the collapse of the Republic and the replacement of its powers by the 
enlightened monarchy of his Augustus, Dio was not doing anything necessarily new. He 
may have formed this idea from his reading of Dionysius or Appian or, just as possibly, 
Cicero. However, where Dio is distinctive lies in two factors: first, his use of the speeches 
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 D.H. AR. 5.73.3; also 5.77.4. 
22
 D.H. AR. 5.70.3. 
23
 App. BC. 1.98. That Appian underlines the distinction between a βασιλεὺς and a τύραννος and still applies 
both to Sulla indicates that he has not confused about the difference: Sulla’s dictatorship was not merely a 
kingship, but a tyrannny. 
24
 App. BC. 1.99, 1.101. 
25
 Kalyvas (2007) 414. 
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above all to articulate this point; and second, his bipartite problematisation of the 
dictatorship. Unlike his predecessors, Cassius Dio did not merely argue that the Republican 
dictatura had to be replaced with monarchy so-called solely because of its association with 
tyranny, especially with conventional identifiers of tyranny such as crudelitas.
26
 He 
additionally suggests through his speeches that the office had grown unpracticable owing 
to the requirements of the newly-enlarged empire. Its powers therefore had to be replaced 
with those of the monarch. In Dio’s interpretation, then, the dictatorship was not only 
tainted by tyranny and Sullan crudelitas. The legal restrictions, and especially the six-
month term and the domestic prerogative over Italy, meant that it was useless in the face of 
drawn-out exigencies abroad. Why not, then, simply have a monarch? It is not clear 
whether this argument is distinctively Cassius Dio’s own; to engage in a little speculation, 
its apparent absence from earlier sources may indicate so. Even if this is not the case, 
however, it is striking that Dio develops both of these vitiations of the Republican 
dictatorship concurrently, and – as I will show in the analysis – chooses to do so in the 
speeches above all. 
 
I begin that analysis with Q. Lutatius Catulus’ dissuasio (36.31-35). It is clear that where 
the historian intended the words of Pompeius and Gabinius to be mistrusted by the reader, 
the opposite is the case here. In a very different narrative preface to the oration, Dio writes 
that all present honoured and respected Catulus as one who always spoke and acted in their 
best interests (ᾐδοῦντο πάντες αὐτὸν καὶ ἐτίμων ὡς τὰ συμφέροντά σφισι καὶ λέγοντα ἀεὶ 
καὶ πράττοντα).27 This is consistent with the historian’s later necrology of him, too: he 
records that Catulus safeguarded the public interest the most conspicuously of all men 
alive at that time.
28
 Accordingly, the speaker’s exordium unfolds in the same vein: Catulus 
begins by stating that ‘you are all clearly aware that I have always been exceeedingly 
devoted in your behalf, Quirites’.29 By design, the reader is supposed to take this assertion 
of patriotic cultivation of the public good at face value; and this makes Catulus an ideal 
voice for communicating Dio’s own historical interpretations. By emphasising his 
speaker’s commitment not to his own interests but to the state’s, Cassius Dio confirms the 
authority of the speaker and lends persuasive value to Catulus’ comments on the historical 
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 E.g. Plat. Rep. 8.566b; Cic., Cat. 2.14; Dom. 75, 94; Fin. 4.31; Inv. 2, 49.144; Cael. 52, 89; Phil. 2.117, 13.18; 
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situation.
30
 What we have here, as Münzer noted, is a calm and factual presentation of the 
scope of the proposed innovation:
31
 it was constructed to be believed. 
 
I will discuss the comments in this speech which pertain to the problems of imperii 
consuetudo and φθόνος in the succeeding sections, but my principal concern here is Dio’s 
problematisation of the dictatorship. In a revealing passage, the historian’s Catulus first 
sets out why, in the context of the Mediterranean piracy situation of 67 BCE, even the 
supreme executive power of the res publica, the dictatorship, would be useless. So far from 
arguing against the extraordinary command of the lex Gabinia, Dio’s orator merely 
verbalises the historian’s interpretation of why there was no other alternative than to give 
Pompeius further δυναστεία: 
 
But if it is indeed necessary to elect an official alongside the yearly magistrates, 
there is already an ancient precedent, that is, the dictator (παράδειγμα 
ἀρχαῖον, λέγω δὲ τὸν δικτάτορα). However, our ancestors did not establish this 
office for every circumstance, nor for a period longer than six months (οὔτε 
ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον ἑξαμήνου). Therefore, if you do require such an official, it is 
possible for you to engage either Pompeius or any other man as dictator 
without transgressing the law nor failing to deliberate carefully for the 
common good – on the condition that this be for no longer than the allotted 
time nor outside of Italy (μήτε παρανομήσασι μήτ᾽ ὀλιγώρως ὑπὲρ τῶν 
κοινῶν βουλευσαμένοις, δικτάτορα εἴτε Πομπήιον εἴτε καὶ ἄλλον τινὰ 
προχειρίσασθαι, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μήτε πλείω τοῦ τεταγμένου χρόνον μήτε ἔξω τῆς 
Ἰταλίας ἄρξῃ). For you are not unaware, I think, that our ancestors zealously 
preserved this limitation, and that no dictator can be found who served 
abroad, aside from one who went to Sicily and achieved nothing. But if 
Italy requires no such person, and if you cannot bear not only the function of 
a dictator but even the name – as is clear from your anger against Sulla 
(ὅτι τὸ ἔργον τοῦ δικτάτορος ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄνομα δῆλον δὲ ἐξ ὧν πρὸς τὸν 
Σύλλαν ἠγανακτήσατἐ) – how could it be right to create a new position of 
authority over practically everything within Italy and outside it for three 
years (ἐς ἔτη τρία καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἔξω 
πράγμασιν)? You all know what horrors come to states from such a course, and 
how many have often disturbed our people because of their lust for extra-legal 
powers and have brought innumerable evils upon themselves.
32
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Catulus’ recapitulation on the terms of the law seems to me significant in the context of 
these comments on the limitations of the dictatorship. He closes this argument by stating 
that the proposed lex would provide its beneficiary with a command for three years, and 
outside Italy (ἐς ἔτη τρία καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἔξω 
πράγμασιν). This functions in direct contrast to Catulus’ earlier delineation of the 
prerogative of the dictatorship, which must be for no longer than six months and within 
Italy (ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μήτε πλείω τοῦ τεταγμένου χρόνον μήτε ἔξω τῆς Ἰταλίας ἄρξῃ). The 
dictatorship, obviously, was not suitable for combatting Mediterranean piracy – outside of 
Italy – and for a protracted length of time, which the historian’s earlier comments on the 
magnitude of the pirate concern suggest was necessary.
33
 Catulus’ argument here against 
the proposals of the Gabinian law though his suggestion of an alternative in the dictatura is 
therefore wholly illogical.  
 
It may be that Dio was simply quite incompetent. Perhaps he did not realise, despite citing 
clearly the reasons for which the dictatorship was not a suitable replacement for a lengthy 
overseas command, that these limitations specifically ruled out that office. This will not 
do: the rather neat historical detail of the only dictator hitherto sent out of Italy, to Sicily, 
who accomplished nothing (οὐδεὶς ἄλλοσε πλὴν ἑνὸς ἐς Σικελίαν, καὶ ταῦτα μηδὲν 
πράξαντος) is an oblique reference to A. Atilius Calatinus’ despatch to Sicily in 249 BCE, 
almost two centuries before the depicted context. Dio had done his research.  
 
My suggestion, rather, is that Dio made the objection deliberately nonsensical. His 
Catulus’ statement about the importance of adhering to the established laws by applying 
the dictatorship to this emergency (μήτε παρανομήσασι) is ironic when it is precisely the 
legal constraints of the dictatorship, just mentioned by Catulus, which rendered the office 
unsuitable. This intention, in fact, is merely underlined by the reference to Calatinus’ 
unsuccessful dictatorship in Sicily: it is hardly a stirring example of the utility of the office 
for resolving exigencies abroad. Furthermore – and as I have already stated – the 
transparent contradistinction between the actual requirements of the complex military 
problem beyond Italy’s shores and the legal restrictions upon the dictatorship, articulated at 
the beginning and end of the excerpt, sets out quite clearly that the dictatura was not a 
viable option. There is no trace of these thoughts in Dio’s source for this speech, Cicero’s 
De Imperio: the material is quite probably the historian’s own. Catulus’ objection to the lex 
Gabinia on these grounds is, therefore, unpersuasive and ineffective, and I think 
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deliberately so. Cassius Dio’s argument, through his speaker, is that yet another position of 
command for Pompeius was the only viable option in 67 BCE. Certainly he does not 
mention other alternatives, beyond the clearly impracticable dictatorship. He articulates 
this argument nowhere in his narrative, and only in his oration of Catulus. As I discussed in 
Chapter 4, the political ramifications of yet further honour for Pompeius in the form of the 
lex, including the inevitable φθόνος of his enemies and his consequent entry into the 
Triumvirate to regain authority, were profound indeed.  
 
It is furthermore striking that of two exempla of the dictatorship cited by Dio’s Catulus in 
support of the use of that magistracy, one is simply a failure (Calatinus); and the other, 
more loaded, is Sulla. This brings me onto my second point: Dio’s use of the speeches to 
represent Late Republican anxieties about the reputational difficulty of dictatorship. 
Barden Dowling has argued that there is no evidence to suggest that the exemplum of 
Sullan crudelitas had yet entered political discourse by the time of this debate.
 34
 Our 
earliest citation arrives with Cicero’s In Catilinam.35 Moreover, Q. Lutatius Catulus is a 
poor choice of speaker to equate Sulla’s dictatorship with a cruel tyranny. His father had 
sided with Sulla, committing suicide rather than face Marius following this latter’s 
occupation of Rome; and the younger Catulus himself argued for the retention of the 
Sullan constitution during his consulship.
36
  
 
Nevertheless, the historical argument being made is central to Dio’s exposition of the 
toxicity of the dictatorship and the comparative attractiveness of monarchy as an exercise 
of powers. The suggestion of the historian’s speaker in this instance that the Quirites 
cannot bear the name, let alone the sight, of another dictator so soon after Sulla may be an 
exaggeration (οὐχ ὅτι τὸ ἔργον τοῦ δικτάτορος ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄνομα δῆλον δὲ ἐξ ὧν πρὸς 
τὸν Σύλλαν ἠγανακτήσατἐ). But it is quite consistent with Dio’s illustration of Sullan 
crudelitas as a whole. Cassius Dio conceived of Sulla as a cruel tyrant who was widely 
detested during and after his dictatorship.  
 
A few examples will suffice. There is, first, the fragmentary narrative of Sulla’s conquest. 
Prior to this time the general had in Dio’s view been ‘thought the foremost in humanity and 
piety’ (φιλανθρωπίᾳ τε καὶ εὐσεβείᾳ πολὺ προέχειν ἐνομίζετο), and only relied upon good 
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associates. But following his victory at the Colline Gate, he changed, as if he had ‘left his 
former self outside the walls of Rome’ (μετεβάλετο, καὶ ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἔξω τε τῶν τειχῶν 
τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ κατέλιπεν), and proceeded to outdo Marius in his brutality (τὸν 
δὲ δὴ Κίνναν καὶ τὸν Μάριον τούς τε ἄλλους τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτὸν γενομένους πάντας ἅμα 
ὑπερέβαλεν).37 Later, Dio writes that Caesar’s extension of the pomerium during his own 
dictatorship ‘was thought similar to the acts of Sulla’ (ὅμοια τῷ Σύλλᾳ πρᾶξαι ἔδοξεν); but 
he, in fact,  treated the wives of those slain in his war for power with such generosity that 
he ‘put Sulla’s cruelty greatly to shame’ (τήν τε τοῦ Σύλλου μιαιφονίαν μεγάλως ἤλεγξε).38 
And Pompeius’ motivation, too, in disbanding his legions at Brundisium upon his return 
from the East  - very shortly after Catulus’ speech – was, in the historian’s view, that he 
understood that ‘people regarded Marius’ and Sulla’s deeds as hateful’ (τά τε τοῦ Μαρίου 
καὶ τὰ τοῦ Σύλλου ἐν μίσει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἠπίστατο ὄντα).39 Catulus’ citation of the 
Sullan exemplum, then, is by no means a positive reflection of the Republican dictatorship, 
as indeed Dio’s orator says himself (οὐχ ὅτι τὸ ἔργον τοῦ δικτάτορος ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄνομα 
δῆλον δὲ ἐξ ὧν πρὸς τὸν Σύλλαν ἠγανακτήσατἐ). 
 
I suggest, then, that Cassius Dio used his Catulus as a representation of what he conceived 
of as contemporary concerns about the nature of the dictatorship in the wake of Sulla; and 
chiefly in connection with crudelitas. The suggestion of Dio’s speaker that Rome turn to 
the dictatura rather than to a further extraordinary command for Pompeius is a nonsense, 
and deliberately so. All Catulus does is rehearse the historian’s own evaluation of the 
problems of that office. These, on the one hand, were clearly reputational: Catulus’ 
acknowledgement of the Quirites’ hatred of the dictatorship on Sulla’s account attests to 
this. There is no reason not to think that Dio believed that the conflation of Sulla’s 
dictatorship with a tyranny was sincerely a problem. His own narrative comments on Sulla 
and tyrannical crudelitas confirm that he perceived such concerns as genuine. On the other 
hand, this was additionally a practical and logistical problem. The dictatura was ill-suited, 
as an emergency power, to the requirements of an overseas empire; and this would 
necessitate further extraordinary commands for dynasts such as Pompeius, or, equally 
destructively, long periods of prorogued imperium abroad and far from senatorial 
oversight. That, as I will show in the next section on imperii consuetudo, had far-reaching 
political and constitutional consequences of its own. 
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But some words on the Amnesty-speech of Cicero (44.23-33) and the Agrippa-Maecenas 
debate will be helpful first. These, again, focalise Dio’s interpretation of the problem of the 
Republican dictatorship. Cicero’s Amnesty-speech, of course, follows immediately after 
the assassination of Caesar in Dio’s account and is intended to serve as a conciliatory 
reflection on the constitutional flashpoint of 44 BCE.  
 
A word on the source-material, which is important here. We may be less likely to take the 
speech seriously, as a medium of historical explanation, if situation, speaker, style, and 
argument are wholly fabricated. We find a speech of Cicero on the Amnesty in no source 
other than Dio. Gudeman suggested that the oration was entirely a fiction of the historian’s 
own creation.
40
 On the other hand, Sihler’s hypothesis reads that, as Livy included an 
amnesty-speech of Cicero because he admired the orator, Dio found this in Livy and 
reproduced it himself.
 41
 But there is no reference to this oration in the text or in its 
epitomated Periochae; and so we do not know, in fact, that Livy included such a 
composition in the first place. This theory also strikes me as somewhat problematic. If 
Livy drafted an amnesty-speech of Cicero because he admired him, how does it follow that 
Dio, who detested that orator, wrote one too? In this connection, another scholar posits that 
the amnesty-speech in Dio is ‘a purely rhetorical product’ – the implication being that it 
serves no purpose in the reconstruction of the historical situation – which Dio took 
wholesale from his source.
42
 This again should be left aside, as the source is unknown in 
any case and there is no record of the speech outside of Dio.  
 
More attractive is the possibility that the historian reconstructed the speech from excerpts 
of Cicero found in Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria.43 There are certainly a few parallels 
with Thucydidean language in the composition,
44
 although this does not at all rule out that 
the historian found genuine Ciceronian arguments and then dressed them up in his own 
choice of style. I have argued in Chapter 2 that this was his practice in reconstructing 
Catulus and Calenus’ arguments from the De Imperio and Philippicae.  This seems to me 
an attractive possibility. Schwartz initially suggested that in writing an amnesty-speech of 
Cicero, Dio was indeed replicating a now-lost Ciceronian oration on that subject.
45
 This is 
not incredible, as the orator himself suggests that he spoke publicly on March 17
th
 44 BCE 
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in favour of peace.
46
  Velleius Paterculus and Plutarch also allude to that occasion.
47
 
Furthermore, Fechner has shown that Dio’s version of the amnesty-speech replicates a 
number of genuine Ciceronian concerns, and especially the fixation with concordia.
48
 I 
suggest cautiously, then, that in drafting a speech of Cicero advocating peace between the 
various factions in the days following the Ides of March, Cassius Dio took a genuine 
occasion of oratory which he could have found even in Cicero; and that he certainly 
composed it himself with his own stylistic choices, but with certain arguments that he 
found in his own readings of Cicero or reconstructed from Quintilian. If he did so, this 
would merely be in keeping with his use of the De Imperio and Philippicae. My intention 
is not to provide a conclusive source-analysis of this oration, but rather to assert that the 
occasion and arguments ought not to be dismissed on first sight.  
 
And indeed – for like Catulus’ oration on the lex Gabinia it seems a further reflection on 
the internal factors, among them the problem of the dictatorship, which in Dio’s view 
precipitated the end of the Republic and the advent of new supreme powers in the 
monarchy.  Above all, the speech elaborates the theme of tyranny at some length. This, in 
the immediate narrative context of Caesar’s recent dictatorship, is important. It is clear 
from that account that the historian did not himself consider Caesar’s dictatorship a 
tyranny. We therefore need to separate the voice of Dio and the voice of his Cicero. There 
are certainly negative moments in the historian’s reconstruction: Caesar’s affair with 
Cleopatra,
49
 his extortion of money to finance his triumph,
50
 and the profligate waste of 
funds at the triumph itself, are strongly criticised.
51
 As I outlined in Chapter 3,
52
 Dio 
additionally uses this narrative to underline examples of Caesarian cruelty and duplicity, 
especially in the administration of summary justice.  
 
But the account of his reign is, generally, positive. The dictator’s monetary reforms were 
important and necessary, and benefitted creditors and debtors alike.
53
 Those who plotted 
against him were motivated not by his crudelitas – the hallmark of the tyrannus – but in 
spite of it, and from fear that his ‘goodness’ (τὴν χρηστότητα αὐτοῦ) would not last.54 
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Further, I have already noted that Caesar’s generosity ‘put Sulla’s cruelty greatly to shame’ 
in the historian’s view (τήν τε τοῦ Σύλλου μιαιφονίαν μεγάλως ἤλεγξε).55 The dictator 
was, in Dio’s presentation, a scheming vulture, pleonectic and wastrel at the same time, 
who absolutely aspired to kingship.
56
 But he was no tyrant. The following point is 
therefore somewhat ironic. According to the historian, Caesar’s dictatura possessed all the 
trappings of monarchy: he adopted the attire of the ancient kings of Alba, and a golden 
chair and crown set with jewels was to be carried into theatres.
57
 Regardless of the debate 
concerning Caesar’s relationship with monarchy,58 to the historian, in this dictator Rome 
had found a monarch. But this monarch did not have to be a tyrant; whereas the last 
dictator, Sulla, certainly had been in Dio’s assessment. Augustus, too, as I show in Chapter 
7, was a benevolent king in the historian’s view. It is therefore paradoxical that the 
dictatorship, within Dio’s interpretation of the constitutional framework of executive 
powers under the Republic, bred tyranny; while its counterpart – monarchy as such – did 
not. It did not with Caesar; nor too, as I show later, with Augustus.  
 
The exempla and comments drawn by Dio’s Cicero confirm that within the historian’s 
interpretation the dictatura and tyranny had become conflated in the Republican 
psychology, thereby necessitating new executive powers. Like Catulus, the Cicero depicted 
is an ideal voice for communicating the historian’s own evaluation of the situation: he is 
presented as authoritative and not to be at all distrusted. Although Dio transparently 
disliked the orator, as with Catulus he uses the proemium to underline the speaker’s 
motivation for the public good on this occasion: 
 
Senators, I have always thought it necessary to advise you sincerely and justly 
on all matters, but under these circumstances most of all, in which, if we can 
come to an agreement without going into all the details [of what has recently 
happened] in any way, we will not only save ourselves, but enable all other 
citizens to survive. However, if we wish to go over all that has happened bit-by-
bit, then I fear dreadful circumstances; but I do not wish to cause offence 
even at the beginning of my speech (δυσχερὲς δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἀρχόμενος τῶν λόγων 
εἰπεῖν βούλομαι).59 
 
The conciliatory purpose of Dio’s Cicero is clear from the beginning, and there is nothing 
in the surrounding narrative to suggest that the historian viewed the orator’s motive in 
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advocating peace as self-serving. This conciliatory aspect is important: Dio’s Cicero is a 
restricted voice. He states, in the excerpt, that he will not go minutely into detail about all 
that has happened – and so advises from the beginning that his point is not to rehearse the 
ills done by the Caesarian and anti-Caesarian factions against one another – and wishes to 
secure peace by offending neither side.  
 
In keeping with that conciliatory tone, then, Dio does not have his orator make overt 
criticisms of Caesar or specifically equate his dictatura with a form of tyranny. That 
would contradict the irenical purpose of the speech; the historian appears to have given 
careful consideration to the occasion of oratory and what it required. He places an 
evaluation of the seriousness of the situation into the mouth of his speaker: ‘nothing can 
save the state unless we decide on this very day and as quickly as possible to adopt a 
policy, or we will never be able to regain our position’.60 This is certainly consistent with 
Dio’s own assessment of the crisis: he stresses that the Caesarian and anti-Caesarian 
factions each decamped, one occupying the Capitoline and one the Forum; Antonius fled; 
and vehement speeches were delivered on both sides.
61
 Rather, to foster harmony in a 
manner commensurate with the magnitude of the crisis, Dio’s Cicero reflects on the 
relationship between the Republican dictatorship and tyranny with an oblique reference: 
 
I will offer you an example from that finest and most ancient city, from which 
even our ancestors were not averse to drawing their laws. For it would be 
shameful for us, who so far exceed the Athenians in might and wisdom, to 
deliberate worse than they did. I speak of something that you all know, here. At 
one time, those Athenians were in a state of civil strife and because of this 
were vanquished by the Spartans, and were then tyrannised by the more 
powerful of their citizens (στασιάσαντές ποτε, καὶ ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν 
Λακεδαιμονίων καταπολεμηθέντες καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν δυνατωτέρων πολιτῶν  
τυραννηθέντες). And they did not drive out their ills until they came to a 
compact and agreement to set aside their past grievances – many and severe 
though these were – and to never bring forward accusations about these or bear 
malice toward anyone because of them. Thus, when they had come to their 
senses in this way, they not only ceased to be tyrannised and revolutionary 
(τοιγάρτοι σωφρονήσαντες οὕτως οὐχ ὅτι τυραννούμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες 
ἐπαύσαντο), but even flourished in every way, and regained their state and lay 
claim to rule over all the Greeks.
62
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In the context of Dio’s time, one may understandably read this as a jeu d’esprit, a touch of 
classicism in an intellectual climate that frequently memorialised the Greek past.
63
 I have 
shown in chapter 3 that the historian’s relationship with his time is more complex than 
this. In fact, this exemplum seems more significant in the context of Dio’s immediate 
narrative. Prior to this oration, the historian recounts the extraordinary power of the most 
recent dictator, the monarchical honours voted to him, the φθόνος resultant from these,64 
and the nature of his de facto kingship, nominally dictatorship, over Rome. Dio’s Cicero 
cannot in this setting state that Cicero’s dictatura was a tyranny. Rather, by using oblique 
references to tyranny with the Athenian exemplum immediately after the recent death of a 
Roman dictator (ὑπὸ τῶν δυνατωτέρων πολιτῶν τυραννηθέντες; τυραννούμενοι καὶ 
στασιάζοντες) the problem of tyranny and dictatorship is brought again to the fore in a 
manner that will not offend either side. The historical Cicero certainly believed that 
Caesar’s dictatura was a form of tyranny;65 and here, I suggest that Dio found a way of 
expressing those contemporary anxieties about the nature of the Roman dictatorship in a 
manner that was appropriate to the context of oratory.  
 
This intention is furthermore underlined by Cicero’s later citation of the exemplum of 
Sullan crudelitas. Just as in his dissuasio Dio’s Catulus suggested that the Roman people 
in 67 BCE were too hostile to the dictatorship to endorse it in the wake of Sulla’s reign of 
terror, so too here does Dio’s Cicero unveil a string of negative examples of cruelty and 
factionalism. ‘Marius prospered in times of strife, and after being driven out he gathered a 
force and did – well, you know what…similarly, Sulla – not to mention Cinna or Strabo 
or any who came inbetween – was powerful at first, and after being defeated, finally made 
himself master, and there was no terrible deed he did not do (ἔπειτα δυναστεύσας οὐδὲν ὅ 
τι οὐχὶ τῶν δεινοτάτων ἔπραξε).’66 The paralipses have the effect of emphasising the 
horror of the crimes committed in and around the time of Sulla’s dictatorship. But they 
additionally bring again into the reader’s focus Dio’s evaluation of the negative reputation 
of the Republican dictatura as an exercise of powers. In view of the historian’s own 
opinion that sole-rule is necessary, this is important. Dio argues that the traditional 
emergency power of the res publica had become tainted by tyranny – but that solerule 
was imperative all the same in emergencies. 
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To provide a closing note on Cicero’s amnesty-speech, it furthermore seems to me that 
the historian’s problematisation of the Republican dictatura as a form of tyranny develops 
between the speech of Catulus in Book 36 and that of Cicero in Book 44. He used his 
Catulus to argue, first, that in the wake of Sulla the office was simply toxic; and that it 
was ill-suited to emergencies within the overseas empire in any case. His Cicero, as I 
show above, maintained the former of these, citing the negative exemplum of Sulla and 
still equating Caesar’s recent tenure, obliquely, with a tyranny. But he is also used to 
suggest that by 44 BCE that office had grown to be associated with the forceful usurpation 
of power. There are obvious reasons that such an argument of Dio’s would be more 
effective in the context of 44 BCE with Cicero than 67 BCE with Catulus: there were 
simply more examples. In Greek and Roman political thinking, obtaining power through 
military means was the hallmark of τυραννίς. The notion of tyranny had traditionally been 
linked to violent usurpation since Plato: what set tyrants apart from kings was the brute 
force by which they attained their power.
67
 In the context of the recent assassination of the 
last dictator, then, the comments of Dio’s speaker on this point seem to me telling: 
 
Formerly – and not very long ago – those who had military power usually 
became masters of the government (πρότερον μὲν γάρ, οὐκ ὀλίγος ἐξ οὗ 
χρόνος, οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐγκρατεῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἐγίγνοντο), 
so that they could dictate to you what you ought to deliberate on rather than you 
determining what they ought to do. But now practically everything is at such a 
point that affairs are in your hands and lay to your charge: whether from 
yourselves you should have either harmony and with it liberty, or seditions and 
civil wars once again and from these a slave-master (καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ 
δεσπότην).68  
 
The inference to be made from this statement seems to me clear and functions as Dio’s 
own interpretation. Caesar, like Sulla, had seized control of Rome through the leverage 
offered by military power (οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες). Dio ensures that the reader does not miss 
the inference by stressing the recency of this (πρότερον μὲν γάρ, οὐκ ὀλίγος ἐξ οὗ 
χρόνος). It is Caesar that is designated. Importantly, application of this leverage led to 
political inversion, as Cicero states: generals, who ought to be at the disposal of the 
Senate to command, had used their might to upturn the relationship between military and 
government. This inversion of the relationship between the senatorial and military 
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elements begot two dictators – Sulla and Caesar – or rather, in Dio’s illustration of the 
contemporary perspective of Cicero, two δεσπόται.  
 
Between the orations of Catulus and Cicero, then, it seems to me that Cassius Dio 
presented two different but equally negative evaluations of the nature of the Republican 
dictatorship as an unattractive and impractical form of sole rule: a form of tyranny, tainted 
by crudelitas and the forceful usurpation of power, and additionally ill-suited to the needs 
of the empire. Had Dio failed to convince his reader through these orations that the 
Romans of the first century BCE had grown to detest that office – and thus to be more 
receptive to a new form of autocracy in Augustus’ Principate – he additionally states so 
once (but only once) in his narrative. Recounting the lex Antonia, Dio states that the 
Romans permanently abolished the dictatorship in the wake of Caesar’s tenure  
 
for posterity, on the grounds that the disgrace of men’s deeds lay in their 
titles (ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι τῆς τῶν ἔργων δεινότητος οὔσης); but in fact, 
those misdeeds arise from their possession of armed forces and from the 
character of the individual office-holder, and they disgrace the titles of 
authority  under which those deeds happen to be done (ἐν ᾗ ποτ᾽ ἂν τύχῃ 
δρώμενα, προσρήσεις διαβαλλόντων).69 
 
Dio’s argument is not that he, the historian with hindsight, thought that the Republican 
dictatorship was necessarily tyrannical, tainted with crudelitas and the seizure of power 
through brute force. Rather, he shows that the Romans of the first century BCE believed 
that this was the case, and that abolishing that office would rectify these problems. This, 
certainly, is expressed by the historian himself at one point, above, in the authorial 
narrative; and he additionally has his Cassius call Caesar a tyrant in a conversation with 
Antonius shortly after the Ides.
70
 But it is elaborated far more fully in the speeches of 
Catulus and Cicero. In Dio’s History then, from the contemporary perspective of the 
speeches the dictatorship had become too toxic to serve as a blueprint for sole rule. New 
plenipotentiary powers would need to be sought.  
 
Coming, then, to the point at which the confirmation of those new powers becomes a 
reality in Dio’s history, I close this problematisation of the dictatorship with the ‘defence’ 
of δημοκρατία of M. Vipsanius Agrippa (52.2-13). This is set in the context of a debate in 
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camera before Octavian, on which manner of constitution Rome ought to adopt in the 
wake of Actium. To understand the function of this oration properly,  its counterpart in 
the ‘monarchical’ speech of C. Cilnius Maecenas (52.14-40) is also indispensible. Both, I 
suggest, continue Dio’s vitiation of the Republican dictatura. But they additionally work 
in concert with the surrounding narrative to articulate the historian’s interpretation that, by 
specifically avoiding the dictatorship and its relationship with tyranny, Augustus’ regime 
was successful. 
 
Agrippa has traditionally been viewed as the weaker party in the debate and has received 
far less scholarly attention than Maecenas. The detail of the political reforms advocated in 
Maecenas’ speech, compared with the romantic idealisation of δημοκρατία in Agrippa’s 
oration and its distinctly classical and Hellenic flavour,
71
 may have generated this. While 
Maecenas’ views have been set alongside those of Dio without question, 72  and many 
studies, moreover, have examined the speech in that regard,
73
 Agrippa’s ‘defence’ of 
δημοκρατία has been received as a short contrast-piece, a preliminary to the headline act of 
Maecenas.
74
 One view suggests that the argumentation was kept deliberately weak;
75
 and 
Millar, who also devotes substantially greater attention to Maecenas, writes in his brief 
analysis of Agrippa’s oration that Dio’s choice of speaker was in any case unsuitable. 
Millar suggests that the historian could not seriously and credibly have attributed pro-
Republican sentiments to Agrippa, as he describes him in his later necrology as ‘a fervent 
supporter of monarchy’.76  Stekelenburg attempts to resolve this discrepancy by suggesting 
that it may have been a conscious creation of Dio’s in order to demonstrate two different 
aspects of Agrippa’s persona: candour in stating honestly his love of the res publica, but 
loyalty to Augustus later as monarch.
77
 While this reading is sympathetically nuanced, 
there is no need to resolve this discrepancy, as it does not exist. Dio does not describe 
Agrippa as ‘a fervent supporter of monarchy’. He writes that he ‘helped Augustus to 
establish the monarchy as if he were a supporter of it (ὡς καὶ δυναστείας ὄντως 
ἐπιθυμητὴς), but that he won over the people as if he were the most democratic of men (ὡς 
καὶ δημοτικώτατος)’.78 Agrippa’s comments are not at variance with his character; we 
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should thus be careful not to attach less meaning to his statements than is due.
79
 In that 
direction, two more recent studies have asserted that the ‘to democracy’ oration of Agrippa 
had more to do with Cassius Dio’s own view of the Roman Republic than with the remote 
thought-world of democratic Athens which McKechnie identified.
80
 These, however, do 
not touch upon the way in which Cassius Dio used the oration to elaborate his 
interpretation of the problem of power under the Republic and the challenges which, in his 
view, Augustus would have to face to overcome that problem.   
 
Just as Catulus and Cicero, the speaker here again begins by underlining his commitment 
to the public good in the proemium: ‘O Caesar, I have deemed it best in this situation, just 
as in all others, to think not of my own interests, but of yours and the state’s.’81 As, too, 
with Catulus, Agrippa’s selfless concern for the good of the state is reiterated in Dio’s later 
necrology of the speaker.
82
 Catulus, Cicero, and Agrippa therefore form a unity of three 
speakers whose regard for the collective good in speaking in the depicted context is 
underlined by the historian himself in his own voice. This renders them authoritative 
orators whose views on the Republic the reader ought to trust. This functions in stark 
contrast to Dio’s presentation of  Pompeius, Gabinius, Caesar, and Octavian, who as I have 
shown in Chapter 3 corrupt the fora of debate with their deceiftful rhetoric and selfish 
concerns. Strikingly, of these two ‘types’ of Republican orator in the Roman History the 
latter, negative type are universally successful in obtaining their objectives; and the former, 
positive type fail to persuade. I will have further historical conclusions to draw from this in 
the summative Conclusion to this chapter.  
 
Returning, however, to the dictatorship. Significantly, the theme of tyranny recurrs 
frequently in Agrippa’s ‘defence’ of the res publica. This is historically important in the 
context of a debate on the precipice of Augustus’ monarchy.  More than any other oration, 
Agrippa’s exhortation maintains an explicit focus on tyranny throughout. This seems to me 
to function as a means of establishing a simple, but important, historical problem. The 
historian firmly believed that in times of war and civil strife,
83
 Rome needed the oversight 
of a single administrator. But with the dictatorships of the first century BCE behind it, how 
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could the new  autocratic regime of Augustus avoid the taint of tyranny and thus facilitate a 
secure constitutional transition? Certainly, Agrippa states, the people would punish another 
tyrant: 
 
In democracies, the more men there are who are wealthy and brave, the more 
too do they vie with one another and magnify the state; and the state in turn 
makes use of them and rejoices in them, unless one of them begins to desire 
tyrannical power. For the citizens severely punish this person (πλὴν ἄν τις 
τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμήσῃ. τοῦτον γὰρ ἰσχυρῶς κολάζουσι). 84 
 
Dio’s Agrippa, then, sets up an historical problem for the Augustan regime to overcome. In 
the wake of the historian’s record of Caesar’s dictatorship this seems to me especially 
significant. The reader cannot fail to think here of the recent events in Dio’s narrative, in 
which the ‘tyrant’ Caesar, as the speech of Cicero illustrates him to be from the 
contemporary outlook, was severely punished indeed (ἰσχυρῶς κολάζουσι). There is, 
perhaps, a possibility that the reader may not immediately make this connection between 
the punishment of tyranny under δημοκρατίαι and the recent example of Caesar’s 
dictatura. All the more reason, then, for Dio to underline through his orator that the last 
dictator was indeed punished for this reason, with an explicit exemplum of Caesar: 
 
For it is difficult for this state, which has enjoyed a Republican government for 
so many years and rules so many races of men, to consent to become a slave 
(δουλεῦσαί) to anyone. You have heard that they banished Camillus when he 
had white horses at his triumph, and you have heard that they impeached Scipio 
when they had condemned him of being grasping. And you remember how 
they set out against your father because of their suspicion that he was 
aiming at monarchy (μέμνησαι δὲ ὅπως τῷ πατρί σου προσηνέχθησαν, ὅτι 
τινὰ ὑποψίαν ἐς αὐτὸν μοναρχίας ἔσχον). 85  
 
I may be reading too much into the relationship between Cicero’s speech, which referred to 
Caesar’s usurpation of the dictatorship through force as begetting a slave-master from the 
Repubican persepctive (δεσπότης), and Agrippa’s statement that the Roman people will 
never submit to the slavery of one man’s absolute power (δουλεῦσαί). It may be a further 
reflection, particularly in the wake of Caesar’s dictatorship and the abolition of this office 
under the lex Antonia, of how Dio perceived the Republican perspective on the dictatura 
by this time.  
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However, it seems clear to me from the above excerpts that, with the explicit  exemplum of 
Caesar’s recent dictatorship and his punishment, and in consideration of the speeches of 
Catulus and Cicero on the dictatorship as a form of tyranny, Cassius Dio is reaching the 
climax of an historical interpretation with his Agrippa. This argument relies upon us 
reading the speech of Agrippa after those of Catulus and Cicero and the narratives of 
Sulla’s and Caesar’s dictatorships. In Dio’s view the problem of individual power and 
tyranny was a real risk to the successful ratification of Augustus’ sole rule in 27 BCE. The 
previous model of individual power, in the form of the Republican dictatorship, had 
unquestionably failed, as the historian explores through his speeches of Catulus and 
Cicero. Moreover, throughout Agrippa’s oration the terms μοναρχία and τυραννίς are used 
interchangeably on six occasions.
86
 The speaker’s fundamental thesis, that ‘tyrannies are 
the natural product of monarchies’ (τὰς τυραννίδας τὰς ἐκ τῆς μοναρχίας ἐκφυομένας),87 is 
Dio’s evaluation of the historical problem in 27 BCE. In view of the dictatorship’s 
connotations of crudelitas, forceful usurpation of power, uselessness in the face of military 
problems abroad, and the negative examples of Sulla and Caesar behind it, it was simply 
toxic from the contemporary perspective – but in Dio’s view sole rule was needed, all the 
same.  
 
Through his Maecenas, Cassius Dio foreshadows precisely the measures which his 
Augustus will subsequently undertake to surmount that issue. The solution lay in the title 
the future princeps was to adopt, and in the outward appearance of his sole rule. In the 
closing section of his oration, Dio’s Maecenas advises Octavian to  
 
decline the title of king, if you really do desire the reality of monarchy but fear 
the name of it as an accursed thing, and rule alone under the title of ‘Caesar’. 
But if you come to require other epithets, then the people will give you the 
title of imperator, just as they gave it to your father (δώσουσι μέν σοι τὴν 
τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος, ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ πατρί σου ἔδωκαν); and they will revere you 
(σεβιοῦσι) with another way of address, so that you may reap the crop of the 
reality of kingship without the odium which attaches to the name of ‘king’ 
(ἄνευ τοῦ τῆς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῆς ἐπιφθόνου).88 
 
The phrase σεβιοῦσι δέ σε καὶ ἑτέρᾳ τινὶ προσρήσει is an elegant play on words on the 
historian’s part, which looks forward to Octavian’s later title of Augustus (σεβαστός). But 
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in spite of the pun, the issue of nomenclature and of appearances in general was a real one 
in Dio’s interpretation. Here some step-by-step recapitulation is required, as Cassius Dio’s 
argument is complex and developed over many books. Sulla, first, had been a cruel tyrant 
as dictator, and becomes an exemplum of tyranny and crudelitas through Dio’s history and 
indeed in the speeches of Catulus and Cicero. By the time of Caesar’s assassination in 44 
BCE, the most recent dictator had unquestionably been a monarch – he is portrayed as such 
in the historical diegesis – and is compared by Dio’s Cicero in his speech to a tyrant on the 
basis of his usurpation of power and his enslavement of the people, like Sulla before him. 
Following this, the historian states quite explicitly that the lex Antonia abolishing the 
dictatorship was ratified because the Romans believed, mistakenly, that the cause of Sulla 
and Caesar’s misdeeds had been the title of dictator under which they performed them 
(ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι τῆς τῶν ἔργων δεινότητος οὔσης). Then, Dio’s evaluation through 
Agrippa: the Roman people had assassinated Caesar because they suspected they were 
being tyrannised. μοναρχία and τυραννίς are, moreover, conflated throughout this oration, 
compounding the synonymy between kingship, even in the form of the dictatorship, and 
tyranny from the Republican perspective.  
 
Finally Maecenas, by way of response, posits the solution. Looking back to cite once again 
the exemplum of Caesar’s position of sole-rule (ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ πατρί σου ἔδωκαν), and 
looking forward to Augustus’ title of  σεβαστός and the danger of assuming any loaded or 
toxic titles, Dio’s Maecenas advises his interlocutor of the need to find a new, 
uncontaminated exercise of powers. Failure to do so, he states, would arouse odium, and – 
the repeated exempla of Caesar indicate – a repetition of violent past events.  
 
That Augustus resolved the problem of the dictatura, which I suggest Dio problematised 
and vitiated through his three ‘defences’ of δημοκρατία, is confirmed by the historian 
himself in his own voice. It is the last time Cassius Dio mentions the dictatorship in his 
Roman History, in his narrative of the year 22 BCE, five years after the Augustan 
Settlement of Book 53. The relevant passage is worth quoting in full: 
 
The people in Italy were suffering as a result of pestilence and famine, for the 
plague was everywhere and no one worked the land. I imagine that the same 
was the case in other parts too. But the Romans, thinking that these things were 
happening to them for no reason other than that they did not have Augustus as 
consul, wished to engage him as dictator (δικτάτορα αὐτὸν ἠθέλησαν 
προχειρίσασθαι); and after shutting up the Senate in the curia they compelled 
them to enact this by a vote, threatening that they would burn them all inside 
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otherwise. After this, they took the twenty-four fasces and approached 
Augustus, begging him to consent to be made dictator as well as curator of 
the grain-supply, just as Pompeius had once done (δικτάτορά τε ἅμα 
δεόμενοι λεχθῆναι καὶ ἐπιμελητὴν τοῦ σίτου, καθάπερ ποτὲ τὸν Πομπήιον). 
Under compulsion he accepted the latter of these, and ordered that two men be 
chosen each year from among those who had served as praetors at least five 
years previously, so as to see to the distribution of grain.  But he did not 
accept the dictatorship, and indeed rent his clothes (δικτατορίαν οὐ 
προσήκατο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα προσκατερρήξατο) when he could find no 
way of convincing the people otherwise, either by argument or begging. For as 
he already had power and honour in excess of the dictators anyway, he rightly 
guarded against the envy and hatred that title would bring (ὀρθῶς τό τε 
ἐπίφθονον καὶ τὸ μισητὸν τῆς ἐπικλήσεως αὐτῶν ἐφυλάξατο). 89  
 
By studiously avoiding the dictatorship which Sulla and Caesar had borne before him, 
Augustus therefore warded off a repetition of the Caesarian precedent: the ἐπίφθονον καὶ 
μισητὸν which could, in the historian’s view, have destroyed the new regime as easily as 
previous ones. Through his three ‘defences’ of δημοκρατία, Cassius Dio developed a 
narrative of the Republican dictatura which implicated that office in the collapse of the 
constitution itself and made its failings, perversely, an argument for the success of the 
Principate. No state, I outlined at the beginning of this section, could function securely 
without the direction of a single ruler, in the historian’s opinion; but the exigencies, at 
home and abroad, of a fiercely competitive senatorial class and of a far-reaching 
Republican empire nevertheless required solerule all the same. Dio’s argument, which 
receives its most detailed treatment in the speeches, is that the Republican dictatura had 
become completely unworkable, viewed by its contemporaries as a form of tyranny; but its 
extraordinary executive powers nevertheless had to be replaced. Herein lies the paradox of 
Dio’s history of the first century BCE. Under a δημοκρατία, Rome had seen many tyrannies 
or regimes perceived as tyrannical by their subjects. Under the monarchy of Augustus, it 
could escape them. 
Factor 2: Imperii Consuetudo 
In this second section I return to Catulus’, Cicero’s, and Agrippa’s defences of the old 
order to investigate how Cassius Dio used these to articulate his interpretation of the 
corrosive effect of military authority abroad upon the constitution. I argue that, just as Dio 
viewed the dictatorship in 67 BCE as a wholly unsuitable response to a complex and 
potentially lengthy military situation outwith Italy, so too did he conceive of the 
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prorogation of imperium over protracted periods as the cause of Marius’, Sulla’s, 
Pompeius’, and Caesar’s decline into cupido dominandi. The Republican empire of Rome, 
then, was at an impasse. It could neither make effective use of the dictatorship, on 
reputational and practical grounds; nor could it safely delegate those powers to individual 
commanders over the lengthy periods required without risking also their decline into 
δυναστεία. 
 
This section will necessarily be shorter than the previous one. In my discussion of the 
historian’s use of these orations to explain the problem of the Republican dictatorship and 
the imperative to replace it with monarchy, I have already reviewed the literature on each 
particular speech, given an overview of the historical context, and discussed the possible 
source-material. I will not repeat these here. Moreover, Cassius Dio’s interpretation of the 
deleterious effect of prolonged military power abroad upon the individual dynast – and by 
extension, upon the constitution – is somewhat less complex than his problematisation of 
the dictatorship. His method, certainly, is similar with both historical concerns. Just as with 
the dictatura, Dio uses the speeches of Catulus and Cicero to reflect upon the problematic 
distribution of power within the Republican empire; he then uses his Agrippa to state 
explicitly the hurdles the Augustan regime will have to overcome in this regard; and 
finally, his Maecenas predicts the solution to the problem, which the first princeps will 
indeed follow in the succeeding diegesis. But the problem itself is less conceptually 
difficult than Dio’s vitiation of the Republican dictatura, and so will need less elaboration. 
A brief overview first, however, will be helpful. Here I consider the nature of the 
interpretation being offered by Dio through the speeches, the historian’s relationship with 
earlier sources, and the theoretical framework he develops in his narrative.  
 
The term imperii consuetudo first appears in Suetonius’ Vita Divi Caesaris. In his Vita, the 
biographer first introduces an excursus on the causes of the Caesarian Civil War: his 
pretext for the war, Suetonius writes, was that the Senate were treating unfairly those 
tribunes of the plebs who were loyal to him (et praetextum quidem illi ciuilium armorum 
hoc fuit). But other causes of the war were also possible and variously held (causas autem 
alias fuisse opinantur), and the author proceeds to list these briefly. It is in that context that 
one possibility, above all, is developed at some length: 
 
Some believe that he was seized by his own habituation to commanding 
(captum imperii consuetudine), and that after comparing his own and his 
enemies’ strength, he made the most of that occasion to usurp supreme power; 
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this he had eagerly desired from his youth. This seems to have been what 
Cicero thought too (quod existimasse uidebatur et Cicero), because he writes 
in the third book of his De Officiis that Caesar always had these verses of 
Euripides’ Phoenissae on his lips, which he translates thus: ‘for if the law is to 
be transgressed, then it’s to be transgressed for the sake of ruling; nurture 
your piety elsewhere!’ (‘nam si uiolandum est ius, regnandi gratia uiolandum 
est: aliis rebus pietatem colas’).90 
 
For Suetonius, then, the cause of Caesar’s bid for dominatio was his imperii 
consuetudo, his ‘habit of commanding’. If Cicero’s translation of Euripides and his 
testimony that this was Caesar’s catch-phrase are to be trusted, then the biographer’s 
suggestion in fact originated with Caesar’s contemporaries. What precisely Suetonius 
means by imperii consuetudo is unclear – and this is crucially important. Arthur 
Eckstein has recently explored this term, specifically with reference to Caesar, and 
convincingly demonstrates in his article that  
 
the experience of governing a large province on one’s own, the experience of 
exercising sole responsibility over large regions and great numbers of people, 
the experience of independence and power and control, the taste for it (and in 
some cases the great wealth that could be derived from it), all this sometimes 
created what one might call an ‘imperial counterculture’ to the law-ruled state 
existing at the centre…In the centre, politicians had to deal with many foci of 
power, and they had to cooperate at least minimally with one another, to be 
dependent upon one another to some extent. Out in the provinces, however, it 
was different: often one person, one superior person, made all major decisions. 
Out of this difference, conflict could develop.
91
 
 
Imperii consuetudo then, as Eckstein elucidates in his analysis, is the phenomenon of 
individual habituation to personal power as the result of continued command abroad. The 
case of Caesar may have been as obvious to Suetonius as it is now to modern scholars. By 
the time of the Civil War, Caesar had been in possession of imperium for a period of 
thirteen years: praetor, governor of Lusitania, consul, and then proconsul in Gaul for eight 
years. Commanding had simply become his habit (consuetudo), and he was loath to give it 
up.
92
 He had become destructively habituated to power, and this was directly caused by the 
way that the Republic organised its empire, with frequent over-reliance upon individual 
commanders.
93
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Cassius Dio does not, of course, use the Latin expression imperii consuetudo, nor indeed 
finds a simple translation to denote ‘habituation to commanding’. But his Greek 
expressions, such as κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀρχὰς (‘commanding successively’) and τοσούτοις 
ἐφεξῆς ἔτεσι (‘for many years in succession’) capture the sense of the historical problem in 
his narrative of this period; and, as I will show, in contexts where the destructive 
ramifications of imperii consuetudo are being discussed. 
 
At first glance, one would suppose from the comments Dio makes in his own authorial 
voice that there is no need to look at the speeches. It is certain – to linger a moment on the 
narrative – that the historian viewed the organisation of power within the Republican 
empire as a serious issue.  In his account of Caesar’s third consecutive term as dictator and 
consul in 46 BCE, the historian states quite explicitly his view that the dictator’s imperii 
consuetudo had led him to desire absolute power. According to Dio, Caesar reformed the 
provincial administration, decreeing that pro-magistrates should not hold power for more 
than one or two years, 
 
because he himself had ruled the Gauls for many years in succession and 
as a result of this had been led to desire absolute power (ὅτι τε αὐτὸς 
πολλοῖς τῶν Γαλατῶν ἐφεξῆς ἔτεσιν ἄρξας ἔς τε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τῆς 
δυναστείας μᾶλλον προήχθη) and to increase his military might, he limited by 
law the term of propraetors to one year and proconsuls to two consecutive 
years, ruling that absolutely no one be permitted to hold and command for a 
longer time than this. 
94
 
 
Two accounts of this law survive which predate Dio: Cicero’s first Philippica and 
Suetonius’ Vita Divi Caesaris.95 Mention of the dictator’s previous career is absent in both. 
Although the historian probably read them,
96
 Dio is our only ancient author who argues 
that Caesar’s own experience of ruling Gaul precipitated his reassertion in 46 BCE that 
commanders ought not to wield power over extended periods. It is clear that, in the 
historian’s interpretation, it was specifically as a result of the experience of commanding 
abroad for years at a time that Caesar’s monarchical ambitions were generated, and that he 
wished to prevent a repetition. 
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As yet there is still nothing especially revolutionary in this. Suetonius and Appian had 
already developed the idea, and there is, again, every likelihood that Dio had read 
Suetonius. Rather, in this section I demonstrate three points which seem to me more 
interesting. First, the historian attaches this argument about imperii consuetudo not only to 
Caesar as Appian and Suetonius had, but to all the major military dynasts of the first 
century BCE, including Marius, Sulla, Metellus, Pompeius, and Caesar. Second, he outlines 
specifically the way in which that problem was surmounted by the Augustan Principate 
and how the reforms passed following the Settlement of 27 BCE directly addressed this 
major failing of the Republican organisation of power. And third, he uses the speeches 
above all to elucidate these explanations.  
 
A moment further on the narrative framework. That imperii consuetudo was a universal 
problem in the Late Republic in Cassius Dio’s view – and not merely restricted to Caesar – 
is confirmed by his account of the electoral chaos of 53 BCE and Pompeius’ stab at the 
dictatorship.
97
 He specifically writes that a decree was passed to the effect that no one 
formerly invested with imperium, either an ex-praetor or ex-consul (μηδένα μήτε 
στρατηγήσαντα μήθ᾽ ὑπατεύσαντα), should assume a command abroad without an interim 
of five years (τὰς ἔξω ἡγεμονίας, πρὶν ἂν πέντε ἔτη διέλθῃ). Dio’s embedded focalisation 
of the Romans’ intentions at this point is incisive and revealing: they did so ‘in order that 
these men, by not being in a position of power immediately after holding one, would cease 
their craze for offices’ (εἴ πως ὑπὸ τοῦ μὴ παραυτίκα ἐν δυνάμει τινὶ αὐτοὺς γίγνεσθαι 
παύσαιντο σπουδαρχοῦντες).98 
 
Within this narrative framework, then, Cassius Dio clearly presented imperii consuetudo as 
an issue not only in the context of Caesar’s career. He suggests that it was a more general 
problem. To Dio, it was specifically the lack of hiatus between periods of authority and the 
practice of proroguing individuals’ commands – especially shortly after their terms of 
office – which led to acrimonious competition (σπουδαρχοῦντες) and, more gravely, the 
development of ἐπιθυμία τῆς δυναστείας among the governing class.  
 
On a final historical note, successive office-tenure had been forbidden as early as the lex 
Genucia of 342 BCE, which stipulated an interval of ten years between positions of 
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authority; and, more recently in the context of the Late Republic, the lex Villia of 180 BCE 
reasserted that interval, this time reduced to two years. The late res publica, naturally, saw 
repeated deviations from this latter law. The replacement of military crisis in Italy with 
military crisis abroad gave elites justification to exercise their longing for prolonged power 
with a disregard for the legal restrictions; and the popular assemblies, in any case, could 
and repeatedly did disregard those restrictions.
99
 The effect of this could be profound 
indeed – and here I turn now to the analysis of the speeches.  
 
I have already argued earlier in this chapter that Dio used his dissuasio of Catulus on the 
Gabinian law to illustrate his view of the conflation in the Republican psychology between 
the dictatorship and tyranny, and to assert the inutility of that office in the face of a 
Republican empire. It seems to me clear, however, that the historian additionally used the 
oration to set out his own historical evaluation of the cause of Marius and Sulla’s descent 
into ἐπιθυμία τῆς δυναστείας. This, he suggests, was the phenomenon of imperii 
consuetudo as the result of continued office-holding. 
 
After the proemium, in which Catulus’ probity and patriotism – and thus his interpretative 
authority from the reader’s perspective – are emphasised, Dio’s Catulus moves on to the 
first of three argumentative sections. The first section maintains that the lex Gabinia is 
forbidden by law (36.31.3-32.3). The second, that the extraordinary new powers enshrined 
in it are unecessary as long as other imperium-holders exist (36.33.1-34.4). And the third, 
that the proposed command would be better exercised by a number of generals directly 
answerable to the people (36.35.1-36.4). Although the title of each of these headings is 
debatable, this is cosmetic.
100
 All three sections have at their heart the fundamental 
question of imperii consuetudo in Dio’s history: the effect of prolonged power upon the 
individual and upon the res publica. The opening to Catulus’ first section is worth quoting 
in full: 
 
First and most importantly (πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστά), I say that we should 
never entrust so many commands to a single man, one after another 
(μηδενὶ ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ τοσαύτας κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀρχὰς ἐπιτρέπειν). For this is not only 
forbidden by law, but has been found to be very dangerous in our experience. 
Nothing else (οὔτε γὰρ τὸν Μάριον ἄλλο τι) made Marius ‘what he was’, so to 
speak, except being entrusted with so many wars in the shortest space of 
time (ὅτι τοσούτους τε ἐν ὀλιγίστῳ χρόνῳ πολέμους) and being made consul 
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six times (ὕπατος ἑξάκις) in the briefest period. Nor Sulla, except that he 
commanded our armies for so many years in succession and after this was 
made dictator, then consul (τοσούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἔτεσι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν 
στρατοπέδων ἔσχε καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δικτάτωρ, εἶθ᾽ ὕπατος).  For it is not in 
human nature, not only in the youthful spirit but the elder too, to wish to abide 
by the customs of our ancestors when one has been in power for a long time 
(ἐν ἐξουσίαις ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον). 101 
 
According to Dio’s speaker, the lust for power that led Marius and Sulla to seize control 
was the direct result of Rome’s over-reliance upon their skills. Historically, C. Marius 
owed his six consulships in the period 107-101 BCE to the threat of Jugurtha in Numidia 
and a possible Cimbrian invasion. L. Cornelius Sulla took continual charge of the First 
Mithridatic War between 87-83 BCE before serving as dictator and then consul in the two 
following years, as Dio’s Catulus outlines here.102 Catulus’ assertion that such commands 
are forbidden in law (ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἀπηγόρευται) may be an oblique reference to the lex 
Vilia, although it is not necessary to credit this to see that this is an important moment of 
historical interpretation. The problem was imperii consuetudo, and it is the ‘first and most 
important’ (πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστά φημι) of Dio’s Catulus’ arguments. Moreover, 
‘nothing else’ made Marius and Sulla degenerate (οὔτε γὰρ τὸν Μάριον ἄλλο τι… οὔτε τὸν 
Σύλλαν) other than their protracted periods of authority, particularly abroad but also in 
domestic magistracies. It seems clear to me that this passage, within a speech, serves as 
Cassius Dio’s first and most elaborate treatment of the problem of prolonged personal 
power under the Republic – and given the context we are to infer that Pompeius, too, was a 
further iteration of that problem. 
 
On the other hand, Dio’s narrative of Marius’ and Sulla’s careers is extremely fragmentary. 
One may reasonably question whether these words of Catulus’ are the historian’s own 
interpretation of the cause of their cupido dominandi, or are intended to serve merely as a a 
representation of the ‘standard optimate arguments’ which would be cum rebus tum 
personis accommodata.
103
  
  
But the fragments themselves seem to suggest that this latter is quite impossible. I have 
already discussed in this chapter the scant vestiges of Dio’s account of the Sullan Civil 
War and his ‘transformation’ into a tyrant; but reutrning to these here will be beneficial. In 
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the aftermath of the battle of the Colline Gate, Dio describes the shift in Sulla’s character 
following his victory over the Marians. He had, as I have already stated, been considered 
foremost in φιλανθρωπίᾳ τε καὶ εὐσεβείᾳ, but then outdid Marius and Cinna in the brutal 
horrors he inflicted (τὸν δὲ δὴ Κίνναν καὶ τὸν Μάριον τούς τε ἄλλους τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτὸν 
γενομένους πάντας ἅμα ὑπερέβαλεν).104 Above all, in his evaluation of this process of 
degeneration into tyranny the historian puts the case down to Sulla’s experience of 
absolute conquest (τοῦ παντελῶς κρατήσειν). It was this, in Dio’s view, which corrupted 
the general and made him institute a tyranny over the Republic.
105
 This, of course, 
followed directly after Sulla’s command in the Social War (91-88 BCE) and then the First 
Mithridatic War (87-86 BCE), followed by further command in the east (85-83 BCE) and, as 
Dio’s Catulus states, his dictatorship (82-81 BCE) and consulship at the end of that decade. 
It seems to me clear that the view of Catulus, in this first section, is the historian’s own 
evaluation of the cause of his longing for absolute power: imperii consuetudo. 
 
Dio’s Catulus opens the second section of his speech by reiterating that his first argument, 
that power ought not to be concentrated repeatedly in one man’s hands, is ‘the most 
important of all’ (πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο καὶ μάλιστα λέγω).106 The crucial connection 
between imperii consuetudo and the degeneration of Sulla is therefore deliberately 
underlined at both the introduction and close of that exemplum. In this second section, 
Dio’s Catulus asserts that the unconstitutional powers of the lex Gabinia were in any case 
not required, as the usual system of propraetors and proconsuls functioned perfectly well. 
‘For why bother to elect the annual magistrates at all’, Catulus asks, ‘if you are not going 
to make use of them for such tasks? Surely not just so they can go about in purple-bordered 
togas?’.107 It is possible, as Saylor Rodgers has observed, that Dio imitated Demosthenes in 
this thought; although a Demosthenic overlap is not a persuasive basis on which to bypass 
the historical-explanatory value of the speech.
108
 In this section, Dio’s Catulus stresses that 
in the context of 67 BCE – long before Caesar’s imperii consuetudo – the continued 
prorogation of military authority had led already to disaster: 
 
How can it be right that a new command be created, and that for three years 
and over all affairs within Italy, without Italy, and, in a word, over everything? 
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For I think that you all know how many disasters come to states from this 
practice (ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου), and how many men have frequently disturbed our 
people and wrought incalculable harm upon themselves because of their 
lust for extra-legal powers (ὅσοι διὰ τὰς παρανόμους φιλαρχίας τόν τε δῆμον 
ἡμῶν πολλάκις ἐτάραξαν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτοὺς μυρία κακὰ εἰργάσαντο, πάντες 
ὁμοίως ἐπίστασθε). 109 
 
This vein of Catulus’ argument will be familiar; I have already discussed it with respect to 
the historian’s problematisation of the Republican dictatorship. But the overlap here 
already existed, in Dio’s historical thinking. He viewed the dictatura, as I set out in the 
previous section, as unviable in 67 BCE not only on reputational grounds, but on 
constitutional and practical grounds: the legal restrictions rendered it unsuitable for 
addressing military crisis abroad. Here Dio seems to me also to articulate a different, but 
very much related, problem. The dictatorship was unable to remedy the complex and 
drawn-out pirate situation outwith Italy; but someone necessarily had to. The proposed 
command, of three years, with many legati, away from the capital and senatorial oversight, 
was in the historian’s view anathema to the contemporary Republican; but if there were 
other viable alernatives, Dio is unaware of them and presents the contemporary political 
class as equally nonplussed. The lex Gabinia was quite inevitable in that context, 
particularly in view of the populus’ adoration of Pompeius in the historian’s assessment.110 
This, as I discussed in Chapter 3, was necessarily a chance for Pompeius to acquire further 
δόξα and δυναστεία; and Dio’s Catulus here both reflects and prognosticates. Disasters, he 
states, have ‘many times already’ (πολλάκις) been wrought upon Rome specifically from 
‘a practice such as this’ (ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου): that of entrusting individual generals with too 
much power. Dio has his Catulus state immediately before this excerpt – and I think quite 
deliberately – that the system of annual magistrates ought to be maintained.111  
 
What we have here, therefore, is a calm reflection on the Republican practice of entrusting 
individual commanders with military authority over long periods, and on the disastrous 
consequences of this practice. There seems little doubt to me that this reflection is the 
historian’s own. One need only compare these statements of Catulus to the narrative 
framework of views expressed in Dio’s own voice to perceive that the historian regarded 
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imperii conseutudo as a genuine concern in the late res publica, and not merely with 
respect to Caesar as Suetonius argued. It originated much earlier with Marius and Sulla.
112
 
 
I close my analysis of Dio’s use of Catulus to elaborate the historical problem of imperii 
consuetudo with a brief recapitulation of an earlier point. This is the suggestion of Dio’s 
orator in the third section of his speech that great honours and powers exalt, and then 
destroy, even the best men (αἵ τε γὰρ μεγάλαι τιμαὶ καὶ αἱ ὑπέρογκοι ἐξουσίαι καὶ τοὺς 
τοιούτους ἐπαίρουσι καὶ διαφθείρουσιν).113 I have already shown, in Chapter 4,114 the way 
in which Dio uses his orator as a means of prognostication. The historian judged the 
ramifications of the lex Gabinia in markedly moral terms. He set out in this speech, first, a 
prediction of the φθόνος which would indeed later result from the prestige of that 
command, rendering Pompeius politically impotent and driving him into the Triumvirate; 
and, second, a foreshadowing of Pompeius being exalted and then destroyed by μεγάλαι 
τιμαὶ καὶ ὑπέρογκοι ἐξουσίαι, realised at Pharsalus in 48 BCE, when Pompeius’ 
complacency after an exceptional military career left him defeated and, ultimately, ruined. 
 
But Dio also seems to me to use this third section to make a more general argument about 
the deleterious effects of prolonged personal power, especially military, upon individual 
ambition.  
 
Who does not know that it is neither remotely appropriate nor advantageous to 
entrust all our business to one man (τὰ πράγματα προστάσσεσθαι καὶ ἕνα 
τινὰ), or for any one man to be master of all our possessions, even if he is the 
most excellent? Great honours and excessive powers exalt, and then destroy, 
even such excellent men as these (μεγάλαι τιμαὶ καὶ αἱ ὑπέρογκοι ἐξουσίαι καὶ 
τοὺς τοιούτους ἐπαίρουσι καὶ διαφθείρουσιν).115 
 
Dio’s reader has already observed the truth of this statement in the earlier accounts of 
Marius’ and Sulla’s degeneration into brutality. In Dio’s assessment, the character of Sulla 
in particular was exalted by his great and continual power, and then destroyed by that same 
agency. Dio’s argument in this passage is that granting Pompeius yet another position of 
great authority, enshrined in the lex Gabinia, would make him as habituated to his own 
power as his predecessors, exalting and ultimately destroying him. The Republic would 
again suffer as a result. 
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This is precisely what the later consequences of Pompeius’ imperii consuetudo turn out to 
be. In his prefatory comments before Pharsalus, Dio outlines that both Pompeius and 
Caesar were ambitious for dominion.
116
 ‘Both’, he writes, ‘were reaching after absolute 
power (παντὸς κράτους), and were greatly influenced by innate ambition (φιλοτιμίᾳ 
ἐμφύτῳ) and also by great acquired rivalry…their temperaments only different in so far as 
Pompeius desired to be second to no man, and Caesar to be first of all’.117 The historian’s 
reflection on their respective careers at this point is interesting, and highly relevant. He 
envisages the pair enumerating their former commands; Pompey thinking of Africa, 
Sertorius, Mithridates, and his pirate command; and Caesar of Gaul, Spain, the crossing of 
the Rhine, and the expedition to Britain. ‘And thinking, indeed, that all those achievements 
were at stake, and each being eager to appropriate the other’s glory, they were most 
excited’.118 The pair were thus incited to battle, and indeed to the civil war, by their long 
and glorious military careers. Caesar, Dio states, had no intention of becoming a private 
citizen again ‘after commanding for such a long time’ (ἐκ χρονίου ἡγεμονίας);119  but 
Pompeius, too, had been similarly corrupted by his imperii consuetudo. Dio places 
Pompeius in a continuum of ambitious generals whose lengthy tenure of military authority 
corrupted and destroyed both them and the res publica.  
 
How, then, to prevent imperii consuetudo among the commanders of the regime that 
followed the Republic? I argue that the solution can be found again in the Agrippa-
Maecenas debate. In the previous section I explored the way in which Cassius Dio used the 
exhortations of his Agrippa and Maecenas as a means of historical explanation. He set up, 
through Agrippa, a final reflection on the Republican dictatura. In the narrative context, 
after the accounts of Sulla’s and Caesar’s dictatorships and the speeches of Catulus and 
Cicero likening these to tyranny, the speaker outlined a key challenge the Augustan 
Principate would have to overcome: the people proceeded against Caesar for his 
aspirations to regnum, and could do so too with Augustus (μέμνησαι δὲ ὅπως τῷ πατρί σου 
προσηνέχθησαν, ὅτι τινὰ ὑποψίαν ἐς αὐτὸν μοναρχίας ἔσχον). Moreover, men who aspired 
to tyranny were punished severely by citizens (πλὴν ἄν τις τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμήσῃ: τοῦτον 
γὰρ ἰσχυρῶς κολάζουσι); and this, certainly, was no empty threat after the fate of the last 
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dictator. The response of Maecenas, however, outlined the historian’s evaluation of the 
means whereby Augustus could bypass the toxicity of the titles of dictator and rex, and the 
importance of adopting a new, uncorrupted title: σεβαστός. This recommendation of the 
studious avoidance of old titles proposed was, of course, followed by Dio’s Augustus later 
in the diegesis.  
 
In a similar fashion, the historian seems to me to have used the δμοκρατικός speech of 
Agrippa and its monarchist counterpart to reflect upon the problem of imperii consuetudo 
in the Late Republic, and then to outline the means of addressing this. To Dio, the key to 
halting the corrosive issue of the distribution of power, and particularly over lengthy 
periods within the empire, lay within the first princeps’ reforms to the provincial 
administration.  
 
But before the solution comes Dio’s clear reiteration of the problem. Marshalling his 
arguments for a res publica restituta, Agrippa outlines a weak argument for rejecting 
monarchy. An emperor, he states, would need to have many helpers – helpers sent out to 
the corners of the empire, far from his superintendence. Yet so far from serving as a 
grounds to reject monarchy, this merely elaborates, more fully, what has by this point in 
the narrative proven to be such a fundamental flaw of Dio’s Republic: 
 
Then again, apart from those who are guilty of wrongdoing, there are many 
men who pride themselves, some on their birth, others on their wealth, and still 
others on something else, who, though in general not bad men, are yet by nature 
opposed to the principle of monarchy. If a ruler allows these men to become 
strong, he cannot live in safety (καὶ αὐτοὺς οὔτ᾽ αὔξεσθαί τις ἐῶν ἀσφαλῶς 
δύναται ζῆν), and if, on the other hand, he undertakes to impose a check on 
them, he cannot do so justly. What, then, will you do with them? How will you 
deal with them?...For if you allow these various classes to grow strong, you 
will not be able to deal with them easily (ἂν δὲ ἐάσῃς ταῦθ᾽ ὡς ἕκαστα 
αὔξειν, οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αὐτὰ διάθοιο). True, if you alone were equal to carrying 
on the business of the state and the business of warfare successfully and in a 
manner to meet the demands of each situation, and needed no assistant for any 
of these matters, it would be a different matter. As the case stands, however, 
since you would be governing this vast world, it would be quite essential 
for you to have many helpers (πᾶσά σε ἀνάγκη συναγωνιστὰς πολλούς, ἅτε 
τοσαύτης οἰκουμένης ἄρχοντα, ἔχειν); and of course they ought all to be both 
brave and high-spirited. Now if you hand over the legions and the offices to 
men of such parts, there will be danger that both you and your government 
will be overthrown (κίνδυνος ἔσται καὶ σοὶ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ καταλυθῆναι)…If, 
on the other hand, you entrust nothing to these men, but put common men of 
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indifferent origin in charge of affairs, you will very soon incur the resentment 
of the first class, who will think themselves distrusted, and you will very soon 
fail in the greatest enterprises…And yet I need not explain to you all the evils 
that naturally result from such a condition, for you know them thoroughly 
(ὅσα ἐκ τούτου κακὰ γίγνεσθαι πέφυκε, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐδὲν δέομαί σοι σαφῶς 
εἰδότι διηγεῖσθα); but this one thing I shall say, as I am constrained to do — 
that if a minister of this kind failed in every duty, he would injure you far 
more than the enemy (πολὺ πλείω ἄν σε τῶν πολεμίων βλάψειεν).120 
 
Of course this applies to the Late Republic more than any other period in Dio’s narrative. 
These comments arrive at a point of major transition in Dio’s work between Republic and 
Principate. The historian deliberately draws the reader’s attention to this transition by a 
programmatic statement at the beginning of Book 52, a moment before Agrippa’s speech, 
stating that ‘these were the achievements of the Romans and these their sufferings under 
the monarchy, under the Republic, and under the dominion of a few, over a period of 725 
years’.121 These comments thus seem to me as much a reflection on the history of what has 
come before, which the reader has to this point seen played out at great length, as on the 
problems of monarchy as such.  
 
In this context, Dio’s audience cannot fail to think upon reading this passage of Marius, 
Sulla, Pompeius, and Caesar. I am at a loss as to what other generals in the empire who, 
entrusted with its legions and its governance as Agrippa states, could pose a risk of 
overthrowing the government (οὐκοῦν ἂν μὲν τοιούτοις τισὶ τά τε στρατεύματα καὶ τὰς 
ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζῃς, κίνδυνος ἔσται καὶ σοὶ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ καταλυθῆναι). Dio’s Agrippa 
later uses the precise exempla of Marius, Sulla, Pompeius, and Caesar in a survey of 
generals of the Republic, thus bringing them directly to the forefront.
122
  
 
Agrippa’s argument, like Catulus’ earlier on the dictatorship, certainly seems illogical. He 
is made to dissuade Augustus from becoming a monarch on the grounds that he would 
require numerous helpers abroad in administering his empire (πᾶσά σε ἀνάγκη 
συναγωνιστὰς πολλούς, ἅτε τοσαύτης οἰκουμένης ἄρχοντα, ἔχειν). These, too, would have 
to be entrusted with armies and positions of power; and they would have to be brave and 
high-spirited (ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους), able to carry out their commands with distinction. 
Yet, Dio’s Agrippa states, if the princeps allows these men to prosper and become strong 
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with their legions within the empire, he cannot possibly enjoy security himself (αὐτοὺς 
οὔτ᾽ αὔξεσθαί τις ἐῶν ἀσφαλῶς δύναται ζῆν). Indeed, such men would injure the emperor 
more than his enemies abroad could (πολὺ πλείω ἄν σε τῶν πολεμίων βλάψειεν), and 
posed the risk of ultimately overthrowing the government. Is this not Dio’s history of the 
Late Republic?  
 
Agrippa’s argument on the danger of monarchy and the benefit of δημοκρατία is therefore 
deliberately illogical and unpersuasive. This, however, is not because the speech acted as a 
cosmetic prelude to the main feature of Maecenas,
123
 or was poorly composed. Rather, Dio 
deliberately presents the impasse through his orator: imperii consuetudo would always be 
an issue when the strong are given military authority far from the city of Rome, regardless 
of the constitution. It certainly had been under the δημοκρατία, which Dio’s Agrippa 
idealises into unpersuasive fantasy while simultaneously rehearsing one of the reasons for 
its collapse. In the historian’s assessment, then, imperii consuetudo remained a very real 
risk indeed to the new monarchical regime, as it had been, fatally, under the Republic.   
 
In his Maecenas, Cassius Dio delineates his interpretation of the measures necessary to 
rectify the destructive organisation of military power under the res publica and to secure 
viable constitutional change. Dio’s Maecenas proffers three suggestions which, I argue, 
relate fully to the historical problem of imperii consuetudo in the first century BCE. After 
suggesting that these will make it both possible and easy for the new princeps ‘to rule well 
and without danger’, he outlines his plan (καὶ δυνατὸν καὶ ῥᾴδιον τῷ γε ἔμφρονι τὸ καὶ 
καλῶς καὶ ἀκινδύνως ἄρξαι).124  
 
Dio argues through his Maecenas, first, that the new princeps ought to cleanse the Senate 
of any unsavoury figures, ‘since some, on account of our civil strifes, have become 
senators who are not worthy’ (ἐπειδή τινες οὐκ ἐπιτήδειοι διὰ τὰς στάσεις βεβουλεύκασι). 
He should then hand-pick their replacements himself, selecting candidates to join the 
governing class not on the basis of their wealth – indeed, he should donate the required 
monies if necessary – but those who are of good birth and good character (ἀντὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν 
ἄλλων τούς τε γενναιοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους). This, the speaker suggests, will solve the 
problem of assistants to rule the empire posed earlier by Agrippa: ‘for in this way, you will 
have many assistants and secure the loyalty of the leading provincials; and the provinces, 
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having no leaders of distinction, will not cause political revolutions’ (οὔτε ἐκεῖνα 
νεοχμώσει τι μηδένα ἐλλόγιμον προστάτην ἔχοντα).125 
 
Secondly, Augustus should appoint magistrates and imperial governors himself. The 
historian’s analysis here is incisive, and again has everything to do with his history of the 
Late Republic. All appointments, Maecenas states, should be made by the emperor, and 
should certainly not be entrusted to the plebs or the citizen body to fill. The reasoning 
behind this argument of Dio’s Maecenas is revealing: ‘for the people will cause civil strife 
(στασιάσουσι) because of those offices, and the senators will use them to further their 
ambitions (διασπουδάσονται)’. One cannot help but think here of the lex Gabinia episode, 
in which the mendacity and self-interest of Pompeius and Gabinius in Dio’s reconstruction 
succeeded in winning over the populus and securing further δυναστεία for the former. To 
ensure, furthermore, that the Republican magistracies and pro-magistracies abroad are 
shorn of their potential to overthrow the government, Augustus should additionally deprive 
them of their traditional powers and make them titular, ‘so that the same things do not 
happen all over again’ (ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ αὖθις γένηται).126 In this way, those in receipt of 
the honour of those positions domi militiaeque will continue to enjoy the prestige of their 
titles, but will be unable to ‘cause another revolution’ (μήτε τοῦ ἀξιώματός τι αὐτῶν 
ἀφαιρήσει καὶ τοῖς νεωτερίσαι τι ἐθελήσουσι μὴ ἐπιτρέψει).127 
 
Finally – and crucially – Maecenas insists on a long hiatus between a magistrate’s tenure in 
the city and his position of command abroad. Pro-magistrates should not go out 
immediately after their urban office, but should wait; and, even more importantly, they 
should not be under arms during this period: 
 
So deprive the magistracies of their power (τῆς δ᾽ ἰσχύος παράλυσον) to such 
an extent that, although you will not be taking away any of their prestige, you 
will give no one who wishes it the chance to cause another revolution (καὶ 
τοῖς νεωτερίσαι τι ἐθελήσουσι μὴ ἐπιτρέψει). This is how it will be, then, if you 
assign them mainly to domestic affairs (ἐνδήμους). And do not allow any of 
them to have armed forces during their term nor immediately afterward 
(μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς καιρῷ ὅπλα τινὶ αὐτῶν ἐγχειρίσῃς μήτε εὐθύς). Rather, 
you should allow them only after a lapse of some time (ἀλλὰ χρόνου 
διελθόντος), as much as seems sufficient to you in each instance. For in this 
way, none of them will stir up revolutions, since they will never be put in 
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command of legions while still enjoying the prestige of their titles, and they 
will be more peaceable after they have been private citizens for a time (οὔτε 
τινὲς νεοχμώσουσι, στρατοπέδων κύριοι ἐν τῷ τῶν ὀνομάτων φρονήματι 
γενόμενοι, καὶ χρόνον τινὰ ἰδιωτεύσαντες πεπανθήσονται).128 
 
This important passage seems to me a persuasive analysis of all that Dio perceived as 
defective in the allocation of imperium under the Republic. The connection, here, between 
the protracted tenure of military authority and the capacity for revolution is spelled out 
plainly and repeatedly indeed. Maecenas’ statement here that office-holders will be ‘more 
peaceable after a spell as private citizens’ (χρόνον τινὰ ἰδιωτεύσαντες πεπανθήσονται) 
overlaps with the historian’s own narrative interpretation of the Senate’s attempt in 53 BCE 
to reassert the principle forbidding successive office-holding, particularly with regard to 
ex-praetors and ex-consuls  (μηδένα μήτε στρατηγήσαντα μήθ᾽ ὑπατεύσαντα). They hoped 
that these men, ‘by not being in a position of power immediately after holding one, would 
cease their craze for offices’ (εἴ πως ὑπὸ τοῦ μὴ παραυτίκα ἐν δυνάμει τινὶ αὐτοὺς 
γίγνεσθαι παύσαιντο σπουδαρχοῦντες).129 In this important context, there is additionally 
Maecenas’ distinction between those assigned to domestic affairs (τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἐνδήμους 
αὐτοὺς ἀποφήνῃς) and those in possession of armed forces, either during their term or 
immediately after it (μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς καιρῷ ὅπλα τινὶ αὐτῶν ἐγχειρίσῃς μήτε εὐθύς). 
Through his orator here in 27 BCE, Cassius Dio lays out his interpretation of the 
appropriate remedy to a distinctly Late Republican issue he raised through Catulus four 
decades earlier: that no individual should be entrusted with many positions of command, 
one after another (μηδενὶ ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ τοσαύτας κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀρχὰς ἐπιτρέπειν).130 This, in 
short, is the problem of imperii consuetudo; and through Maecenas, the historian 
articulates his solutions to that problem. The speaker’s statements seem to me constructed, 
quite deliberately in the context of the preceding narrative, as a direct response to the Late 
Republican problem of individual commanders growing habituated to their own authority 
by long periods in power. 
 
This is exactly the interpretation that the historian applies to Augustus’ reforms to the 
provincial administration in 27 BCE in Book 53. As I detailed in Chapter 3, Dio writes first  
that the new princeps feigned a reluctant acceptance of the absolute power offered to him 
by the Senate. In the narrative which follows that recusatio imperii, Dio outlines a series of 
Augustan reforms which strike me as particularly important in relation to Catulus’ and 
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Agrippa-Maecenas’ comments on imperii consuetudo, and indeed in relation to the 
historian’s own authorial comments cited at the start of this section more generally.  
According to Dio, wishing to appear ‘Republican’ (δημοτικός),131 Augustus declared that 
he would not govern all the provinces himself. Instead, he made some senatorial, and 
others imperial, entrusting to the Senate ‘the weaker provinces on the pretext that they 
were safer and peaceful and not at war’ (τὰ μὲν ἀσθενέστερα ὡς καὶ εἰρηναῖα καὶ ἀπόλεμα 
ἀπέδωκε τῇ βουλῇ), but to himself the stronger imperial provinces, on the grounds that 
they were more dangerous and troublesome, thus sparing the Sentate bother (τὰ δ᾽ 
ἰσχυρότερα ὡς καὶ σφαλερὰ καὶ ἐπικίνδυνα). 132  Dio’s analysis here seems to me 
significant: 
 
He said that he was taking this course so that the Senate might enjoy the best of 
the empire without fear while he himself would have all the hardships and 
dangers. In reality, it was so that under this pretext the senate would be 
unarmed and feeble, while he alone would have arms and maintain troops 
(ἵνα ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει ταύτῃ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν καὶ ἄοπλοι καὶ ἄμαχοι ὦσιν, αὐτὸς δὲ 
δὴ μόνος καὶ ὅπλα ἔχῃ καὶ στρατιώτας τρέφῃ).133 
 
In the historian’s view, then, it was by imposing direct imperial control over the allocation 
of legions qua provinces that Augustus curbed the capacity of the senatorial class – that is, 
the governing and commanding class – to make ‘the same things happen all over again’ (τὰ 
αὐτὰ αὖθις) as Maecenas stated. The actions of the first princeps are constructed as a direct 
response to the issues outlined in Catulus’ and Agrippa’s orations and the solutions posited 
in Maecenas. The historian, moreover, provides an embedded focalisation which lays bare 
his evaluation of the emperor’s true intentions: to keep the governing class – the ‘imperial 
counterculture – weak, and himself – the ‘centre’ – strong.134  
 
To complete the package, Augustus furthermore decreed that the governors of his own, 
imperial provinces be selected by the princeps himself; but that those of the senatorial 
provinces be chosen at random, by lot. The historian provides no analysis of the historical 
ramifications of this measure here. However, he certainly labours Augustus’ duplicity in 
pretending to be guarding the best interests of the governing and senatorial class while in 
fact keeping the lion’s share of military power within the provinces for himself. The 
conclusion seems to me implicit: the element of chance – the random allocation to 
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commands abroad by lot – for the senatorial class weakened the ordo, while in inverse 
proportion the direct oversight of the princeps kept the centre strong:  
 
This, then, was the appointment of the provinces. But as Caesar wished – 
naturally! – to lead the Romans far away from thinking that he had 
monarchy in view (βουληθεὶς δὲ δὴ καὶ ὣς ὁ Καῖσαρ πόρρω σφᾶς ἀπαγαγεῖν 
τοῦ τι μοναρχικὸν φρονεῖν δοκεῖν), he undertook to rule the provinces given to 
him for only ten years; for he promised to bring them into good order within 
this time, and proclaimed boastfully that, if they were pacified sooner, he 
would return them all the more quickly to the Senate (προσενεανιεύσατο 
εἰπὼν ὅτι, ἂν καὶ θᾶττον ἡμερωθῇ, θᾶττον αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀποδώσει). He 
therefore first of all appointed the senators themselves to govern both types of 
province, except Egypt. This one alone he assigned to an eques…then he 
decreed that the governors of senatorial provinces should be annual 
magistrates, chosen by lot (τοὺς μὲν καὶ ἐπετησίους καὶ κληρωτοὺς), except 
when a senator had special privilege because of having many children or a good 
marriage. But the other governors were to be chosen by the emperor 
himself (ὑπό τε ἑαυτοῦ αἱρεῖσθαι) and to be called his emissaries and 
propraetors, even if they were consulars. For thus, of the two titles which had 
been long established under the Republic, he gave that of praetor to those 
chosen by him.
135
  
 
Augustus’ boastful proclamations and wish, ‘of course’ as Dio intones ironically (δὴ),136 to 
obfuscate his manoeuvres to secure absolute power are presented, deliberately, as a means 
of clothing Augustus’ reforms to the provincial administration as a means of cementing 
power within the empire behind a veneer of Republicanism. Against the backdrop of 
Maecenas’ detailed focus on the necessary practical reforms to prevent ambitious 
commanders from growing habituated to their own power by long periods of authority in 
the empire, this interpretative moment of Dio’s seems important. By addressing the issue 
of imperii consutetudo – a key focus in Catulus’ and Agrippa’s ‘defences’ of δημοκρατία – 
in a manner consonant with the recommendations of Maecenas, the new princeps avoided 
a repetition of the precedents of Marius, Sulla, Pompeius, and Caesar.  
 
The speeches of Catulus and Agrippa in defence of the old order, and the programmatic 
counterpart to this latter in the detailed exhortation of Maecenas, thus seem to me to form a 
logical unity. Cassius Dio was not the first narrator of the past to posit the cause of 
Caesar’s megalomania as his imperii consuetudo. Where Dio is more of interest, however, 
lies in his use of the speeches: to develop a sophisticated and sustained narrative of the 
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problem of imperii conseutudo under the Republic, and to outline his interpretation of the 
measures the Augustan regime took to address that problem. The issue, the historian argues 
through his Catulus, long predated Caesar in any case. The orator’s reflection on Marius 
and Sulla’s long periods of military power and the disastrous consequences of those can 
only be the historian’s view, particularly in comparison with his account of Sulla’s reign of 
terror. Pompeius, furthermore, belonged within that series of generals corrupted by great 
authority ruling the provinces in Dio’s assessment; and the lex Gabinia was a further 
extension of this. In Agrippa’s encomium of a fantasy-Republic, which does not exist in 
the historian’s preceding narrative, the historian then lays out a series of reflections on the 
problem of the organisation of military power under monarchies. This reflection, in fact, 
merely brings into sharper focus the historian’s evaluation of imperii consuetudo in the 
first century BCE. Within the narrative context, Agrippa’s admonishments on the risk of 
generals of distinction thriving in the provinces has nothing, so far, to do with monarchy 
and everything to do with Dio’s Late Republic. But in Maecenas, the historian delineates a 
series of measures he viewed as necessary directly to combat that problem; and these, 
subsequently, are implemented by the first princeps. Cassius Dio viewed imperii 
conseutudo as a cause of the Sullan and Caesarian Civil Wars, certainly, and of the end of 
the res publica. By attacking that fatal flaw of the Republic, as the historian articulates 
through his Maecenas, Augustus could and did secure beneficial and long-lasting 
constitutional change. This argument, it seems to me, would be threadbare, unpersuasive, 
and almost imperceptible without the speeches.  
Factor 3: Φθόνος 
To close, I turn in this third section to the distinctively emotive element that Cassius Dio 
brings to his causation of the collapse of the Roman Republic. This again receives its 
fullest treatment in the set-piece orations. I discuss again, here, the historian’s three 
‘defences’ of the Republic; but the theme of φθόνος is so pervasive in almost all of Dio’s 
speeches of this period and indeed in his account of the late res publica as a whole that it 
will be important to consider several other of these compositions in addition. I suggest that 
Cassius Dio perceived φθόνος as a defining characteristic of Late Republican political 
culture and interpreted this as the cause of major, and destructive, constitutional 
movements. He accordingly elaborated this in some detail and with great frequency in his 
speeches of this period, confirming their embeddedness within his framework of historical 
causation. Moreover, as I will show shortly, the problem of φθόνος practically disappears 
from the Roman History after Augustus’ accession in 27 BCE. 
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It was not, of course, unprecedented to conceive of envy as a motivating factor in the 
hostile actions of elites. As both Harrison and Rees have shown of Herodotus and 
Thucydides respectively, φθόνος often causally underpinned the cynical manoeuvres of 
individuals.
137
 In that context, it would be simple to assume that Dio’s incorporation of this 
emotive aspect into his causation of the collapse of the res publica was merely a reflection 
of his classicising tendencies. Certainly much scholarship has been devoted to the 
historian’s admiration for the language and thinking of Thucydides,138 although less has 
been said about his relationship with Herodotus.
139
  
 
Cassius Dio’s development of the theme of φθόνος could, certainly, be seen simply as a 
case of belletristic imitation if that aspect recurred consistently throughout his work. But it 
does not. The vast majority of instances of φθόνος occur in Dio’s Late Republic. It is 
furthermore ‘reinvented’ as a positive force in public life under the Augustan regime, and 
occurs but infrequently in the account of the later Principate. In view of this, the historian 
clearly saw the spiteful emotion of φθόνος, as a portmanteau both of invidia and odium,140 
as a characteristic feature of Late Republican political life. Envy, therefore, was not a mere 
trope to be recycled at any point, but was deeply embedded within Dio’s conceptual 
skeleton of the first century BCE. Again – as I discuss later in Chapter 7 – this emotion is 
reinvented as a (bizarrely) positive force in political life in Dio’s account of the Augustan 
regime, and is comparatively absent in the history of the Principate as a whole.  
 
Some statistics will elucidate this point more clearly and establish a theoretical basis for 
looking at the speeches. In the half-millenium period prior to the Gracchi in the Roman 
History – preserved in the fragments and epitomes of Books 5-22 – there are only eight 
instances of an historical character acting because of their φθóνος in the historian’s 
interpretation.
141
 Clearly there are transmissional issues: Dio’s Regal- to Mid-Republican 
narrative is quite lacunose. However, as Kemezis has convincingly argued, the fragments 
suggest that the historian conceived of this period as something of a golden age, and 
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certainly in comparison with the corruption which followed in the first century BCE.
142
 In 
this regard Dio locates himself in a long tradition of Roman historiography, including 
Sallust and Livy, which dichotomised the turpitude of the Late Republic and the probity of 
earlier periods. It is therefore a speculation, but not an unjustified one, to suggest that 
identifiers of moral decline and aristocratic discord such as φθóνος will have necessarily 
been less prevalent in the historian’s account of that earlier age.  
In the century between the Gracchi and the reign of Augustus, however, φθóνος becomes 
significantly more pronounced, especially as the catalyst for hostile individual action. All 
told, in the century between the controversial tribunes and the death of the first princeps 
(Books 25-55) there are eighty-two instances of the morpheme -φθον-, indicating envy.143 
It is telling that eight of these occur in the narrative of Caesar’s assassination and funeral.  
 
This intense focus upon φθóνος as a causal force in history is particular to Dio among our 
Imperial Greek historians of this period. Causal participles of the verb φθονεῖν, the phrase 
‘because of envy’ (ὑπὸ τοῦ φθόνου), and the dative of cause (φθόνῳ) appear frequently, 
but much less so in Plutarch and Appian, who place far less emphasis on envy as a factor 
of history. Indeed, the morpheme -φθον- occurs only twenty-one times in Appian’s entire 
history of the Sullan and Caesarian civil wars,
144
 and only once in his Mithridatica.
145
 
Cassius Dio thus applies a framework of historical causation to the late res publica in 
which the emotive aspect, the jealous begrudging of another’s success, plays a central role 
in aristocratic discord above and beyond his Greek predecessors or indeed any 
predecessors. The historian accordingly made his orations of the Late Republic consistent 
with that framework. 
 
A word on Dio’s programmatic statements regarding this emotion. As Kuhn-Chen has 
mentioned, φθóνος in the Roman History occurs especially between former equals who 
begrudge the advancement or enrichment of their former peer of comparable status.
146
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This, in fact, is underlined by Cassius Dio even in the earliest books of his history, in 
conclusion to his account of the death of Remus at Romulus’ hands. Summarising that 
episode with a closing epimythium, the historian states that φθóνος is simply a dormant 
aspect of human nature, which will surface whenever one of two equals tries to surpass the 
other: ‘for thus it is that by its nature the human condition cannot bear to be ruled by what 
is similar and familiar to it, partly from envy and partly from contempt’.147 In consequence, 
φθóνος in the historian’s assessment was the natural result of a system – such as Romulus’ 
and Remus’ coregency – in which individuals of equal status attempt to compete. This of 
course applies to the Late Republic. As Fechner has shown, this principle of equality was a 
fundamental characteristic of Dio’s view of the res publica: he conceived of δημοκρατία as 
underpinned especially by equality of opportunity and equality before the law (ἰσομοιρία, 
ἰσονομία).148 It was therefore inevitable, in Cassius Dio’s assesment, that φθóνος must 
proliferate under the Republic, just as in all δημοκρατίαι: 
 
For indeed, if there had ever been a strong democracy, it had only been at its 
best for a short time, so long as it had neither the kind of numbers nor strength 
for the envy that results from ambition or the aggrandisements that result 
from prosperity to spring up within it (φθόνους ἐκ φιλοτιμίας ἐγγενέσθαι).149 
 
This revealing passage, which I quoted more fully with its surrounding context at the start 
of this chapter, is fundamental to Cassius Dio’s reconstruction of the collapse of the Roman 
Republic and the role of the speeches within that reconstruction. Aside from brief 
comments,
150
 there has been remarkably little work on the significant role played by 
jealousy as a factor of history in Dio’s account of the first century BCE; nor, for my 
purposes here, the historian’s use of speeches to develop an historical explanation of that 
factor.  
 
The orations themselves – to turn now to these – certainly demonstrate that Cassius Dio 
aligned these compositions with his own theoretical conception of the problems inherent in 
δημοκρατίαι. I have already set out in Chapter 4 how Dio perceived of φθóνος as integral to 
the historical situation in 67 BCE,
151
 and so only a brief repetition of his three speeches on 
the lex Gabinia here will suffice.  
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In his narrative comments prior to Pompeius’ false recusatio, the historian states without 
equivocation that the motives that underlay the speaker’s choice of dissimulatio were, 
above all, to accrue greater honour by appearing to have been forced to accept the 
command; and to avoid the φθóνος that seeming to have deliberately sought out those 
powers would generate.
152
 These concerns, accordingly, are repeated by Dio’s Pompeius, 
who pretends to reject the honours of the lex on the grounds that all positions of power are 
causes of envy and hatred (ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾶτε ὅτι καὶ ἐπίφθονα καὶ μισητὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτά 
ἐστιν).153 No man, moreover, could happily live among those who envy him (τίς μὲν γὰρ ἂν 
εὖ φρονῶν ἡδέως παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποις φθονοῦσιν αὐτῷ ζῴη;).154 In the context of speech this is 
presented as part of the misleading, but persuasive, value of the recusatio: Pompeius in the 
depicted situation is all the more succcessful with the people – and Catulus, in contrast, 
fails to persuade – because he capitalises on very real concerns about φθóνος which the 
historian in the preceding narrative has already stated were a genuine problem. To continue 
labouring Dio’s point, the exhortation of Gabinius which follows then encourages the 
general not to fear the jealousy of his opponents, but rather to aim to succeed all the more 
for this reason and thus spite his traducers (πείσθητι οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τούτοις, μηδὲ ὅτι 
τινὲς φθονοῦσι φοβηθῇς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο μᾶλλον σπούδασον).155 And, finally, 
Catulus’ defence of the traditional status quo rounds off this thought about envy by 
predicting, on the historian’s behalf, that the honour of the Gabinian law cannot fail but to 
bring jealousy to its beneficiary (οὔτε ἀνεπίφθονον ἔσται αὐτῷ πάντων τῶν ὑμετέρων 
μοναρχῆσαι).156 
 
The problem of φθóνος is thus significantly emphasised through all three speeches of 67 
BCE. It seems clear that the historian particularly wished to bring this concern to the fore in 
that episode. Understandably so, as I argued in Chapter 4: for Dio’s Catulus serves as a 
means of historical explanation by virtue of his prediction of the later consequences of the 
lex. Catulus’ foreshadowing of the φθóνος that extraordinary powers under a competitive 
senatorial system would bring Pompeius comes true, I showed earlier, with the envy of the 
consul Metellus. This latter would not ratify the general’s military and political 
arrangements in Asia Minor: 
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And so, since he could accomplish nothing because of Metellus and the others, 
Pompeius declared that they were jealous of him (φθονεῖσθαί ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν) 
and that he would communicate this to the people. However, as he feared that 
he might fail to win them over too and incur even greater shame, he abandoned 
his demands. Thus he realised that he did not have any real power, but only 
the name and the envy for the positions he had once held (γνοὺς ὅτι μηδὲν 
ὄντως ἴσχυεν, τὸ μὲν ὄνομα καὶ τὸν φθόνον ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἠδυνήθη ποτὲ εἶχεν).157 
 
This φθóνος, then, emerged in the historian’s interpretation from the honour of the lex 
Gabinia and the general’s other commands, and left him at the mercy of his opponents. But 
it had further and more significant political consequences. Moments after this reflection on 
Metellus’ φθóνος, which in Dio’s view had resulted directly from Pompeius’ many 
positions of honour and left him ‘without any real power’ (μηδὲν ὄντως ἴσχυεν), the 
historian interprets Pompeius’ motives for joining the First Triumvirate. ‘For Pompeius 
was not himself as strong as he hoped to be (ὅσον ἤλπισεν ἰσχύων); and, seeing that 
Crassus was in power and that Caesar’s influence was growing, he feared that he might be 
destroyed by them; and he hoped that, by sharing in their present advantages, he could 
regain his former authority (τὴν ἀρχαίαν δι᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξουσίαν ἀναλήψεσθαι)’.158 Dio thus 
frames Pompeius’ entry into the Triumvirate as a direct response to his own lack of 
political might at the hands of Metellus and his jealousy (μηδὲν ὄντως ἴσχυεν) and as an 
attempt to recoup some of his lost prestige and cachet (τὴν ἀρχαίαν δι᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξουσίαν 
ἀναλήψεσθαι). In this way, through his three speeches on the Gabinian law – but especially 
Catulus’ ‘defence’ of δημοκρατία and his prediction of the φθóνος that such honours 
would bring – Cassius Dio sets into motion a chain of political events which began with 
envy; and which ended, ultimately, with the destructive alliance between Crassus, Caesar, 
and Pompeius.  
 
The historian’s amnesty-speech of Cicero reflects some of these concerns about the 
political ramifications of φθóνος. These statements on envy seem to me to take on an 
especial explanatory significance when situated within the context of the preceding 
narrative, which must be turned to first. In his account of the assassination of Caesar 
immediately prior to Cicero’s defence of the res publica, Cassius Dio details his own 
interpretation of the auspicious state of the constitution under the dictator’s leadership and 
of the factors which precipitated the end of this period of stability. He writes:  
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A terrible frenzy fell upon certain men because of jealousy of his 
advancement and hatred of his position of honour above them (φθόνῳ τε 
τοῦ προήκοντος καὶ μίσει τοῦ προτετιμημένου σφῶν προσπεσὼν). They 
murdered him unjustly, giving a new definition to sickening infamy; and their 
deed scattered [Caesar’s] decrees to the wind and brought revolutions and 
civil wars to the Romans once again after a time of harmony (ἐξ ὁμονοίας 
καὶ πολέμους ἐμφυλίους τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις παρεσκεύασεν). For they said that they 
were both the murderers of Caesar and so the liberators of the people; but in 
truth, they plotted impiously against him and threw the state into revolution 
again when it at last had a stable government (τὴν πόλιν ὀρθῶς ἤδη 
πολιτευομένην ἐστασίασαν).159 
 
This passage certainly seems, on the one hand, to feed more broadly into Cassius Dio’s 
positive conception of monarchy, especially in comparison with δημοκρατία. Immediately 
after this excerpt the historian launches into his long constitutional excursus, with which I 
began this chapter, praising monarchies and delineating the fatal flaws of republics and 
democracies.  
 
On the other hand, this programmatic dimension is not the only aspect of Dio’s narrative 
excursus at the opening of Book 44. The historian states here, quite plainly, that it was the 
envy and odium that resulted from Caesar’s meteoric advancement beyond his former 
state of relative equality with his peers which precipitated their action (φθόνῳ τε τοῦ 
προήκοντος καὶ μίσει τοῦ προτετιμημένου σφῶν). This is the only cause that he cites, 
anywhere, for this major political event. Major indeed; for Dio then sets out his view of 
the effect this φθóνος exerted on the state, renewed at last into stability and harmony: 
more civil war, violence, and revolution. The historian suggests that this φθóνος was the 
deliberate creation of the Senate in any case: in his view, almost all voted him ever more 
extravagant honours not in order to gratify him, ‘but in order that he might be the more 
swiftly destroyed, wishing to make him envied and resented all the sooner’ (καὶ οἵ γε 
πλείους, ἔς τε τὸ ἐπίφθονον καὶ ἐς τὸ νεμεσητὸν προάγειν αὐτὸν ὅτι τάχιστα βουλόμενοι 
τοῦτ᾽ ἐποίουν, ἵνα θᾶσσον ἀπόληται). 160  Dio therefore presents a Late Republican 
political class perfectly aware of the capacity of extraordinary honour to bring its holder 
into disrepute; but additionally states clearly his view that the result of this φθóνος was 
merely further disaster for Rome. 
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Dio’s Cicero makes a similar argument shortly after this explanation of the historical 
causes, and results, of the dictator’s assassination. In this immediate narrative context, I 
find the comments of the historian’s orator on competition and factional disunity and 
framentation significant. He exhorts the Romans to 
 
give up our mutual enmities, or jealousies (πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχθρας ἢ 
φιλονεικίας), or whatever else one should call them, and return to our former 
state of peace and friendship and harmony (εἰρήνην καὶ φιλίαν καὶ 
ὁμόνοιαν); and we should remember, if nothing else, that as long as we 
conducted our government in this latter way, we acquired wealth and fame and 
territories and allies. But since we have been led into injuring one 
another…we have become decidedly worse off (ἀφ᾽ οὗ δὲ ἐς τὰ πρὸς 
ἀλλήλους κακὰ προήχθημεν…πολὺ χείρους ἐγενόμεθα). And I for my part 
think that nothing can save the state at this time unless we adopt a policy this 
very day and with all possible speed, or else we will never be able to regain 
our former position (οὐδ᾽ ἀναλαβεῖν δυνησόμεθα).161 
 
The vocabulary in this instance is slightly different to the lex Gabinia speeches: 
φιλονεικία, rather than φθóνος, is the undesirable aspect of Republican political culture 
most to be abandoned. But while reading Cicero’s reflection upon senatorial competition 
the reader cannot fail to think of the assassination of Caesar which occurred a few chapters 
before; nor indeed of the historian’s reflection on the harmony and stability which his 
regime brought, dashed utterly by the φθóνος of his competitors. This seems to me an 
important reflection on what Dio describes as a crucial moment of στάσις, in which the 
historian uses his orator to set out his explanation: competition among the Roman 
aristocracy had bred φθóνος, leading to Caesar’s murder and to renewed strife. Only by 
abandoning that course could the Republic be saved. 
 
This point is furthermore made implicit by the list of exempla which Dio’s Cicero relays 
later in the oration. Citing Marius, Sulla, Cinna, Strabo, Pomeius, and Caesar as proof of 
‘all the time we have spent wearing ourselves away fighting one another’ (πόσον μὲν 
χρόνον κατατετρίμμεθα πολεμοῦντες ἀλλήλοις), the historian’s message is that the same 
was of course happening yet again in 44 BCE; and this resulted directly from the φθóνος of 
Caesar’s enemies, his former equals in the senatorial class.162 Dio seems to me to have 
made a conscious and deliberate choice in the amnesty-speech to bring forward the theme 
of φιλονεικία; and predicates this upon an immediately preceding narrative in which 
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φθóνος takes centre-stage as a key motive in dynastic power-struggles and renewed 
internecine conflict.  
 
The ‘envy that results from ambition’ (φθόνους ἐκ φιλοτιμίας) therefore seems to me to 
have been elaborated not only in Cassius Dio’s three speeches of 67 BCE at a time of major 
constitutional crisis, but additionally a further time by Cicero in 44 BCE.
163
 These, of 
course, are not the historian’s only explorations of the destructive problem of envy in a 
speech of the Late Republic; and it will be worthwhile to sketch out other iterations before 
moving on to Agrippa and Maecenas. There is, first and quite ironically, the example of 
Julius Caesar in his exhortation to the mutinying troops at Vesontio (38.36-46). I have 
already set out the programmatic statements in the narrative: Dio’s comments on Romulus’ 
murder of Remus, and his excursus on the inevitability of envy in a competitive 
δημοκρατία theoretically underpinned by equality of opportunity. In view of this, the 
(transparently disingenuous) comments of Dio’s Caesar to his troops seem significant, and 
are surely the historian’s own opinion on the problem of φθóνος. Encouraging his men to 
protect what they have against the ‘aggressor’ Ariovistus, the orator states the historian’s 
own belief that in a system in which two parties are equal, those left behind will inevitably 
envy their new superiors:  
 
Many are plotting against [the Romans’] prosperity, since everything that lifts 
people above their peers arouses both emulation and jealousy (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ 
ὑπεραῖρόν τινας καὶ ζηλοῦται καὶ φθονεῖται); and in consequence of this 
eternal warfare is waged (κἀκ τούτου πόλεμος ἀίδιός) by all inferiors against 
those who excel them in any way…For it is impossible for men who have 
advanced to such distinction and to power so vast to live quiet lives without 
danger.
164
 
The intentions of Dio’s orator here, as I discussed in Chapter 3, are certainly not to be 
trusted. The historian has ensured that already in his narrative preface to the speech. 
Nevertheless, the view of Dio’s Caesar that those whose peers have excelled them must 
envy their new superiors is entirely consistent with the historian’s evaluation of the cause 
of Caesar’s assassination, the consequent discord, and, ultimately, the circumstances 
under which Octavian came to power and permanently abolished the res publica. 
Moreover, this oration arrives only shortly after the three speeches on the lex Gabinia in 
Book 36 and, later, the diegetic material of Book 37. That narrative of Pompeius’ exalted 
position and the φθóνος which (as Catulus prognosticated) would inevitably stem from it 
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culminated in him, too, incurring the envy of a former equal: Metellus. Like the 
assassination of Caesar, Pompeius’ impotence in 60 BCE as a result of envy had grave 
consequences for the Republic in the historian’s interpretation. 
 
Antonius’ laudatio funebris of Caesar, too, continues to focalise the problem of φθóνος in 
Dio’s late res publica. I will discuss this oration in far more detail in Chapter 6, where a 
close reading will be required to explore Dio’s presentation of the corrosive nature of Late 
Republican imperialism. But this speech, too, has explanations to offer on the historian’s 
evaluation of the effect of φθóνος on the state, and these merit brief consideration here. 
There is, first, a short antithetical comment on Caesar’s character: he neither neglected 
those in bad fortune nor envied those in good fortune (οὔτε γὰρ δυστυχήσαντά τινα αὐτῶν 
ὑπερεῖδεν οὔτε εὐτυχήσαντί τινι ἐφθόνησεν).165 There seems to me little in this by way of 
historical explanation, and it may merely have been inserted to enhance the panegyrical 
character of the funeral oration. More of interest, however, are Antonius’ comments on 
the cause of Caesar’s recall from his campaigns to Rome by his opponents in 50 BCE. 
After a reflection on the general’s adventures in Gaul and Britain in that decade, Antonius 
summarises the reason for Caesar’s order by the Senate to return to Rome: 
 
If certain persons had not begun to stir up revolution and compelled him to 
return home before the appropriate time, because they envied him 
(φθονήσαντες αὐτῷ τινες) – or rather, envied you – then he would have 
subdued all Britain along with the other islands surounding it and all Germany 
up to the Arctic Ocean.
166
 
 
In order to perceive the historical importance of φθóνος in Dio’s vitiation of the Republic, 
we do not need to accept that Cassius Dio is here using his Antonius to reiterate his view 
of the historical cause of Caesar’s recall to Rome. This caused discord within the Senate, 
some taking Caesar’s side and others Pompeius’.167 It is striking, however, that in his 
narrative of 50 BCE the historian does present the motives of those who worked for the 
recall in a manner equally unfavourably as his Antonius. He writes, for example, that M. 
Marcellus instigated the measure because he desired ‘the immediate downfall of Caesar, 
since he was of Pompeius’ faction’ (πάντ᾽ εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ Καίσαρος καταλύσει ῾τῆς γὰρ 
τοῦ Πομπηίου μερίδος ἦν᾽ ἔπραττε). Furthermore, Marcellus wished to have Caesar 
replaced as commander ‘before the appointed time’ (πρὸ τοῦ καθήκοντος χρόνου). This 
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close overlap with Antonius’ reflection in his speech upon Caesar being recalled ‘before 
the appropriate time’ (πρὸ τοῦ προσήκοντος καιροῦ) indicates that Antonius is expressing 
views consonant with the historian’s own interpretation. In Dio’s view, moreover, 
Pompeius in 50 BCE had C. Marcellus made consul in order to use him against Caesar, 
seeing that Marcellus was hostile to this latter in spite of their relation by marriage (ἐπειδὴ 
τῷ Καίσαρι καίπερ ἐξ ἐπιγαμίας προσήκων ἐχθρὸς ἦν). It is not difficult, in this context 
and in the context of Dio’s presentation of envy in this period as a whole, to imagine that 
Cassius Dio did believe that the φθóνος of Caesar’s enemies precipitated their 
manoeuvres against him in 50 BCE as Antonius states. 
 
This of course had dramatic political ramifications. Immediately after narrating these plots 
at Rome, the historian writes that the general ‘was on no account inclined to become a 
private citizen again after holding such an important command for such a long time; and 
he was especially afraid of falling into the hands of his enemies’.168 The emphasis on the 
length of Caesar’s time with military authority abroad and the cachet of this again reflects 
the centrality of imperii consuetudo to the historian’s conception of the downfall of the 
Republic: Caesar had simply become habituated to his own power, and had no intention 
of becoming a private citizen again. In consequence, Dio writes, the general courted 
favour at Rome, drew more senators to his side, and collected further money and 
troops.
169
 The φθóνος of the general’s opponents, then, merely strenghtened his position 
and caused a rift in the Senate. Caesar would, of course, cross the Rubicon the next year.   
None of this, however, necessarily explains the comparative absence of φθóνος, which in 
Dio’s record of the late res publica proves to be so destructive, in the Augustan account. 
Indeed, as I will show in Chapter 7, Dio presents the first princeps’ monarchy as a moral 
corrective to precisely this problem. In this later narrative envy only occurs, peculiarly, in 
connection with the envy of another’s virtue and patriotism – a volte-face of considerable 
proportion.  
 
I suggest that, just as with the problem of the toxicity of the dictatorship as an exercise of 
sole power, and with the destructive issue of imperii conseutudo, Cassius Dio used the 
Agrippa-Maecenas debate to reflect a final time upon the problem of Late Republican 
φθóνος, and to outline his interpretation of the solutions to this. Paradoxically, in the 
historian’s assessment it was the absolute power of a single monarch in Augustus which 
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broke the cycle of competition and envy, restoring the elite to relative harmony. In a 
similar fashion to his reflection on the danger of imperii consuetudo to the sole ruler – 
which served only to rehearse what had so often been a defect of Dio’s Republic – 
Agrippa again posits in his proemium that as a monarch, Augustus will attract only 
φθóνος: 
 
O Caesar, do not be surprised if I try to turn you away from monarchy, even if 
under that system I would acquire many benefits from it – or at least if you held 
it. For if it were to be in your interest, I would of course desire it very much. 
But since monarchy does not offer the same benefits to rulers as to their friends, 
but the friends can reap the fruit of all the benefits they wish safely and 
unenvied and the rulers on the other hand get only the jealousies and 
dangers (ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν καὶ ἀνεπιφθόνως καὶ ἀκινδύνως πάνθ᾽ ὅσα ἐθέλουσι 
καρποῦνται, τοῖς δὲ καὶ φθόνοι καὶ κίνδυνοι συμβαίνουσιν), I have decided as 
usual to look not to my own interests, but to yours and the common good.
170
 
 
This statement of Dio’s Agrippa is, again, a deliberately weak and illogical admonishment 
of the dangers of monarchy. To this point, the reader has seen time and again the 
deleterious effects of φθóνος; but certainly not in a monarchy. The grave threat of envy has 
been played out, quite recently in the narrrative, in the example of Caesar’s assassination, 
precipitated in Dio’s view by the φθóνος of his enemies. Other figures, such as Pompeius, 
furthermore suffered seriously as a result of their enviable positions and took the Republic 
down with them as a result. Envy as a motivating factor in hostile senatorial action 
furthermore pervades Dio’s account of this period more generally.171 These opening lines 
of Agrippa on the danger of φθóνος certainly seem to me a summary of Dio’s view of the 
challenges the Augustan regime would have to face; but they clearly rehearse a key factor 
in the collapse of the Republic.  
 
I may be reading too much into Dio to suggest that the orator’s focus on jealousy is 
especially significant in view of its placement: it is among the opening lines of the speech. 
And yet the closing lines of Maecenas’ response, too, also discuss the historical problem of 
φθóνος. In this way, the Agrippa-Maecenas debate is book-ended by jealousy. This is 
especially significant given the location of the exchange within the Roman History at a 
point of major constitutional transition between Republic and Principate. Envy has hitherto 
been a significant aspect of Late Republican political culture in the historian’s presentation, 
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brought repeatedly under the reader’s gaze in speeches and narrative. Now, at this diegetic 
pause, Dio’s Agrippa prognosticates that it poses an equally substantial risk to the new 
order to come. 
 
But Dio interpreted the solution through his Maecenas. I repeat, here again, the concluding 
lines of that oration. I analysed these earlier in this chapter to demonstrate the historian’s 
use of Maecenas to explain how Augustus overcame the reputational difficulty of 
dictatorship and kingship, and instead secured power by assuming a new title less odious to 
the contemporary perspective. The key, Cassius Dio states, to avoiding φθóνος lay again in 
the self-presentation of the Augustan Principate:
172
 
 
decline the title of king, if you really do desire the reality of monarchy but fear 
the name of it as an accursed thing, and rule alone under the title of ‘Caesar’. 
But if you come to require other epithets, then the people will give you the 
title of imperator, just as they gave it to your father (δώσουσι μέν σοι τὴν 
τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος, ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ πατρί σου ἔδωκαν); and they will revere you 
(σεβιοῦσι) with another way of address, so that you may reap the crop of the 
reality of kingship without the odium which attaches to the name of ‘king’ 
(ἄνευ τοῦ τῆς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῆς ἐπιφθόνου).173 
 
As I have already written in this chapter, Dio’s Augustus followed this recommendation. 
The Romans, the historian states, ‘hated the name of monarchy so much that they called 
their rulers neither dictators nor kings, nor any other such name’. But since monarchy was 
in any event necessary, they chose the name imperator, even for rulers who had not 
conquered in battle, ‘in order that the rulers might seem to have their power not from 
domination, but from the laws’. Accordingly, Augustus assumed the title. 174  In the 
historian’s assessment it is precisely by doing so that the new princeps avoided the 
φθóνος which had killed his adoptive father, the last dictator. Dio’s account of the 
abortive dictatorship grant of 22 BCE, which I explored earlier,
175
 is revealing in this 
regard. Suffering famine and pestilence, the people offered Augustus the dictatura, 
wishing for an end to their problems: but he rejected the title: ‘for since he already had 
power and honour well superior to the dictators anyway, he rightly staved off the jealousy 
and the hatred of that title’ (ὀρθῶς τό τε ἐπίφθονον καὶ τὸ μισητὸν τῆς ἐπικλήσεως αὐτῶν 
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ἐφυλάξατο).176 In Dio’s view – and as his Maecenas recommends -  Augustus’ avoidance 
of the appearance of kingship remedied the problem of φθóνος. The fora in which the 
Republican elite had attempted to compete – the Senate floor, popular elections and 
assemblies, and the provinces – were not only brought under monarchical control, as Dio 
explains in Book 53. They were brought under the control of a monarch who, by avoiding 
the trappings of kingship which had brought fatal φθóνος to Caesar, avoided φθóνος 
himself, and secured the transition from Republic to Principate. The historian not only 
posits this hostile emotion, time and again, as the underlying factor in the cynical 
advances of the senatorial elite in his narrative. In his three ‘defences’ of the res publica, 
Cassius Dio constructs a narrative of the disastrous consequences of φθóνος in the first 
century BCE; and again, uses the speech of Maecenas to set out his solutions to that 
problem.   
Conclusion 
Cassius Dio conceived of overarching and consistent historical factors which in his 
interpretation undoubtedly precipitated the collapse of the Roman Republic. These, 
certainly, appear in his narrative on occasion. But their treatment is far more detailed in the 
speeches, in which the historian sets out his impression of what the contemporary response 
would have been to these factors at major points of constitutional difficulty.  
 
It seems to me clear that Dio composed these speeches in such a way as to mirror, quite 
deliberately, the interpretative framework sometimes expressed in his own voice in the 
narrative. These orations are fully embedded in the historian’s conception of constitutional 
change. In reflecting through his Catulus and Agrippa on the problem of individual 
commanders growing habituated to their own authority, the historian unveils a view which 
we find unexpressed elsewhere in his history: that imperii conseutudo had been a problem 
many decades indeed before the Caesar of Suetonius’ biography, and that this was directly 
responsible for Marius’, Sulla’s, Pompeius’, and Caesar’s degeneration into cupido 
dominandi. He furthermore used his Maecenas to delineate his own interpretation of the 
measures necessary to counter this problem. Speech precipitates action: and Dio’s 
Augustus will later follow precisely these measures. The historian’s problematisation of 
the Republican dictatura, moreover, strikes me as highly sophisticated. Developed in the 
orations of Catulus, Cicero, and Agrippa, this problematisation shows that in the 
historian’s view the conflation between the dictatorship and tyranny, as a form of 
                                                          
176
 Cass. Dio. 54.2.4-5. In this Dio captures the self-justifying tone of Aug. RG 5. 
194 
 
 
degenerate monarchy, grew increasingly acute in the Republican psychology. Moreover, 
this conflation in the historian’s view was developed on different bases. In the context of 
67 BCE one had the recent example of Sullan crudelitas, a conventional locus of tyranny. 
By 44 BCE, Dio’s argument has developed: given the recent marches both of Sulla and 
Caesar upon the urbs, the dictatorship had additionally become associated with the forceful 
usurpation of power. It was, in any case, unsuitable for the needs of an overseas empire, as 
the historian elaborates through his Catulus; yet sole power in some form was necessary all 
the same. There was, finally, the pervasiveness of φθóνος in political life. A trope, yes, and 
not difficult to conceive of. But I can see no reason to doubt that the historian did indeed 
conceive of this emotion as having grave and far-reaching historical consequences, and the 
gravity of this problem is accordingly reflected in the speeches.  
  
There remains the historical problem of speech itself. In Chapter 3, I argued that Cassius 
Dio retrojected his own contemporary anxieties about the probity of rhetoric onto the Late 
Republic, and indeed only onto that period. He conceived self-interested deception as a 
fundamental characteristic of political oratory in the first century BCE; and presents such 
deception as universally successful in commandeering the fora of debate. This, then, 
approximates with Factor 4 in my survey in the Introduction of Cassius Dio’s explanation 
of the failures of the res publica. In inverse proportion, however, it is striking that Dio’s 
‘defences’ of the Republic are universally unsuccessful. All three orators – Catulus, Cicero, 
and Agrippa – are presented by the historian as working sincerely for the public interest, as 
advocates of the status quo. In the case of Dio’s Catulus and Agrippa, their arguments are 
often transparently illogical and unconvincing, and I think intentionally on the historian’s 
part. Catulus, by arguing for the importance of sticking to the law and electing a dictator to 
address the pirate issue overseas, merely rehearses all the reasons, reputational and 
constitutional, for which the dictatorship was wholly unsuitable to the task. Agrippa, too, 
presents imperii conseutudo and φθóνος as inevitable within monarchies as a basis for 
rejecting that constitution; but in doing so he merely rehearses the defects of Dio’s 
Republic.   
 
Herein lies the subtlety. Cassius Dio’s ‘defenders’ of the Republic defend the indefensible, 
in both ethical and practical terms, and fail miserably. The lex Gabinia was ratified, 
contrary to the altruistic patriotism of Dio’s Catulus. In the wake of Cicero’s speech on the 
amnesty, M. Antonius – as I show in the next chapter – delivers a highly emotive laudatio 
funebris of Caesar, thereby enraging the plebs and generating renewed conflict. Agrippa, 
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obviously, argues for an idealised Republic which bears no semblance to the reality of the 
preceding narrative; and Dio’s Augustus is left unpersuaded. In Cassius Dio’s view, it was 
dishonest dynasts – Pompeius, Gabinius, Caesar, Antonius, Octavian – who could 
command the floor in the Late Republic. Attempts to preserve the traditional order and 
traditional institutions – represented in Catulus, Cicero, and Agrippa – proved empty and 
unconvincing. The gulf between the ideal of the δημοκρατία and the grim reality had 
simply grown too vast.  
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Chapter 6: The Enemies of the Republic 
Factor 5: Introduction 
In this second case-study I demonstrate the way in which Dio deployed his speeches on 
imperial policy and military conflict more generally to argue that imperialism, too, was a 
causal factor in the decline of the Republic. I suggest that Cassius Dio conceived of the 
expansion of the fines as the catalyst for the resurfacing of negative but previously dormant 
aspects of human nature which are played out in his narrative of Republican imperialism. 
In the aftermath of this narrative, the historian places speeches into the mouths of major 
military dynasts which entirely contradict the ‘true’ nature of their foreign policies as 
illustrated in the diegesis. Such orators, again, are presented as successful; and by 
obfuscating the true nature of Late Republican imperialism, they misdirect and prevent 
careful planning of imperial policy, hoodwinking Senate, people, and military into 
permitting the empire to become a space in which their personal δυναστεία can be 
cultivated. Military improbity abroad, therefore, generated rhetorical improbity at home – 
represented in the speeches. In Cassius Dio’s interpretation, this misdirection of sound 
debate directly enabled the Republican empire to become a space in which yet further 
φιλοτιμία, πλεονεξία, and ἐπιθυμία could be satisfied, and further δυναστεία acquired. This 
vicious cycle persisted until the imposition of competent superintendence by a single 
authority – Augustus – broke that cycle.  
 
Cassius Dio was not the first historian to suggest that the expansion of the Roman 
imperium precipitated moral decline, especially after the disappearance of metus hostilis. 
As Fechner has argued, the view that security and freedom from fear precipitated moral 
degradation was a commonplace of Roman historiography which Dio too reflected.
1
 
Sallust wrote that it was only after barbarous nations, great kings, and Carthago aemula 
imperii Romani were crushed that moral decline took root in the urbs: superbiam, 
crudelitatem, deos neglegere, omnia venalia habere edocuit; ambitio multos mortalis 
falsos fieri subegit. The empire, he writes, was changed ex iustissumo atque optumo into a 
thing crudele intolerandumque.
2
 But Sallust speaks of the problem as if of a sudden and 
unexpected change; he does not suggest that the vices of ambitio and avaritia were ever-
present in human φύσις and were waiting for the catalyst which would unleash them. In 
this respect, then, the kernel of Cassius Dio’s thinking is closer to Tacitus, who suggests 
                                                          
1
 Fechner (1986) 136-154.  
2
 Sall. Cat. 10.1-6. 
197 
 
 
that corruption is inherent in human nature, but can be triggered by external factors. I 
discuss this further in the next section.  
  
The connection between republican imperialism and ethical collapse, then, was a well-
furrowed field, and may have left Dio little room to be distinctive. But it seems to me 
striking – as I shall show in this chapter – that the historian went to particular lengths to 
examine the effect of these immoral foreign policies upon political rhetoric. The historian 
gives, as far as I can see, no overarching programmatic statement on the nature of Late 
Republican imperialism and the effects of this, as one finds in Sallust and Tacitus among 
others. Rather, he judged the deleterious impact of foreign policy in the first century BCE 
upon the Republican constitution in terms of its effect on public speech, and used the 
speeches to set out that explanation. In Dio, then, we find a problematisation of Late 
Republican imperialism which, certainly, built upon existing ideas about expansion and 
ethical decay. But this problematisation seems to me predominantly articulated to the 
reader in an unconventional way, through the speeches, and argues that Republican 
imperialism negatively affected deliberative oratory first of all. The degeneration of 
political culture and the constitution, then, emerged not in direct consequence of foreign 
policy, but rather in direct consequence of the effect of foreign policy on political rhetoric. 
To perceive this, we need the speeches.  
 
But I am begging the question. To investigate Cassius Dio’s conception of the effect of 
inherently corrupt φύσις upon debates on foreign policy and by extension upon the 
constitution, I must first show that he did conceive of φύσις as inherently corrupt. 
Therefore, in the first section of this case-study I briefly survey the historian’s presentation 
and view of human nature, his relationship with his predecessors, and the recent 
scholarship on this question. In the second section I set out how the historian presented this 
conception of φύσις, and particularly the problems of φιλοτιμία, πλεονεξία, and ἐπιθυμία, 
as endemic within Late Republican imperialism in his narrative. Then, in the third section I 
turn to the speeches of Pompeius and Gabinius (36.25-28), Caesar at Vesontio (38.36-46), 
and Antonius’ laudatio funebris (44.36-49). I suggest that these orations delivered by Dio’s 
‘enemies’ of the res publica elaborate the historical problem of the corrosive effect of 
morally bankrupt foreign policy, and the necessarily dishonest rhetoric it generated, upon 
political decision-making.  
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Dio and Φύσις 
Until recently, two opposing theories prevailed in modern scholarship on Cassius Dio’s 
presentation of the relationship between Republican imperialism and moral decline. The 
first, that of Fechner, suggests that like Sallust and Livy, Cassius Dio conceived of ethical 
decay as contingent upon imperial expansion and the removal of metus hostilis. In that 
regard, then, human nature altered along with the circumstances.
3
 Under such a conception, 
negative modes of behaviour, including φιλοτιμία, πλεονεξία, and ἐπιθυμία, emerged in 
direct consequence of the augmentation of the empire. In contrast, Martin Hose has argued 
that such an idea of moral development would be quite impossible, because like 
Thucydides, Cassius Dio believed that φύσις was a fixed and unaltering quality:4  
 
Dio’s history of the Republic, therefore, was not conceived according to a 
framework of moral decline (Dekadenzmodell). This would be inconsistent with 
the conception of man which Dio inherited from Thucydides. For, if human 
nature remains the same, then the notion of a populus Romanus, which is 
pulcher, egregius, pius, sanctus atque magnificus up to a certain point in time 
and only then morphs into the opposite as a result of empire and security, is 
unthinkable. In a ‘Thucydidean’ impression of mankind, man may be driven by 
ambition and the pursuit of profit at, indeed, any time.  
 
According to Hose, then, it cannot be imagined that Cassius Dio believed in a degeneration 
of φύσις in the Late Republic as a result of increased wealth and security, because like 
Thucydides he regarded φύσις as constant. While Hose is surely right to account for Dio’s 
often-attested admiration for that historian,
5
 this argument seems somewhat circular. He 
suggests that Dio could not have adopted one view of human nature on the premise that he 
adopted another. But that premise itself is not evidenced. The fact alone that Dio admired 
Thucydides does not prove that he endorsed his interpretation of a fixed and unaltering 
human nature, particularly in contrast to other Roman historians of the period such as 
Sallust and Livy. Moreover, Rees has recently written that from his narrative of the 
Corcyrean crisis it is legitimate to ask whether Thucydides did not believe that aspects of 
φύσις could alter or emerge according to political developments in any case.6  
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In fact, Rees’ recent suggestion strikes me as the most plausible. He argues that ‘Dio 
believed that the moral decline and imperial augmentation of Rome caused an acceleration 
in the problems inherent in Republican politics, caused by human nature…constitutional 
change could affect human nature, either suppressing its worst elements or exaggerating 
and altering its effects’.7 According to this argument, Cassius Dio conceived of moral 
problems that were always inherent and dormant in φύσις, but which could be made to 
manifest themselves, or indeed to disappear, according to circumstances. This is attractive, 
and it is moreover suggested by Tacitus. Tacitus writes of an ‘ancient and inherent’ desire 
for power among mortal men, which exploded with the growth of the empire (vetus ac iam 
pridem insita mortalibus potentiae cupido cum imperii magnitudine adolevit erupitque). 
This explosion of immorality furthermore occurred when the world had been subdued and 
rival nations defeated (ubi subacto orbe et aemulis urbibus regibusve excisis). From that 
security, civic fragmentation and ultimately civil war emerged (modo turbulenti tribuni, 
modo consules praevalidi, et in urbe ac foro temptamenta civilium bellorum).
8
 In this 
chapter, then, I will accept with Rees that Dio took a Tacitean view of human nature, in 
which particular vices are vetus ac insita mortalibus; and that these only manifested 
themselves when the enlargement of the empire gave individual dynasts greater 
opportunities for satisfying their φιλοτιμία, πλεονεξία, and ἐπιθυμία.  
 
In the next section I show that Cassius Dio presented these vices as rampant in the newly-
enlarged empire, and used his speeches in a novel way: to explore the effect of this 
corruption upon political oratory and thus upon the Republican constitution. But it will first 
be worthwhile to define some of these terms and assess their centrality to the historian’s 
conception of φύσις. I have already discussed φθóνος in the previous chapter. Although the 
historian believed, in connection with Romulus and Remus, that man is by nature 
predisposed to envy and scorn those who are equal to him and yet seek to surpass him,
9
 Dio 
nevertheless saw φθóνος as a problem of the Late Republic above all and as the inevitable 
result of a δημοκρατία based upon equality.10 This vice in human φύσις, then, could clearly 
manifest itself differently or to a greater extent in the historian’s interpretation depending 
upon external factors, even if the vice itself was inherent. All φθóνος required, Dio 
suggests, was the catalyst – here theoretical equality and the resultant competition. In the 
next chapter I will show that the imposition of Augustus’ benevolent and virtuous rule 
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precipitated the disappearance of negative φθóνος from political life in the Roman History. 
This inherent vice, then, both manifested itself and then receded according to the political 
circumstances.
11
  
 
The jealous begrudging of another’s success was not, of course, the only ethical flaw 
pronounced especially in Dio’s late res publica. Most commonplace of all in narratives of 
the decline of the Republic was πλεονεξία, and this accordingly takes a central position in 
Dio’s vitation of Republican imperialism. Although the Regal and Mid-Republican 
accounts are fragmentary, as I remarked in my discussion of φθóνος in the previous 
chapter, πλεονεξία occurs only twice in the surviving material of that period. 12  But it 
appears seventeen times in the Late Republic,
13
 and only once in the twenty-five books 
which succeed the Augustan era. The grasping desire to acquire more – πλεονεξία – was 
thus fundamental to the moral character of the first century BCE in Dio’s view.14 The 
historian often expresses in gnomic language that πλεονεξία is inherent in human nature. In 
his account of Mithridates’ and Tigranes’ attempts to induce Arsaces of Parthia to join their 
alliance and declare war on Rome, he writes that the kings warned Arsaces to strike before 
the Romans should secure the opportunity: ‘for every victorious force, by nature (φύσει), is 
insatiable for success, and sets no limit to its greed (μηδένα ὅρον τῆς πλεονεξίας 
ποιεῖσθαι).’15 Similarly, in the later speech of Cicero on the Amnesty, Dio has his orator 
declare that limitless greed and arrogance is the natural result of good fortune (τό τε γὰρ 
εὐτυχῆσαν ὕβρει τε πλεονάζει καὶ οὐδένα ὅρον τῆς πλεονεξίας ποιεῖται).16 M. Antonius, 
moreover, was greedy by his very nature in the historian’s view and was accordingly 
detested by Brutus (ὑπ᾽ ἐμφύτου πλεονεξίας ὁρῶν ὄντα, οὐχ ὑπεῖξεν αὐτῷ).17 Cassius Dio 
therefore appears to have viewed πλεονεξία as a vice insita mortalibus, but especially acute 
in the first century BCE. 
 
Ambition, too, was a problem. As Rees has observed, φιλοτιμία was not a universally 
negative notion, particularly among Dio’s recent predecessors of the Greek poleis such as 
Plutarch and Dio of Prusa.
18
 In these authors it could signify competition among local elites 
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to surpass one another in their euergetism toward the polis and thus to acquire individual 
prestige by way of serving the community. Dio clearly recognised this positive form of 
φιλοτιμία: he has both his Catulus and Agrippa assert in their ‘defences’ of δημοκρατία that 
entrusting power into the hands of many, rather than one man alone (here Pompeius qua 
commander and Octavian qua monarch), will lead men to vie and compete with one 
another not to further their own interests, but to magnify the Republic (ἀλλ᾽ ὅσῳ ἂν πλείους 
καὶ πλουτῶσι καὶ ἀνδρίζωνται, τόσῳ μᾶλλον αὐτοί τε φιλοτιμοῦνται καὶ τὴν πόλιν 
αὔξουσι).19  In this way, φιλοτιμία could serve the community at large rather than the 
individual. But it is striking that, as I detailed in the previous chapter, this positive form of 
φιλοτιμία occurs only in the speeches of Catulus and Agrippa in Dio’s Late Republic:20 that 
is, in two idealisations of a fantasy res publica which no longer exists and which fail to 
persuade the audience. These, indeed, merely serve to illustrate by contrast the proliferation 
of destructive ambition in the Late Republic, which Dio’s Maecenas twice states is 
germane to δημοκρατίαι.21 
 
For ambition in Dio’s account of the first century BCE is an overwelmingly negative force, 
and Catulus’ and Agrippa’s lone daydreams merely emphasise that truth. There is, first, 
Dio’s clearly-expressed view that envy emerges naturally (ἐγγενέσθαι) from φιλοτιμία and 
indeed inevitably under a δημοκρατία – and this φθóνος killed Caesar and threw the state 
into turmoil and civil war once again.
22
 Earlier, the historian writes that Tiberius 
Gracchus’s φύσις, among other external factors, only led him all the more readily into 
ambition (καὶ φύσει ἀξίᾳ αὐτοῦ χρώμενος, τά τε τῆς παιδείας ἔργα ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα 
ἀσκήσας, καὶ φρόνημα μέγα ἔχων…μᾶλλον ἔς τε φιλοτιμίαν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν προήχθη).23 Dio’s 
assessment of his younger brother Gaius is quite similar. The former tribune had been led 
both away from and as a result of his natural excellence onto the path of ambition (ἐκεῖνος 
μὲν ἀπ   ̣̣̔̓ ἀρετῆς ἐς φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐς κακία ἐξώκειλεν), whereas this Gaius pursued 
that path simply by his nature and his nature alone (οὗτος δὲ ταραχώδης τε φύσει).24 I have 
already outlined in Chapter 3 that Cassius Dio interpreted Caesar’s campaign against 
Ariovistus as a quest to satisfy his own φιλοτιμία and placed this accusation into the mouth 
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of his soldiers,
25
 and will discuss this in more detail in the following two sections. So too 
with Dio’s interpretation of Pompeius’ manoeuvres to secure the lex Gabinia: he was 
spurred on to grasp after further power ὑπό τε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φιλοτιμίας, but this was merely in 
accordance with his natural practice in the historian’s view.26 Like πλεονεξία, then, Cassius 
Dio viewed φιλοτιμία as an aspect of human φύσις which was quite inherent but which 
could be exacerbated by external factors, such as the character of the constitution – 
δημοκρατία, to which Dio writes explicitly that φιλοτιμία was germane – or increased 
opportunities for exercising it.  
 
Then, finally, there is covetousness and desire in general (ἐπιθυμία). Quoting a 
programmatic passage of Dio, Rees has very deftly written that the historian ‘sees ἐπιθυμία 
as an integral, if corrupt, part of human nature, but believes that it can be sublimated’.27 He 
quotes an important passage on the reconciliation of the third king of Rome, Tullus 
Hostilius, and the Alban dictator Mettius Fufetius, which I translate here: 
 
And so because of these things they each gave up that quarrel; but they disputed 
instead about the leadership. For they saw that it is impossible for two peoples 
to form an alliance on a basis of equal sovereignty, because of the inherent 
desire of men to compete with their equals and to desire to rule others (ἐκ 
τῆς ἐμφύτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρός τε τὸ ὅμοιον φιλονεικίας καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν 
ἑτέρων ἐπιθυμίας).28  
 
There are obvious similarities here with Cassius Dio’s conception of the character of 
δημοκρατίαι: the historian believed that any system  theoretically founded on equality, be 
that between citizens competing for distinction or equal allies ever seeking to be the 
stronger, would generate strife. As Rees has convincingly written, the historian did believe 
that such ἐπιθυμία could be controlled and made into a positive force.29 
 
But this is not my interest here. Rather, I am concerned with how Dio believed this 
inherent aspect of φύσις could manifest itself or become more pronounced according to the 
circumstances, particularly within the context of a large and wealthy Republican empire. In 
the second section of Chapter 5, I explored how Dio used his speeches to develop a 
problematisation of the Republican system of distributing power. I have suggested that he 
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argues, through his speeches of Catulus and Agrippa, that imperii consuetudo became a 
fundamental problem in the Late Republic: individual commanders were too heavily 
relied-upon for exigencies abroad in lieu of a useless dictatorship, and developed a taste for 
their own control. The desire of individuals for δυναστεία, therefore, emerged directly 
from the organisation of power within the empire, and the empire helped them on the way 
to that goal. In that context, it is striking that Dio so often presents δυναστεία as the object 
of ἐπιθυμία in the Late Republic. As Kuhn-Chen has shown, Dio explicitly states that a 
number of individual dynasts – including Pompeius, Caesar, Octavian, Antonius, and less 
importantly Brutus, Cassius, and Cicero – were driven by their own ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἄρχειν.30 
As I show in the next section, ἐπιθυμία could additionally serve as grounds for declaring 
war: Dio presents Caesar’s manoeuvres deliberately to provoke the Herminians and then 
Ariovistus into war as precipitated by his own ἐπιθυμία for further power. Covetous desire 
can additionally be cognate with πλεονεξία in Dio’s history of the Late Republic.31In the 
historian’s interpretation, Marius proscribed leading citizens in his consulship ‘because of 
his desire for their money’ (ἐπιθυμίᾳ χρημάτων);32 Sulla killed ‘some because of envy, and 
others because of money’ (τοὺς μὲν φθόνῳ, τοὺς δὲ διὰ τὰ χρήματα); 33  and the 
proscriptions undertaken by Antonius, Octavian, and Lepidus were each equally driven to 
act ‘according to his own ἐπιθυμία and his private advantage’ (οἷα γὰρ οὐχ ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς 
ἀλλὰ τριῶν πρός τε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἑκάστου καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον πάντα 
ποιούντων).34 In Dio’s history of the Late Republic, then, covetous desire is an especially 
manifold and destructive vice which, though always inherent in human nature (ἐμφύτου 
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις), proliferated in a manner commensurate with the increased opportunities 
to satisfy it through war and civil strife in the Late Republic.  
 
Фιλοτιμία, πλεονεξία, and ἐπιθυμία therefore seem to me quite integral to Cassius Dio’s 
conception of φύσις. These had occurred in the earlier sections of the Roman History, 
certainly, as aspects of human nature which in the historian’s view were ever-present. But, 
just as φθóνος, these negative manifestations of the human condition appear markedly 
more pronounced in Dio’s account of the Late Republic. It is difficult to escape the 
conclusion, with Rees, that Cassius Dio took a Tacitean conception of φύσις which 
understood that particular vices, vetus ac insita mortalibus, resurfaced or receded 
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according to the application of external stimuli. These vices, I go on to show briefly in the 
next section, are presented by Dio as rife within the theatre of Late Republican imperialism 
above all, where opportunities for glory through war and enrichment through subjugation 
were plentiful. In Dio’s interpretation, this in turn generated a corruption of deliberation on 
foreign policy at home, enabling individual dynasts to convince Senate, people, and 
soldiery to continue to allow them to exercise their φιλοτιμία, πλεονεξία, and ἐπιθυμία 
within the empire. But that latter point is for section three, where we will again see the 
fundamental importance of the speeches within Cassius Dio’s explanation of the collapse 
of the Republic. It will be helpful to first give an overview of Dio’s presentation of Late 
Republican imperialism as a lens for shortly analysing the speeches. 
Dio and Late Republican Imperialism 
My intention here is not to give in this short space a comprehensive overview of the study 
of Roman foreign policy or of Dio’s place within that field. This would be a worthy thesis 
in itself. Nor is it my intention to argue that Cassius Dio’s hostile narrative of Roman 
military activity in the first century BCE is distinctive among our sources in and of itself – 
that is, without the speeches as a medium of explanation. For one, I have already 
recognised his debt to Sallust and Tacitus. However, two points do seem of interest here 
and point to the historian’s originality of thought: his characterisation, first, of Republican 
imperialism as a form of slavery, striking from the Roman perspective; and second, his 
deliberate subversion of and attack upon the Thucydidean-Carneadic theory of ‘defensive 
imperialism’ through the speech of Caesar at Vesontio.35 I will discuss here the three 
φύσις-themes of φιλοτιμία, πλεονεξία, and ἐπιθυμία; and Dio’s presentation of Late 
Republican foreign policy as δουλεία. To ‘defensive imperialism’ I turn in the discussion 
of Caesar’s exhortation at Vesontio in section three. My intention above all is to locate a 
narrative of first-century military activity in Dio which the speeches are transparently and 
deliberately made to contradict, and to sketch out Dio’s distinctiveness in using his 
speeches in this way to implicate imperialism in the collapse of the Republic. If points 
emerge at which the narrative presentation itself of Late Republican foreign policy appears 
striking or distinctive, however, then that is a further welcome development.  
 
I turn to πλεονεξία first. I have already noted the assertion of Roman greed which Dio 
places into the mouth of Mithridates and Tigranes as grounds to encourage Arsaces of 
                                                          
35
 I briefly review the literature on ‘defensive imperialism’ in the next section (‘Degenerative Debate’), as an 
overview will serve no purpose here.   
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Parthia to enter their war: ‘for every victorious force is by nature insatiable for success and 
sets no limit to its greed, and the Romans, having already conquered many indeed, would 
not then choose to leave Parthia be’ (μηδένα ὅρον τῆς πλεονεξίας ποιεῖσθαι).36 While 
these, clearly, are the arguments that the historian imagined Mithridates and Tigranes 
might proffer, it is striking that he presents the two kings on the defensive here against 
Roman πλεονεξία and encouraging Arsaces also to act defensively, pre-empting a Roman 
attack to protect his borders. Dio is perhaps more hostile to Rome here than other sources. 
Appian suggests that Mithridates had long been preparing for the conflict and was by no 
means on the defensive.
37
 Cicero additionally presents Mithridates as an aggressive 
expansionist in the De Imperio,
38
 although his testimony is unreliable given his immediate 
political objective of magnifying the scale of the Mithridatic problem to justify further 
commands for Pompeius.  
 
There was of course nothing new, and in this episode specifically, in Dio attacking Roman 
πλεονεξία from the enemy perspective: consider the letter of Mithridates in Sallust.39  
Nevertheless, this moment in Dio begins a sustained and consistent attack on the πλεονεξία 
of Late Republican imperialism which will persist throughout his narrative up to Augustus’ 
reign. Shortly afterward, Dio records that Lucullus rejected the propraetorship of Sardinia 
out of scorn for the endemic corruption among Roman provincial governors in general 
(μισήσας τὸ πρᾶγμα διὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς τοὺς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι δρῶντας).40 We do 
not hear of Lucullus’ hatred for the corrupt actions of Roman generals ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι 
elsewhere, and it is legimitate to believe that this embedded focalisation is Dio’s own 
reflection upon a more general problem. Certainly it does not apply only to Sardinia, but to 
the provinciae more broadly and the  πολλοὺς who governed them in their own interest. 
The historian presents Late Republican imperialism as similarly pleonectic in his 
assessment of the sufferings of the Cretans at the hands of Metellus: ‘in addition to many 
other injuries’, Dio writes, Metellus took Eleuthera by treachery and then extorted money 
from the inhabitants (ἄλλοις τε οὖν πολλοῖς ἐκεῖνος ἐλυμήνατο, καὶ Ἐλευθέραν τὴν πόλιν 
ἐκ προδοσίας ἑλὼν ἠργυρολόγησε).41 
                                                          
36
 Cass. Dio. 36.1.2.  
37
 App. Mith. 68-69. However, consider also that Appian suggests that Rome deliberately provoked the war by 
encouraging Nicomedes IV of Bithynia to launch an unprovoked attack upon Mithridates in 89 BCE, narrated 
in App. Mith. 11-14 and discussed also in Sherwin-White (1984) 108-120. Here Appian and Sallust Hist. 
4.67.9 agree. On Appian’s sources for this incident cf. Kallet-Marx (1995) 250-254. 
38
 Cic. Man. 4. 
39
 Sall. Hist. 4.67.  
40
 Cass. Dio. 36.41.1. 
41
 Cass. Dio. 36.18.2. 
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Dio’s account of Crassus’ proconsulship and quinquennium in the east from 54 BCE 
unfolds similarly. Crassus, he writes, wanted to achieve something which would bring him 
financial gain along with military glory (δόξης τε ἅμα καὶ κέρδους ἐχόμενον πρᾶξαι). But 
finding his own proconsular province of Syria deficient in booty (μηδὲν ἐν τῇ Συρίᾳ 
τοιοῦτό τι εἶδεν), he began a long, and ultimately quite fruitless, engagement with Parthia: 
‘he had no complaint to bring against them; but he had heard that they were extremely 
wealthy (παμπλουσίους) and that Orodes would be easy to capture’. 42  This hostile 
interpretation of Crassus’ Parthian campaign seems to me naturally coloured by two 
factors. Firstly, Dio’s belief that this action represented the beginning of centuries of 
hostility between Rome and Parthia,
43
 which were still in train in Dio’s own time and 
which the historian viewed as a fruitless waste of effort and resources.
44
 And secondly, 
Plutarch’s own presentation of Crassus, who writes that the general got the greater part of 
his wealth from warfare, making his profit from the miseries of the state.
45
 Crassus, like 
Merellus, is nevertheless a further example of Cassius Dio’s clear belief in the prominent 
role played by πλεονεξία in the Republican empire.  
 
There was then the Egyptian débacle of 58-53 BCE, a further elaboration of the greed 
inherent in Roman foreign policy in this period. Following the deposed Ptolemy XII’s 
flight to Rome, Dio describes Ptolemy’s ability to corrupt the Senate at some length: his 
money was so effective (τοῖς χρήμασι κατεκράτει) that his often successful attempts to 
assassinate his political opponents went unmentioned in the Senate, and those within that 
body who worked most assiduously to restore him to this throne were those who had been 
paid the most. When Ptolemy had the leader of an Alexandrian embassy hostile to him 
assassinated too, he remained in favour through an alliance with Pompeius.
46
 At this point 
the historian transitions to an account of the omens seen within the urbs that year and links 
these explicitly to senatorial corruption: ‘and so while mortals undertook these affairs 
under the influence of money (ὑπὸ τῶν χρημάτων), the deity at the very beginning of the 
year struck the statue of Jupiter Albanus with thunder, and so delayed the restoration of 
Ptolemy for a while’.47 Dio thus implicates the corruption of foreign policy by πλεονεξία in 
the manifestation of divine disfavour in the city.  
                                                          
42
 Cass. Dio. 40.12.1. 
43
 Cass. Dio. 40.14.1. 
44
 Cass. Dio. 75[74].3.2-3. 
45
 Plu. Crass. 2.3. 
46
 Cass. Dio. 39.12-14. 
47
 Cass. Dio. 39.15.1. 
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In that context, the historian’s comments on A. Gabinius – the tribune of the lex Gabinia 
who Cassius Dio believed was a κάκιστος ἀνήρ – are equally symbolic of his view of Late 
Republican foreign policy. During his proconsulship in Syria, like Crassus, Gabinius had 
been eagerly extorting the local population (πολλὰ μὲν καὶ τὴν Συρίαν ἐκάκωσεν), but 
again like Crassus was dissatisfied with the minimal profit to be gained from harrying this 
particular province (πάντα δὲ δὴ τὰ αὐτόθεν λήμματα ἐλάχιστα εἶναι νομίσας). Initially, 
Dio writes, he too planned an invasion of Parthia to gain their wealth for himself (τόν τε 
πλοῦτον αὐτῶν στρατεύσων).48 However, distracted from this pleonectic venture by a large 
bribe from Ptolemy, he invaded Egypt in contravention of provincial law and the Sibylline 
books, and restored Ptolemy to his throne.
49
 Again, Dio records that this infiltration of  
πλεονεξία had far-reaching political consequences at Rome: after recounting several 
unfavourable omens, Dio writes that ‘the Romans were distressed at these, and expected 
that worse ones still would occur because of the anger of the gods at the restoration of 
Ptolemy’.50 
 
There are of course numerous other examples. M. Antonius during his governorship of 
Macedonia ‘inflicted many injuries upon the subject nations and even upon territories 
allied to Rome…ravaging the possessions of the Dardanians and their neighbours’ .51 The 
historian Sallust, in Dio’s view, was entrusted by Caesar with the province of Numidia 
‘ostensibly to manage, but in reality to harry and plunder’ (λόγῳ μὲν ἄρχειν ἔργῳ δὲ ἄγειν 
τε καὶ φέρειν ἐπέτρεψεν), and during this time took many bribes and confiscated the 
inhabitants’ property (ἀμέλει καὶ ἐδωροδόκησε πολλὰ καὶ ἥρπασεν). Dio’s criticism of 
Sallust’s hypocrisy in this regard is especially satisfying: ‘after writing such treatises as he 
had, and making many bitter remarks about those who fleeced others, he did not practice 
what he preached. Therefore, even if he was completely exonerated by Caesar, yet in his 
history, as upon a tablet, the man himself has chiselled his own condemnation all too 
well.’52  
 
Cassius Dio’s is therefore a consistent, albeit conventional, presentation of πλεονεξία in 
Late Republican foreign policy. The relationship he constructs between the greed rampant 
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 Cass. Dio. 39.56.1. 
49
 Cass. Dio. 39.56.4-6. 
50
 Cass. Dio. 39.61.3-4. 
51
 Cass. Dio. 38.10.1. 
52
 Cass. Dio. 43.9.2-3. Cary’s 1914-1927 LCL translation. For an evaluation of this passage and the evidence for 
Sallust’s corruption cf. Barr (2012) 58-63.  However, cf. Syme (1964) 34, who observes that corruption 
charges were a convenient means of removing political opponents from power and may often have been 
false. 
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in the Egyptian débacle and the manifestation of divine anger in the form of omens in the 
urbs is neat; and I see no reason not to accept that Dio believed that πλεονεξία may indeed 
have been the cause of inauspicious portents, heralding disaster for the state. More 
important for our purposes, however, is the narrative backdrop of endemic πλεονεξία on 
the part of individual commanders, onto which Dio will later superimpose his orations of 
the ‘enemies’ of the Republic: Pompeius, Gabinius, Caesar, and Antonius. It is telling that 
πλεονεξία, as a negative and inherent aspect of human φύσις in the historian’s view, is 
most frequently exercised within the theatre of the provinces. Dio’s implicit argument is 
that the breadth of the empire offered many new routes to satisfying individual greed, thus 
awakening the πλεονεξία which was vetus ac insita mortalibus. It is also telling that the 
period covered in Books 36-40, from which I have drawn the examples here,  is the same 
period in which four of these five speeches fall.  The contrasts between the improbity of 
the narrative and the idealised, patriotic imperialism of these mendacious speeches will be 
fresh in the reader’s mind.  
 
The historian presents covetous desire or ἐπιθυμία as equally widespread within the 
empire. To return briefly to Crassus’ campaign against Parthia, Dio writes that it was not 
only financial gain that the general desired, but glory (Κράσσος ἐπιθυμήσας τι καὶ αὐτὸς 
δόξης τε ἅμα καὶ κέρδους ἐχόμενον πρᾶξαι),53 and of ἐπιθυμία of this type there are many 
examples. Dio’s interpretation of Caesar’s motivation for provoking the inhabitants of the 
Herminian Mountains into war, during his proconsulship in Lusitania in 58 BCE, is highly 
similar. He writes that Caesar ignored the problem of banditry which was plaguing the 
province, and  instead wished to use his position as a stepping-stone to the consulship 
through δόξα: ‘he desired glory (δόξης τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶν), emulating Pompeius and others 
before him…in fact, he hoped, if he should accomplish something here, to be chosen 
consul immediately’.54 Accordingly, in Dio’s assessment Caesar ordered the inhabitants of 
the Herminian Mountains to move into the plain, giving as his pretext (πρόφασιν) the need 
to prevent further banditry,  but in truth knowing that they would disobey and thus give 
him grounds for war (κἀκ τούτου πολέμου τινὰ ἀφορμὴν λήψεται).55 After crushing them, 
Dio writes, Caesar believed he had achieved enough for the consulship and left his 
province to canvass for the office even before his successor had arrived.
56
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 Cass. Dio. 40.12.1. 
54
 Cass. Dio. 37.52.1-2. 
55
 Cass. Dio. 37.52.3.  
56
 Cass. Dio. 37.54.1: πράξας δὲ ταῦτα καὶ νομίσας ἱκανὴν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐπιβασίαν πρὸς τὴν ὑπατείαν εἰληφέναι 
σπουδῇ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας, καὶ πρὶν τὸν διάδοχον ἐλθεῖν, ὥρμησε. 
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Dio’s presentation of Caesar’s deliberate provocation of Ariovistus, the king of the Suebi, 
into war is almost identical. He writes that the Sequani and Aedui perceived the general’s 
ἐπιθυμία for another war (τήν τε ἐπιθυμίαν αὐτοῦ ἰδόντες), and accordingly offered him an 
excuse to war with Ariovistus as a ‘favour’ (εὐεργεσία). Caesar, in turn, was not concerned 
for the king’s allied status, and indeed thought nothing of it in comparison with the δόξα to 
be got from a further victory, provided that he could provoke Ariovistus and thus secure a 
plausible pretext (πρὸς δὲ δὴ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἰσχὺν οὐδὲν 
τούτων ἐφρόντισε, πλὴν καθ᾽ ὅσον παρὰ τοῦ βαρβάρου πρόφασιν).57 Dio’s focus is again 
on Caesar’s ἐπιθυμία τὴς δόξης.  
 
In accordance with Dio’s interest in the effect of the corruption inherent in φύσις upon 
Late Republican foreign policy – and, in turn, upon public debate on that policy, as we 
shall soon see – the historian seems here to concentrate on the moral aspect, on ἐπιθυμία, 
rather than on the legal problems. Dio has little to say about Caesar’s legal position in 
crossing the Rhine and thus campaigning beyond the borders of his province of Gaul in 58 
BCE. Clearly he recognised the issue: he writes that the mutiny at Vesontio occurred 
because ‘all the soldiers were saying that they had no business with this war and that it had 
not been decreed (προσήκοντα οὔτε ἐψηφισμένον), but was merely being fought because 
of Caesar’s private ambition (διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν τοῦ Καίσαρος φιλοτιμίαν)’.58 He is, moreover, 
fully aware that Gabinius’ incursion into Egypt in 55 BCE was forbidden by law: provincial 
governors, he writes, were forbidden from leaving their province or declaring war outwith 
its boundaries.
59
 But he chooses to emphasise the φύσις aspect, of ἐπιθυμία. Certainly 
Caesar attempted to justify his attack on Ariovistus by this latter route, invoking a 
senatorial decree from 61 BCE which stipulated that quicumque Galliam provinciam 
obtineret…Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet.60 Caesar thus presented 
his attack on Ariovistus, ostensibly in defence of the Aedui (Haeduos), as a legitimate 
action.
61
 The lex Vatinia certainly gave Caesar a quinquennium over Cisalpine Gaul and 
Illyricum, to which a further senatorial decree added Narbonensian Gaul; and the terms of 
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 Cass. Dio. 38. 34.1-3.  Consider also Suet. Jul. 24.3. 
58
 Cass. Dio. 38.35.2. The exceptionality of the detail has been noted by Hagendahl (1944) 26: ‘Dio is the only 
classical author who gives the remarkable piece of information that Caesar within his own army had been 
accused of starting a war on his own with no authority from the senate and the general assembly’. This detail, 
however, is already in Caesar’s account of the mutiny, as Gabba (1955) 301 has noted, at BG 1.40: primum 
quod aut quam in partem, aut quo consilio ducerentur, sibi quaerendum aut cogitandum putarent. Dio could 
easily have found it there. 
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 Cass. Dio. 39.56.4. 
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 Caes. BC. 1.35.4.  
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 On which cf. Hagendahl (1944) 12: ‘this is the only place…where Caesar tries to corroborate the justness of a 
warlike undertaking by a reference to powers granted to him…Caesar had no other legal justification for his 
undertaking than the decree of the Senate three years earlier’. 
210 
 
 
all were extended by the lex Trebonia of 55 BCE.
62
 Tentatively, I am inclined to suggest 
that Dio chose to explore the problem of ἐπιθυμία in this instance, rather than the legal 
issues, not because he did not understand them; his own comments suggest he probably 
did. Rather, Dio treated the occasion as a further iteration of the destructive effect of an 
aspect of human φύσις upon foreign policy in the Late Republic because that is simply 
what he saw as the important issue. This, of course, will come to be elaborated in the 
speech of Caesar, which I analyse in the next section. 
 
Other examples of ἐπιθυμία being satisfied within the empire are of course legion. One 
may consider Metellus’ attack upon Crete, whose motive in Dio’s interpretation was a 
‘desire for δυναστεία’ (δυναστείας τε ἐρῶν);63  like Caesar, he wished to use military 
success as the springboard to his own political cachet at home. Pompeius, in seeking after 
his controversial pirate command over the Mediterranean, thoroughly desired the 
extraordinary honour of the lex Gabinia (ὁ Πομπήιος ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πάνυ ἄρξαι); and in 
Dio’s reconstruction he pretended more than ever in this instance not to desire what he 
truly wanted (ἦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ὡς ἥκιστα προσποιούμενος ἐπιθυμεῖν ὧν ἤθελε: τότε 
δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον). His aim, above all, was to secure glory (τὸ εὐκλεὲς) by appearing forced to 
accept his truest desire.
64
 Equally, Dio presents Caesar’s first expedition to Britain in 55 
BCE in a similar light. He writes that he was particularly eager to cross over to the island 
(ἐπεθύμησε διαβῆναι), since opportunities for war - and thus further δόξα – were less 
abundant now that Gaul had been pacified.
65
 The historian writes that very little was 
achieved, and Caesar sailed back to the continent. But his ἐπιθυμία τὴς δόξης had been 
fulfilled, all the same: 
 
So he sailed back to the mainland and put an end to the disturbances. From 
Britain he had won nothing for himself or for the state except the glory of 
having conducted an expedition against its inhabitants (τοῦ ἐστρατευκέναι ἐπ᾽ 
αὐτοὺς δόξα).; but on this he prided himself greatly and the Romans at home 
likewise magnified it to a remarkable degree (οἱ οἴκοι Ῥωμαῖοι θαυμαστῶς 
ἐμεγαλύνοντο).66 
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 For the legal question cf. Hagendahl (1944); Ramage (2001); Also Mommsen (1874)
3 1088: ‘wenn ein mit 
Rom befreundeter Staat gegen einen anderen mit Rom nicht im Bundniss stehenden dessen Hilfeleistung 
erbittet, so bedarf der Feldherr…der Autorisation des Senats.’ 
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 ἔρως and ἐπιθυμία seem synonymous in this case.  
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 Cass. Dio. 36.24.5.  
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 Cass. Dio. 39.51.1. 
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 Cass. Dio. 39.53.1.  
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So ἐπιθυμία, both for wealth and glory through military conquest, seem to me fundamental 
hallmarks of Dio’s illustration of imperial policy in the Late Republic. The inference to be 
drawn from the prominence of covetous desire, especially as a motivating factor in the 
selfish actions of individual dynasts within the provinciae, seems to me quite implicit. The 
enlarged physical space of the empire – Spain, Gaul, Britain, Syria and Parthia, Egypt – 
created also a moral space in which ἐπιθυμία, like πλεονεξία, could be exercised. These 
vices, certainly, were inherent aspects of human φύσις which lay dormant; but the 
proliferation in opportunities to satisfy these led naturally, in Dio’s view, to a proliferation 
of occasions on  which precisely that happened. ἐπιθυμία τὴς δόξης, in particular, occurs 
almost universally in connection with military activity. Commanders, such as Crassus, 
Pompeius, and Caesar are driven to campaign, often illegally or unconstitutionally, because 
of their desire to use conquest as a stepping-stone to δόξα and thus political power, as with 
Caesar’s unjust campaign against the Herminians. Once again, all of these examples of 
ἐπιθυμία are drawn from Books 36-40, throughout which the four speeches of Pompeius, 
Gabinius, and Caesar are interwoven. They are an exceptionally negative narrative 
backdrop before which to place these speeches on foreign policy.  
 
Finally, I close this section with some further words on φιλοτιμία and on Dio’s 
presentation of Republican imperialism as a form of δουλεία. Rees has described φιλοτιμία 
as ‘the dominant and most destructive vice in Dio’s history’,67 and it is fully embedded 
within the historian’s presentation of Late Republican military activity. There is, first, 
Dio’s necrology of Scipio Africanus, who through his military career ‘indulged his 
ambition more than was fitting or compatible with his virtue in general’ (Σκιπίων ὁ 
Ἀφρικανὸς φιλοτιμίᾳ πλείονι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον τό τε ἁρμόζον).68 Pompeius’ attempts to 
secure the extraordinary powers of the lex Gabinia – which as I have discused in earlier 
chapters had grave political consequences of their own in the historian’s view – was 
generated not only by his ἐπιθυμία for τὸ εὐκλεὲς, but ‘certainly by his own ambition’ (γε 
ὑπό τε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φιλοτιμίας) in Dio’s evaluation.69 One can equally recapitulate here on 
Caesar’s campaign against Ariovistus. In addition to being a further extension in the 
historian’s interpretation of the general’s ἐπιθυμία τὴς δόξης, it also seems to me clear that 
the embedded focalisation Dio places into the mouth of Caesar’s mutinying troops is very 
much the historian’s own: ‘all the soldiers were saying that they had no business with this 
war and that it had not been decreed (προσήκοντα οὔτε ἐψηφισμένον), but was merely 
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212 
 
 
being fought because of Caesar’s private ambition (διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν τοῦ Καίσαρος 
φιλοτιμίαν)’.70 I have suggested that Dio may have found the legal detail – the suggestion 
that the campaign into Germania had been neither voted nor approved by the Senate 
(ἐψηφισμένον) - in the BG itself. 71  But these comments on Caesar’s φιλοτιμία are 
consistent with Dio’s authorial presentation of the circumstances surrounding the general’s 
calculated hostility to Ariovistus in 58 BCE. It is quite safe to conclude that the historian 
uses this quotation of the soldiers’ objections to articulate his own interpretation of the 
historical factor which drove Caesar on campaign:  φιλοτιμία.  
 
Furthermore, such ambition exercised within the empire clearly engendered hostility 
between Pompeius and Caesar in Dio’s view, particularly regarding each other’s military 
achievements. In his account of the year 56 BCE, Dio writes of Pompeius’ anger at 
Caesar’s overshadowing his own achievements in Gaul:  
 
The fact, however, that Caesar's influence was increasing and the people 
admired his achievements so much (αὐξανόμενος, καὶ ὁ δῆμος τά τε 
κατειργασμένα αὐτῷ θαυμάζων) that they dispatched men from the senate, on 
the supposition that the Gauls had been completely subjugated, and that they 
were so elated by their hopes based on him as to vote him large sums of money, 
was a cruel thorn in Pompey's side. He attempted to persuade the consuls not to 
read Caesar's letters immediately but to conceal the facts as long as possible, 
until the glory of his deeds should win its own way abroad (μέχρις ἂν 
αὐτόματος ἡ δόξα τῶν πραττομένων ἐκνικήσῃ, συγκρύπτειν), and furthermore 
to send some one to relieve him even before the regular time. He was so 
ambitious (τοσαύτῃ γὰρ φιλοτιμίᾳ ἐχρῆτο) that he undertook to disparage and 
undo all that he himself had helped to gain for Caesar, and that he was 
displeased with him both because he was greatly praised and because he 
was overshadowing his own exploits (καὶ ἐκείνῳ τε ἄλλως τε μεγάλως 
ἐπαινουμένῳ  καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ συσκιάζοντι ἄχθεσθαι).72 
 
This passage is revealing. Unquestionably φιλοτιμία was in Dio’s evaluation a negative 
constant of human φύσις which could be satisfied within the theatre of the empire: I have 
just delineated the historian’s comments on Pompeius’ φιλοτιμία and the lex Gabinia, and 
Caesar’s φιλοτιμία in the case of Ariovistus. But such ambition, exercised within the 
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 Cass. Dio. 38.35.2. Cf. Hagendahl (1944) 26: ‘Dio is the only classical author who gives the remarkable piece 
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provinces, clearly manifested itself in the form of aristocratic discord, too. Dio, I have 
already written, viewed envy as the natural result of competition among equals, which must 
inevitably occur in a δημοκρατία. Here Dio sets out plainly the corrosive relationship 
between ambition, satisfied through military activity within the empire, and the fatal rift 
between Pompeius and Caesar. To ensure that we get the point, Dio furthermore mentions 
Caesar’s successes in Gaul – which were precipitated by his own φιλοτιμία – his 
commentarii to the Senate, and Pompeius’ own φιλοτιμία, overshadowed by these recent 
successes.  
 
But such ambition in Dio’s view was simply an innate characteristic of both generals. 
Both, he writes, were spurred on to civil war by their innate ambition and their competition 
to satisfy it (ὅτι τοῦ τε παντὸς κράτους ἀμφότεροι ἐφιέμενοι, καὶ πολλῇ μὲν φιλοτιμίᾳ 
ἐμφύτῳ πολλῇ δὲ καὶ φιλονεικίᾳ ἐπικτήτῳ χρώμενοι).73 Φιλοτιμία was simply an aspect of 
their φύσις in Dio’s view; and this aspect of course meets its fullest gratification within the 
sphere of the empire and military activity abroad.  
 
It seems to me hardly possible to escape the conclusion  that, in Dio’s reconstruction of the 
Late Republic, these three foci of the corruption inherent in human nature - φιλοτιμία, 
πλεονεξία, and ἐπιθυμία – were made possible by, and were exercised predominantly 
within, the augmentation of the empire.  To Dio, imperial expansion was the canvas on 
which to paint the moral turpitude of the Late Republic. Cassius Dio’s was not, of course, 
the only history to illustrate Late Republican imperialism in this way; although Fechner is 
surely right to suggest that Dio’s is the most hostile, brutal account of expansion in the first 
century BCE among our surviving ancient authors.
74
 Perhaps that alone should give us 
pause. But Dio seems to me to have developed turbulence within the city and within the 
Republic at large in relation to military developments abroad. His use of omens in the 
Egyptian crisis, for example, implicates divine anger at the πλεονεξία surrounding Ptolemy 
in the manifestation of that anger in the political sphere, in the urbs.
75
 In a similar fashion, 
Dio manipulates the annalistic structure – transitioning between military matters and then 
domestic matters by citing standard annalistic material, such as omens – to implicate the 
disaster of Crassus’ Parthian campaign, presented in terms of ἐπιθυμία, within the chaos in 
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the city in 53 BCE.
76
 Military and political, as shown in my quotation of Pompeius’ and 
Caesar’s φιλοτιμία in the excerpt above, exert a mutually catastrophic effect. Perhaps this 
is why Cassius Dio explicitly calls Late Republican imperialism a form of δουλεία.77  
 
Cassius Dio presented Late Republican foreign policy in an exceptionally hostile light. It 
was on the one hand the space in which φιλοτιμία, πλεονεξία, and ἐπιθυμία could be 
satisfied and, in consequence, further δυναστεία acquired. On the other hand (and in 
consequence of these vices), it was a form of δουλεία. Imperial expansion brought with it, 
in the historian’s intepretation, a proliferation of those negative dimenstions of φύσις 
which directly enabled individual dynasts to secure further δυναστεία – and thus end the 
Republic – by using it as a field in which to cultivate their ambition, wealth, and longing 
for prestigious glories. The intensity of Dio’s hostility to Late Republican imperialism may 
be grounds to give us pause. But where the historian is more of interest, I think, lies in his 
use of this unfavourable narrative of Republican foreign policy as a backdrop before which 
to place his speeches. Dio deployed these, I argue now, to explore the effect of this 
degenerate imperialism upon political rhetoric at home, and the disastrous consequences of 
this for the res publica.  
Degenerative Debate 
In this third section I turn to the speeches themselves: those of Pompeius and Gabinius 
(36.25-28), Caesar at Vesontio (38.36-46), and Antonius’ laudatio funebris for the dictator 
(44.36-49). All of these reflect upon Late Republican foreign policy; but not in a way that 
necessarily gives a radical re-evaluation of imperialism per se in this period. That is not 
their purpose. Rather, I suggest that against the unfavourable narrative backdrup I outlined 
in the previous section, Dio uses these orations to set out his interpretation of the corrosive 
effect of Late Republican expansion upon political oratory. I argue that through the 
speeches of these four self-interested dynasts, the historian articulates for the reader his 
view that corrupt foreign policies in the Late Republic necessarily generated a corruption 
of debate surrounding those policies. Individual commanders such as Pompeius, Gabinius, 
and Caesar, were able in Dio’s reconstruction to misdirect decision-making by obfuscating 
the true character of their involvement in military matters. As I have elaborated in Chapters 
3 and 5, such deceptive rhetoric is universally effective in Dio’s Republic. In consequence, 
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the imperium Romanum became a space in which power-hungry dynasts continued to 
exercise the immorality inherent in their φύσις unchecked, because the barriers which 
could otherwise impede them – Senate, people, soldiery – were under their control. This, 
naturally, precipitated further δυναστεία and thus the collapse of the Republic.  
 
It will be worthwhile to discuss these in the order in which they appear; that is, in the order 
in which Cassius Dio expected his audience to encounter them. By virtue of their 
succession, and their embeddedness within Dio’s account of immoral imperialism in Books 
36-40, these form a logical unity which culminates in Antonius’ long reflection on the 
character of Republican expansion in his laudatio of Book 44. This latter functions 
particularly as a retrospect on Caesar’s career and on the role of imperialism within the 
collapse of the res publica as a whole, before a further narrative of renewed civil war 
between Antonius and Octavian.  
 
Beginning, then, with Pompeius and Gabinius. Both transparently misrepresent the 
character of Late Republican military activity in order to satisfy the former’s ἐπιθυμία τὴς 
δόξης and φιλοτιμία, and thus secure further δυναστεία. The historian states explicitly 
immediately before the speech that these were Pompeius’ objectives.78  I have already 
discussed, in Chapter 3, the historian’s method of laying bare the true, self-interested 
intentions of the orators in his narrative prefatory comments; amd Dio applies a similar 
authorial frame to the exhortation of Caesar at Vesontio, which I discuss shortly.  
 
The gulf between the actual truth of Pompeius’ involvement in the empire as presented in 
the historical diegesis and the misrepresentation of this in the recusatio imperii is made 
apparent to the reader by the disingenuously patriotic statements contained within it. This 
tone is established from the beginning. In his exordium, Dio’s orator begins by asserting 
that all men, by their very nature, delight in having benefits conferred upon them by their 
fellow-citizens (φύσει τε γὰρ πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἐγκαλλωπίζονται ταῖς παρὰ τῶν 
πολιτῶν εὐεργεσίαις). Continuing in this vein, Dio’s Pompeius repeatedly stresses that he 
is exhausted from a lifetime of devoted service to the state: these have left him wearied 
before his years (μηδ᾽ ὅτι ἔτη τόσα καὶ τόσα γέγονα ἀριθμεῖσθε), and expressions of 
exhaustion recur several times in the short speech (κέκμηκα; κατατέτριμμαι; πεπόνημαι) as 
well as assertions that Pompeius has faced extraordinary dangers for the good of the people 
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(ἐκινδύνευσα; πολλοὺς δὲ κινδύνους).79 To complete this image of selfless devotion to the 
public welfare, Dio’s orator closes by stating that he, surely, cannot be the only general 
who loves the Quirites, and that there must be other competent commanders of comparable 
patriotism (οὐ γάρ που ἐγὼ μόνος ὑμᾶς φιλῶ ἢ καὶ μόνος ἐμπείρως τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔχω).80 
 
Thus far this serves only to demonstrate the speaker’s duplicity: Pompeius was an habitual 
liar and used this effectively, in Dio’s view of the late 60s, to secure further power for 
himself (ἦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ὡς ἥκιστα προσποιούμενος ἐπιθυμεῖν ὧν ἤθελε: τότε δὲ καὶ 
μᾶλλον). 81 . However, two other points seem more of interest here: first, Pompeius’ 
rehearsal of his many campaigns; and second – directly in this connection – the historian’s 
interpretation of the populus’ crazed love for the general. In Chapter 3 I have already noted 
the way in which Dio’s Pompeius reflects upon his engagements in Sicily and Africa 
against the Marians and then in Spain against Sertorius. The historian’s narratives of both 
are lost; but I have argued that it is likely that these engagements were presented as an 
exercise in garnering δυναστεία, as Dio brings this dimension to the fore even in his 
account of Pompeius’ earliest military career. Plutarch, moreover, stresses the lengths to 
which Pompeius went to bully the senate into appointing him commander in the Sertorian 
war.
82
 In an important section of his recusatio, Dio’s orator recounts the direct political 
impact at home of his many military successes abroad: 
 
Do you not recall how many hardships I underwent in the war against Cinna, 
though I was the veriest youth, and how many labours in Sicily and in Africa 
before I had as yet come fully of age, or how many dangers I encountered in 
Spain before I was even a senator? I will not say that you have shown 
yourselves ungrateful toward me for all these labours. How could I? On the 
contrary, in addition to the many other honours of which you have deemed 
me worthy (πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὧν πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων παρ᾽ ὑμῶν 
ἠξιώθην), the very fact that I was entrusted with the command against 
Sertorius, when no one else was either willing or able to undertake it, and that I 
celebrated a triumph, contrary to custom, upon resigning it, brought me the 
greatest honour (τό τε ἐπινίκια καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνῃ παρὰ τὸ νενομισμένον πέμψαι 
μεγίστην μοι τιμὴν ἤνεγκεν).83 
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An historical explanation is being offered here. After listing his successful campaigns in 
this manner, Dio’s Pompeius states that he was accordingly rewarded by the people, and 
indeed in an exceptional fashion: Pompeius’ triumph broke convention (παρὰ τὸ 
νενομισμένον) in that he was merely an eques and so ineligible, and this brought him 
μεγίστη τιμὴ in the historian’s view. Pompeius’ political success in the urbs emerged 
directly from his successes abroad, even where these were motivated purely by the 
fulfilment of his desire for δυναστεία. These campaigns then satisfied the general’s 
ἐπιθυμία τὴς δόξης and φιλοτιμία. 
 
But they additionally made the populus too crazed with enthusiasm to see the grave danger 
that further entrenchment of Pompeius’ power would bring, as Catulus admonishes in vain. 
Immediately before this patriotic rehearsal of his many services to the res publica, Dio’s 
Pompeius states, disingenuously, that ‘I do not think it fitting that you should be so 
insatiable toward me (ἀπλήστως οὕτω πρός με διακεῖσθαι), or that I myself should 
continually be in a position of command.’84 It seems to me revealing that this leads into the 
speaker’s recapitulation of his campaigns abroad and the μεγίστη τιμὴ this had brought 
him, including an extra-legal triumph. Within this sentence, the phrase ἀπλήστως οὕτω 
πρός με διακεῖσθαι is of fundamental importance to the historian’s intepretation of the 
historical situation in 67 BCE and the causal relationship between this situation and 
Pompeius’ earlier campaigns. Dio’s Pompeius, naturally, is being disingenuous in 
encouraging the Quirites not to be insatiable (ἀπλήστως) in their zeal for him. But the fact 
that they were is the historian’s own view. In his narrative preface prior to the recusatio, 
Dio states that Pompeius sought after the command because of the zeal of the people and 
his own ambition (ὑπό τε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φιλοτιμίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ δήμου σπουδῆς).85 The 
speaker’s rehearsal of his many military successes is of course intended within the depicted 
context to exacerbate that zeal. The historian’s interpretation, it seems to me from the 
speech and its surrounding material, is this: although Pompeius’ early career had likely 
been a quest for δυναστεία, the craze of the populace for such successes (ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ 
δήμου σπουδῆς) led them to be instantly predisposed to give him further extraordinary 
powers. Pompeius furthermore emphasises that predisposition (ἀπλήστως). In 
consequence, the general in Dio’s view capitalised on the opportunities offered by this, 
misrepresenting his career as a long endeavour of self-sacrifice for the good of the res 
publica, and thereby satisfying his φιλοτιμία and desire for τὸ εὐκλεὲς even further by 
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securing the lex Gabinia. It was a vicious and destructive cycle. Self-interested expansion 
was artfully misrepresented by selfish leaders, causing the people to make rash decisions 
and ignore genuine patriots, such as Catulus, and in consequence give dynasts even further 
opportunities to satisfy their immorality – and further their δυναστεία – abroad.  
 
Gabinius’ response elaborates this further. Like Pompeius’ recusatio, I have already 
analysed this speech, in Chapters 3 and 5, from the viewpoint of the pervasion of 
mendacious rhetoric and φθόνος in Dio’s Late Republican political culture. But these are 
not its only purposes within his account of the collapse of the Republic. Just as the 
recusatio, Gabinius’ exhortation is a further exploration of the effect of degenerate foreign 
policy upon political rhetoric. This speech begins, like its predecessor, with hypocritical 
patriotic sentiments which Dio again uses to characterise Gabinius as another self-
interested dynast. It is not, the tribune states, the business of a good citizen to have 
ἐπιθυμία, and especially not ἐπιθυμία to rule (οὔτε γὰρ ἄλλως ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἄρχειν 
ἐπιθυμεῖν).86 There is an obvious irony in this: the authorial narrative prior to the speeches 
states that Pompeius was eager for precisely that (ὁ Πομπήιος ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πάνυ ἄρξαι),87 
and I have shown that ἐπιθυμία in Dio’s Late Republic is a vice exercised in and through 
the military sphere in particular. To labour the point, Dio’s Gabinius states that the Quirites 
should choose what is beneficial not to Pompeius, but to the state, and that the 
responsibility of the χρηστὸς καὶ φιλόπολις is to sacrifice himself, if need be, for his 
country – further irony in both respects given the character of the speaker and Dio’s later 
description of his avaricious ventures into Parthia and Egypt.
88
 
 
Gabinius again rehearses Pompeius’ military commands, which Dio believed made the 
populace insatiable in their zeal for him and so led him to greater δυναστεία (τῆς τοῦ 
δήμου σπουδῆς; ἀπλήστως). Like Pompeius, he mentions the general’s success in the 
Sertorian war;
89
 this reiteration serves again to underline the historian’s view that 
misrepresenting such commands as a service for the public good enabled Pompeius to 
secure further power through the people in contione. Within this reflection on the 
commander’s career, Dio’s Gabinius additionally seems to me to appeal to the self-interest 
of the populus at large:  
 
                                                          
86
 Cass. Dio. 36.27.2. 
87
 Cass. Dio. 36.25.5. 
88
 Cass. Dio. 36.27.3-6. On Gabinius’ corruption as a provincial governor see p.207 above.  
89
 Cass. Dio. 36.27.3.  
219 
 
 
Or do you think that this Pompeius, who in his youth was able to make 
campaigns and lead armies, increase your own possessions (τὰ ὑμέτερα αὔξειν), 
protect the possessions of your allies (τὰ τῶν συμμάχων σώζειν), and acquire 
the possessions of those arrayed against us (τά τε τῶν ἀνθισταμένων 
προσκτᾶσθαι), could not now be most useful to you?90 
 
I may be reading too much into Cassius Dio’s construction of this episode to suggest a 
certain irony in this statement: his Gabinius convinces the Quirities to afford Pompeius 
further opportunities to advance his own self-interest - ἐπιθυμία τὴς δόξης and φιλοτιμία – 
by appealing to the self-interest of the people at large.  Again, the near-complete loss of 
Dio’s account of Pompeius’ early career means that we are unable to compare Gabinius’ 
representation here of the general’s movements, which portrays them as a service to the 
state, to the actual ‘truth’ as Dio conceived of it and illustrated it. But if the sole fragment 
which survives of this period is anything to go by, then the historian presented Pompeius’ 
early military life as much as a quest for δυναστεία as the rest of his career would later turn 
out to be.
91
 In this regard, then, both Pompeius’ and Gabinius’ self-presentation of patriotic 
concern for the public good seems to me a deliberate invention of the historian’s own 
devising, to demonstrate the effectiveness of such misrepresentations of military activity as 
a means of misdirecting the fora of debate. Such a misdirection, in the context of 67 BCE, 
of course had political consequences. Satisfying Pompeius’ ambition and lust for glory, the 
honour of the lex subsequently left him at the mercy of the  φθóνος of Metellus and others 
as well as rendering him too exalted and over-confident to defeat Caesar at Pharsalus, both 
of which Dio’s Catulus prognosticates, as I set out in Chapter 5.  
 
But above all, the most interesting point (for the purposes of this chapter) that the historian 
verbalises through the speeches of Pompeius and Gabinius on the lex is his interpretation 
of the attitude of the public toward Pompeius in 67 BCE and the relationship between this 
and his success. By bringing forward the insatiable zeal of the Quirites in the recusatio, 
Dio explains that Pompeius’ military successes were the cause of his μεγίστη τιμὴ, 
including his extra-legal triumph. These left the populace enamoured with him and willing 
to vote him further honours, which would ultimately prove fatal both to him and the res 
publica. By misrepresenting his campaigns as a selfless act of sacrifice for the public good, 
Dio’s Pompeius and Gabinius successfully rendered the people even more crazed with 
admiration. It is highly unlikely, given the false tenor of the orations in general and Dio’s 
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presentation of both speakers as avaricious and power-hungry dynasts within the imperial 
sphere, that these comments on Pompeius’ military activities were anything but a lie in the 
historian’s view.  
 
In Cassius Dio’s evaluation of the lex Gabinia, then, the deliberate falsification of Roman 
imperialism and the consequent misdirection of imperial policy-making led directly to a 
dynast accruing further opportunity to satisfy his ἐπιθυμία and φιλοτιμία within the empire. 
The historian elaborates a similar point, I suggest, in the exhortation of Caesar to his 
mutinying subordinates at Vesontio. In Chapter 3 and in the second section of this chapter 
(‘Dio and Late Republican Imperialism’) I have already delineated Dio’s interpretation of 
the episode. Only a brief recapitulation will be necessary: the Sequani and Aedui, 
perceiving Caesar’s ἐπιθυμία for war with Ariovistus (τήν τε ἐπιθυμίαν αὐτοῦ ἰδόντες), 
happened to give the general precisely the excuse he wanted for conflict. Caesar provoked 
the king of the Suebi deliberately into hostilities, in order to secure a pretext (πρόφασιν τοῦ 
πολέμου) but his troops complained of their leader’s illegality and his φιλοτιμία, 
unquestionably the historian’s own view of the motivations which precipitated the conflict 
(οὔτε ἐψηφισμένον διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν τοῦ Καίσαρος φιλοτιμίαν). 92  The speaker’s implicit 
purpose is naturally to restore order and coerce the mutineers to undertake the campaign 
against Ariovistus. In this Dio’s Caesar is highly successful: obedience in the matter 
followed with little difficulty (καὶ τούς γε στρατιώτας οὐ χαλεπῶς ἔπεισαν πειθαρχῆσαι).93 
 
Several scholars have treated Caesar’s Vesontio-exhortation as a demonstration of the 
historian’s own philosophical view on the nature of expansionism in general and 
appropriate imperial policy. A number of sentiments in the oration seem a priori to 
indicate the historian’s acceptance of a ‘defensive’ philosophy of imperialism: that is, the 
belief that a state should not seek economic benefits from expansion nor should engage in 
warfare for the purpose of imperial augmentation, but rather should enter a war only to 
protect its fines. Such a state, moreover, should be eternally prepared for war, so as to stave 
off conflict. This metrocentric interpretation of Roman imperialism, prevalent in older 
scholarship, holds that Rome’s philosophy of expansion was constructed in that vein: 
Rome was in essence a peaceful state which only reacted militarily in response to 
aggressive neighbours.
94
 Although more recent work, especially that of Harris, Sherwin-
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White, and Kallet-Marx,
95
 has reinterpreted this view of Republican foreign policy (and in 
Harris’ case has argued precisely the opposite),96 it is not my intention to contribute to that 
debate here. Rather, my concern lies with Dio’s own interpretation of Late Republican 
imperialism and how he uses the speeches to demonstrate the effect of this upon public 
debate.  
 
Some sentiments do seem to conform to a ‘defensive’ notion of imperialism. Dio’s Caesar 
cites as exempla the major defensive wars of the Middle Republic: 
 
The Carthaginians would have given [our ancestors] much money not to 
extend their voyages thither, and much would Philip and Perseus have given to 
keep them from making campaigns against them; Antiochus would have given 
much, his sons and grandsons would have given much, to have them remain in 
Europe. But those men in view of the glory and the greatness of the empire did 
not choose to be ignobly idle or to enjoy their wealth in security, nor did the 
older men of our generation who even now are still alive; nay, as men who well 
knew that advantages are preserved by the same methods by which they 
are acquired, they made sure of many of their original possessions and also 
acquired many new ones (ἅτε εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ 
κτᾶται τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ σώζεται, πολλὰ μὲν ἐβεβαιώσαντο τῶν προϋπαρχόντων).97 
 
The orator additionally makes several other statements which seem at first sight to 
underline this intention, such as warning the soldiers that, as many are plotting against 
Rome’s prosperity, it is imperative to defend Rome’s borders against its enemies.98 The 
argumentation, certainly, makes ample use of defensive notions of imperialism to attain its 
objective. For this reason, a number of scholars have argued that Dio deployed this oration 
to set out his own philosophy of military activity. Most importantly, Gabba has argued 
from his reading of this oration that the historian adhered to ‘defensive’ notions of 
imperialism because of his admiration for Thucydides. He writes that, as Thucydides’ view 
of the appropriate way to conduct foreign policy can apparently be traced back to the 
sophist Carneades,  Dio uses his speech of Caesar to set out classical, sophistic conceptions 
of the imperative to defend oneself in a world governed by the necessity of conflict.
99
 This 
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view has been accepted by more recent scholars,
100
 and Hagendahl, before Gabba, treated 
the views of Dio’s Caesar on imperialism as the historian’s own.101 
 
This view is in error; and as Fechner has rightly observed, the only evidence for such a 
reading of Cassius Dio’s views on imperialism lies in the exhortation at Vesontio.102 I have 
already shown in the second section of this chapter that Dio was conspicuously hostile to 
Late Republican foreign policy. In consequence, it is unthinkable that his Caesar’s 
advocacy of defensive imperialism in any way approximates with what Dio perceived as 
the reality. Gabba’s interpretation and subsequently those of Christ and Zecchini have 
emerged from overlooking the embeddedness of the speech within Dio’s narrative. In the 
historian’s view, Caesar’s war against Ariovistus was an aggressive one, motivated purely 
by ἐπιθυμία and φιλοτιμία and other vices in human nature. He deliberately presents the 
campaign as such immediately prior to the oration. The irony – of having Caesar espouse 
defensive notions of foreign policy and the need to protect oneself from aggressive 
outsiders in a world governed by the necessity of conflict, and in this context – is obvious 
and deliberate. Speculatively, whether the historian intended the transparent irony of this 
aggressive speech advocating a defensive philosophy of imperialism to serve as some form 
of veiled attack on Carneades or sophistic notions of empire is unclear. It would certainly 
be consistent with the historian’s hostility toward the sophists. It should, however, serve as 
a reminder that not every aspect of the Roman History can be traced back to Thucydides, 
and indeed that Dio had views of his own on the Late Republic to put forward which had 
little to do with him at all.  
 
Dio’s exhortation of Caesar at Vesontio therefore serves as a further example of a 
rhetorically-skilled general misdirecting decision-making by intentionally falsifying the 
true nature of his involvement in imperial expansion. There is, first, the deliberate 
misrepresentation of the campaign as a defensive endeavour to protect Rome’s fines, which 
the reader knows from Dio’s own narrative preface to be absolutely false: it was an 
aggressive and unjustified campaign purely to serve the baser aspects of Caesar’s φύσις, 
his ἐπιθυμία τὴς δόξης and φιλοτιμία.  
 
Moreover, like Pompeius and Gabinius, Dio’s Caesar clothes the corruption inherent in his 
φύσις  - which he will of course go on to satisfy within the empire and thus secure further 
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glory, power, and prestige – behind a veneer of patriotism and devotion to the res publica. 
The opening of the speech, for example, is an invocation to keep one’s private interests and 
those of the state separate; and, crucially, to keep self-interest out of debates on foreign 
policy (οὐ τὸν αὐτόν, ὦ ἄνδρες φίλοι, τρόπον ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς περί τε τῶν ἰδίων καὶ περὶ 
τῶν κοινῶν βουλεύεσθαι).103 This is highly significant. In the very first line of his Caesar’s 
exhortation, Cassius Dio underlines in explicit terms his interpretation of the fundamental 
historical problem of Late Republican imperialism.  A Roman general declares an unjust 
and aggressive war, by means of calculated deception, for no other reason than to satisfy 
his personal ἐπιθυμία τὴς δόξης and φιλοτιμία; and begins his oration by exhorting the 
massed troops to keep their private ambitions out of debates on these matters.  The irony is 
obvious. But more importantly, it serves to demonstrate Dio’s view of the historical 
situation and brings this to the reader’s attention from the beginning. Just as Pompeius 
before him, Caesar in Gaul deliberately obfuscated his selfish intention to use the empire 
as a launchpad for his own ambitions, and insinuated his own private interests into the 
debate. Just as Pompeius before him, he succeeded in misdirecting his audience and 
convinced them to allow him to continue solidifying his δυναστεία within the empire. And, 
just as Pompeius before him, yet another period of prestigious military success generated 
his imperii consuetudo, leading him to desire absolute power.
104
 The corrosive effect of 
Late Republican imperialism on political debate, and thus upon the constitution, in Dio’s 
view was profound indeed.  
 
Then, finally, there is the laudatio funebris of M. Antonius (44.36-49), set shortly after 
Caesar’s assassination and in the immediate aftermath of Cicero’s speech on the Amnesty 
(44.23-33). Whether the occasion of speech actually existed is not entirely clear. Appian 
writes that Antonius did indeed deliver a funeral oration for Caesar in the forum  and that 
he was criticised for this. Importantly, he records that the Senate especially blamed him for 
his laudatio because ‘it was on account of this speech most of all that the people were 
incited to disregard the recently-approved decree of a general amnesty’ (ὑφ᾽ ὧν δὴ μάλιστα 
ὁ δῆμος ἐρεθισθεὶς ὑπερεῖδε τῆς ἄρτι ἐπεψηφισμένης ἀμνηστίας).105 The significance of 
this in Dio’s account I will return to in a moment. Suetonius, on the other hand, writes 
explicitly that Antonius did not deliver such an oration and indeed in place of this 
(laudationis loco) had a decree of the Senate, voting Caesar apotheosis and other honours, 
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proclaimed publicly. He does state, however, that Antonius added a few further words to 
this decree (quibus perpauca a se uerba addidit), but does not specify their content.
106
 
 
It would be fruitless to compare Appian and Cassius Dio’s laudationes of Antonius. The 
former numbers only a few lines of Greek, and the latter ten chapters, comparable in length 
to the involved creations of Catulus on the Gabinian law or Caesar’s exhortation at 
Vesontio. It is striking, however, that where Appian’s very brief funeral oration of 
Antonius makes no mention whatsoever of the dictator’s military career,107 Dio’s Antonius 
elaborates (and misrepresents) this at considerable length. The immediate political 
consequences of this misrepresentation in the historian’s presentation, as I will go on to 
show in this final study, were immediate and severe.  
 
This speech of Antonius clearly seems to me to function as part of a pair, and this is 
important to recognise in placing the oration within Dio’s explanation of the effect of 
amoral imperialism upon political oratory. As I explored in the previous chapter, Cicero’s 
speech on the Amnesty is conciliatory in tone and achieved results which directly 
alleviated the factional crisis of the Caesarians and the tyrannicides. Dio writes that the 
speech succeeded in persuading the Senate to vote to restore harmony (τοιαῦτα εἰπὼν 
ἔπεισε τὴν γερουσίαν μηδένα μηδενὶ μνησικακῆσαι ψηφίσασθαι). At the same time (ἐν ᾧ), 
the assassins themselves promised to preserve the acta of the dictator intact, and all were 
eager to honour the spirit and letter of Cicero’s proposal (παρὰ τὴν γνώμην αὐτοῦ 
ὥρμησαν).108 The oration led directly to cohesion and reconciliation. Antonius’ funeral 
speech, which follows a few chapters later, achieves the opposite result. In his prefatory 
remarks, the historian writes that the people, initially glad to be rid of Caesar’s δυναστεία, 
were calm (οἵ τε πολλοὶ ἔχαιρον τῆς δυναστείας τοῦ Καίσαρος ἀπηλλαγμένοι).109 But after 
hearing the dictator’s will, the populus became excited (ἐταράχθησαν); ‘and Antonius’, 
Dio begins, ‘aroused them yet more by stupidly bringing the body into the Forum, just as it 
was, covered in blood and open wounds, and by then delivering a speech to them which 
was ornate and brilliant, but not at all appropriate for the situation’.110 The oration on 
Caesar’s actions in Gaul and Britain will lead, as Dio will later clarify in his concluding 
summary, to renewed anger, fragmentation, and civil war. Dio’s ‘defence’ of the 
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δημοκρατία in Cicero alleviates the crisis; and its immediate successor in Antonius, a 
dynast who himself used the empire for his own enrichment,
111
 renews it. 
 
Antonius devotes around a quarter of the speech to a reflection on Caesar’s military career 
(44.40-44). In his introduction to this section the speaker states that he will discuss the 
dictator’s political services to τὰ κοινὰ (περὶ τῶν κοινῶν αὐτοῦ πολιτευμάτων λέγειν),112 
but will pass over his campaigns and focus only upon his actions as a magistrate (ὅσα μὲν 
οὖν ἄλλως στρατευόμενος ἐλαμπρύνετο…παραλείψω…ὅσα δὲ δὴ ἄρχων  ὑμῶν ἔπραξε, 
ταῦτ᾽ ἐρῶ μόνα).113 This is momentarily confusing in that the majority of this section in 
fact deals with Caesar’s campaigns. However, this failed ‘attempt’ by Dio’s Antonius to 
separate domestic from foreign corresponds precisely to the historian’s interpretation of 
Late Republican imperialism. The self-interested actions of generals abroad were not a 
phenomenon distinct from the organisation of the res publica, but directly influenced it; 
and corrosively, as Pompeius, Gabinius, and Caesar’s persuasive falsifications of the true 
nature of their policies, and their consequent transformation of the fora of debate into 
instruments to enable yet more of their corruption within the empire, confirm.  
 
Antonius falsifies Caesar’s military career, arranged chronologically, in a manner 
consistent with that established already in the interaction between the Vesontio speech and 
Dio’s own narrative comments. He begins with his propraetorship of Lusitania (60 BCE). 
 
First of all, this man went on campaign in Spain; but finding its inhabitants 
disloyal (ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ, καὶ ὕπουλον αὐτὴν εὑρών), he did not allow them to 
become unconquerable under the name of peace, nor did he prefer to spend 
his time as governor in peace and quiet rather than do what was best for 
the state (ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς χρόνον διαγενεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ κοινῇ 
συμφέροντα πρᾶξαι). Instead, since they would not willingly  change their 
behaviour, he brought them to their senses unwillingly…for this reason, you 
voted him a triumph for this and immediately made him consul (τὰ ἐπινίκια 
αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐψηφίσασθε καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ὕπατον εὐθὺς ἐδώκατε). From 
this fact it was absolutely clear that he had not waged this war for his own 
desire or glory (οὔτε ἐπιθυμίας οὔτε εὐκλείας), but as a preparation for our 
future prosperity. In any case, he set aside the celebration of the triumph 
because of pressing public business, and after thanking you for the honour, he 
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entered the consulship, happy with that alone as his glory (ἀρκεσθεὶς δὲ 
αὐτῇ ἐκείνῃ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν, ὑπάτευσε).114 
 
This lengthy passage is revealing. Caesar’s activities in Lusitania are misrepresented as τὰ 
κοινῇ συμφέροντα, even though Dio states in the narrative of the event itself that he was 
motivated purely by desire for his own glory (δόξης ἐπιθυμῶν). 115  Moreover, Dio’s 
Antonius states that Caesar chose not to pass his propraetorship in peace and quiet, because 
he wished to do good service to the res publica  (αὐτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς χρόνον 
διαγενεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ κοινῇ συμφέροντα πρᾶξαι). This is a deliberate overlap with the 
‘truth’ of Dio’s narrative of  the general’s time in Lusitania, in which he writes that, 
certainly, Caesar did not wish for ‘peace and quiet’ during his command (ἄνευ μεγάλου 
τινὸς πόνου καθήρας ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν, οὐκ ἠθέλησε).116 He wished, rather, to busy himself 
about satisfying his own ἐπιθυμία τὴς δόξης. Moreover, the causes of Caesar’s campaign 
against the inhabitants of the Herminian Mountains during this time are here attributed by 
Dio’s Antonius to their rebellious disloyalty (ὕπουλον αὐτὴν εὑρών); but this is a fiction. 
In his account of the year 60 BCE the historian makes clear that while Caesar could have 
been at peace (ἐξὸν αὐτῷ εἰρηνεῖν), he made war deliberately against the Herminians under 
false pretexts and indeed provoked them deliberately into war with unjust demands.
117
 This 
he did purely for the hope that he would obtain the consulship as a result if he could pull it 
off (ἀλλ᾽ ἤλπιζεν, ἄν τι τότε κατεργάσηται, ὕπατός τε εὐθὺς αἱρεθήσεσθαι).118 Antonius’ 
oration presents this consulship as a willing gift of the people, but it is clear that in Dio’s 
narrative interpretation, Caesar conspired for it and sought to achieve it through the glory 
of unjust aggression. Moreover,  Dio writes Caesar did not willingly set aside his triumph 
to attend to matters of state, as his Antonius is made to vaunt: Cato vigorously opposed it 
and had the measure scrapped.
119
  
 
This polarity between the truth of Caesar’s corrupt actions in Lusitania and their 
misrepresentation in Antonius is a highly sophisticated example of the pairing of 
prosopopoeia with narrative. Though separated by seven books and sixteen years of 
events, Dio maintains a focussed conspectus to make these two narratives of Caesarian 
expansion as contradictory as possible on every point. But this is not merely a display of 
compositional technique. By constructing the panegyric in this manner, Dio valorises his 
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broader argument about the corruption of rhetoric on the empire. The misrepresentation of 
the moral baseness of Late Republican imperialism as the service of the state (τὰ κοινὰ) 
rather than oneself (τὰ ἴδια) will enrage the audience, vitiating Cicero’s attempts to 
promote harmony and cohesion and leading ultimately to another civil war.  
 
Before these ramifications, however, the historian sets out further examples. For Gaul, 
Antonius raises the contentious issue of alliances. Advertising ‘how many and how great’ 
Caesar’s achievements were in this sphere (ὅσα αὖ καὶ ἡλίκα), Dio’s orator side-steps the 
issue of Ariovistus’ status as a friend and ally of Rome while simultaneously recalling it: 
‘so far from being burdensome to our allies, he actually helped them, because he was in no 
way suspicious of them and furthermore saw that they were being wronged’.120 Of course 
this refers to the campaign, ostensibly in defence of the allied Aedui and Sequani, against 
Ariovistus’ incursions. Again the narrative and the speech are inconsistent. In the actual 
account of the affair, the Aedui and Sequani called Caesar to their defence ‘because they 
saw his desire (ἐπιθυμίαν αὐτοῦ ἰδόντες) and sensed that his deeds corresponded with his 
hopes, and wished to do him a favour at the same time as taking revenge upon the 
Germans’.121 Caesar’s deliberate provocation of Ariovistus solely for the sake of δόξα and 
ἰσχύς we have already seen in this context. 122  There may also be a deliberate 
contradistinction between Antonius’ statement that the general was ‘not suspicious’ of 
Rome’s allies (μήτε τι αὐτοὺς ὑπώπτευσε) and the accusations of disloyalty, suspicion, and 
changing front levied against Ariovistus by Caesar in the Vesontio speech (ὕποπτός 
ἐστιν). 123  Again in his panegyric before the populus, Dio’s Antonius misrepresents 
Caesar’s actions in Gaul as an act for the good of the Republic: on two occasions the 
speaker states that these campaigns were undertaken ‘for our sake’ (ταῦθ᾽ ἡμῖν 
προσκατείργασται),124 when the narrative truth is a war of self-interested aggression whose 
object was to satisfy the corruption in Caesar’s  φύσις. 
 
After Spain and Gaul, Dio’s Antonius turns finally to the general’s expedition to Britain in 
55 BCE. This, too, is presented consciously and deliberately by the historian, by virtue of 
his earlier narrative of the event, as a false misrepresentation: 
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And had not certain people in their envy of him (φθονήσαντες), or rather of you 
(μᾶλλον δὲ ὑμῖν), provoked discord (ἐστασιάκεσαν) and compelled him to 
return before the needed time, then he would certainly have taken all of Britain 
along with the other islands that lie about it, and all Germany up to the Arctic 
Ocean…nevertheless, those men who had come to regard the constitution as no 
longer public, but their own property (μηκέτι κοινὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἰδίαν), prevented him 
from subjugating these.
125
 
 
Here those who began to lobby for Caesar’s recall in 51 BCE are illustrated emotively as 
the enemies not only of the general, but of the populus Romanus as a whole. Of course 
what in fact induced Caesar to return from Britain, in Dio’s account, was not the envy of 
his opponents in the city as Antonius falsifies, but an uprising in Gaul, as both Dio and 
Caesar’s commentarii record in the narrative of the event.126  
 
The resurgence of the distinction between public and private interest is important in this 
excerpt. Throughout, and in common with all other Republican generals of high status,  as 
I demonstrated in the second section of this chapter, Caesar’s military activity has been 
unwaveringly depicted as a quest for the selfish objectives of δόξα, φιλοτιμία, and 
δυναστεία. In Dio’s narrative the case of Britain was no different: he went for glory (τοῦ 
ἐστρατευκέναι ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς δόξαι).127 In this instance, to suit the purposes of the speech (to 
glorify Caesar and nullify Cicero’s attempts to foster harmony) this truth is inverted. 
Caesar is made a champion of the common cause in the face of egocentric senatorial 
opposition. Of all of Dio’s speakers on the empire, only one – Catulus – genuinely 
recognises the sanctity of separating τὰ κοινὰ from τὰ ἴδια, and speaks in a manner 
consistent with this separation. In his speech at Vesontio, Dio’s Caesar opens with that 
exhortation, to keep selfish private interest out of debates, especially in that context on 
foreign policy (οὐ τὸν αὐτόν, ὦ ἄνδρες φίλοι, τρόπον ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς περί τε τῶν ἰδίων 
καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν βουλεύεσθαι).128 But in so doing he only emphasises the historian’s 
interpretation that such a distinction had utterly disappeared; all military dynasts, in Dio’s 
view, used debates on foreign policy merely to further their private ambitions. In Antonius, 
this theme is raised for the last time in one of Dio’s speeches on Late Republican foreign 
affairs. Like Caesar, Gabinius, and Pompeius, Antonius’ refusal to follow the Catulan 
model of honest debate for the common good misdirects the populus. By granting the 
blurred distinction between τὰ κοινὰ and τὰ ἴδια within public speech a last expression in 
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the funeral oration, Dio closes his account of Late Republican imperialism with a final 
statement of its fatal flaw. 
 
The political consequences of Antonius’ falsification of Caesar’s actions in Spain, Gaul, 
and Britain are immediate in Dio’s reconstruction. As in Appian’s account, they nullify the 
harmony fostered by Cicero’s successful address. But Dio’s speech of Antonius, and his 
explanation of the consequences, is far more detailed and intense than the comparatively 
laconic Appian. In Dio, speech motivates action in a way that is immediate and profound. 
Directly after the laudatio (τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἀντωνίου λέγοντος), the audience became excited, 
then enraged, and went on a hunt for the tyrannicides, reproaching the Senate on the way. 
Setting up a pyre in the middle of the Forum, they nearly burned it down; this was 
prevented by the intervention of the soldiers and some rioters were thrown headfirst from 
the Capitoline. The tribune Helvius Cinna was murdered.
129
 An altar set up to Caesar was 
dismantled by the consuls, those who erected it punished, and the office of dictator 
abolished.
130
 Antonius took Dolabella as his colleague to prevent him from inciting further 
stasis (μὴ στασιάσῃ) and was corrupt in his administration of Caesar’s acts – which all had 
previously promised to recognise after  Cicero’s speech on the Amnesty. 131  Finally, 
Lepidus’ own power was increasing and a marriage alliance between himself and 
Antonius, as well as the title of pontifex maximus, were needed to keep him in check.
132
 
With this register of renewed discord, fragmentation, and Antonius’ and Lepidus’ 
increasing δυναστεία, Book 44 closes – and a new narrative, of Augustus’ rise to power 
and the Second Triumvirate, begins.  
Factor 5: Conclusion 
Just as Cassius Dio presented a morally-upright and genuinely Republican manifestation of 
public debate in the first century BCE in his ‘defences’ of the δημοκρατία, so too did he 
present its antithesis in Pompeius, Gabinius, Caesar, and Antonius. The former are 
universally ineffective; and the latter, on each occasion, attain their selfish objectives. 
Indeed, in the case of Cicero on the Amnesty and its response in the laudatio funebris of 
Antonius, it is the dynast who in Dio’s reconstruction undermines and ultimately reverses 
all of the Republican statesman’s conciliatory work following Caesar’s assassination. The 
historian, I have argued in Chapter 3, had clear concerns about the use and abuse of 
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oratory, and chose to explore the ramifications of this problem only in his speeches of the 
Late Republic. The political consequences of that issue in the historian’s view were severe 
indeed.  
 
And, I have suggested, in the military sphere especially. Two points are of particular 
interest here. Firstly there is the credibility of Dio’s argument. To what extent can modern 
scholars be justified in accepting his interpretation that the immoral character of Late 
Republican foreign policies, as a playing-field for  φιλοτιμία, πλεονεξία, and ἐπιθυμία, 
necessarily exerted a corrosive effect upon political debate surrounding those policies? 
And that, in consequence, this corruption of public debate enabled individual dynasts to 
misdirect decision-making, securing further prestigious commands and continuing to 
enhance their wealth, power, and prestige within the empire? Secondly, it also seems 
legitimate to ask whether this interpretation would be discernible without the speeches, and 
if so, how clearly and to what degree.  
  
To turn to the first of these, I have argued in this investigation that Cassius Dio took a 
Tacitean view of human nature which accepted that certain base desires were inherent in 
φύσις, but could be made to manifest themselves or proliferate in response to external 
stimuli. We can be reasonably confident from Dio’s own account of Late Republican 
foreign policy in Books 36-40 that he conceived of imperial augmentation, and its 
increased opportunities for vice, as that stimulus. Dio drew this from a long tradition of 
Roman historiography, beginning with Sallust or earlier; and in presenting Late Republican 
imperialism in this light he was not performing a radical re-evaluation of it. But I do not 
think that was his intention. Rather, Dio’s purpose – and in keeping with his own interest 
in the use and abuse of oratory – was to demonstrate through his speeches the effect of 
such base imperialism upon political rhetoric within the centre. Through his orations of 
Pompeius, Gabinius, Caesar, and Antonius, Cassius Dio develops his argument: the 
corruption of Roman imperialism necessitated a corruption of debate on that imperialism, 
in which its true nature had to be obfuscated and misrepresented by ambitious dynasts to 
secure further power. The ramifications of this could be far-reaching: further commands 
for Pompeius and the consequent pride which would magnify and ultimately destroy him, 
in addition to the φθόνος extraordinary honours would bring; further glory, might and 
prestige for Caesar in the wake of yet another military victory abroad; and further discord 
and civil war as a result of Antonius’ deliberate misrepresentation of Caesar’s campaigns 
as a benevolent service for the public good.  
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Speculatively, the historian may not have been wrong in suggesting that the character of 
Late Republican imperialism was deliberately falsified by dynasts and that this could 
misdirect decision-making. Caesar in his commentarii, quite understandably, presented his 
campaigns in Gaul and Britain in a favourable light to satisfy an immediate political 
objective. That self-justification responded to the contemporary problem of Caesar’s 
legitimacy in commanding for so long a time; and a dispassionate, third-person register of 
the general’s successful services to the res publica abroad might mitigate any hostile 
manoeuvres to impeach him, particularly if campaigns were believed to be progressing 
unsatisfactorily. Through his speeches, Cassius Dio seems to me to communicate his  own 
view of the problem of rhetorical self-presentation – especially deceptive self-presentation 
– and the effect of this upon the apportioning of power within the empire.      
 
Such a view could, naturally, be communicated through the narrative alone: I have set out 
Dio’s unfavourable narrative presentation of Late Republican foreign policy in the second 
section of this chapter. But one wonders what the historian’s explanation of the 
degenerative effect of the military dimension upon the political, constitutional dimension 
would have been if the orations I have discussed in this chapter were not present. Dio’s 
hostility toward Late Republican imperialism would certainly still be discernible; this is 
not particularly elaborated in the speeches in any case. But how else might Cassius Dio 
have selected to explore the corrosive effect of imperialism upon public debate on military 
affairs, if not through representations of that debate? These furnished the historian with a 
persuasive means of demonstrating, for his reader, the political ramifications domi of 
individual dynasts’ foreign politices militaeque; not in his own voice, but in the voice of 
the characters who were directly involved in accelerating that process of decline. To Dio, 
speech itself was part of the problem of the collapse of the res publica, and to perceive 
this, we need the speeches. But as I show in the third and final case-study, both morality 
and rhetoric undergo a tandem transformation in Cassius Dio’s account of Augustus’ reign, 
correcting the flaws of the Late Republic while simultaneously reflecting upon them a final 
time.  
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Chapter 7: Speech after the Settlement 
Factor 6: Introduction 
This final case-study investigates the changing role of speech in Dio’s text. In his narrative 
of the Augustan Settlement of 27 BCE, the historian explicitly marks out the Principate as a 
new period not only in Roman history, but in his narrative. He writes programmatically 
that his work has moved into a new phase, contrasting the former period of the Republic 
(τὰ πρόσθεν) with the new monarchy under which he lived (τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα). He warns the 
reader that while it was easy to get publicly-recorded information for the Republican 
section, the secrecy of monarchical government made ἀκρίβεια much harder to achieve. 1 
Dio’s tone here is exculpatory, but the shift in his work to the new ‘narrative mode’ of the 
Principate is a real one.
2
 Although the annalistic framework persists until the year 46 CE,
3
 
Dio organises his material from Augustus’ reign onward biographically around a single 
princeps and his family as the dominant causes of historical action, with a character-sketch 
and necrology book-ending each reign.
4
 As Dio’s history changed, so too did his speeches. 
 
Dio’s speeches of the Principate have received far less attention than those of the Late 
Republic. The bulk of the scant scholarship elucidates how the historian used them to 
articulate his concerns about his own period. These fall under identifiable themes which 
are clearly present. The speeches of Livia and Cassius Clemens, for example, concern the 
clemency of the emperor (ἐπιείκεια);5 as a survivor of Commodus and Caracalla, Dio was 
especially interested in this theme.
6
 The battle exhortations of Boudicca and Marcus 
Aurelius are fundamentally concerned with magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία), kindness 
(φιλανθρωπία), and other manifestations of imperial ἀρετή. 7  Finally, some words of 
Hadrian on the adoption of Antoninus Pius exemplify Dio’s recognition of the unfortunate 
contrast between legitimate succession under Antonine adoption and the internecine 
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conflicts of the Severan age.
8
 After the reign of Augustus, Dio’s speeches of the Principate 
are also uncharacteristically short: the longest, the exhortations of Boudicca and Marcus 
Aurelius, number only three chapters each.
9
 This may be due to the epitomators Xiphilinus 
and Zonaras, upon whom we are heavily reliant after Augustus’ reign. Although 
Xiphilinus’ epitome in particular was often faithful to Dio,10 both epitomators abridged 
heavily.
11
 Nevertheless, it is clear that, just as I have argued that the speeches of the Late 
Republic explored the historical problems of that constitution and explained its demise, so 
too do the ‘kingship speeches’ of the Principate explore concerns intrinsically relevant to 
the character of monarchy.  
  
The exploration of the ἀρετή of the ruler and the character of his regime was certainly one 
important aspect of the historian’s speeches of the Principate. But it is not the complete 
picture. In this chapter, I argue that Dio composed his speeches of the Augustan period to 
reiterate the historical problems of the Late Republic and to demonstrate how a new 
political culture overcame those problems. I argue that the Augustan speeches are distinct 
both from the speeches of the later Principate, which explore the character of the ideal 
monarchy as such, and from those of the Late Republic, which Dio used to explain why the 
res publica failed. Rather, the Augustan speeches are placed within a transitional period in 
which both of these questions converge. The historian deploys these to reveal the ideal 
character of speech after the Settlement, presenting a new rhetorical culture which 
persuasively repeats the characteristics of the Late Republic which it eschews, and 
highlights the virtues of enlightened monarchy which are made possible by that new 
rhetorical culture. In this way, Dio placed the Augustan speeches at a liminal phase to 
serve as a final reflection on the historical problems of the res publica and as an 
explanation of how Augustan ἀρετή rectified those problems. They look back, to the 
speeches of the Late Republic, and forward, to the kingship speeches of the later 
Principate. 
 
To demonstrate this I divide this chapter into three sections. In the first I sketch the 
historian’s narrative presentation of Augustus’ reign and its reinvention of notions of ideal 
                                                          
8
 The only detailed work on the speech of Hadrian (69.20.2-5) is Davenport & Mallan (2014), which sees it as an 
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9
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(2014). 
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 Swan (2004) 36-38. 
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kingship along the lines of ἐπιείκεια, μεγαλοψυχία, φιλανθρωπία, and παρρησία. Turning 
to this question will serve as a methodological basis for discussion of the speeches. In the 
second I discuss the ways in which the historian used Augustus (53.3-10), Livia (55.16.2-
21.4), and Tiberius (56.35.41.9) to reflect a final time on the problem of φθόνος in the Late 
Republic. These speeches, I argue, function in concert with the favourable narrative of 
Augustus’ reign to underline the historian’s argument that  the cycle of ambition and envy 
was broken by the new regime. In the third I examine how Dio used the Augustan orations 
to provide the reader with a retrospective view of the problem of δυναστεία and its 
negative ramifications in Late Republican imperialism and civil war. It it my suggestion 
that the historian used these speeches to demonstrate that the imperial virtues according to 
which he judged the first emperor (ἐπιείκεια, μεγαλοψυχία, φιλανθρωπία, and παρρησία) 
corrected the problems associated with Republican δυναστεία. The speeches of Octavian 
and Tiberius in particular verbalise a final time the historian’s conception of Late 
Republican political and military life and underline how Augustan ἀρετή rectified its 
corrosive influence. Dio therefore embedded his final reflections on the δημοκρατία within 
a transitional stage: the reader can see the moral virtues of the new regime in the narrative 
immediately surrounding the speeches, but can additionally read reflections on the Late 
Republic which illustrate what its problems were by contrast.  
Augustan Virtues 
Cassius Dio’s presentation of the first princeps has been a matter of debate. Noting the 
contrast between his unfavourable treatment of Octavian in the Republican books and his 
more sympathetic characterisation in the narrative of his reign as Augustus, older 
scholarship suggested that Dio changed source and simply followed the opinions of each.
12
 
Such a view does not seem likely. As I suggested in Chapter 2, the historian had ten years 
of reading Roman history to formulate his own impressions. It is not credible that in the 
composition-stage he would forget his own opinions and transmit those of a source which 
his research had led him to disbelieve.
13
 Millar’s view was that Dio assembled his account 
from a medley of sources, given over neither to particular praise nor blame and “an attitude 
of mixed acceptance and indignation” to both triumvir and princeps in equal measure.14 
The full exploration of Manuwald on the subject attributes the shift to the nature of the 
material. The princeps would attract less criticism than the Republican dynast in any 
possible view; but even after Actium, Dio’s original assessment of Octavian as an 
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 E.g. Charlesworth (1934) 875-876 and Levi (1937) 415-434. 
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 On Dio’s sources for Augustus generally cf. Millar (1964) 84-101 and Manuwald (1979) 168-268. 
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unscrupulous revolutionary and disloyal ally is not fundamentally reversed. The lack of 
either positive or negative extreme rendered his presentation of Octavian-Augustus, all in 
all, rather pale (etwas blaß) and Dio’s only explicit authorial assessment of his character 
upon his death is positive, but sober (zwar nüchtern, aber uneingeschränkt positiv).
15
  
 
More recent perspectives suggest that the historian approved of Augustus as a model ruler, 
but found the actions of Octavian the dynast less laudable, and moulded his presentation 
accordingly to each.
16
 This interpretation is far more sympathetic given Dio’s hostile 
opinion of δημοκρατία and his approval of monarchy, although that preference is not 
particular to Dio within Imperial literature.
17
 Still, the competitive nature of the Late 
Republic, compared with the absolute authority of a single ruler, made reprehensible 
behaviour inevitable in his view. This, as Kemezis has recently shown, gets to the heart of 
my question of Dio’s presentation of the Late Republic. Kemezis argues that it was not 
possible for Octavian to be a noble dynast. Only in the new narrative mode of the 
Principate could his positive characteristics flourish, liberated from the constraints of 
Republican corruption.
18
 Dio most clearly articulates this idea in the recusatio of Augustus 
in Book 53, to which I turn in the next section. The speech is fundamentally Republican in 
its deceptive character and hostile presentation of the speaker’s motives; but is the last of 
its kind in the history, and hints at the positive aspects of enlightened kingship which will 
flourish in Dio’s later narrative after Republican rhetorical culture has been abandoned.  
 
The aspects of enlightened despotism according to which the historian judges Augustus’ 
reign ultimately belong to the tradition of Greek philosophy and its influence upon 
rhetorical education. In assessing the first princeps (and indeed later emperors) according 
to a set of virtues Dio was not doing anything particularly new: temperance (σωφροσύνη), 
wisdom (φρόνησις), bravery (ἀνδρεία) and justice (δικαιοσύνη) had a long history.19 Dio is 
oddly silent on the golden shield of virtues presented to Augustus shortly after the 
Settlement, virtutis clementiae iustitiae pietatis causa,
20
 although as Wallace-Hadrill has 
shown, this was by no means the establishment of a new ‘canon’ of virtues: varying 
combinations of virtues are attested and the theory of ‘cardinal’ virtues can be set aside.21 
As I have shown in Chapter 4, Dio’s writing was strongly influenced by the 
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 Manuwald (1979) 273-276 for all of the above paraphrases.  
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 Reinhold (1988) 13; Rich (1989). 
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progymnasmata. In this regard his interest in conventional moral ideas of virtue seems 
likely to have more to do with the exercises in ἐγκώμιον and the βασιλικòς λόγος, which 
drew from Greek philosophy,
22
 than in any personal interest in kingship literature.  
 
In view of this philosophical influence (through the filter of rhetorical education), it is 
peculiar that the laudatio funebris of Tiberius, as Dio’s ἐγκώμιον of Augustus par 
excellence, does not mention the cardinal virtues at all. Aside from one reference to 
φρόνησις,23 the cardinal virtues of the Greek kingship speech are not mentioned once. 
Rather, Dio appears to have judged Augustus’ regime by different parameters, and in a 
combination which is distinctively his own. The virtues mentioned in Tiberius’ speech are 
μεγαλοψυχία (magnanimity),24 φιλανθρωπία (liberality, kindness),25 παρρησία (acceptance 
of free speech),
26
 and ἐπιείκεια (clemency).27 I will turn to the emphasis placed on these 
virtues in Tiberius’ laudatio and in the other Augustan speeches in the third section. My 
interest is not in the philosophical history of these virtues or the originality of the 
combination – particular to Dio though it is. Rather, in sections two and three I outline how 
Dio presents this combination of Augustan virtues in the speeches of Augustus, Livia, and 
Tiberius as correcting the rhetorical and political culture of the Late Republic, as illustrated 
in the speeches of that period, and thus securing beneficial constitutional change. 
 
An overview of these virtues in Dio’s narrative of the years 27 BCE-14 CE demonstrates 
how consistently they characterise Augustus’ reign. First, παρρησία. As Mallan has 
recently explored,
28
 the historian viewed παρρησία as characteristic of the Roman 
Republic; it and its verbal form παρρησιάζομαι occur most frequently in the Late 
Republican narrative.
29
  But this changed after the battle of Philippi: in the aftermath, Dio 
states that ‘the people never again obtained genuine freedom of speech (ἀκριβῆ 
παρρησία)’.30 This programmatic statement of a turning-point in the history of speech at 
Rome, which likens the death of ‘genuine’ freedom of speech with the advent of 
monarchy, bears some relation to Polybius, who presented παρρησία as the hallmark of 
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 Kroll (1935) 206ff., Martin (1974) 177ff. 
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 Cass. Dio. 56.37.2: φρονιμώτατα. 
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 Cass. Dio. 56.39.3. 
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democratic government.
31
 Yet despite the traditional Greek connotation of freedom of 
speech with political liberty,
32
 Dio’s presentation of παρρησία in the Late Republican 
narrative and orations is markedly negative, as it is repeatedly misused for self-interested 
political objectives at the expense of harmony. The historian’s fullest negative treatment of 
this theme came in the form of Cicero.
33
  As I outlined in Chapter 5, the consolatio of 
Philiscus in Book 38 serves as Dio’s own interpretation of the causes of Cicero’s exile and 
his later assassination: ‘I fear, as I look at your situation and remember your frankness of 
speech (τὴν σὴν παρρησίαν), and behold the power and number of your enemies, that you 
may be cast out once again’.34 It was only natural in the historian’s view that Cicero make 
himself hated because of his intemperate frankness (τῇ παρρησίᾳ ἀκράτῳ καὶ κατακορεῖ 
χρώμενος) and his longing for a reputation for eloquence outstripped his desire to be a 
good citizen.
35
 To this argument Dio presents the unrestrained personal attacks of the 
Cicero-Calenus invectives of Books 45 and 46 as an unfortunate coda. That Dio drew the 
material for both directly from the original Philippics, as I suggested in Chapter 2, 
demonstrates his recognition of the ugly side of παρρησία in the Republic embodied in 
Cicero. Indeed, Dio’s Cicero and Calenus both repeatedly mention παρρησία in the 
debate.
36
 The historian uses these speeches in this highly politically charged context (the 
aftermath of Caesar’s assassination) to demonstrate the relationship between frankness of 
speech – at its worst – and Republican aristocratic discord. 
 
But under Dio’s Augustus, παρρησία is reinvented as a positive force – a force which 
enables a more harmonious government. In the historian’s presentation it is precisely the 
princeps’ willingness to accept παρρησία which enables the other virtues of ἐπιείκεια, 
μεγαλοψυχία, and φιλανθρωπία to exist. Maecenas’ list of recommendations on successful 
government included an instruction to the new emperor to grant his advisors παρρησία in 
expressing their opinion.
37
 The reign as a whole is consistent with this. Thus, when 
Augustus stood in defence of Nonius Asprenas at trial and the prosecutor ‘indulged in 
excessive παρρησία’, that prosecutor later stood before the princeps to have his morality 
scrutinised. Augustus acquitted him, in a display of μεγαλοψυχία, on the basis that the 
                                                          
31
 Polyb. 2.38.6, 6.9.4-5.  
32
 See Mallan (forthcoming, 2016). 
33
 For assessments of Dio’s hostile presentation of Cicero in general cf. Millar (1964) 55 and more recently 
Lintott (1977) 2514-2517; for a more positive view, cf. Fechner (1986) 48-57. 
34
 Cass. Dio. 38.29.1. 
35
 Cass. Dio. 28.12.6-7. 
36
 As Mallan points out: 45.18.2, 45.35.1-2, 45.46.3, 46.9.4, 46.15.3. 
37
 Cass. Dio. 52.33.6; see also Agrippa’s request at the beginning of his oration at 52.3.3 for permission to speak 
his mind freely. 
238 
 
 
man’s παρρησία was necessary for the moral good of Rome.38 On another occasion, when 
the emperor was on the verge of sentencing men to death, Dio records that Maecenas had 
convinced him otherwise. Augustus, far from being displeased, was glad: ‘because 
whenever he was given over to unfitting passion as a result of his own nature or the stress 
of his affairs, he was set right by the παρρησία of his friends’.39 Augustan ἐπιείκεια is thus 
directly facilitated by παρρησία. Dio’s clemency speech of Livia is similar: the speaker 
successfully craves the princeps’ indulgence in allowing her to give her advice freely and 
advise ἐπιείκεια for the plotter, Cn. Cornelius Cinna Magnus.40 Furthermore, Augustus 
refrained from delivering his sententia first in the Senate, but last, preferring to allow the 
senators to express their own without fear.
41
 Finally, he ordered the laws he had enacted to 
be inscribed and made public in the senate, allowing its members to speak out if any 
displeased them.
42
 Tolerance of παρρησία in Augustus’ reign is praised also by 
Suetonius.
43
 But in Dio it is particularly emphasised as the aspect of his rule which 
facilitates ἐπιείκεια and μεγαλοψυχία, and which stands in stark contrast to the Late 
Republican παρρησία of Cicero. 
 
This tolerance of frank speech was what made Augustus δημοκρατικὸς in the historian’s 
view. Such is the assessment of his character as a ruler which Dio attaches to the case of 
excessive παρρησία at Nonius Asprenas’ trial above, and at another point in his narrative 
of Augustus’ reforms to the provincial administration.44 The term does not of course mean 
‘democratic’ in the classical Athenian sense, nor indeed does it relate at all to the δῆμος. 
Rather paradoxically, it denotes the princeps’ attitude to the senatorial elite and governing 
aristocracy – who stood most to lose under the new constitution – and his preservation of 
their safety and status.
45
 The good civilis princeps would not only have to preserve the 
lives and property of his people, but to behave as one of them himself, refusing excessive 
honours and kingly adulation.
46
 Thus Augustus behaved toward the people ‘as if they were 
free citizens’, making a habit of returning to the city at night so as not to trouble them with 
pomp and fanfares, and recording his property in the census ‘just like any other ἰδιώτης’.47 
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There can be no doubt that Dio approved and holds Augustus aloft as a model in this 
regard – and indeed more so than Tacitus and Appian.48 
 
Acceptance of παρρησία was only one aspect of Augustus’ rule as the ideal of the 
δημοκρατικὸς emperor. The other moral considerations of ἐπιείκεια and φιλανθρωπία 
mentioned in Tiberius’ encomium of the ideal ruler are equally developed throughout the 
reign. Thus when Dio lauds the princeps’ collaboration with Agrippa in public works, 
which were ‘the most humane (φιλανθρωπότατα), most celebrated, and most beneficial of 
projects’, 49  he does not mark out anything particularly unusual for Augustus’ reign. 
Displays of generosity and kindness are common: one may consider his donations to those 
barred from the Senate on account of their wealth, but who deserved it for their upright 
living (εὖ βιούντων) – a recommendation found in Maecenas’ speech;50 or, after returning 
to the city at night to spare its people any bother, his subsidy of free public baths and 
barbers the following day; or his choice to fund the rebuilding of the Basilica of Paulus 
himself but allow Aemilius Lepidus to take the credit.
51
  
 
The task of bringing Rome into a state of security after a century of intermittent political 
turmoil also gave the new princeps numerous opportunities to display his ἐπιείκεια. The 
degree to which we should trust the claim victorque omnibus veniam petentibus civibus 
peperci is a matter of debate,
52
 and numerous plots litter the account of Augustus’ reign. 
The haphazard arrangement of these within the chronology speculatively suggests that Dio 
may have drawn these elements from a single source which treated the plots against 
Augustus in a thematic rather than chronological manner.
53
 If that were the case, it would 
be less interesting than the fact that the historian deliberately broke from his annalistic 
sources to consult a work on that theme in the first place. The multiplicity of plots gave the 
historian a chance to elaborate on imperial ἐπιείκεια. For Dio’s Augustus is a clement 
figure. There are certainly negative moments. Dio attributed his campaign in Gaul in 16 
BCE to his need to vacate the city: many had grown to dislike the princeps’ inconsistency 
in applying punishment. He had publicly humiliated Livia through his affair with 
Maecenas’ wife.54 Furthermore, Dio reports that Augustus was so furious with Julia’s 
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nocturnal activities that he could not restrain himself, but banished her as well as executing 
her paramour Iullus Antonius for conspiracy.
55
  
 
Nevertheless, examples of his ἐπιείκεια are many. His willingness to accept the παρρησία 
of Maecenas and Livia exhorting him to clemency we have already seen. One may also 
consider the case of Rufus, unscathed after attacking the emperor’s authority;56 or Pollio’s 
attempt to feed his slave alive to eels, prevented by Augustus’ pity;57 his refusal to punish 
women for their promiscuity in the wake of Julia’s disgrace;58 his attempt to control his 
anger at Sisenna, refusing to do or say anything violent;
59
 his consternation at the plot of 
Cinna Magnus, not wishing to put the conspirators to death;
60
 or, following the flight 
abroad of some plotters, his decision that in trials in absentia the jury’s vote be public, but 
unanimous – a provision made ‘not out of anger, but really for the public good’. 61 
Suetonius devoted a section of his life of Augustus to the conspiracies formed against the 
princeps’ rule, but says nothing about Augustan clemency in this context and indeed little 
throughout the life.
62
 Clementia appears only once,
63
 venia not at all, and parco once in the 
sense of sparing lives.
64
 Dio, in contrast, eagerly promoted Augustan ἐπιείκεια and was 
convinced by this aspect of the princeps’ self-presentation. 
 
So Dio judged Augustus’ reign with great favour. By presenting it as a major reinvention 
of Roman political culture the historian was doing nothing new; but in his focus on 
παρρησία Dio created a striking distinction between the rhetorical culture of the Late 
Republic, where excessive frank speech contributed to elite discord, and of the Augustan 
regime, where παρρησία facilitated clemency and magnanimous leadership. In microcosm 
this argument appears at its clearest when we juxtapose the invectives of Cicero and 
Calenus, where παρρησία generates disunity, with the speeches of Maecenas or Livia, 
where παρρησία leads to political harmony. Further, by assessing Augustus’ reign 
according to a set of virtues laid out in the laudatio funebris of Tiberius, Dio took an 
established point from Greek philosophy and the encomiastic tradition, but reinvented it 
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within a combination of his own making. Παρρησία, ἐπιείκεια, μεγαλοψυχία, and 
φιλανθρωπία characterise his reign as a whole. Although aristocratic plots against 
Augustus do emerge, it is significant that no attempt is made to develop the motives or 
characters of the conspirators at all; many go simply unnamed. Rather, it is the new kind of 
aristocrat, Agrippa and Maecenas, upon whom the focus lies, who are presented 
throughout the narrative and especially in their necrologies as agents of the emperor’s 
μεγαλοψυχία and φιλανθρωπία,65 while the liberty of παρρησία and blessing of ἐπιείκεια 
flow from the emperor himself.  
 
It is telling that when the competition opened for the consular elections in 22 and 19 BCE, 
it was both times a disaster in Dio’s view. He writes that the citizen body fell again into 
factional discord and murders ‘and thereby showed that it was impossible for them to be 
safe under a δημοκρατία’.66 On both occasions the historian records that Augustus had to 
step in, saving a vestige of the Republic from its own uselessness. Dio presents the 
Augustan regime as everything that the Republic was not in the reflection quoted here. But 
to convince his audience of this argument, he placed the bulk of his final reflections on 
Late Republican political culture into his speeches of this period, not his narrative. These 
illustrate by contrast the reinvention of the nature of speech at Rome and the politics it 
generated, and juxtapose the character of the late res publica with that of the new regime 
which I have shown Dio praised. It is to these I now turn.  
Reflections on the Late Republic: Φθόνος  
Three historical themes are repeated in three of Dio’s set-pieces of the Augustan period. 
First, the problem of φθόνος, which Chapters 5 and 6 showed was not a mere 
commonplace or rhetorical topos, but was central to the causal framework that Dio applied 
in the speeches to aristocratic fragmentation and the end of the Republic. Second, the issue 
of δυναστεία, the acquisition of which, I have demonstrated in the previous case studies, 
the historian presented as the primary objective of all major Late Republican military 
figures. And third, the three speeches of the Augustan narrative also reflect on the 
character of Late Republican imperialism and foreign policy, reiterating the conflation 
between the interest of the state (τὰ κοινὰ) and one’s own benefit (τὰ ἴδια) and the abuse of 
the subject communities in the civil war. Through a reading of the orations of Augustus 
(53.3-10), Livia (55.16.2-21.4), and Tiberius (56.35.41.9), I argue in this section that the 
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historian deployed these speeches to reiterate each of these three historical problems of the 
Late Republic and to suggest their resolution by the new regime, using speech to build a 
persuasive interpretation of the causes and success of constitutional change.  
 
To φθόνος first. As we have seen, envy of wealth or personal power lay at the heart of 
most hostile elite interactions in Dio’s account of the Late Republic; this interpretation is 
distinctive to Dio among our Greek narrators of this period. The historian made this quite 
plain in the speeches of Pompeius, Catulus, Caesar, Antonius, Agrippa, and Maecenas. In 
the historian’s interpretation – articulated in these orations – φθόνος was responsible for 
major political movements such as Pompeius’ entry into the First Triumvirate and the 
assassination of Caesar, as well as a plethora of minor attacks by individuals Dio did not 
bring centre-stage. But like παρρησία, φθόνος is reinvented in the history. In the text of the 
Augustan Principate, it is transformed in two ways. On the one hand, this emotive aspect of 
aristocratic disunity disappears almost completely from the narrative and ceases to be a 
factor of history. On the other hand, where rarely it does occur – notably in the speeches of 
Livia and Tiberius – the object of envious desire radically shifts, from the acquisition of 
δυναστεία in all its forms (δόξα, ἡγεμονία, ἰσχύς, πλεονεξία) to the acquisition of virtue.  
 
Φθόνος is mentioned four times in Augustus’ recusatio imperii before the Senate in the 
narrative of 27 BCE. 67  Unlike the speeches of Livia and Tiberius which follow, the 
recusatio is fundamentally a Late Republican speech. At this point in the narrative, 
Octavian has not yet grown into the benevolent exponent of ἐπιείκεια, μεγαλοψυχία, 
φιλανθρωπία, and παρρησία. Rather, his characterisation is similar to Dio’s other Late 
Republican dynasts.
68
 The historian prefaces Octavian’s speech with an authorial statement 
underlying his intentions: ‘he wished to make another show of magnanimity 
(μεγαλοψυχία), in order that he might be honoured all the more from this fact, and to have 
his monarchy confirmed by willing men, rather than to seen to have forced them to do 
so’.69 Of course this is not a genuine show of high-mindedness: the μεγαλοψυχία for which 
the emperor is praised in Tiberius’ laudatio cannot yet exist,70 for Dio’s Octavian in 27 
BCE is still compelled to speak in precisely the same manner as Pompeius forty years 
earlier.  He is still in the ‘Late Republican’ mode.71 This seems to me signalled by the fact 
that the narrative preface to Octavian’s recusatio is (unsurprisingly) similar to Pompeius’ 
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recusatio. In both, Dio spells out the orator’s desire to rule, before creating the antithesis 
between the voluntary confirmation of the people and the wish to appear unwillingly 
compelled.
72
 It is important that Dio’s vocabulary is markedly different in Octavian’s case: 
gone is the mention of φιλοτιμία and τὸ εὐκλεὲς in the preface which were attributed to 
Pompeius. The tone is less critical. But both, he writes, desired τιμή and power, and were 
prepared to lie for it. So as the first speech of the Augustan narrative, the recusatio of Book 
53 is also the last of the Republic. Contrary to one view, there is nothing unusual in 
examining the speech to understand Dio’s view of the late res publica:73 the episode is 
structured to make the reader do precisely that. Accordingly, where Octavian mentions 
φθόνος it is as ‘Late Republican’ as the oration itself. This is most apparent at 53.8.6, 
where the Pompeian overtones are obvious: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pompeius’ later claim to be exhausted in mind and body (κατατέτριμμαι μὲν τὸ σῶμα, 
πεπόνημαι δὲ τὴν γνώμην) after a life of πόνος might have been justified by the time of his 
pirate command at the age of forty.
74
  But for Dio’s Octavian to make the claim at thirty-
six is too great a stretch, and this would be plainly incompetent on the historian’s part if he 
intended the reader actually to believe it. I find this doubtful; my investigation has shown 
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For I am exhausted and have suffered 
hardships, and I am able to sustain myself 
no longer in mind or body. And further 
still, I can foresee the envy and the hatred 
which spring up among some people even 
against the finest men, and the plots which 
emerge from them too. 
αὐτός τε γὰρ καὶ πεπόνημαι καὶ 
τεταλαιπώρημαι, καὶ οὐκέτ᾽ οὔτε τῇ ψυχῇ 
οὔτε τῷ σώματι ἀντέχειν δύναμαι: καὶ 
προσέτι καὶ τὸν φθόνον καὶ τὸ μῖσος, ἃ καὶ 
πρὸς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεταί τισι, 
τάς τε ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπιβουλὰς προορῶμαι. 
 
 
Cass. Dio. 53.8.6. 
Were you to count up the campaigns I’ve 
made and the dangers I’ve suffered, you 
would find them many more than the 
number of my years; and you would thus 
believe that I no longer have strength for 
such labours and cares. But if you persist, 
know this: that all such positions cause 
envy and hatred. 
καὶ τὰς στρατείας ἃς ἐστράτευμαι καὶ τοὺς 
κινδύνους οὓς κεκινδύνευκα ἀναριθμήσητε, 
πολύ γε πλείους αὐτοὺς τῶν ἐτῶν εὑρήσετε, 
καὶ μᾶλλον οὕτω πιστεύσετε ὅτι οὔτε πρὸς 
τοὺς πόνους οὔτε πρὸς τὰς φροντίδας 
καρτερεῖν ἔτι δύναμαι. εἰ δ᾽ οὖν τις καὶ 
πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντέχοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾶτε ὅτι καὶ 
ἐπίφθονα καὶ μισητὰ πάντα.  
Cass. Dio. 36.25.5-26.1 
. 
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that Dio was a sophisticated and highly-trained speechwriter. This can be more reasonably 
explained with two points.  
 
Firstly, in view of the narrative preface to the speech it is clear that the incongruous 
argument of φθόνος serves to illustrate the speaker’s mendacity – just like any other of 
Dio’s Late Republican dynasts – and the argument is made deliberately redolent of 
Pompeius to achieve this, emphasising the corruption in Late Republican rhetorical culture. 
Secondly (and more importantly), within the context of the preceding narrative these 
concerns about the relationship between power and φθόνος remain a reflection of a 
distinctly Late Republican problem. The historian signals to his readers that, as Octavian’s 
powers have not yet been constitutionally confirmed, the speaker is still a participant in a 
culture where power generates envy. Were the account of the first century BCE leading up 
to this not sufficient to demonstrate the reality of this problem, the speech is littered with 
exempla of Julius Caesar,
75
 whose assassination Dio attributed to φθόνος. 76  Octavian 
repeats the argument a second time later in the speech, stating that he wishes to be free 
from jealousy and plots (μήτε φθονεῖσθαι μήτε ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι).77 It may also be that 
Catulus’ response in Book 36 to Pompeius’ recusatio, who predicts that ‘his task as 
monarch (μοναρχῆσαι) over all your possessions will not be free from envy (οὔτε 
ἀνεπίφθονον)’,78 looks forward to this recusatio of Octavian or vice versa. In the first 
speech of Augustus’ monarchy the historian locates the orator’s concerns about jealousy 
within a destructive and distinctly Late Republican framework, and reflects on the 
inevitability of that problem without a radical re-evaluation of the constitution. 
 
Hesitantly, however, the speech additionally looks forward to the reinvention of φθόνος by 
the Augustan regime. Section 53.10 is, in short, a compact list of all the negative factors 
which Dio attributed to the decline of the Republic. Octavian exhorts the Senate to avoid 
innovation and preserve Rome’s established customs; to treat their private means as the 
common property of the state; to treat the allied communities and subject nations fairly and 
not use them against one another; and to ensure discipline and loyalty to the state among 
the army.
79
 In Chapters 5 and 6 we saw that Dio depicted a late res publica which pursued 
precisely the opposite course. In this context it is peculiar to read the historian’s speech of 
Octavian as ‘a final comprehensive opportunity to display the advantages of the 
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Republic’;80 such a reading ignores Dio’s hostile opinion of δημοκρατίαι, his negative 
presentation of most aspects of the Late Republic, and his enthusiasm for the system that 
followed.  Nevertheless, among these recommendations Dio’s Octavian also looks forward 
as well as back: 
 
Always entrust the magistracies both in peace and war to the best and most 
prudent men, neither feeling envy for them nor indulging in rivalry on 
account of making this man or that more prosperous, but instead on account 
of preserving and enriching the state.
81
 
τάς τε ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς εἰρηνικὰς καὶ τὰς πολεμικὰς τοῖς ἀεὶ ἀρίστοις τε καὶ 
ἐμφρονεστάτοις ἐπιτρέπετε, μήτε φθονοῦντές τισι,  μήθ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὸν δεῖνα ἢ 
τὸν δεῖνα πλεονεκτῆσαί τι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὴν πόλιν καὶ σώζεσθαι καὶ 
εὐπραγεῖν φιλοτιμούμενοι. 
 
Leaving aside the barely-concealed reference to the Senate’s split at the end of Book 40 
between Caesar and Pompeius (μήθ [φιλοτιμούμενοι] ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὸν δεῖνα ἢ τὸν δεῖνα 
πλεονεκτῆσαί),82 Dio constructs an ideal in this passage of a regime in which φθόνος is 
absent and φιλοτιμία is directed toward honourable objectives.  
 
In this regard, it is striking that throughout the narrative of Augustus’ reign, φθόνος only 
appears where the emperor’s ἀρετή, which I discussed in the first section, actively prevents 
it. This is a major departure from the political culture of Dio’s Late Republic. Thus in his 
list of Agrippa’s public euergetism, the historian states that Agrippa ‘not only incurred no 
φθόνος because of this, but was honoured greatly by Augustus and all the people; and the 
reason was that he collaborated with Augustus in the most humane projects 
(φιλανθρωπότατα)’.83 Later, when ill omens plagued the city and the people ‘believed that 
these things had happened for no other reason than that they did not have Augustus as 
consul’, the princeps in a show of his δημοκρατικὸς rule declined the dictatorship, ‘and 
rightly guarded against the ἐπίφθονον and μισητὸν of that title’.84 Augustus’ μεγαλοψυχία 
and φιλανθρωπία were further displayed when he allowed many of his subordinates to 
celebrate triumphs and to have public funerals for their achievements, which Dio writes he 
granted without envying their honour (ἀφθόνως). 85  Moreover, Augustus’ selection of 
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Tiberius as his successor was motivated by the need to find a man of distinction who, like 
Agrippa, could conduct the emperor’s business without envy (ἄνευ φθόνου).86  
 
Where φθόνος occurs in Augustus’ reign, Dio focusses only on how successfully the new 
regime counteracted it through a system of benevolent rule. It thus attained the desideratum 
I quoted above from Octavian’s address, eliminating φθόνος among the elite and rectifying 
a key historical problem of the Republic. By bringing φθόνος to the reader’s attention four 
times in the recusatio, Dio uses the oration to display the destructiveness of envy in the 
late res publica a final time, and to look forward to its abolition under the Augustan 
Principate. The placement of the address within the history at a transitional stage between 
the two constitutions as well as the ‘Republican’ character of the speaker underline that 
intention. Agrippa and Maecenas’ admonishments about the risk of φθόνος to any man 
invested with great power in the controversia of Book 52 are thus resolved by a system 
founded on civilitas and the four kingly virtues of παρρησία, ἐπιείκεια, μεγαλοψυχία, and 
φιλανθρωπία, which Dio outlined in Tiberius’ funeral laudatio of Augustus and fully 
exemplified in the narrative of his reign.
87
 
 
The dialogue of Livia and Augustus continues to persuade the reader of that argument. In 
its two mentions of φθόνος,88 the exchange underlines again the problem of envy, but in so 
doing persists with Dio’s argument that this problem ceased to be a significant factor of 
history because of positive constitutional change. Furthermore, it suggests that in contrast 
to Late Republican envy, which was directed toward δόξα, ἡγεμονία, ἰσχύς, and πλεονεξία, 
envy under the Augustan Principate could be motivated by desire to acquire another’s 
ἀρετή. This reinvention of φθόνος is articulated also in the funeral speech of Tiberius, to 
which I turn shortly. The reign of the first princeps is the only period in Dio’s text during 
which the object of envy is presented as ἀρετή. This attests to the central position this 
emotion took in the interpretative skeleton that the historian applied to the end of a factious 
Republic and the (comparatively) virtuous revolution of Augustus. Like παρρησία, even a 
flaw of the res publica such as φθόνος could be reinvented by benevolent rule in Dio’s 
view.  
 
Set in camera in the narrative of 4 CE, the dialogue is a lengthy advocacy of the political 
and moral virtues of mercy, placed mainly in the mouth of Livia with short interjections by 
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Augustus. Its immediate narrative context is the plot of Cn. Cornelius Cinna Magnus, for 
whom the emperor’s wife advises imperial clemency after a botched assassination attempt. 
As I have already demonstrated in Chapter 2, there is little reason to doubt that the 
historian had a copy of Seneca’s De Clementia before him. The conspiracy of Cinna 
Magnus is attested in only these two authors.
89
 Problematically, both attribute the plot to 
different actors and different dates. Seneca states that the conspirator was L. Cornelius 
Cinna and that the plot was reported to Augustus cum annum quadragensimum transisset 
during his campaign in Gaul.
90
 Assuming that annum quadragensimum indicates the 
emperor’s age, Adler writes that this suggests 13-16 BCE: Augustus’ only time 
campaigning in Gaul during his forties.
91
 Dio on the other hand dates the conspiracy to 4 
CE with Cn. Cornelius Cinna Magnus at its head.
92
 Most scholars agree that Dio had the 
correct conspirator, unlike Seneca,
93
  but the wrong date. Believing that in the aftermath of 
the plot Augustus awarded Cinna Magnus the consulship for the following year and 
knowing that he held it in 5 CE, Dio appears to have mistakenly located the conspiracy in 4 
CE.
94
 But I suggest that he may additionally have read annum quadragensium to indicate 
not Augustus’ age (sixty-seven in 4 CE) but the fortieth year of his career in public life. If 
so, then Dio may have deduced the date from his reading of Seneca and from his own 
knowledge of the consuls for 5 CE, but must have had a supplementary source to give him 
the correct name of Cn. Cornelius Cinna Magnus, rather than Seneca’s L. Cornelius Cinna. 
 
The two mentions of φθόνος in the dialogue function as a call-and-response which 
emphasises the historian’s argument that under Augustus’ regime it was far less significant 
a factor of history than under the res publica. In the narrative preface to the speech, Dio 
statestthat the princeps did not wish to execute Cinna Magnus in any case,
95
 and in the 
preliminary λαλιά between the two characters, his Augustus reiterates the problem of 
jealousy: 
 
I for one know, my wife, that nothing with the character of great power is 
free from envy and plotting (οὔτ᾽ ἄλλο τι τῶν μεγάλων ἔξω φθόνου καὶ 
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ἐπιβουλῆς καθέστηκεν), and monarchy least of all. For we would be equal to 
the gods if we did not have responsibilities and cares and anxieties above those 
of all other citizens. But the fact that grieves me most is that this is the way it 
has to be, and that it must be impossible to find any remedy for it (ἀδύνατον 
θεραπείαν τινὰ αὐτῶν εὑρεθῆναι).96 
 
The speaker’s complaint is only half borne out by the preceding narrative. We have seen 
already that numerous plots were formed against the first princeps, and Augustus’ concern 
for ἐπιβουλαί is justified in this context. But  as I have demonstrated, Dio clearly did not 
consider φθόνος an element present within the new regime – in contradistinction to the 
Late Republic – and indeed presented it as actively prevented by Augustan ἀρετή.  Again, 
the speaker’s claim that it is impossible to find any remedy to the inevitability of envy and 
plotting (ἀδύνατον θεραπείαν τινὰ αὐτῶν εὑρεθῆναι) is again only half-true and not the 
historian’s own opinion: for the past three books Dio has been to this point presenting the 
ways in which he did find a remedy for the Late Republican problem of φθόνος and 
created a more harmonious political culture. Nevertheless, like the speech of Agrippa, the 
λαλιά of Augustus does articulate Dio’s interpretation of the problems the incipient 
monarchy would have to overcome (and did). It furthermore serves to emphasise Dio’s 
positive view of the princeps’ ἐπιείκεια: in a later interjection Augustus complains that 
‘being compelled always to punish or avenge oneself upon people brings great distress, or 
at least to good men’.97 
 
Livia’s response explains more about the historian’s view of the Late Republic. As Adler 
has pointed out, Dio appears to have deliberately ‘undercut’ the credibility of her 
exhortation to clemency for Cinna Magnus.
98
 Immediately after the clemency-dialogue he 
inserted an element absent from Seneca’s version: an authorial epilogue, stating that ‘it was 
in fact Livia, who was most responsible of all for the salvation of Cornelius, who would 
herself go on to take the blame for the death of Augustus’.99 If, as Adler suggests, Dio used 
this conclusion to undermine the credibility of Livia as an advocate of ἐπιείκεια (despite 
his own personal approval of clemency and hatred of cruelty),
100
 then this would not be the 
first time the historian undercut the message of his Livia in the scenario. A revealing 
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passage on φθόνος has far more to say about Dio’s view of the late res publica than about 
the Augustan Principate:  
 
It is believed that we are killing many because of anger or because of our 
desire for their wealth, and many others because of fear of their bravery or 
actually envy of their virtue! (ἀρετῆς τινος φθόνῳ)! They say that those who 
observe and listen secretly to such rumours make up many lies, some of them 
because of enmity and others of anger, some because they have been paid by 
the enemies of their victims and others precisely because they have not 
been paid. These people not only report that so-and-so did something terrible 
or were about to do so, but even report that, when so-and-so said whatever, one 
man upon hearing it said nothing, but another laughed, or another cried (ὁ 
δὲ ἀκούσας ἐσιώπησεν, ἄλλος ἐγέλασεν, ἄλλος ἐδάκρυσεν).101 
 
As I outlined in the first section, Dio nowhere suggests that the Augustan regime presented 
any of these characteristics. The first line in particular, in which Livia suggests that the 
princeps is believed to be killing many people out of anger, lust for their wealth, or φθόνος 
of their virtue, is especially inconsistent with Dio’s illustration of the new political culture 
at Rome, which is characterised throughout by ἐπιείκεια, μεγαλοψυχία, παρρησία, and 
φιλανθρωπία. It is difficult to believe that this is a serious historical reflection upon the 
Augustan Principate; if it were it would be a very inept volte-face on the part of its author.  
 
Rather, Livia’s unfounded admonishment about rumours of Augustus’ envy for the 
possessions and virtues of others is highly reminiscent of the Sullan proscriptions. Most 
striking is the phrase at the end of the passage. The suggestion of informants reporting who 
smiled, laughed, was silent, or cried and then condemning them on that basis – completely 
unattested in the narrative of Augustus’ reign – had a precedent in the account of Sulla’s 
proscription lists. ‘To cry or to laugh proved fatal on the spot; and for this reason many 
were killed, not because they had said or done anything forbidden, but because they had 
frowned or smiled. So closely were their faces observed’.102 From the reader’s perspective 
this vivid thought is all the more memorable because it occurs only in Dio among our 
Imperial narratives of the Sullan proscriptions, and only in these two places in his text.
103
 
Moreover, Livia’s bizarre suggestion that the princeps was suspected of murdering 
πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμίᾳ χρημάτων overlaps with the historian’s interpretation of the motivations 
which underlay the proscriptions: ‘they murdered all they saw who surpassed them in any 
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way, some out of envy and others because of their money’.104 Finally, Livia’s reference to 
payment for information, very peculiar in the context of Augustus’ reign, again calls to 
mind the praemium awarded for the successful capture of the proscribed. Although not 
present in Dio’s account of 81 BCE, it occurs regularly elsewhere, not least among texts the 
historian probably read.
105
 
 
So the reflection of Dio’s Livia on murder, espionage, and self-interested motives seems to 
me far more suggestive of the political culture of the Late Republic than of the early 
Principate.  In this context the speaker’s mention of φθόνος ἀρετῆς τινος is a loaded one. 
For the first time in Dio’s surviving text, this hostile emotive aspect, which in the account 
of the first century BCE only occured as a spur to acquire δόξα, ἡγεμονία, ἰσχύς, and 
πλεονεξία, is reinvented. As the historian’s focus shifted from the causes and character of 
aristocratic discord to the presentation of Augustan ἀρετή, the object of φθόνος shifted too 
– somewhat optimistically. Virtue could be envied, too.  
 
This transformation of the political culture of Rome from the immoral government 
presented in the Late Republican books to the more virtuous regime of Augustus I 
delineated in section one is additionally reflected upon in the closing lines of the speech. In 
conclusion, Dio’s Livia states that, should the princeps follow her (unecessary) advice, 
‘people will think that you did all the unpleasant things you did back then because of 
necessity (πάντα ἀνάγκῃ πεποιηκέναι δόξεις); for it is not possible for one man to change 
so great a city from republic to monarchy without bloodshed’.106 This apology for the 
actions of Octavian the dynast – among which we may include his negative presentation as 
a Pompeian dissembler in the recusatio speech – is Dio’s own. In his necrology of the 
princeps, he writes that, if any citizens remembered his actions in the civil wars, ‘they 
attributed them to the necessity of the circumstances’ (ἐκεῖνα μὲν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἀνάγκῃ ἀνετίθεσαν), and they formed their real opinion on his noble character later, after 
his time as monarch (τὴν δὲ δὴ γνώμην αὐτοῦ ἐξ οὗ τὸ κράτος ἀναμφίλογον ἔσχεν 
ἐξετάζειν ἠξίουν): for great indeed was the difference between the two (πλεῖστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ 
διάφορον).107 I do not think the similarity between the closing remarks of Livia’s speech 
and Dio’s concluding remarks to Augustus’ reign is accidental.  
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In her speech, then, Dio’s Livia makes three retrospects on the late res publica. First, the 
loaded Republican problem of φθόνος and its (to us) very utopian reinvention under 
Augustus as envy for virtue rather than wealth or power. Second, the use of language 
redolent of Dio’s account of the Sullan proscriptions in her deliberately inaccurate 
assessment of the character of the new regime. This serves to illustrate, through the 
contrast of Livia’s speech with the narrative material, the ἀρετή of Augustus’ monarchy in 
contrast to the darkest moments of the Late Republic. And third, the historian’s own 
apology for Octavian’s actions during the civil war. His actions, Dio writes through his 
Livia and later in the necrology, were necessary (ἀνάγκῃ ἀνετίθεσαν) because of the 
δημοκρατία under which he lived. His true ἀρετή could only appear when he had put an 
end to that corrosive system. Augustus’ true character could be discovered afterward, when 
he had put an end to the corruption of the δημοκρατία.  
 
This investigation of how Dio used the Augustan orations to reflect upon and create 
contrasts with the φθόνος of the Late Republican speeches can close with the laudatio 
funebris of Tiberius. This speech mentions φθόνος five times;108 once more than the four in 
Octavian’s recusatio, and in a very different manner to that speech. As I have shown, the 
historian depicted Octavian voicing concerns about φθόνος as a Late Republican dynast 
and in language deliberately reminiscent of Pompeius. Here Dio elaborated, through his 
speaker, the inevitability of envy and resentment within the Republican constitution; but 
the later narrative of Augustus’ reign demonstrates that the historian believed that the new 
regime broke that cycle. Tiberius’ reflections on φθόνος unfold accordingly. In the first 
instance, the speaker’s two reflections on φθόνος in the proemium echo those of Dio’s 
Livia, in which the object of envy was recast for the first time in the history as desire for 
ἀρετή. His Tiberius begins: 
 
For I am not worried that you will accuse me of weakness for being unable to 
attain your desires, nor that you will be jealous toward him, whose virtues 
surpassed your own (ἢ αὐτοὶ τῷ ὑπερβάλλοντι ὑμᾶς τῆς ἀρετῆς αὐτοῦ 
φθονήσητε). For who does not know that even if all men came together, they 
could not sing praises worthy of him, and that you will all willingly grant him 
these triumphs, not envying the fact that none of you could equal him, but 
even taking pleasure in his lofty excellence? (οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑμῶν ἐξισωθείη οἱ 
φθονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπερέχοντι αὐτοῦ ἀγαλλόμενοι;)109 
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The language is hyperbolic, and Augustus’ reign was no utopia even to Dio. But the focus 
of φθόνος clearly shifts in the speeches following the Settlement of 27 BCE from δόξα, 
ἡγεμονία, ἰσχύς, and πλεονεξία to virtue. As Manuwald and Rich have already pointed out, 
there are a number of inconsistencies in the speech of Tiberius which are discordant with 
the actual narrative of the princeps’ regime. Tiberius is made to speak as if Augustus has 
already been deified and he already ratified as his successor, and he claims that Octavian’s 
resignation was sincere – a statement that the reader knows perfectly to be false after its 
elaborate treatment in the recusatio.
110
 But it is clear that, despite these inconsistencies, 
Dio uses his Livia and Tiberius to create an idealised picture of the reinvention of φθόνος 
by the Augustan regime and its correction of spiteful envy under the Late Republic. This 
functions in the broader narrative context, which I laid out in the first section, in which 
φθόνος is consistently prevented or avoided by Augustus’ policies. The historical problem 
of envy, which as I have shown in Chapters 5 and 6 was central to the historian’s 
understanding of aristocratic disunity in the Late Republic, is a distinctive element which 
Dio brings to the fore as a destructive problem in his Late Republican speeches and 
presents as resolved under the new regime. 
 
The historian made the later three reflections of his Tiberius on envy consistent with this. 
In these Dio uses his speaker to further persuade the reader of his own opinion that the 
Augustan regime interrupted the cycle of ambition and envy which had been characteristic 
of the late res publica. Thus Tiberius’ summary of the benefits of his reign can only be 
read as a reflection of the historian’s own view of the innateness of φθόνος to the Republic 
and its resolution under Augustus: ‘for who would not choose to be safe without trouble 
(ἀπραγμόνως σώζεσθαι), to prosper without danger, and to enjoy the blessings of the 
constitution without envy (τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τῶν τῆς πολιτείας ἀφθόνως ἀπολαύειν)?’111 
Dio’s own enthusiastic account of the earliest decades of the Principate admits of no doubt 
that the speaker’s assessment is his own. Later, in a list of Augustus’ benefactions and 
public building works, Tiberius states that he permitted others to erect buildings in their 
own name, ‘always looking to the public good, but never envying anyone for the individual 
fame that they obtained from these works’ (τὸ τῷ κοινῷ χρήσιμον διὰ πάντων ἰδών, ἀλλ᾽ 
οὐ τῆς ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς εὐκλείας ἰδίᾳ τισι φθονήσας).112 The reader has already seen the truth of 
this from Dio’s interpretation of the harmonious relationship between the princeps and 
Agrippa, who incurred φθόνος neither from Augustus himself nor anyone else for his 
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building projects.
113
 Finally, this thought is also repeated later in the laudatio, where the 
speaker lauds the first emperor’s unenvious (ἀφθόνως) encouragement of his subordinates’ 
reputations.
114
 
 
Thus, Cassius Dio appears to have judged the failures of the res publica and the success of 
the new government in substantially moral terms. I do not think that it is insignificant that 
the problem of φθόνος disappears entirely from the historian’s account of the Augustan 
regime; nor that, where it is mentioned in the speeches of Livia and Tiberius, the focus is 
rather on what was not envied. Where the speakers do suggest jealousy, this is only in 
connection with ἀρετή. In his most detailed reflection on the reign of Augustus in the 
laudatio funebris, Dio mentions φθόνος more than in any other speech in his text and in 
every instance suggests that in his interpretation it was no longer a factor of history in 
political life. This is a striking departure from the place of envy in Dio’s speeches of the 
Late Republic, in which it is universally connected to factional discord and political 
violence. In this regard, the historian brought an element to the decline of the Roman 
Republic and the success of the Augustan Principate which was distinctively his own, but 
which can only be ascertained by reading the historian’s speeches.   
Reflections on the Late Republic: Δυναστεία 
Dio’s retrospects on the late res publica in these speeches were not purely moral. The 
historian additionally used them to make some explicit closing statements on aspects of 
Late Republican political life which in Chapters 5 and 6 we saw emerge from the problem 
of excessive personal power (δυναστεία): factional discord, corrupt foreign policy, and 
civil war. Reflections of this kind do not occur in the speeches of the later Principate: they 
are particular only to those of the Augustan age. This demonstrates further that Dio used 
the orations of this period as an opportunity to elucidate a final time his interpretation of 
Late Republican political culture within a transitional phase of the history. These 
reflections juxtapose Dio’s narrative of the ideal monarchy of Augustus, in which the 
speeches are embedded, with the negative retrospects on the Late Republic contained 
within the orations. By briefly turning to the speeches of Octavian and Tiberius, I will 
demonstrate that the historian not only deployed these to recapitulate the problems which 
grew out of Late Republican δυναστεία, but additionally contrasted these with the virtues 
of  ἐπιείκεια, μεγαλοψυχία, παρρησία, and φιλανθρωπία with which the historian 
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characterised the new regime. These orations serve to confirm the interpretative framework 
Dio applied to the collapse of the Republic and to strengthen his argument for the 
imperative for monarchy and the success of constitutional change.  
 
Among the Augustan speeches, Tiberius’ laudatio is Dio’s most detailed exposition of the 
problems of Republican δυναστεία and the role of Augustan ἀρετή in rectifying those.115 It 
is to this I turn first. One reading of the speech suggests that by this point in the Augustan 
account, the Principate was ‘so firmly established that the historian avoided further 
discussion of the old Republic and the new form of government’.116 I do not think that this 
is the case. As I have already pointed out, as a piece of encomium Tiberius’ speech is 
transparently hyperbolic and indeed contains some details inconsistent with the narrative. It 
should be treated with caution, and as Rich writes it must primarily be read as a reflection 
of Dio’s view of what the speaker would say about Augustus under the circumstances.117 
But the oration is littered with reflections on the res publica and the new government 
which are transparently the historian’s own.118 A revealing but lengthy passage presents an 
idealised reflection of Augustan ἐπιείκεια which reiterates several of the historian’s own 
narrative opinions: on the civil war, on the transformation of Octavian from dynast into 
noble princeps, and on key Late Republican figures. I abridge it here: 
 
And so this Augustus...the moment he had driven away civil wars by doing and 
undergoing things which he did not himself desire but which the heavens 
decided (πράξας καὶ παθὼν οὐχ ὅσα αὐτὸς ἤθελεν ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα τῷ δαιμονίῳ 
ἔδοξεν), first of all spared the majority of those opponents who had survived 
the battles, thereby not at all imitating Sulla, who was called Felix (ἐν 
μηδενὶ τὸν Σύλλαν μιμησάμενος τὸν εὐτυχῆ ὀνομαζόμενον). And although he 
honoured his allies with many great gifts, he did not permit them to do anything 
arrogant or outrageous. You know perfectly well the various people this applies 
to, such as Maecenas and Agrippa (καὶ τὸν Μαικἠναν καὶ τὸν 
Ἀγρίππαν)…For Augustus had these two qualities, which have never been 
present in one man alone. There have of course, I know, been some who spared 
their enemies…but consider this example, that Sulla and Marius detested 
even the children of their enemies (τεκμήριον δέ, Σύλλας μὲν καὶ Μάριος καὶ 
τοὺς παῖδας τῶν ἀντιπολεμησάντων σφίσιν ἤχθηραν). Need I mention the other 
examples? Generally Pompeius and Caesar refrained from this. However, they 
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allowed their friends to do several things which were against their own morals. 
But this man combined both of these qualities…and demonstrated to his 
allies that it is virtue that is ‘felix’ (τοῖς συναγωνισαμένοις εὐτυχῆ τὴν ἀρετὴν 
ἀποδεῖξαι).119 
 
Here Dio uses this statement of Tiberius to voice several of his own views of the history of 
the Late Republic and the salutary effects of Augustan ἀρετή. As I have shown in my 
discussion of the speech of Livia, the apology for the actions of Octavian during the civil 
wars articulated in the passage above is very much the historian’s own. The suggestion that 
Octavian acted as all other Late Republican dynasts out of necessity rather than desire, 
only to be transformed into the model ruler after he had broken free from the φθόνος and 
φιλοτιμία which Dio viewed as germane to δημοκρατίαι,120 is made three times in the 
history. Significantly, this occurs twice in a speech in the mouths of Livia and Tiberius, but 
only once in the narrative, in Dio’s necrology of the princeps.121 Dio chose to bring this 
interpretation – and one which reflects badly on the Republic and well on Augustus – most 
to the fore not in his narrative, but his speeches. 
 
The loaded exemplum of Sullan cruelty within this passage also makes an important 
historical statement about the role of ἀρετή, in the historian’s view, in Augustus’ historical 
success and his resolution of the ills of the res publica. In the opening and closing lines of 
this excerpt, Dio’s Tiberius states that, although Sulla was called Felix (τὸν εὐτυχῆ 
ὀνομαζόμενον), it was Augustus who demonstrated that felicitas could not exist without 
ἀρετή. This is the historian’s own view. In the fragmentary narrative of the Sullan civil 
war, he states that until the battle of the Colline Gate, Sulla ‘was believed to be foremost in 
piety and kindness (φιλανθρωπίᾳ τε καὶ εὐσεβείᾳ), to such extent that ‘all thought he had 
Fortune as his ally (τὴν τύχην σύμμαχον)’. However, as he drew closer to power, his 
character changed, and indeed so dramatically ‘that he could no longer be called Fortunate’ 
(οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἤνεγκεν εὐτυχήσας).122 As Eckert has recently shown, Dio is not 
new among imperial authors in challenging Sulla’s felicitas; Valerius Maximus and Seneca 
make a similar suggestion, and we can be quite sure Dio read some works of the latter.
123
 
But the historian seems to be making his own historical argument about the relationship 
between ἀρετή and successful sole power. As I demonstrated in the first section, Dio 
presented Augustus’ monarchy as a regime characterised by ἀρετή. One of these Augustan 
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virtues, φιλανθρωπία, had belonged to Sulla – but he left it behind, Dio states, as he grew 
closer to power. So within the constitutional framework of the Late Republic, Sulla’s 
personal power (δυναστεία) led him to abandon virtue (especially φιλανθρωπία) and 
pursue instead a course that vitiated his right, in the historian’s view, to the title Felix. The 
result was the proscriptions, memories of which Dio echoes in the clemency speech of 
Livia. Augustus, on the other hand, survived and ‘reorganised the state for the best’ 
precisely because of his  ἀρετή.124 In this way, the historian provides through Sulla and 
Augustus contrasting exempla, Republican and monarchic, failed and successful, of the 
exercise of individual power.  
 
Dio’s elaboration on the aspects of Augustan ἀρετή in Tiberius’ funeral speech (ἐπιείκεια, 
μεγαλοψυχία, παρρησία, φιλανθρωπία) also functions in close conversation and contrast 
with his history of Late Republican δυναστεία. Shortly after this excerpt, Dio’s Tiberius 
launches into an encomium of Augustus’ attitude toward the Senate, of which in the first 
section I showed that the historian broadly approved.
125
 The speaker states that the 
princeps ‘did not dissolve the Senate’s right of voting on decrees, but even ensured that 
their freedom of speech (παρρησία) was protected…and in the elections he inculcated in 
the people a love of honour rather than a love of factious competition (τὸ φιλότιμον ἀντὶ 
τοῦ φιλονείκου)’.126 This, in fact, is only half true. There is no doubt that Dio approved of 
Augustus’ attitude to and protection of παρρησία, which as I have demonstrated he viewed 
as a enabling factor in the virtues of the new regime and especially conducive to ἐπιείκεια. 
Under Augustus παρρησία is permitted to function as a positive force in public life, in 
contrast to the Late Republican frankness of Cicero and Calenus.
127
 But Dio consciously 
brings to the fore those occasions on which the consular elections descended into violence 
and discord, in language highly reminiscent of the res publica.
128
 In this context, it is 
difficult not to read Tiberius’ unrealistically positive reflection on the elections under 
Augustus as a deliberate retrospect on an aspect of Late Republican political life that Dio 
was happy to see the back of. Certainly he benefitted from a system in which the emperor, 
not the people, selected magistrates.
129
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Tiberius’ assessment of Augustus’ φιλανθρωπία additionally left the historian room for 
some further reflections on the Late Republic. The speaker’s view that ‘he brought the 
remaining element of factional discord (τὸ μὲν στασιωτικὸν) into harmony through his 
kindness (φιλανθρωπίᾳ) and moderated the soldiery (τὸ δὲ στρατιωτικὸν) through his 
generosity (εὐεργεσίᾳ)’ is all Dio:130 the antithetical paronomasia τὸ μὲν στασιωτικὸν…τὸ 
δὲ στρατιωτικὸν was probably irresistible for such a highly rhetorically-trained 
historian.
131
  
 
But it is clear from Dio’s comments on Augustus’ and Agrippa’s public works that the 
historian did view the φιλανθρωπία of their joint ventures as a corrective to the Republican 
problem of φθόνος,132 and Dio states explicitly that by following Livia’s exhortation to 
φιλανθρωπία, Augustus prevented further plots beyond that of Cinna Magnus,133 thereby 
preventing yet another power-struggle for control of Rome. Other reflections on the res 
publica placed into the mouth of Tiberius – that a δημοκρατία could never encompass 
interests so vast as Rome’s and that  monarchy was entirely necessary from that 
perspective,
134
 and that the assassination of Caesar removed a well-ordered government 
and thereby threw the state into confusion
135
 - must be taken as Dio’s own.  
 
Dio similarly resurrects key moments in the history of Late Republican δυναστεία in the 
recusatio of Octavian, on which some closing words will suffice. Unlike Tiberius, whose 
exempla are predominantly of Late Republican military figures (Caesar, Pompeius, Sulla), 
Dio’s Octavian sets out a loaded echo of the major military campaigns of the previous 
century, several of which, I showed in Chapter 6, the historian treated with marked 
disfavour:  
 
For what might one compare to this deed of mine? [my resignation] The 
conquest of Gaul or the enslavement (δούλωσιν) of Pannonia, the subjugation 
of Moesia, or the overthrow of Egypt? Or Pharnaces, Juba, Phraates, the 
campaign against the Britons, or the crossing of the Rhine?...nevertheless, 
none of these is worthy to even come close to this present deed of mine, even 
without mentioning the civil wars, the largest and most diverse of all to have 
ever occurred, which I settled humanely (φιλανθρώπως), overcoming all 
enemies who resisted but sparing as friends all who surrendered 
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(ἀντιστάντος ὡς καὶ πολεμίου παντὸς κρατήσαντες) …for who could appear 
more magnanimous (μεγαλοψυχότερός) than I, to say nothing of my dead 
father – and who more nearly divine?136 
 
Of course the historian does not intend his Octavian to appear positively in this instance. 
Augustan mercy (ἐπιείκεια), magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία), and humanity (φιλανθρωπία) do 
not, and cannot, be convincingly expressed in the recusatio because the speaker is still 
characterised as a Late Republican dynast. These aspects of the speaker’s ἀρετή can only 
truly emerge later, after his transformation into Augustus. In this context the recapitulation 
of the military history of the Late Republic serves as a negative reflection on  routes to 
δυναστεία within that system. Dio has selected – I think deliberately – exempla which in 
his narrative depicted Late Republican imperialism at its worst: the crossing of the Rhine, 
the British campaign, and Rome’s intervention in Egypt were, as I discussed in Chapter 6, 
depicted by the historian purely as an exercise in the acquisition of δόξα and satisfaction of 
πλεονεξία.  
Factor 6: Conclusion 
So Cassius Dio seems to me to have continued to discuss and reflect upon the problems of 
the Late Republic throughout his speeches of the Augustan age. The assessments of and 
occasionally veiled references to the problems of δυναστεία and φθόνος Dio places into the 
mouths of his orators are the historian’s own attempt to bring these issues, characteristic of 
his account of the late res publica, to the attention of the reader a final time, and to 
juxtapose these with an Augustan narrative characterised by a combination of kingly 
virtues of the historian’s own devising. This juxtaposition of unfavourable retrospect in the 
speeches with favourable assessment of Augustus in the narrative served the purpose, on 
the one hand, of persuading the reader of the imperative for monarchy and the ills of 
δημοκρατία. But it additionally served as a last opportunity to remind the reader of 
everything that the historian’s idealisation of the Augustan regime was not, and of the 
negative practices which Rome had left behind. They would not re-emerge again in Dio’s 
history – until that of his own time.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
It will be worthwhile at this point to give some concluding recapitulation and overall 
conspectus of the nature and purpose of Dio’s speeches of the Late Republic and Augustan 
Era as a whole. I additionally point to some potentially fruitful future directions for 
research. A lengthy recapitulation of each chapter and each section here may not be 
attractive. I have set out more detailed conclusions to each of my six investigative chapters 
following the discussion concerned. However, some broader and more general principles 
can be underlined here, and I think securely.  
 
First of all, Cassius Dio did develop an overarching causal framework according to which 
he interpreted the collapse of the Roman Republic and the comparative success of the 
Augustan Principate. I do not think we can continue to accept the intepretation of Millar’s 
highly influential 1964 Study of Cassius Dio, which I quoted in the Introduction, that Dio 
had no general historical views which he applied to his history, nor had the wherewithal to 
write this in a coherent or connected manner.
1
 I have argued in the body of this thesis that 
the causal skeleton mapped by Dio onto the process of constitutional change can be 
reduced to six historical factors: the unviability of the dictatorship as an exercise of 
supreme executive power owing to its conflation with tyranny and its legal restrictions, 
precipitating and justifying aristocratic acceptance of monarchy as such as its replacement; 
the corrosive organisation of military power within the empire, which generated the 
autocratic ambitions of all major dynasts from Marius to Caesar; the pervasion of envy 
within political life and the role of this as a catalyst to factional competition; the problem 
of rhetoric, in which all Republican attempts to further the public interest fail, and in 
inverse proportion all deceptive attempts to further dynastic interest succeed; the deliberate 
misdirection of imperial policy-making by ambitious commanders through dishonest 
misrepresentation of their megalomaniac military activities, enabling such activities to 
continue; and the moral revolution of Augustus’ reign, in which a positive, but surely 
idealised, culture of virtue directly prevents violent competition from resurfacing and 
reinvents παρρησία and φθόνος as positive forces in political life. Dio’s elaboration of 
these factors through his orations is of course not uniform – not every issue is discussed in 
every speech – but it is consistent.  
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Secondly, Dio fully embedded his speeches of the Late Republic and Augustan Era within 
that causal framework. I arrived, in the first instance, at my division of Dio’s view of the 
problems which vitiated the res publica into six historical factors simply by reading the 
formal orations. This thesis began with the task of engaging with Dio’s speeches as its 
intial, nebulous object; and from that basis I have been able to map the historian’s causal 
framework of constitutional change. There were certainly questions of self-presentation, as 
I have discussed in Chapter 3: Cassius Dio was an intellectual, and compositional art – 
particularly when it engaged with classicism -  of course enhanced his own παιδεία. It is 
moreover a possible and attractive theory, but still speculative, that the historian delivered 
certain of his speeches himself to friends at court or circulated them among other 
pepaideumenoi. But it does not follow, from the fact that the orations asserted Dio’s 
literary art, that these were not embedded within a broader historical interpretation and 
served an explanatory purpose for the reader within that interpretation. Too often, overt 
belletrism in an ancient historian’s work generates also modern suspicion about the 
historian’s purposes or credibility. In contrast, I have suggested here – first in Chapter 3 
and then through illustration in the case-studies – that Dio’s compositional skill and 
knowledge of Attic ought not to distract us from the important question of the 
communicative role that the orations play within the historical interpretation.  
 
Thirdly, these compositions are the principal vehicle of that interpretation within the 
Roman History. It has certainly been necessary to account for the historian’s programmatic 
statements, his own assessment of the motives which precipitated particular courses of 
action on the part of his characters, and, very importantly, his syncrisis of δημοκρατία and 
μοναρχία at the opening of Book 44. But any overarching narrative conspectus of the 
historical factors which in Cassius Dio’s view precipitated the collapse of the Roman 
Republic and the success of the new regime is conspicuous only by its absence. Rather, I 
have suggested that these factors can clearly be identified within the speeches. In 
particular, these compositions seem to me to exert a cumulative effect by virtue of their 
embeddedness within the narrative, and so drive forward Dio’s exposition of the historical 
problems which rendered the res publica increasingly untenable. In Chapter 5, for 
example, I have argued through the speeches of Catulus, Cicero, and finally Agrippa that 
the dictatura grew increasingly unviable in the historian’s view, but for different reasons in 
different periods. In the context of 67 BCE it was unattractive because of the recent 
memory of Sullan crudelitas and the connotations of his dictatorship with tyranny; and 
because of its inutility for addressing the menace of Mediterranean piracy and imperial 
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affairs more broadly. In the context of 44 BCE, it was furthermore despised because of its 
association with the forceful usurpation of power, all the more potent after not one, but two 
dictators had seized power through military means within living memory. Agrippa acts as a 
coda to this, arguing in 27 BCE against Augustus’ monarchy on the basis that it must 
inevitably degenerate into a tyranny; but in so doing he merely serves as Dio’s own 
reiteration and summary of the trend for dictators in the Late Republic to themselves 
become tyrants. Augustus, I have argued in Chapter 7, broke that trend in the historian’s 
view. It seems to me striking that the historian at no point lays out this cumulative 
interpretation, which climaxes with the Agrippa-Maecenas debate, in explicit terms for the 
reader within the narrative. For that, as his other five factors, we must turn to the speeches.  
 
Finally, there is the role played by the actual presentation and characterisation of public 
speech under the Late Republic, for which these compositions are understandably 
indispensible. Dio explored the problem of rhetoric in the Late Republic more fully than 
any other historian of that period, and perhaps more fully than any other extant historian in 
general. There seems to me little doubt that Dio conceived of the nature of public debate 
within the δημοκρατία as a genuinely corrosive internal factor which precipitated the 
downfall of precisely the form of constitution in which it was most required. It is worth 
repeating here that Demosthenes’ statement - ‘there is no greater wrong a man can do you 
than to lie; for as our political system is based upon speeches, how can it be safely 
administered if the speeches are false?’ – is emblematic of Dio’s res publica as a whole.2 
Models of genuinely deliberative oratory, epitomised above all in Catulus, fail. In parallel, 
excessive παρρησία, represented in Cicero and Calenus as I discussed in Chapters 4 and 7, 
illustrate Late Republican oratory at its most futile and degenerate; while the pervasion of 
artificial and self-interested, but persuasive, models of oratory represented in numerous 
dynasts in each instance misdirects the public interest. It leads, ultimately, to greater 
personal power, greater imperial glories, renewed φθόνος, and renewed stasis. Even 
disregarding the embeddedness of these compositions within Dio’s narrative and their 
coherency with his causal framework, the speeches are compelling even only as 
representations of the role played by oratory in the failure of the δημοκρατία it was 
supposed to maintain.   
 
Dio’s use of his speeches as a medium of historical explanation, and quite consistently, 
seems innovative. This brings me on to some concluding remarks about the implications of 
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this thesis in possibilities for future research. In particular, it will be apparent to Roman 
historians that, despite Dio’s innovations in rhetoric, much of the inspiration for his six 
causal factors of constitutional change understandably emerges from the tradition of 
Roman historiography. I have not attempted here to argue that Cassius Dio performed or 
attempted to perform a radical re-evaluation of the collapse of the res publica on the 
macro-level. He certainly brings the problem of rhetoric and the political ramifications of 
this more fully to the fore than any other surviving account; and in this regard his response 
to and concerns about the sophistic rhetorical culture of his time lend his explanation of the 
decline of the Republic a distinctive flavour. But the fundamental kernels of his thought 
can be traced back to Sallust, Livy, Tacitus, and Suetonius. His illustration of the 
proliferation of φθόνος, for example, clearly belongs within a Sallustian-Livian tradition of 
Republican moral decline; although the way in which he uses speeches to present this as 
the catalyst for a chain of events, such as Pompeius’ political impotence in 60 BCE and his 
entry into the Triumvirate as discussed in Chapter 5, certainly seems distinctive. Again, 
Dio’s problematisation of the organisation of power within the empire clearly seems to me 
to build upon Suetonius’ interpretation of Caesar’s imperii conseutudo. Here Dio maintains 
the kernel of the original argument, but uses his orations to build on it. He suggests that it 
had been a problem long before Caesar, and posits in Agrippa and Maecenas the solutions 
which, in his view, Augustus’ reforms to the provincial adminstration made directly to 
counter that problem. Equally, the historian’s view of φύσις and the destructive 
relationship between this and imperialism in the first century BCE seems to derive from or 
coincidentally approximate to Tacitus. A new study of Dio’s debt to the Latin 
historiographical (and biographical) traditions would be exceptionally valuable. 
Thucydides remains recognised as the dominant historiographical influence upon Cassius 
Dio’s language and thought. In fact, certain of his views – such as his potentially veiled 
attack on defensive imperialism, as I laid out in the third section of Chapter 6 
(‘Degenerative Debate’) – do not show an emulation of Thucydides at all.  
 
In this connection, it would be worthwhile to re-evaluate the extent to which historians 
made use of contemporary rhetorical material in writing their own speeches, especially 
when depicting either an historically-attested occasion of oratory or an act of speech which 
is parallel or similar to an attested one. I have argued in Chapter 2 that Dio was particularly 
indebted to Cicero in this regard: not only for aspects of the argumentation of his speeches, 
as has been briefly recognised elsewhere, but for elements of the rhetorical style and for 
the actual order in which the argumentation progresses. Speculatively, it may one day be 
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possible to determine a margin of error, either with Dio or with other authors, regarding the 
degree to which one can imagine that an occasion of oratory, represented by an historian 
through a speech, approximates with the historical reality. Certainly Appian, in his speech 
of Tiberius Gracchus on his agrarian law,
3
 has his Gracchus state in support of the lex that 
great unemployment, a decreasing Italian population, and an increasing slave population 
made agrarian reform quite necessary.
4
 It is precisely these arguments for the lex 
Sempronia agraria which, Plutarch states, Gaius Gracchus recorded in a pamphlet about 
his older brother’s law. Plutarch seems to suggest that Gaius’ tract is still extant in his own 
time;
5
 and as his writing preceded that of Appian by only a few decades, it is possible that 
Appian gathered these arguments from the biographer or from the tract itself. Such 
speculations can no doubt be repeated elsewhere with firmer evidence.  
 
More broadly, the influence of rhetorical education upon the way in which Greek 
historians wrote, particularly by the time of formalised progymnasmata, is worthy of 
further study. In Chapter 4 of this thesis I have argued that the progymnasmata inculcated 
in Dio a moralising conception of history itself, which taught the author, through sententia 
and fabula, to approach the task of composition as the task of moral illustration. The 
student was given an ethical thought which it was incumbent upon him to valorise, either 
proving it by example in his own fable or, later, reelaborating it into other narratives and 
discourses. Such a consistently didactic curriculum, which began with the sententia under 
the age of ten and continued throughout the student’s adolescence with the re-elaboration 
of these morals into suasoriae and declamations, must inevitably have conflated the moral 
and the compositional. In Dio’s case – I have suggested in Chapter 4 – the moral in fact 
served as a means of persuasion. By locating his interpretation of the causes of military and 
political crises, such as Pompeius’ defeat at Pharsalus or the exile of Cicero, within a 
received code of moral values which his audience could be presumed to accept, Dio laid 
out historical causes which would not have been fanciful to the contemporary perspective. 
The moral dimension, so often critiqued in Dio’s speeches of the Late Republic, seems to 
me to have served as a form of evidence or proof, for the contemporary reader, of the 
validity of his interpretation. As with his speeches of the Late Republic and Augustan Era, 
so too with the ethical statements contained within them did the historian have the vices 
and failures of individual dynasts and the Republican state at large to present to his reader. 
He may not necessarily have been wrong. 
                                                          
3
 App. BC. 1.7-11 for the oration and the surrounding context.  
4
 In two indirect speeches at App. BC. 1.9.1 and 1.11.1. 
5
 Plu. TG. 8.7. 
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